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Why do states display such remarkable variation in their military effectiveness? This
question is different from asking why states win or lose wars, because military effectiveness
is not synonymous with victory. States can fight very well on the battlefield but still lose:
consider the Germans in both world wars. Or they can fight very poorly but still win:
consider the Soviets in the Winter War against Finland in 1939-40.
These discrepancies exist because war outcomes hinge on all sorts of factors besides
battlefield performance. The political goals for which a war is fought, the terrain, third-party
involvement, the balance of material capabilities-all can influence ultimate victory and
defeat. Military effectiveness bears on these outcomes but remains distinct. It pertains to the
fighting power that each side is able to generate from the resources that it possesses, separate
from the question of whether that fighting power is enough to bring ultimate triumph.
In thinking about the challenges of U.S. foreign policy, the distinction between
victory and effectiveness is especially striking. Given its overwhelming material power, the
United States is almost sure to eke out some type of conventional "victory" from whatever
military operations it chooses to launch in the contemporary international environment. But
the price it pays for doing so is likely to vary dramatically depending on the military
effectiveness of opponents. Historically, some of the poor, weak states that America has
encountered have fought much better than anticipated, such as Serbia in 1999. Others, such
as Iraq in 2003, have collapsed much more rapidly than expected, despite their large armies.
These sorts of startling differences in effectiveness can also be found in the militaries of U.S.
coalition partners and allies, even though many are rich or have received large infusions of
U.S. aid and weapons.
In considering these realities, it seems evident that states vary widely in their military
effectiveness and that this variation drives differences in the costs, length, and settlement of
wars. In particular, states seem to display puzzling differences in their ability to generate
operational- and tactical-level fighting power from their resources, a type of power that I
refer to in this study as battlefield effectiveness. Battlefield effectiveness requires states to
perform three key tasks: to generate cohesive military units, to train those units in the
performance of basic tactics, and to endow them with the initiative and coordination needed
to conduct the complex operations crucial to effectiveness in modern battle.
Beyond the dilemmas of current U.S. foreign policy, even a cursory examination of
the last century of warfare suggests that there is significant variation in states' abilities to
perform these tasks and therefore to impose costs upon their adversaries in war. Three
particular types of such variation stand out. The first is cross-national variation, that is,
instances in which some national armies seem to consistently perform better than others-
for example, the outnumbered Israeli army consistently performing better on the battlefield
than its Arab opponents in the series of conflicts between 1948 and 1973. The second type
of variation is over-time within the same country-for instance, the Chinese army's excellent
performances against the United States in 1950 and India in 1962, followed by a rather poor
showing its smaller, weaker neighbor Vietnam in 1979. The third type of variation is across
different units within the same military even in the same war-for instance, the 1991 Gulf
War, in which some Iraqi units surrendered immediately upon contact with coalition forces,
while others stood and fought. What can account for these differences?
In trying to answer this question, the study of military effectiveness has generally
focused on large structural factors such as wealth, demography, culture, and regime type. But
this approach is problematic, because these variables actually behave more like constants,
changing very little if at all in individual states over time. As a result, they are poorly suited to
explaining much of the variation just described. For example, none of these variables could
explain the over-time shifts just mentioned in Chinese performance, or the cross-unit
differences in Iraqi performance in 1991, because large structural factors did not change over
time or vary across different military units in these individual states.
Large structural variables are important, of course, and certainly condition the overall
military power one would expect a state to be able to generate. They do constitute a plausible
explanation for at least some cross-national variation in battlefield effectiveness. To continue
the Arab-Israeli contrast mentioned above, for example, it is probably significant that Israel
was a democratic, increasingly wealthy, highly unified society facing fractious, authoritarian,
and economically underdeveloped Arab opponents.
Nevertheless, the mechanisms that undergird the causal power of these sorts of
sweeping structural forces remain poorly understood. While there may be good reasons to
think that wealth, democracy, western culture, or societal unity somehow enhance military
performance, it is not entirely clear what it is about these factors that actually matters. One
might just as easily suspect that authoritarian regimes should have military advantages
instead, with the examples of Nazi and Wilhelmine Germany, the Soviet Union, and North
Vietnam immediately springing to mind, among others. What, then, can help account for the
full range of variation in states' battlefield effectiveness?
The Argument
This study proposes an explanation for variation in military effectiveness focused on
the forms of intervention that political leaders adopt toward their military organizations.
There is a long-standing intuition that states' civil-military relations do shape their
performance in war. Perhaps no book on this subject has been more influential than Samuel
Huntington's The Soldier and the State.' Huntington argued that the complete separation of the
military from politics was the linchpin of both civilian control and military effectiveness.
Insulating the military from politics, he contended, was the only way to foster a professional
military ethos that would ensure both deference to civilian authority and fighting prowess on
the battlefield.
Huntington's thesis has not gone unchallenged, with a great many scholars
demonstrating that, in fact, excessive military autonomy can hinder military effectiveness,
especially at the strategic level. While put differently in different contexts, the general
argument is that close civilian involvement in military affairs is necessary for optimal
performance in war. Still, a large literature has continued to expound the essentially
Huntingtonian proposition that civilian intervention, often derided as "politicization,"
reduces military effectiveness in various ways.
This study contends that the debate between these views-rooted fundamentally in
the distinction between Huntington's favored "objective" control of the military and the
"subjective," politicized control he rejected-is a false one. Beginning from the premise that
the complete insulation of the military from politics is empirically rare, this study focuses
instead on differingfons of political intervention into the military and the ways in which
these forms influence performance on the battlefield.
I Samuel H untington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: H arvard University Press, 1957).
Here, the term "political intervention" refers simply to intervention by political
leaders into military affairs; the word "political" specifies the actor who intervenes, not the
purpose of the intervention. The study uses this term rather than the more common "civilian
intervention" because in many instances the political actors of interest are not civilians.
Although military dictators may wield civil authority, for example, it seems hard to describe
their interventions as "civilian."
Furthermore, the term "civilian intervention" naturally leads to a focus on the trade-
off between civilian control and military autonomy, and the impact that differing equilibria
have on military performance. Yet empirically there seems to be no determinate relationship
between military autonomy and military performance. To be sure, some highly autonomous
militaries do follow the pathway to effectiveness outlined by Huntington: namely, they
professionalize when left alone and gravitate on their own toward practices that enhance
military effectiveness. Many analysts would put the pre-1914 German army and the U.S.
army in this category, for example, and it is not a coincidence that these were two of the
fighting organizations that Huntington studied in developing his theory. Certainly, other
modern militaries, such as the Pakistani army, lend continued credence to the notion that
high levels of autonomy from civilian control can inculcate professionalism and relatively
good fighting effectiveness.
Nevertheless, other highly autonomous militaries seem to go the opposite direction:
consider the Argentine military under the junta, for example, surely a case where civilian
meddling was not the obstacle to effectiveness. At the other extreme, some militaries
subjected to highly intrusive civilian control perform poorly, such as Saddam Hussein's Iraq
in 1991 or 2003. But intrusive civilian control has also correlated with very effective fighting
forces under other circumstances: consider the Nazis under Adolf Hitler or the Israelis
under David Ben-Gurion, both instances in which leaders exerted intense personal control
over their officer corps. Indeed, the German military went from extreme autonomy in World
War I to extreme civilian intervention in World War 11 but is generally acknowledged to have
fought very well at the tactical and operational levels under both circumstances. Meanwhile,
armies subject to communist control in China and the Soviet Union had or have had
consistently low military autonomy for decades but have varied significantly in their
battlefield effectiveness in different wars.
In short, Huntington's "objective control" may have led to effectiveness in the sorts
of cases he examined, but it does not seem to produce this outcome in all cases. Just as
important, there seem to be many varieties of "subjective control," not all of which are
detrimental to effectiveness, and some of which may actually improve it. What seems to
matter in these cases, then, is not the level or amount of political intervention in the military,
because such intervention or "politicization" is so persistently present that it cannot possibly
explain all the observed variation in military performance. Indeed, even in military
dictatorships, the leading generals quickly become political actors who face the same
dilemmas encountered by their civilian predecessors. Rather, what may matter are theforWs
of political intervention that leaders choose to employ. By examining these forms closely,
this study seeks to discern when political intervention will decimate or enhance military
performance.
In some sense, all forms of intervention are attempts at political control-the
attempt to ensure that military is used for politically acceptable ends. The key question is the
nature of those ends. Virtually all forms of political intervention generate militaries that are
"effective" at doing something, even if that activity has little to do with external
conventional combat. Depending on their perceptions-correct or not-of the nature and
severity of internal and external threats, political leaders can intervene to make militaries
good at state-building, at coup prevention, at suppression of domestic dissidents, at
counterinsurgency, or at a host of other tasks.
But they can also intervene in ways that expressly improve conventional military
performance. These forms of political intervention constitute a series of what I call "best
practices," which I contrast with another approach to political intervention that I call "worst
practices." These two extremes are ideal types, with several varieties of "mixed practices"
being possible between them. It is important to add, though, that none of these practices
involve ceding civilian or political control to the military. The key question is not whether
political leaders intervene, but how.
Taking leaders' threat perceptions as exogenous-and, as will be shown, highly
contingent-the study focuses squarely on forms of political intervention in four key areas
of military activity that are tightly tied to success on the modern battlefield: promotions,
training, command arrangements, and information management. In brief, political leaders
who employ best practices intervene to ensure that military promotions are based on
competence and battlefield performance; they actively encourage rigorous, frequent, and
realistic military training at both the small- and large-unit levels; they ensure that command
authority is decentralized to those in the field rather than concentrated at higher echelons;
and they strongly encourage vertical and horizontal information sharing, as well as frequent
political-military communication. In combination, these policies ensure the generation of
cohesive military units capable of basic tactics as well as the ability to conduct more complex
modern military operations, such as combined arms maneuver.
By contrast, political leaders under worst practices intervene in the same areas of
military activity, but with very different policies. They ensure that military promotion is
based entirely on political loyalty, and they actively select against battlefield prowess in
making decisions about whom to hire and fire in the officer corps; they restrict training; they
both centralize and fracture command structures, concentrating in their own hands decision-
making authority while also circumscribing the range of whatever authority commanders are
given. Lastly, political leaders who adopt worst practices also heavily restrict both vertical
and horizontal communication within the military and engage in little substantive political-
military communication. Together these policies decimate battlefield effectiveness, leading to
militaries that are unable to forge together cohesive units, much less endow them with
tactical skill or the ability to conduct complex operations.
Between these two extremes lie a range of mixed practices that will be discussed in
more detail in the pages that follow. Other things being equal, however, the closer a state
moves toward best practices, the better its military performance in conventional interstate
war will be. Absent these practices, it is virtually impossible for a state to develop a cohesive,
tactically proficient army capable of displaying the coordination and initiative necessary for
complex modern military operations-even if that state has significant material advantages
such as economic power or a large population. Indeed, the closer a state moves toward
worst practices, the more its military performance can be expected to deteriorate. By
contrast, states that adopt best practices are likely to "punch above their weight," generating
maximum fighting power from the resources they possess, however meager.
The Evidence
The study tests these arguments through two controlled, paired comparisons of
states at war: North and South Vietnam (1961-1975), and Iran and Iraq (1980-1988). The
methodology relies on case studies because they enable the most precise measurement of
both the independent and dependent variables. In particular, case studies allow close tracking
of the causal processes at the core of the argument. For both pairs of cases, I utilize
extensive primary source documents, often ones not examined in existing work on these
wars.
Case studies also help avoid a critical inferential problem that plagues many
quantitative measures of military effectiveness: namely, that battle deaths or casualties alone
tell us little about military performance. Low casualties can be a sign of highly skilled
militaries (think of the United States in the 1991 Gulf War), but they can also result from
militaries that surrender, retreat, or simply collapse when attacked (think of South Korea in
1950). Similarly, high casualties can be a sign of poorly led militaries repeating the same
failed tactics again and again (think of the Western Front in World War I), or they can be a
sign of well trained militaries willing to fight to the death (think of the Wehrmacht in the
winter of 1944-45). By analyzing casualty data in context, and in conjunction with close
examination of whether a given military has proved able to perform those three key tasks
listed above, case studies enable a much more accurate assessment of battlefield
effectiveness.
The study relies on the particular cases of North versus South Vietnam and Iran
versus Iraq because they offer the strongest possible controls for alternative explanations
and therefore the cleanest test of the argument. The universe of cases and the case selection
procedure are discussed in more detail in the pages that follow, but the general objective was
to identify "fair" fights-that is, instances in which dyads were evenly matched along the
major dimensions said to matter for military effectiveness. These possible independent
variables include wealth; population; regime type; external threat, or the "stakes" involved in
losing the war; culture and society; and civil-military relations as generally conceived in the
existing literature, that is, as a political environment characterized by either high or low
military autonomy. Another way to put this is that the study sought to avoiding examining
cases whose value of the dependent variable, battlefield effectiveness, was over-determined.
The Vietnam and Iran-Iraq cases are useful in this respect, because the two pairs of
states were each closely matched along these dimensions. Most notably, all four states were
non-democratic, and all experienced high levels of political intervention into their militaries
as they fought large-scale ground wars. But there was substantial variation in each state's
battlefield effectiveness over the course of these wars, both cross-nationally and, in the
South Vietnamese, Iranian, and Iraqi cases, sub-nationally. According to existing theories of
effectiveness, there should have been very little variation of any type across or within these
four states.
Instead, the evidence from the cases shows that differences in the nature of political
intervention account for both the cross-national and sub-national variation in battlefield
effectiveness. In the Vietnam cases, South Vietnamese leaders generally adopted worst
practices in political intervention, which accounts for their poor performance against the
North Vietnamese, despite the fact that the two countries had almost identical levels of
economic development, the same size populations, similar colonial legacies, and very high
stakes in the war. If anything, in fact, the stakes in the war were higher for South Vietnam,
and it should have performed especially well given the massive infusion of American aid it
received. But the empirical evidence reveals that the ways in which South Vietnamese leaders
intervened in their military consistently foiled battlefield effectiveness. Meanwhile, the forms
of North Vietnamese intervention, though no less extensive or "political," had the opposite
effect and maximized fighting power.
Interestingly, however, where South Vietnamese political leaders varied their forms
of intervention-notably, with respect to the 1" Division, which was consistently subjected
to mixed or best practices rather than worst practices--battlefield effectiveness was much
better. Indeed, an analysis of the major battles of the war shows that the 1 " Division's
military performance proved to be virtually indistinguishable from that of North Vietnamese
units. This convergence suggests just how differently the war could have turned out, and
how much sooner it could have ended, had South Vietnamese leaders adopted best practices
with respect to their entire military rather than a single division. It is open to question, of
course, why South Vietnamese leaders did not believe that this alternative was open to them,
and this question is discussed in more detail in the empirical chapters. Still, the excellent
performance of the South Vietnamese 1" Division suggests some of the limits of traditional
explanations of the war's outcome, including communist ideology, the benefits and
disadvantages of fighting on one's own territory, and the role of outside powers. Even with
these other factors in play, South Vietnamese forces could fight surprisingly well when
political leaders adopted best practices.
In the Iran-Iraq cases, political leaders in both states initially adopted worst practices
with respect to political intervention in the military. The result was that for most of the war
neither side was able to capitalize on the advantages that it possessed-in Iran's case,
superior economic wealth and a three-fold population edge, and in Iraq's case, far stronger
allies and a far greater quantity and quality of weapons. Most of the first six years of the war
were a bloody military stalemate.
That said, in the early years of the war Iran's regular forces do seem to have
benefited from the slightly better practices in political intervention that the Shah had
employed, not all of which Iran's revolutionary leaders had yet been able to dismantle. In
particular, Iranian units drawn from the pre-revolutionary regular army, which had received
American training during the 1970s, displayed noticeably better tactical proficiency in the
initial battles than the revolutionary masses roused by Shia clerics to become martyrs.
Unfortunately for Iran, however, its leaders never successfully integrated pre-
revolutionary and revolutionary armed forces, and in fact mistakenly credited the
revolutionary forces rather than the legacy regular units with their country's early battlefield
successes. As a result, Iran's leaders only deepened their imposition of worst practices as the
war went on, decimating whatever legacy lingered from the Shah's era. They instead relied
on soldiers who were ideologically motivated to be cohesive but who lacked any ability to
convert that cohesion into tactical proficiency or complex operations.
With two belligerents both under the full grip of worst practices, the war devolved
into deadlock from roughly 1982-1986. Finally, however, in 1986-several long years after
the disastrous effects of worst practices had been evident, even to him-Saddam Hussein
endeavored to shift the nature of his political intervention into the Iraqi armed forces.
Specifically, he adopted something very close to best practices with respect to his Republican
Guard units, even as he kept worst practices with respect to other units. The result of this
shift was a relatively rapid improvement in the battlefield effectiveness of the Republican
Guard.
Indeed, once subject to different forms of political intervention, these Iraqi units'
effectiveness improved so significantly that they were able to beat their larger, wealthier,
more populous neighbor in a succession of quick battles that ended the war in 1988. These
victories occurred despite the fact that the Iraqi military experienced no great increase in its
autonomy, and the fact that it obviously retained its Arab culture, a trait sometimes maligned
in the effectiveness literature as hindering military performance.
Put simply, both Iran and Iraq performed poorly when their militaries were
uniformly subject to worst practices: in the Iranian case, after about 1982, and in the Iraqi
case, before about 1986. By contrast, in the period before these practices were fully imposed
on the regular military in Iran and in the period after these practices were lifted on the
Republican Guard units in Iraq, military performance by those forces was noticeably better
compared both to the opponent's military and to other units drawn from the same state. The
contrast was subtle in the Iranian case and dramatic in the Iraqi case. But these
distinctions-similar to those seen in the Vietnam comparisons-suggest again the power of
the political intervention variable in explaining battlefield effectiveness. Indeed, the cases
show this variable to matter across a very diverse set of national institutions, ranging from
one-party communist rule (North Vietnam) to military dictatorship (South Vietnam), and
from revolutionary theocracy (Iran) to Ba'thist personalism (Iraq).
The Implications
The cases examined in this study show that non-democratic states exhibit significant
variation in their patterns of political intervention and their battlefield effectiveness, not only
cross-nationally, but also sub-nationally. This latter variation in particular suggests the
importance of looking beyond structural factors to explain and predict military performance.
Indeed, the findings illuminate an important, more agile mechanism-forms of political
intervention in the armed forces-that may actually be doing much of the casual work often
attributed to regime type. The empirical evidence shows that when autocratic regimes adopt
best practices in political intervention, they can perform with surprisingly high levels of
effectiveness, certainly comparable to that often attributed to democratic regimes.
Although such instances may indeed be outliers, they constitute a particularly
important set of cases. First, from a theoretical perspective, understanding instances of
autocratic effectiveness sheds light on what it is about democracies that may enable them to
generally perform better. For a variety of reasons, democracies may be more likely to adopt
best practices in political intervention, but where they fail to do so, or where autocracies
choose to embrace best practices, the performances of the two regime types may be nearly
indistinguishable. Although existing studies would not deny that autocracies sometimes
perform well in war, this study provides the first systematic explanation for when, why, and
how this should occur. Furthermore, the similarity in Iraqi, Iranian, and South Vietnamese
military performance under worst practices, as well as the improvements in Iraqi and South
Vietnamese performance under best practices, should cast strong doubt on the role of any
particular type of culture in determining battlefield effectiveness.
The study also helps differentiate between the concepts of autocracy and civil-
military pathology, which are so conflated that one sometimes seems to serve
interchangeably as a proxy for the other. By intentionally excluding democracies from the
empirical analysis, the research strategy employed here shows that regime type and civil-
military relations are two related but very distinct variables that can move independentlv of
each other. So while the cases here do not dispute the finding that democracies may have
better overall battlefield effectiveness, they should make us very skeptical about the causal
logic normally used to support this claim. At a minimum, the North Vietnamese and Iraqi
cases suggest that the lack of a liberal political culture does not present any inherent bar to
military performance.
The findings are important from a practical perspective, too. If the democratic peace
theory is correct, then virtually all future conflicts will involve at least one non-democratic
regime. It is therefore vital to understand how these states are likely to perform in war. The
study here suggests that a close examination of political intervention in these states' armed
forces-and the threat perceptions that drive such interventions, a topic examined in more
detail in the pages that follow-will shed powerful light on the likely fighting capabilities of
potential adversaries. It will also be critical to an accurate assessment of the battlefield
prowess of potential allies and coalition partners, many of whom may be non-democratic.
Ultimately, states that adopt best practices may not always win their wars, just as
states adopting worst practices may not always lose their wars. As mentioned, many factors
account for war outcomes. But the actual fighting effectiveness of the belligerents surely
matters as well, and understanding the nature of political intervention in the militaries of the
two sides goes a long way toward explaining not only war outcomes, but also why wars end
when they do, with what costs, and with what settlements.
States that adopt best practices can be expected to fight harder, resist longer, and
impose significantly higher costs on their adversaries than might otherwise be expected
based on an assessment of their material resources. Conversely, states that adopt worst
practices can be expected to collapse more quickly than traditional net assessments based on
order of battle data might predict. As a result, understanding the varying forms of political
intervention in the military and how these interventions shape effectiveness is crucial to both
the academic study of war duration, cost, and termination, and also to the practical
policymaking task of assessing fighting power.
The Plan of the Study
The study that follows appears in six parts. Chapter 1 elaborates on the sketch just
given, detailing the puzzle of military performance and discussing how to define and
measure battlefield effectiveness. It also presents the argument in more depth, contrasts it
more tightly with the existing research, and fully explains the methodology.
The next four chapters then execute this methodology. Chapter 2 compares the
values of the independent variable, political intervention in the armed forces, in North and
South Vietnam during from the 1950s through 1975. It finds that the North Vietnamese
generally adopted best practices, while the South Vietnamese adopted worst practices, with
the important exception of the I" Division.
Chapter 3 then compares the battlefield performance of the two states from 1962-
1975 by examining a series of major ground battles in the war in which the United States
played little or no role. The battlefield evidence generally bears out the predictions of the
theory, with North Vietnamese forces proving to be much more effective than the South
Vietnamese, with the exception of the 1" Division. These chapters draw for their evidence
on a variety of documentary sources, including U.S. military and civilian archives, translated
North Vietnamese histories and records, captured documents, contemporary news accounts,
biographies, memoirs, and secondary material.
Chapters 4 and 5 repeat this general approach with respect to the Iran and Iraq cases.
Chapter 4 compares political intervention in the armed forces of the two states, showing that
both generally adopted worst practices. The two exceptions were the legacy Iranian regular
army units from the time of the Shah, which had been subject to slightly better training
practices, and the Iraqi Republican Guard units late in the war, which were subject to
dramatically better practices starting around 1986.
Chapter 5 then compares the battlefield performance of the two states from 1980-
1988 by examining the war's major ground battles in which third party involvement was
minimal. Again, the battlefield evidence generally bears out the predictions of the theory.
Iran enjoyed some early victories through reliance on its regular forces, but as Iranian leaders
accelerated their imposition of worst practices and sidelined regular units in favor of
revolutionary forces, the war devolved into a stalemate. This deadlock lifted on after the
rather dramatic shift in Iraq effectiveness during 1987-8. These chapters again draw for their
evidence on documentary sources, including recently released and translated records and
audio tapes captured from the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. They also examine a
variety of declassified U.S. documents on the war, as well as secondary material.
The conclusion summarizes main findings, draws out the implications, and points
the way toward future research.
CHAPTER 1
Political Intervention in the Military and Its Impact on Battlefield Effectiveness
Why do states generate different levels of battlefield effectiveness from similar
economic, demographic, and technological endowments? Which sorts of states are likely to
generate cohesive military units, to train them adequately in basic tactics, and to endow them
with the ability to conduct the complex operations crucial to effectiveness in modern battle?
Which sorts of states are likely to fail in these tasks, despite evidence that they have the
material resources needed to perform them? In other words, what are the key factors that
determine which states do-and don't-manage to turn their national assets into
operational- and tactical-level fighting power?
This study proposes and tests an answer to these questions focused on the forms of
political intervention that leaders adopt toward their militaries. Here, the term "political
intervention" refers simply to intervention by political leaders into military affairs; the word
"political" specifies the actor who intervenes, not the purpose of the intervention. The study
uses this term rather than the more common "civilian intervention," because in many
instances the political actors of interest are not civilians.' Although military dictators may
wield civil authority, for example, it seems more appropriate to describe them as "political"
rather than "civilian" actors, even while remaining agnostic about the ends that motivate
their intervention.
Debate about the relationship between civil-military relations and military
performance is long-standing, but it has focused almost entirely on the causes and
consequences of varying levels of civilian or political intervention in the military. It is certainly
true that some militaries are so highly autonomous that the question of such intervention is
moot, and it is worthwhile to understand why some militaries are autonomous while others
are not, and the implications for effectiveness. This study, however, focuses on the large
class of militaries in which political intervention is common, and asks and answers a
different question: whatformls can political intervention in the military take, and what impact
do these varying forms have on the battlefield?
There are in fact many different ways for civilians or other political leaders to
intervene in their military organizations, and such intervention seems more common than
not. Even in military dictatorships, which in some sense represent the epitome of military
autonomy, the desire among the reigning general to intervene or "politicize" military matters
is almost always very high. What varies is the form that these and other attempts at political
intervention take, which in turn depends on leaders' motivations in adopting them. Some
forms of intervention, adopted when leaders judge internal threats to be less pressing, are
likely to maximize a state's ability to turn its resources into fighting power on the battlefield.
Other forms may provide excellent protection against serious internal threats, but they will
reduce or even decimate the military's ability to fight effectively against external threats
posed by other states.
By elucidating and examining these configurations of intervention more closely, this
study helps crack the puzzle of why there is so much variation in the battlefield power that
states seem able to generate. The study focuses in particular on political intervention with
respect to four key sets of military activities: promotion patterns, training regimens,
command arrangements, and information management. Although there are other areas in
I For a study that uses the term "civilian intervention," see Barry R. Posen, The Nources of Military Doctrine: France,
Britain, and Germany between the IWorld lWars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984).
which political intervention surely occurs and is important-mobilization policies, for
instance, or doctrinal formation-the study focuses on these core activities because, as we
will see, they are very tightly linked to the requirements of tactical and operational military
effectiveness on the modern battlefield.
By examining different forms of political intervention in these four areas of military
activity, the study illuminates an important mechanism actually driving many observed
differences in military performance-variation often attributed almost entirely to structural
factors, such as economic development, regime type, culture and society, and civil-military
relations writ large. It helps us better understand which aspects of domestic politics matter
most for states' external conflict behavior. It makes sense of instances of military
performance that are puzzling for the dominant theoretical explanations of military
effectiveness, particularly instances of variation in the same military over time or across
different units. And it produces a useful tool for those policymakers seeking to estimate the
likely battlefield prowess of future adversaries, or seeking to build or assess the military
capabilities of allies.
It is important to note that this study does not seek to generate an explanation of
war outcomes-of why, at the end of the day, particular states win or lose wars. The study is
concerned, rather, with the conduct of wars: why particular militaries subject to certain
forms of political intervention seem able to resist longer, fight harder, and display more
sophistication than their adversaries might predict, and why other militaries also subject to
intervention seem to collapse on the battlefield even when they appear to possess the
material capabilities needed to carry on. As we will see, these differences are behind much of
the great variation seen in the length of wars, their human and economic costs, and their
final settlements-aspects of warfare not captured in studies that focus solely on outcomes.
After all, fighting power is not synonymous with victory. Consider that in both world
wars the Germans were considered the best fighting force, but they lost both conflicts-or
that the Israelis are widely considered to have militarily smashed the Syrians in 1982 but their
venture into Lebanon is still labeled a defeat, as was a similar expedition in 2006. War
outcomes depend greatly on the political goals for which wars are fought, and as Clausewitz
noted, the same military activities can lead to victory or defeat, depending on the context.2
Still, other things being equal, we would expect that states that fight better are more
likely to win their wars. Battlefield triumph is, if not a sufficient condition for victory, almost
always a necessary one.3 Even the best strategy brought forth by the best regime cannot
succeed if it cannot be practically implemented. It is worth remembering, for example, that
in World War I the British had a superior overall plan for besting the Germans by early
1915: hold the line on the Continent while fully mobilizing the British and American
economies, cajole America into joining the war, buy time for the Allies' superior economic
to wear down the Germans. If any state could coast to victory on the excellence of its
strategic advantages alone, it would have been Britain. Yet, as Paul Kennedy has noted,
"None of these factors would be enough if battles could not be won."4 Even with the right
strategy in place, the war boiled down to solving "a small but vital number of tactical
- Carl von Clausewitz, On WIar, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1976), p. 87.
3 There are certainly exceptions, such as France in World War 11, a state defeated on the battlefield in 1940 but
later rescued by coalition partners on the winning side.
4 Paul Kennedy, "Military Effectiveness in the First 'orld War," in Ailitary Ectieess, Vol. 1: the First I World
War, Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murrays, eds. (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1988), p. 345.
problems," particularly how to counter U-boat attacks and break through the German trench
system. Strategy mattered, but only when the British actually fought better could they prevail
in the war.
For these reasons, this study focuses squarely on the determinants of "fighting
better"-or worse. This chapter proceeds in four main parts. First, it describes in more detail
what is meant by the phrase "fighting better," presenting a definition of battlefield
effectiveness focused on specific tasks that effective militaries must perform and explaining
where this definition of the dependent variable concurs with and diverges from other
definitions. Second, the chapter discusses the existing explanations for battlefield
effectiveness, noting their contributions but drawing our attention to the empirical puzzles
that they leave unresolved.
The third section of the chapter presents the theory, arguing that differing forms of
political intervention cause variation in battlefield effectiveness. In contrast to much of the
existing literature, my explanation focuses not on the degree of intervention-high or low-
but on the content of that intervention where it occurs. To be sure, political intervention in
the military is not universal, and among highly autonomous militaries, the factors explaining
effectiveness could not, by definition, depend on variations in political intervention. Still, the
theory here hypothesizes that political intervention is very common and that, where present,
different forms of intervention exert systematic influence on standardized and observable
aspects of military performance. The theory thus enables us to draw a clear causal chain
from a variety of political-military patterns to what happens on the battlefield. But, to be
clear, the theory does argue that political intervention is always necessary for battlefield
effectiveness, only that such intervention is very common and that its differing forms matter
greatly for effectiveness where intervention occurs.
Fourth, the chapter discusses the study's methodology, explaining why I rely on a
largely qualitative approach to measuring battlefield effectiveness. This section also discusses
how to measure the independent variables of interest and the case selection procedure. It
focuses in particular on the methodological value of the four case studies that comprise the
bulk of the empirical research: North and South Vietnam in their war from 1961 to 1975 and
of Iran and Iraq from 1980 to 1988. The section concludes with an overview of the method
of structured, focused comparison that guides the case studies; the primary documents used
in each; the approach used to address disconfirming evidence and alternative explanations;
and a preliminary overview of the empirical findings and their theoretical implications.
I. The Dependent Variable: Battlefield Effectiveness
Running through most studies of military effectiveness is a basic distinction between
political-strategic effectiveness, and operational-tactical effectiveness. Military activity at the
political-strategic level is primarily about the selection of overall goals for which wars and
campaigns are fought, whereas operational-tactical military activity takes those goals as
givens and seeks to achieve them through the execution of actual campaigns and the
application of combat techniques in battle.5 Battlefleld efctiveness, the term I use in this study,
refers to a state's success at this latter level of military activity.
As mentioned, this sort of success is not synonymous with victory. As Martin van
Creveld has noted, "Victory is by no means the sole criterion of military excellence. A small
Allan R. Millet and Williamson Murray, "The Effectiveness of Military Organizations," in All//itary F/f'ctiveness,
I 'o/. 1: the Firt I World War (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1988), pp. 6-7, 12, and 19.
army may be overwhelmed by a larger one. Confronted with impossible political and
economic odds, a qualitatively superior force may go down to defeat through no fault of its
own. Not the outcome alone, but intrinsic qualities as well must figure in an attempt to
measure military (or any other) excellence."6 Millet and Murray agree: "Victory is an outcome
of battle; it is not what a military organization does in battle. Victory is not a characteristic of
an organization but rather a result of organizational activity. Judgments of effectiveness
should thus retain some sense of proportional cost and organizational process."7
Effectiveness, in other words, is largely about a military organization's own ability to
perform key tasks efficiently, rather than about the ultimate outcome of those actions.
Outcomes depend heavily on what transpires in the opponent's military organization, the
political and strategic objectives of each side, the terrain on which the war is fought, the
balance of economic and military power, and many other external factors that will be
discussed in more detail later in this chapter. Certainly, such factors are always in play and
must be acknowledged in any thorough analysis, but it is more useful to think of them as
constraints or opportunities facing one side or the other rather than as actually constituting
one side's effectiveness or not. The processes that go on inside wars, rather than simply the
final outcome, provide the most precise reading of the "intrinsic qualities" of interest to Van
Creveld or the "organizational activity" of interest to Millet and Murray.
Fortunately, there is some consensus about what qualities and activities actually
matter most-the tasks in which a military must engage in order to be effective on the
modern battlefield. Indeed, Ken Pollack and Stephen Biddle, among many others, have
studied effectiveness essentially as a question of whether militaries can execute certain crucial
activities or not.8 A military's ability to conduct these activities might be more or less
surprising given its political and strategic goals, or its material and human endowments,
which gets to the efficiency aspect of effectiveness. But the actual activities that constitute
operational- and tactical-level effectiveness are relatively clear, and it is hard to analyze
battlefield performance without reference to them.
To be effective on the battlefield militaries have to be able to 1) generate military
units that maintain cohesion underfire; 2) train those units to perform basic tactics; and 3) endow
those units with the ability to conduct what I call comvplex operations. Together these three
tasks comprise an escalating series of standards by which to judge battlefield effectiveness,
with the best militaries able to do all three, the mediocre ones able to do just tasks 1 and
perhaps 2, and the worst militaries struggling to do even task 1. Put another way, most of the
variation in battlefield effectiveness is really about how well states acquire and integrate
several increasingly challenging competencies in the performance of key tasks. But what is
actually involved in these three sets of tasks?
6 Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.). Arg Pearmlanace, 1939-1945 (Westport, CT: Greenwood
Press, 1982), p. 3.
p. 3.
8 Ken Pollack, Arabs at Var (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002); Pollack, "The Influence of Arab
Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness," Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts
of Technology, 1996; and Stephen Biddle, Ailitag Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).
Risa Brooks also adopts this approach in her discussion of the "skill" component of military effectiveness in
"Introduction: the Impact of Culture, Societ, Institutions, and International Forces on Military Effectiveness,"
in Elizabeth Stanley and Risa Brooks, eds., Creating ilitary Power: The oirces o/Ali/itaq Ectirtieness (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2007), p. 12.
Unit cohesion underfire refers to the military's ability to remain intact in actual
battlefield conditions) This aspect of the dependent variable is largely agnostic on the
higher-order question of whether the units are highly trained, or whether the training they
have received is well matched to the challenges posed by the adversary, topics about which
more will be said below. The question is simply, do units stand and fight once they
encounter the enemy, or do they collapse, desert, or engage in disorderly retreats? How
difficult do conditions have to become, in terms of the enemy's attacks or the privations of
the battlefield environment, before the bonds of the unit snap?
Basic tactics refers to whether coherent military units demonstrate proficiency in
simple skills such as weapons handling and the use of terrain for cover and concealment.
These are the sort of minimal capabilities required to conduct static defenses, ambushes,
orderly retreats, or pre-planned attritional offensives-operations that certainly depend on a
basic degree of training and unit cohesion but do not necessarily require significant initiative
or improvisation during battle, or extensive coordination with other combat arms or larger
units. This part of the dependent variable simply asks, if units remain coherent under fire, do
they demonstrate basic military proficiency as they resist or attack the adversary?
Complex operations refers to whether coherent, tactically proficient units can engage in
operations that require both significant low-level initiative and high-level coordination
among different parts of the military. The specific content of complex operations will vary
depending on the era under consideration (no one would dock Napoleon's armies for failing
to conduct a blitzkrieg); the medium of warfare (air, land, or sea), the type of war (irregular
or conventional); and the military's tactical orientation (offensive or defensive). But within a
particular era, medium, type of warfare, and battlefield context, it is possible to point to
some types of operations as more complex-and therefore a greater test of a military's
operational sophistication-than others.
Within the realm of modern, conventional, interstate land warfare, combined arms
action is a hallmark of complex operations. For example, armies that demonstrate the ability
to combine different types of forces, such as infantry and armor, armor and artillery, or
ground forces and air forces, would be conducting complex operations. On the defense,
these operations could take the form of a mobile defense-in-depth, a fighting withdrawal, or
the execution of counteroffensives. On the offensive, these operations would include
combined-arms attacks, particularly maneuver operations.
What all of these operations have in common is the requirement that armies
integrate the activities of multiple different parts of their military organization. Furthermore,
even though this integration occurs in support of an overall high-level plan, it depends upon
considerable initiative and battlefield responsiveness on the part of commanders and
' Key works on cohesion include Omer Bartov, The Eastern front, 194145: Gernian Troops and the Barbarisation of
l ari/re (Hampshire: Macmillan, 1985); Jasen Castillo, "The Will to Fight: Explaining an Army's Staying
Power," Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, June 2003; Darryl
H enderson, Cohesion, t/)e Huan IE leient in Combat: Leadershi> and Societal In/luence in the Armnies of/the Soviet Union,
the United States, North 1 'ietnani, andIsrae/(Washington, DC: NDU, 1985); Larry Ingraham and Frederick
Manning, "Cohesion: Who Needs It, What Is It, and How Do \We Get It to Them?" Mlilitary Revien', vol. 61
(1981), pp. 3-12; Fdward Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World
War II," Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 12, no. 2 (summer 1948), pp. 280-315; and Christopher C. Straub, The
Unit Fi/: Keeping the Promise o/Cohesioi (W\ashington, DC: NDU Press, 1985). More controversial is S.L.A.
Marshall, Men Ag'1eainst Fire: the Problem olBatt/e Commiand in Future lWar (New York: William Morrow & Company,
1987), the shortcomings of which are treated in David Hackworth and Julie Sherman, About Face (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1989). See also RogerJ. Spiller, "S.L.A. Marshall and the Ratio of Fire," RUSIfjonmal
(winter 1988), pp. 63-71.
soldiers. Units of any size, from the platoon to the corps, can conduct complex operations,
although the coordination challenges grow considerably as armies attempt to integrate the
activities of larger and larger groups of soldiers. One can debate these distinctions, of course,
but it seems clear that within particular classes of warfare we can compare how well
militaries perform such operations, how well a single military performs them across time, or
how well different units within the same military perform them. The basis for coding the
dependent variable is listed in the table below.
CODING THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
BATTLEFIELD EFFECTIVENESS
Unit cohesion
Do units stand and fight when they encounter the enemy?
What are the rates of surrender? Desertion from the battlefield?
Do soldiers follow orders under fire?
Does the severity of enemy attacks or the privations of the battlefield environment affect the
answers to the above?
Tactical proficiency
Do units demonstrate the ability to handle their weapons properly?
Are units familiar with their equipment?
Are soldiers able to use terrain for cover and concealment?
Can the unit execute an ambush? A static defense? Orderly retreats? A pre-planned
attritional offensive?
Complex operations
Can the unit conduct combined arms operations? Inter-service operations? Division-size or
larger operations?
Among defensive operations, is the unit able to conduct a defense-in-depth? Fighting
withdrawals? Counter-attacks?
Among offensive operations, is it able to conduct maneuver operations? Small unit special
forces operations?
To what extent does the unit demonstrate a capacity for both low-level initiative and high-
level coordination?
It is important to note that these aspects of battlefield effectiveness can interact with
one another in various ways, as will be discussed more below. But using this basic rubric, we
can distinguish theoretically among four values of the dependent variable: 1) excellent
militaries or military units, which are coherent, tactically proficient, and able to engage in
complex operations; 2) adequate militaries or military units, which are coherent and
demonstrate basic tactical proficiency, but lack the ability to engage in anything more
sophisticated; 3) mediocre militaries or military units, which remain coherent and resist the
enemy but without competently employing even very basic tactics; and 4) poor militaries or
military units, which do not even remain coherent in battle, quickly collapsing or retreating
upon encountering the enemy.
[SEE NEXT PAGE]
Coding the Values of the Depe dent Variable, Battlefield Effectiveness
1. EXCELLENT 2. ADEQUATE 3. MEDIOCRE 4. POOR
Unit cohesion? Yes Yes Yes No
Basic tactics? Yes Yes No No
Complex operations? Yes No No No
Because the components of the dependent variable are additive and synergistic, the
best militaries or military units are those in the first category. But the distinctions between 1
and 2, 2 and 3, and 3 and 4 still seem relevant in explaining the length, costs, and outcomes
of wars. Certainly, a military whose units can consistently perform all three sets of tasks will
be able to sustain much greater resistance on the battlefield than one whose units can
perform only a couple or only one or none at all. Performance of all three tasks is no
guarantee of ultimate victory, but it does markedly change the costs that a state can impose
on its opponent, other things being equal.
Of course, other things rarely are equal. There is always another aspect of battlefield
effectiveness, which is the appropriateness of operations, complex or not, to the actual
challenges posed by the adversary. For example, by the standards just listed, one could argue
that the U.S. Army was basically "effective" in the Vietnam War: its units were usually
cohesive (though not always, due to the short in-theater rotations and fragging incidents as
the war went on); its soldiers showed up in theater proficient in basic military skills such as
weapons handling; and many units also routinely performed combined arms and maneuver
operations requiring a great deal of low-level initiative and high-level coordination. The
problem was that the content of these operations did little to undermine an adversary that
mostly avoided conventional fights, especially prior to 1968.1
Nevertheless, there is a clear distinction between the sorts of problems the U.S.
Army experienced in Vietnam and those of, say, the Argentine army in the Falklands War.
Argentina's poorly trained, short-term conscripts easily crumbled under the pressure of
British engagement, repeatedly demonstrated a lack of basic military skills, and never came
close to any sort operational sophistication (the air force being the one exception to this
pattern)." One Argentine later described himself as "a civilian in the middle of war, dressed
like a soldier."12 Whatever one can say about the U.S. Army's problems in southeast Asia, no
one could describe it as a force of "civilians dressed like soldiers," especially not its officer
and NCO corps, and especially not during the initial years of the war. The Army had clear
deficits, but they stemmed primarily from a mismatch between its doctrine and the nature of
the enemy, not from units that simply collapsed when asked to perform that doctrine or
lacked training to perform it, including its most complex aspects.
Although this mismatch is important, it speaks to a different sort of variation in
battlefield effectiveness than that examined in this study-primarily because the "mismatch"
" Robert Cas sidy, Counterinsmagency and the Global War on Terror: Military C/lture
and Irregu/ar Iar (Stanford, CA: Greenwood Press, 2006); Andrew Krepinevich, The Army and Vlietnam
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); and John Nag], Iearning to Eat Sonp with a Kni/e:
Counterinsurgency Lessons from Maaya and V ietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). For useful
background, see Austin Long, On "Other Var": Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Conterilnsmgency Research
(Arlington, VA: RAND, 2006).
1 Nora Kinzer Stewart, Mates and Mnchachos: Unit Cohesion in the Fa/k/ands/Ma/iinas I Far (New York: Brassey's,
1991).
" Daniel Kon, Los Chicos de la Guern (Sevenoaks, UK: New English Library, 1983), p. 28.
problem is rare and because it has already been the subject of extensive scholarly inquiry.13 It
is generally the province of highly professional armies that find themselves having to prepare
for and/or fight two kinds of wars at once. For example, the U.S. Army had to prepare for
high-intensity conventional war in Europe at the same time it was engaged in Vietnam; one
could provide a similar explanation for the problems the Soviets faced in Afghanistan, or the
challenges the Israeli Defense Forces face today.
There is no doubt that this conundrum merits attention, but it is essentially a
question about which kinds of complex operations a cohesive, tactically proficient military
should perform. And indeed, recent U.S. experience in Iraq has hinted that, when properly
motivated, this sort of military can at least partially transition from emphasizing one kind of
complex operations (conventional high-intensity war) to another (population-centric
counterinsurgency) relatively quickly, because there is an underlying core of cohesion and
tactical competence that a new doctrine can re-direct toward new ends." It is not obvious,
however, that the policies required to produce this sort of doctrinal shift in a highly
professional military are the same ones that can rehabilitate a military suffering basic deficits
in coherence and tactical skills. One can change the doctrine of this latter sort of military,
but since inappropriate doctrine is not the main driver of its effectiveness problems, the
change is unlikely to produce significant improvements on the battlefield.
As a result, this study focuses on the aforementioned three aspects of battlefield
performance solely within a single type of conflict-interstate conventional warfare-in
order to rule out the doctrinal mismatch problem as an explanation for variation in the
dependent variable. 1 also focus on this realm of warfare because of its historical and
continuing importance to the course of world politics. Despite the increasing prominence of
irregular and "hybrid" conflicts, conventional high-intensity war, in which large units stand
and fight each other over territory, remains a serious threat in many regions of the world,
including the Middle East and much of Asia.15 It is also arguably still the U.S. military's
favored form of combat, one honed during the Cold War and heavily resourced in U.S.
defense budgets to this day. Numerous other nations, notably Iran, Russia, and China,
continue to raise large land armies and to acquire or maintain significant quantities of
conventional weaponry, such as armor, artillery, and fighter-bombers. These indicators all
suggest that the determinants of effectiveness within the realm of interstate conventional
warfare merit continuing attention, even as awareness of and attention to other types of
conflict grow. That said, there is every reason to believe that the basic findings of the
argument presented here could be applied through further research to improve our
understanding of the determinants of effectiveness in these other types of combat.
In summary, the key question of effectiveness is not just whether militaries can
perform the three key tasks in conventional warfare, but how well they perform them given
the resources that they possess. Indeed, as Risa Brooks argues, "Resources are important in
1 See footnote 10. Also, Robert Cassidv, Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya: Mi/itary Strate.ic Culture anid the
Paradoxes ofAymmetric Con/lict (Fort Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003).
1 Brian Burton and John Nagl, "Learning as We Go: the U.S. Army Adapts to Counterinsurgency in Iraq, July
2004-December 2006," Yma/l 'arr and Insmrgencies, Vol. 19, No. 3 (September 2008), pp. 303-327; and Colin
Kahl, "COIN of the Realm: Is There a Future for Counterinsurgency?" I Foreign Airur , November/December
2007, available online.
5 On the notion of hybrid wars, see Frank G. Hoffman, "Hybrid Threats: Reconceptualizing the Evolving
Character of Modern Conflict," Strategic Foirm, No. 240, April 2009, pp. 1-8; and Stephen Biddle and Jeffrey A.
Friedman, The 2006 1Ibanon Camlipaign and the FlIture of Warire: Implicationsf/or rny and De/ense Policy (Carlisle,
PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September 2008).
assessing potential power, but effectiveness tells how well a state can translate those
resources into actual power in war. Effectiveness is the difference between what a state's raw
resources suggest it could potentially do, and what it is actually capable of doing in battle."16
If this is true, and effectiveness is about the efficient performance of key tasks, then
we have to consider the role of resources as an important constraint, one that helps sharpen
our understanding of which instances of military performance are actually puzzling.
Examples would include instances in which militaries that rate similarly in resources
demonstrate differing abilities to perform key tasks, or when the same military varies in its
battlefield abilities over time without a change in its resources, or when different units from
the same military perform differently at the same point in time, despite having access to
similar national resources.
All of this implies, however, that we know which sorts of resources actually matter
for fighting power. If effectiveness is about "what militaries do with what they have," then
even if we can agree about what they should do, we have to know what things they might
have that could matter, and we have to consider what scholars have already uncovered about
variables that affect the conversion of what states have into fighting power. We even have to
consider the possibility that what states do is entirely a function of what they have and that
the notion of effectiveness itself, as the gap between resources and output, is illusory. The
next section delves into these questions in more depth by exploring the existing literature on
effectiveness, as well as some preliminary data.
II. Existing Explanations of Battlefield Effectiveness
In considering the existing literature on military effectiveness, it is important to
distinguish between two sets of variables: variables said to constitute "what states have" and
variables said to influence "what states do with what they have." This study is fundamentally
concerned with the latter category, but it is only when we know the values of both sets of
variables for a given military that we can 1) be confident in the concept of effectiveness
described above, as efficient performance of key tasks, and 2) determine whether a particular
military's level of effectiveness actually needs explaining or not.
The existing literature points to two major types of material resources that are
relevant for the generation of military power: economic wealth and demography. It also
points to four types of non-material variables that are said to be relevant to the conversion
of material resources into fighting power on the battlefield: regime type, threat level, culture
and society, and civil-military relations. This section will examine the theories that emphasize
each of these material and non-material variables, paying particular attention to the sort of
empirical evidence that would confirm or cast doubt on their explanatory value.
[SEE NEXT PAGE]
1( Brooks, "Introduction," p. 3.
Existing Explanations of Battlefield Effectiveness
RESOURCES FORCE MULTIPLIERS OR DIVIDERS
(material variables, "what states have") (non-material variables, "what states do with what
they have')
1. Economic wealth 1. Regime type
2. Demography 2. Threat environment
3. Culture and society
4. Civil-military relations
Economic Wealth
Economic wealth is one of the most intuitive explanations of military power,
although much of the literature in this area focuses on the question of victory rather than
effectiveness per se. The argument has many versions: that wealth enables states to afford
the training and technology needed to professionalize their militaries; that wealthy societies
deliver a higher level of human capital to their militaries, producing soldiers who are easier to
train, can understand more complex operations, or can operate modern technology; that
wealth produces the industrial base needed to fight modern wars; or that wealth is a crucial
precondition of democracy, one of the potential "force multipliers" that will be addressed
below.1 Ultimately, however, all the versions predict that states with greater economic
wealth should perform better in wars and that, between two opponents, the state with
greater economic wealth is more likely to win.
Other studies argue that economic wealth is an important resource but that it alone
can explain neither war outcomes nor, more importantly for our purposes, all the variation
in battlefield performance within wars. For example, Stephen Biddle has shown that states'
GNP is a weak predictor of their odds of victory, leaving nearly half of war outcomes
unexplained. He and others also point to instances in which poor, "low-tech," less
economically developed states seem to have fought better on the battlefield than wealthy,
economically advanced states fielding the most advanced weaponry. 18A commonly cited
example of this phenomenon is the People's Liberation Army in the opening phases of the
Korean War.19 Other puzzles for the wealth explanation include states with similar levels of
wealth that have generated very different levels of battlefield performance, or instances in
which poor states such Serbia in 1999 still seem to have to generated highly competent
Michael Desch, Power and Military E fctiveness: the Fallag of Democratic 'riumphalisi (Baltimore: Johns I lopkins,
2008); Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Con/lict from 1500 to 2000
(New York: Vintage Books, 1987); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1981); David Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," American PoliticalScience
Review, Vol. 86, No. 1 (1992), pp. 24-37; and Michael Beckley, "Economic Development and Military
Effectiveness," Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 33, no. 1 (February 2010), pp. 43-79. Scholars who do not endorse
the wealth argument, but provide useful discussions of it, include Stephen Biddle and Stephen Long,
"Democracy and Military Effectiveness,".Jomrnalof Con/lict Reso/ntion, Vol. 48, No. 4 (2004), pp. 535-546, and
Pollack, "The Influence of...," chapter 5.
YMilitary Power, "Explaining Military Outcomes," in Brooks and Stanley, pp. 207-227.
1 For background on the Korean War, see Roy Appleman, Disaster in Korea: the Chinese Confront Alaczlrthur
(College Station: Texas A&M Press, 1989); Edwin Floyt, The Day the Chinese Attacked: Korea, 1950 (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1990); and Allen Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: the Decision to Enter the Korean IY'ar (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1968).
militaries.2() These anomalies would seem to constitute true effectiveness puzzles and require
examination of additional, possibly non-material, variables.
Demography
A second material explanation of battlefield effectiveness focuses on demography
and its implications for force sizing. The larger a state's supply of fighting-age males, the
larger an army it can mobilize (and replenish), giving it an advantage in force ratios in the
field, a particularly relevant consideration when conducting offensives.21 Larger armies are
also more likely to have manpower to spare for the formation of more specialized units,
suggesting that such militaries might be more able to conduct complex operations. Finally,
states with larger populations probably have a greater capacity for wealth generation,
triggering the causal mechanisms tied to economic power. For all of these reasons, some
scholars believe demography to strongly predict both battlefield performance and war
outcomes.
Others are less convinced, treating population size much the way they treat
economic wealth-as a critical resource on which states draw but far from satisfying as a
single explanation for variation in the performance of key battlefield tasks. Many observers
point to instances in which states or coalitions with very large populations have fought
poorly against those with much smaller ones, the classic examples being the outnumbered
Israelis in their wars against the Arabs, and the Finns against the Soviets in the Winter War.22
The great variation in Chinese military performance across its wars in Korea, on the Indian
border, and with Vietnam similarly would suggest that there is more to explaining variation
in battlefield performance than manpower availability.23 Indeed, China arguably performed
the worst in the war in which it had the greatest overall superiority in numbers, against
Vietnam. What often is said to matter, of course, is not overall numbers, but rather local
ratios of field forces. Stephen Biddle has cut to the heart of this matter, though, showing
statistically that such ratios also do not predict battle outcomes.24
The Limitations of Matenal Explanations: Preliminay Data
Beyond the anomalies just mentioned, my own quantitative examination of all states
that have fought interstate wars since 1945 reveals that differences in material power do not
account for much of the variation in battlefield performance as measured by the ratio of
battle deaths.2 Contrary to what material explanations might predict, ratios of battle deaths
suffered by each side are not inversely proportional to the ratios of their Composite Index of
National Capabilities (CINC) scores, which measure states' total population, urban
population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military
Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon, ll"'ining Ugly: NATO's Ear to Sav Kosovo (Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution Press, 2000); and Barry R. Posen, "The War for Kosovo: Serbia's Political-Military Strategy,"
lnternationalSecurity, vol. 24, no. 4 (spring 2000), pp. 39-84.
NMarko Djuranovic, "Democracy or Demography: Regime Type and the Determinants of War Outcomes,"
Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, Columbia University, 2008.
Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East (New York: Random House, 1982); and
Ed\ward Roberts, Winter lar: Rlssia's iurasion o/ inland, 1939-1940 (New York: Pegasus Books, 2008).
zAndrew Scobell, China's Use of Mlilitary Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the 1ong March (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2003).
Military Poner, chapter 8.
Battle deaths are the basis of a variety of quantitative measures of military effectiveness used in the literature.
These measures will be discussed in much more detail later in the chapter. Here I employ this measure simply
as a heuristic.
expenditures.26 In other words, we would expect CINC scores to be inversely proportional
to battlefield deaths if having greater material power translated linearly into a greater ability
to inflict losses on an opponent.
Instead, the histogram below reveals a surprising number of both over- and under-
performing militaries, that is, militaries that suffered either more or fewer battlefield deaths
than the balance of material capabilities suggested they should have.27
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While there are good reasons to be skeptical about the use of battle deaths as a measure of
effectiveness-reasons that will be discussed later in the chapter-the distribution above is
nevertheless striking. To be sure, the data cluster around the zero point, suggesting that
material factors matter significantly. But combined with our qualitative observations about
puzzling differences in battlefield performance, the large number of outlying observations
should make us skeptical of the view that everything that happens on the battlefield is a
function of material power. What states have does not seem to determine what they do, at
least not entirely. Material power matters, but there still seem to be differences in the
efficiency with which militaries use that power, and therefore real differences in effectiveness
of the type Brooks describes.
Precisely because of these sorts of differences, a second group of theories focuses on
non-material variables that might influence how states actually utilize resources such as
CINC scores are taken from the National Military Capabilities dataset, v. 3.02, originally published as Singer,
J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-
1965," in Bruce Russett, ed., Peace, War, and Nitmbers (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972), pp. 19-48. Battle death data are
available from the author upon request and gathered from a variety of sources, most notably Michael
Clod felter, Wa/are and Amed Conflicts: a Statistical Re/Irence to Casualty and Other Figuitres, 1500-2000 G efferson, N C:
McFarland, 2001).
' This histogram shows the log of (Battle DeathsA / Battle Deathsn) * (CINCn / CINCA). I induced the
logarithmic transformation to reduce skew, making the data easier to view on a graph, and also to normalize
the data around the zero point, making it easier to interpret. Each datapoint represents one side (side A) of a
directed dyad (side A vs. side B) that fought a war. As the datapoints move closer to zero, that means that the
ratio of battle deaths between side A and side B was almost exactly the inverse of their CINC scores, suggesting
there was little apparent gap between resources and performance. But the datapoints farther from the mean
represent increasingly larger gaps between the ratio of battle deaths we would expect based on the ratio of
CINC scores, and the actual battle deaths suffered by the two sides.
economic wealth and demography. These explanations emphasize the roles of regime type,
external threat, culture, and civil-military relations as intervening factors that can explain why
states with similar resources may fight differently or why a state whose resources remain
constant may vary in its fighting abilities over time or across units.
Regime Type
The first of the non-material explanations focuses on regime type as the key
determinant of battlefield effectiveness. Without taking a position on where democracy
comes from, this school of thought simply notes that democracies have won most of the
wars they have fought since 1815.28 Scholars posit different explanations for this empirical
regularity. For example, David Lake argues that the constraints on rent-seeking in
democratic societies enable the devotion of more resources to security, that democracies
generally enjoy greater public support for their wars, and that democracies are better able to
form coalitions against aggressors-all of which lead to a higher win rate for democracies in
wars .29
Dan Reiter and Allan Stam attribute democratic victory to two different mechanisms:
selection effects and fighting prowess. First, they argue, democratic societies produce better
strategic assessment, leading democratic states to pick only those "unfair fights" in which
they are likely to prevail. Second, the liberal values of democratic societies imbue their armies
with better leadership and initiative at the tactical level, enabling them to fight better on the
battlefield.30
Despite its prominence, the regime type theory leaves some puzzling anomalies in its
wake. What, for example, are we to make of cases of effective battlefield performance by
autocratic states such as Wilhelmine or Nazi Germany, or of instances of ineffective
battlefield performance by democratic states, such as India in its 1962 war against China?31
The democracy school does not contend that such cases should never exist, as the regime
a Lake, "Poverful Pacifists"; Bruce Bueno de Mescuita and Randolph Siverson, "War and the Survival of
Political Leaders: a Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability," American PoliticalScience
Association, Vol. 89, No. 4 (December 1995), pp. 841-855; and Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, Democracies at War
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002). Additional literature exploring the conflict behavior of non-
democratic regimes includes Jessica L. Weeks, "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling
Resolve," International Organization, Vol. 62 (winter 2008), pp. 35-64; Mark Peceny and Caroline C. Beer,
"Peaceful Parties and Puzzling Personalists," American PoliticalScience Reriew', Vol. 97, No. 2 (May 2003), pp. 339-
342; Mark Pecenv, Caroline C. Beer, and Shannon Sanchez-Terry, "Dictatorial Peace?" American PoliticalScience
Revien, Vol. 96, No. 1 (March 2002), pp. 15-26; and Brian Lai and Dan Slater, "Institutions of the Offensive:
Domestic Sources of Dispute Initiation in Authoritarian Regimes, 1950-1992," American Journal ofPolitical
Science, Vol. 50, No. I (January 2006), pp. 113-136. A precursor to some of these claims is Stanislav Andreski,
"On the Peaceful Disposition of Military Dictatorships," Joiunial /Strateg/c Studies, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 3-10.
3 Lake, "Poverful Pacifists."
3" Reiter and Stam, Democracies at lfar.
0 On the Germans, see van Creveld, Fig hting Pone,; Holger H1. lerwig, "The Dynamics of Necessity: German
Military Policy during the First World War," in Murray and Millet, Vol. I, pp. 80-115; Manfred Messerschmidt,
"German Military Effectiveness between 1919 and 1939," in Murray and Millet, Vol. II, pp. 218-255; Jurgen E.
Forster, "The Dynamics of Volkegemeinschaft: the Effectiveness of the German Military Establishment in the
Second World War," in Murray and Millet, Vol. III, pp. 180-220. On India in 1962, the literature is voluminous,
but for an overview see Srinath Raghavan, "Civil-Military Relations in India: the China Crisis and After," Journal
o/fStrategic Studis, Vol. 32, No. 1 (February 2009), pp. 149-175; Stephen P. Cohcn, The IJndian Army: Its
Contr'ibtion to t/he De elopmnent o/a Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), especially pp. 175-6; V.
Longer, Red Coats to Olive Green: a History oJthe JIdian Army, 1600- 1974 (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1974), pp.
277-398; K.C. Praval, Indian Army a/ter Independence (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1990), pp. 137-240; and
Raju Thomas, Indian Security' Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), chapter 5.
type argument is probabilistic. But it provides no logically compelling, theoretically
consistent explanation for when these anomalies should arise. Rather than somehow
"proving the rule," these exceptions seem to cast doubt on it. Indeed, many scholars
question the causal mechanisms of this theory-whether the evidence shows that
democracies actually are any better at picking and fighting wars.32 Even the actual record of
democratic victories has come under question, as the finding does not appear to be robust in
the face of reasonable alternative codings and the inclusion of "draws" in the dataset.33
External Threat Environment
A second family of theories focuses on the external threat environment, arguing that
high levels of danger to the state should produce strong pressures for the military to perform
all three of the tasks listed above3 As external threats intensify, militaries should be more
and more likely to move up the spectrum of performance. Different versions of this
argument posit different mechanisms by which threats translate into greater efforts to
produce military power from the states' resources. States that are seeking independence, for
example, or fighting in defense of their homelands, may be more likely to mobilize and
remain cohesive under fire because the stakes are higher for the soldiers involved.35 Indeed,
some scholars argue that nationalism is the key pathway by which intense external threats
translate into better military performance.3 Other explanations point to the role of military
organizations in independently detecting and responding to such threats, while still others
emphasize the importance of civilian direction of such efforts."7
Whatever the posited mechanism, what is hard for theories focused on external
threats to explain are instances in which obvious and grave external dangers do not prompt
increased attention to the tasks relevant to battlefield effectiveness. Particularly puzzling are
32 Risa Brooks, "Making Military Might: Why Do States Fail and Succeed?" InternationalSecurity, Vol. 28, No. 2
(2003), pp. 149-191; Risa Brooks, Strate: the Civil-Military Politics of StrategicAssessmlent (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2008); Ajin Choi, "The Power of Democratic Cooperation," InternationalSecurity,
Vol. 28, No. I (summer 2003), pp. 142-153; Michael Desch, "Democracy and Victory: Why Regime Type
Hardly Matters," InternationalSecurity, Vol. 27, No. 2 (2002), pp. 5-47; Desch, Power and Military Ectieness. For
Reiter and Stain's response, see "Understanding Victory: Why Political Institutions Matter," InternationalSecurity,
Vol. 28, No. 1 (summer 2003), pp. 168-179.
33 Specifically, Reiter and Stain code all states that do not initiate wars as targets even if these states eventually
join the war on the side of the initiator. So, for example, they code Turkey as a target in World War I even
though it allied with Germany and Austria, whom they code as having initiated the war. Reiter and Stam also
exclude from their dataset instances of stalemate, including cases like Vietnam in which the United States, a
democracy, initiated a war resulting in a draw. Alexander B. Downes, "How Smart and Tough Are
Democracies? Reassessing Theories of Democratic Victory in War," InternationalSecurity, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Spring
2009), pp. 9-51.
34 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979); and Posen, Sources, chapters 1
and 2.
35 Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: a Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," InternationalSecurity, Vol.
26, No. 1, pp. 193-128; Eliot Cohen, "Constraints on \merica's Conduct of Small Wars," InternationalSecurity,
Vol. 9 (1984), pp. 151-81; Andrew Mack, "Why Big N ations Lose Small Wars," IVorld Politics, Bol. 27 (1975),
pp. 175-200); and Gil Merom, How Democracies ILose wam// lfars (NeX York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
30 Barry Posen, "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power," InternationalSecurity, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1993),
pp. 80-124; and Daniel Reiter, "Nationalism and Military Effectiveness: Post-Meiji Japan," in Brooks and
Stanley, pp. 27-54.
* On militaries, see Stephen Peter Rosen, lVinning the Next IJar: Innovation and the lodern Malita (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1991); and Kimberly Marten Zisk, Igaging the Enemy: Oqanization Theory and Soviet
Military Innovation, 1955-1991 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). On civilians, see Posen, Solres of
Military Doctrine.
instances in which militaries do not stand and fight in defense of their home territory as
nationalism might predict they should. Anomalies often cited in this regard include the fall of
South Vietnam in 1975 and the fall of France in 1940.38 Even more strange are instances in
which only some units of the same military seem willing to stand and fight, while others
collapse or desert at the first opportunity. Coalition forces encountered this sort of
inconsistent behavior among Iraqi military units in 1991, with some breaking and running
while others stood and conducted valiant but doomed tank operations?9
Culture and Society
A third type of explanation focuses on the roles of culture and society in battlefield
effectiveness. Chief among these is Ken Pollack, who argues that Arab culture has
consistently inhibited the military performance of Arab armies. While recognizing that claims
about culture can be controversial and that factors besides culture do matter for
effectiveness, Pollack nevertheless posits that there are direct links between certain traits
common in Arab societies-such as extreme deference to authority and aversion to
technology-and Arab states' repeated military losses to Israel.m
Along different lines, Elizabeth Kier has suggested that militaries' organizational
culture, stemming from broader societal beliefs about the role of the military, influences the
formation of doctrine, which presumably then shapes fighting abilities.41 Stephen Rosen, too,
has shown that a society's structure, particularly its level of internal divisiveness, has
implications for its generation of fighting power. A military drawn from a divided society can
either mimic its divisions, which risks internal military fractures (as seen in the Italian army in
both world wars), or the military can divorce itself from society and become internally
unified, but only at the risk of becoming so alien to the society it is supposed to defend that
political leaders may be reluctant to employ it (as Rosen argues happened to the Indian
army).42 Randall Schweller's theory of under-balancing has similar implications for military
effectiveness: he posits that states lacking societal cohesion and government legitimacy will
not balance as they should in response to external threats.43
1 Some also expected this sort of collapse in the Soviet satellite states in the event of NATO-Warsaw Pact
conflict in Europe; see James D. Marchio, "U.S. Intelligence Assessments and the Reliability of Non-Soviet
Warsaw Pact Armed Forces, 1946-1989," Studies in Inteliagence, Vol. 51, No. 4 (December 2007), pp. 1-26. It is
important to note, of course, that many argue nationalism did explain the outcome in South Vietnam-because
nationalist sentiment favored the North Vietnamese. Similarly, it is important to remember that the French did
not immediately collapse in 1940, and they imposed substantial losses on the Germans. The Vietnamese case is
discussed in much more detail in chapters 2 and 3, but a useful starting point is Frederick Logevall, The Ongins
o/ the Vietnam! lV'ar (New York: Longman, 2001). On the Battle for France, see Ernest May, Straige 'ictory:
Hit/er's Conquest ofFrance (New York: I Jill and Wang, 2003).
3 Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, The Generals' \'ar- the Inside Story ofthe Con/lict in the Gulf/(New York:
Little, Brown, and Company, 1995), chapter 19.
4" Pollack, "The Influence of...". Similar themes emerge in Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction: Mi/itary Culture
and the Practices of 1f1ar in Iumperial Germany (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); and MacGregor Knox, Hitler's
Italian A/ies: Roya/Ared Forces, F uascist Reimze, and the IVar of / 940-43 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2000).
-1 Elizabeth Kier, JImagining 1Var: French and 13i-itish Military Doctrine betneen the \Varo (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1997).
2 Stephen Peter Rosen, Societies and Alilitary Power: India and HerArrmies (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).
4 Randall Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance o/ Poner (Princeton: Princeton
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Other studies focus on how particular societal traits actually improve military
performance. Jasen Castillo's broad-ranging study argues that the best armies come from
cohesive societies whose communitarian values infuse their soldiers with very high levels of
staying power on the battlefield.44 John Lynn has made similar claims about the combat
power of the armies of revolutionary France, noting that the ideology of the revolution
facilitated a whole series of improvements in French training and doctrine that would have
been impossible in the ancien regime.45
While differing in the specific claims, all of this research shares a basic echo of
Morris Janowitz's observation that it is impossible to separate modern militaries from the
civilian environment that incubates their soldiers.46 Indeed, it seems difficult to deny that
culture and social structure broadly condition military performance.47 Still, much of the
variation in battlefield effectiveness is hard for theories of this type to explain, because the
independent variables of interest retain the same values in individual states over very long
periods of time, making it difficult to use these variables account for instances of sub-
national changes in battlefield effectiveness.
What, for instance, are we to make of the improvement in Egyptian military
performance between 1967 and 1973?48 What about those instances of very different
battlefield performance by different units in the same military in the same war? For example,
despite being drawn from the same national culture and society, some South Vietnamese
army units actually had performed very well in battle prior to the country's collapse in
1975-indeed, their performance was a major reason the war had not ended at several earlier
points, as the later empirical work of this project will demonstrate.
Also, how do we explain puzzling instances of nearly identical battlefield problems
arising in states that have very different cultures and societies, such as the Iraqis in 1991 and
the Argentines in 1982?9 Or of very different battlefield performance by militaries that
drawn from extremely similar cultures and societies, such as North and South Korea in
1950?5 All this additional variation suggests that other factors matter in explaining military
performance, even if culture and society are an important part of the story.
Civil-Military Relations
Lastly, there is a long-standing intuition that states' civil-military relations shape their
performance in war.51 Perhaps no book on the subject has been more influential than Samuel
44 Castillo, "The Will to Fight."
45 John Lynn, The Bayonets ofthe Republic: Motliation and Tactics in the Armyj of Revolutionary France, 1791-94
(Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1984).
4 The Professional Soldier: a Socia/ and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 1960).
4 For further discussion of this class of variables, see Adam Grissom, "The Future of Military Innovation
Studies," Journa/ ofSitrategic Studies, Vol. 29, No. 5 (October 2006), pp. 905-934; and Williamson Murray, "Does
Military Culture Matter?" Orbis, Vol. 43, No. I (Winter 1999), pp. 27-42. A more critical view is Michael
Desch, "Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies," internationalS'ecaulity, Vol. 23, No.
I (summer 1998), pp. 141-170.
4 Risa Brooks explores this variation in S'hapng Stratey, chapters 3 and 4; and Risa Brooks, "An Autocracy at
War: Explaining Egypt's Military Effectiveness, 1967 and 1973," Security Studies, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2006), pp. 396-
430.
4 On the Iracis, see Bernard and Trainor, The Generals' lar. On the Argentines, see Stewart, Mates and
Auichachos.
On the Korean War, see Appleman, Disaster, Hoyt, Tbe Day...; Whiting, China Crosses....
51 A useful overview is Suzanne Nielsen, "Civil-Military Relations Theory and Military Effectiveness," Public
A dministration and Mlanagemnent, Vol. 10, No. 2 (2005), pp. 61-84.
Huntington's The Soldier and the State.52 Huntington argued that the complete separation of
the military from politics was the linchpin of both civilian control and military effectiveness.
Insulating the military from politics, he contended, was the only way to foster a professional
military ethos that would ensure both deference to civilian authority and fighting prowess on
the battlefield.
Huntington's thesis has not gone unchallenged, with a great many scholars
demonstrating that, in fact, excessive military autonomy can hinder military effectiveness,
especially at the strategic level. While put differently in different contexts, the gist of the
argument echoes Clausewitz: close civilian involvement in military affairs is necessary for
optimal performance in war. Barry Posen, Jack Snyder, Deborah Avant, Eliot Cohen,
Michael Desch, and Peter Feaver have all noted in different ways that military organizational
behavior in the absence of civilian oversight can be counterproductive.53
Still, a large literature has continued to expound the essentially Huntingtonian
proposition that civilian intervention or "politicization" of the military reduces effectiveness
in various ways. Scholars such as James Quinlivan, Risa Brooks, and Stephen Biddle and
Robert Zirkle have noted that civilian intrusions into the military to guard against coups-
often described as "coup-proofing" practices-are detrimental to battlefield effectiveness.54
From this perspective, civilian intervention usually amounts meddling. A number of studies
have also emphasized that militaries can improve their effectiveness even in the absence of
direct civilian intervention.55
Despite these disagreements, it seems safe to say that "bad" civil-military relations
should somehow negatively influence battlefield performance, and that a state with such
relations that had very high military effectiveness would constitute a puzzling anomaly for a
civil-military explanation. But what actually distinguishes "good" civil-military practices from
bad ones-what makes some kinds of political intervention efficacious and others
counterproductive-is not obvious from the existing literature, for two reasons.56
First, there is a methodological problem in approaches to the problem thus far.
Many of the studies of the tactical- and operational-level effects of civil-military relations
examine cases where the battlefield performance in question was heavily over-determined.
For example, many of the case studies that demonstrate the negative effects of "coup-
proofing" do not control for at least one obvious confounding variable from those listed
2 Huntington, The Soldier and the State.
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Brooks' Shaping Stratgy does outline several types of civil-military strategic assessment processes, delineating
which types lead to better or worse oversight of military activity and integration with grand strategy, although it
does not examine the impact on actual war-fighting capabilities.
above, and there is an especially pronounced tendency to examine instances of poor, post-
colonial Arab autocracies fighting economically advanced non-Arab democracies.57
Although this research is extremely useful for some purposes, it has difficulty
pinning down the independent impact of civil-military relations as separate from Arab
culture, colonial legacies, autocracy, and wealth-because all of these independent variables
make the same prediction about the value of the dependent variable. As a result, it is still
difficult to define, much less isolate and measure, the independent effect of "civil-military
dysfunction," even if everyone can agree that such "dysfunction," whatever it is, would be
bad for military performance, while some other pattern of civil-military relations would
presumably be beneficial.
Second, there is a substantive problem. In general, the civil-military relations
literature focuses on the trade-off between military autonomy and civilian control, in many
ways mirroring the distinctions Huntington established more than 50 years ago between his
favored "objective" control and the "subjective," politicized control he rejected. Again,
though useful for some purposes, this framework misses the fact that, empirically, the choice
is rarely between a "politicized" military and one free of politics, between an environment of
intense political intervention and an environment completely devoid of it. Rather, there seem
to be many different forms of political intervention, and it may be these forms, rather than
simple variations in the level of military autonomy, that account for variations in battlefield
effectiveness in many states.
As mentioned in the Introduction, for instance, there does not seem to be a
deterministic relationship between military autonomy and military performance. Empirically,
some very autonomous militaries become professional and relatively effective fighting
forces, such as the Pakistani military.58 But other highly autonomous militaries do not:
consider the Argentine military under the junta, surely a case where civilian meddling was
not the problem. At the other extreme, some militaries subjected to highly intrusive civilian
policies perform poorly, such as Saddam Hussein's Iraq. But observers often forget that
intrusive civilian policies have also produced very effective fighting forces at times: consider
the Nazis under Adolf Hitler or the Israelis under David Ben-Gurion, both cases where
In "Coup-Proofing," Quinlivan examines the ineffectiveness of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Syria as they fought
wars against Israel and the United States, two economically well developed democracies. Biddle and Zirkle
examine Iraq as a case of ineffectiveness and North Vietnam as a case of effectiveness, a comparison that does
control for regime type and economic development but whose outcome is not surprising from the perspective
of cultural arguments (Iraq had an Arab culture, North Vietnam did not). In her monograph, Political-Military
Relations, Brooks examines the ineffectiveness of Syria, Egypt, and Jordan, also in wars against Israel. In Brooks'
book, Shapin iStrategr, the state found to have the best strategic assessment practices is a democracy, Britain
1902-1914), which was also the world's reigning economic power at the time. Brooks does argue that Britain
had extremely poor strategic assessment during World War I (although it managed to win the war), but the
other instances of "poor" or "worst" assessment arguably could be explained by the fact that all had at least
one major trait said to predict ineffectiveness: Fgypt in the 1960s (Arab, economically weak, highly autocratic),
Pakistan in the period just before the 1999 coup (not Arab, but economically weak and not a stable
democracy), and Wilhelmine Germany (not Arab, not economically weak, but also not democratic). On the one
hand, these cases give the study significant external validity, showing the range of Brooks' theory across a wide
variety of circumstances. On the other hand, theN leave room for more focused comparisons that control more
tightly for potentially confounding variables to ensure internal validity. Brooks' own examination of the
puzzling improvement in Egypt effectiveness in the 1970s is a superb example of such testing and a model for
my own case studies.
5 Stephen Cohen, The Pakistan Army (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998).
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leaders exerted intense personal control over their officer corps.60 Indeed, the German
military went from extreme autonomy in World War I to extreme civilian control in World
War II but is generally acknowledged to have fought very well at the tactical and operational
levels under both circumstances. Meanwhile, armies subject to communist control in China
and the Soviet Union had or have had consistently low military autonomy for decades but
have varied significantly in their battlefield effectiveness in different wars, and even in
different campaigns in the same war.
These sorts of anomalies suggest that explaining effectiveness requires more than
knowing whether military autonomy or civilian control are high or low. Even extreme values
of those variables seem able to produce all manner of outcomes in terms of battlefield
performance. In the next section I argue that often what really matter for battlefield
effectiveness are the specific forms of political intervention that leaders-whether civilian or
military-adopt toward the military. Indeed, in many societies the figure of political authority
seeking to intervene is not a civilian at all, but some sort of uniformed officer. Even in
military dictatorships, the leading generals quickly become political actors who face the same
dilemmas of intervention faced by their civilian predecessors.
Furthermore, although the overall level of civilian control of the military may vary
little in particular states over time, the specific forms of political intervention can shift much
more rapidly, and can even vary across different parts of the same military at the same time.
For this reason, the mechanisms of political intervention, as opposed to the general level of
civilian control of the military, offer a promising avenue through which to explain the three
types of variation in battlefield effectiveness that present recurring anomalies for the existing
explanations: over-time variation in the performance of individual militaries; unit variation
across a particular military at a particular time; and cross-national variation in the
effectiveness of different militaries that have access to similar levels of resources.
III. Political Intervention in the Military and Its Impact on Battlefield Performance
Not all militaries are subject to political intervention, but among those that are, the
ability to maintain unit cohesion under fire, perform basic tactics, and conduct complex
operations depends fundamentally on theforms of political intervention that political leaders
adopt. What is most important about these forms is not whether they produce high or low
levels of intervention in the military-especially since political leaders will almost always
choose to intervene more rather than less if they can-but rather the content of the
intervention and its impact on four sets of key military activities: promotion patterns,
training regimens, command arrangements, and information management. As different
policies govern these four areas, different sorts of militaries or military units emerge with
differing abilities to conduct the three tasks outlined in the dependent variable.
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System," Journal of.Vtrategic Studies, vol. 6, no. 3 (September 1983): 46-63; Amos Perlmutter, "The Israeli Army in
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The remainder of this section will discuss the independent variable in more detail,
explaining which political-military patterns (i.e., which forms of political intervention in the
four areas of military activity) produce the four values of the dependent variable discussed
earlier (i.e., excellent, adequate, mediocre, poor). I sketch four ideal-typical models of
political intervention, describing them in terms of how a political leader might act toward a
single military. In reality, political leaders may adopt distinct forms of intervention towards
different units within the same military, or vary their use of these forms over time, two
complications I discuss in more detail later in the chapter.
The section concludes by generating a series of hypotheses from the theory,
comparing them to the hypotheses that emerge from the competing explanations. I focus on
the implications of all the theories for armies, rather than navies or air forces, so as to make
the implications as clear and consistent as possible.61 Additionally, most combat has occurred
and will continue to occur on the ground, so armies are a logical place to start.
Excellent Militaies: Best Practices and Maximum Effectiveness
As discussed, the most effective armies in modern conventional warfare are those
that maintain unit cohesion while executing not only basic tactics but also complex
operations. Pulling off this feat requires an unusual combination of both low-level initiative
and high-level coordination that only some forms of political intervention allow.
These forms usually begin with close political attention to promotion patterns in the
military. Of course, such attention on the part of political leaders is not unusual. The key in
the most effective militaries is the substantive basis upon which political leaders judge their
military commanders: actual battlefield competence, as demonstrated by past performance in
battle or, in peacetime, performance in training. As will be discussed in more detail below,
combat leadership is just one among many criteria upon which political leaders can rely to
promote or fire military leaders. Where political leaders actively ensure that experienced and
successful commanders move up the chain rapidly, their armies are likely to develop a much
higher base of human capital over time, reinforcing the ability to plan complex operations
and to develop and maintain tactical proficiency. Officers selected on merit are also much
more likely to be trusted by their soldiers, who know that their commanders will not waste
their lives in pursuit of poorly planned campaigns.
just as important, in the best armies political leaders actively fire officers who have
shown themselves to be cowardly or incompetent in battle. To be sure, political leaders may
61 Air and naval combat could clearly provide useful further tests of my argument and its competitors, and
some evidence along these lines appears in the context of the larger land wars that the case studies examine.
still rely on time in grade or political loyalty as secondary considerations in the promotion
process, but the best militaries will be those in which political intervention in the promotion
process focuses heavily on actual wartime performance or other demonstration of combat
skills as the most crucial basis for movement up-and out of-the chain of command. This,
too, is likely to affect soldier motivation, as the individual soldier knows he will be protected
from the dangers of bad command.
In the most effective armies, political leaders are also likely to be deeply involved in
the design of training regimens. Political leaders will push military leaders to make military
education rigorous, realistic, and frequent, so that unit members have a chance to bond with
one another and to build trust with their officers before entering combat. Political leaders are
also likely to push to ensure that military training occurs in both small- and large-unit
settings and across different parts of the military. It is only through these sorts of extensive
exercises that small-unit proficiency can aggregate into the coordination involved in larger-
unit complex operations. Although we should not expect to see presidents leading marching
drills, there should be close and sustained civilian attention to the actual content of military
training. Political leaders are likely to make suggestions for improvements in training based
on intelligence and other information from the battlefield, which should help produce units
that with high levels of tactical proficiency and the ability to plan and conduct more
sophisticated operations.
Precisely because political leaders in this setting use controls on promotion and
training to ensure that they have a proven and proficient officer corps, they are likely to be
willing to adopt decentralized command arrangements that devolve significant decision-making
authority to those in the field. This devolution enables military units to engage in the
improvisation and initiative required to perform complex operations. While we should still
expect political leaders to seek information about what is happening on the battlefield, we
should not expect to see them restraining commanders from making key operational and
tactical decisions absent headquarters approval. We should also see them pushing to create
integrated and unified command structures that enable rapid decision-making and
coordination across different parts of the military.
Finally, political leaders are likely to implement information management policies that
actively encourage both vertical and horizontal communication within the military and
between political and military leaders. By institutionalizing procedures for horizontal
information sharing, political leaders can ensure that military units are able to disseminate
vital information to one another quickly in battle, improving their ability to communicate in
large-unit and combined arms operations, as well as to improvise and react quickly to
reported changes in the adversary's behavior. By formalizing procedures for vertical
information sharing, political leaders are also likely to ensure that feedback from the
battlefield moves up the chain of command-and makes it to the ears of political
authorities-thereby further prompting changes in promotion patterns or training as needed.
In sum, unit cohesion, proficiency in basic tactics, and execution of complex
operations are most likely in militaries where political leaders actively promote and fire
officers on the basis of military competence; encourage rigorous, realistic, and frequent
training across military units of varying sizes and with different specializations; decentralize
battlefield command; and emphasize vertical, horizontal, and political-military information
sharing about battlefield events. Under these arrangements, high levels of political
intervention in the military should noticeably improve battlefield effectiveness. Examples of
states that implemented these policies-and generated effective armies as a result-include
the Nazis in World War II and the Israelis in 1967.62
To be sure, this list of best practices is not an exhaustive account of all forms of
political intervention that may occur in effective armies; political leaders can and do
implement other policies with respect to these or other areas of military activity. For
example, political leaders make many decisions about military pay and benefits, the military
budget, conscription, and a host of other policies. But as long as political leaders also adopt
best practices in these areas of intervention, their armies should generally perform with
maximum effectiveness.
Deviations from Best Practices
What drives the adoption of different forms of intervention? Why would political
leaders ever adopt anything besides best practices? Political leaders face inherent trade-offs
between protection against external and internal threats. Where leaders prioritize the
military's performance of domestic tasks, such as suppression of dissidents, coup protection,
fighting insurgencies, or state-building, they are likely to deviate from best practices in ways
that harm performance in conventional war against external adversaries. For example,
political leaders may want to use the military as a domestic police force, as a palace guard, or
as an agent of governance to oversee activities like administering local affairs, running
schools, building roads, and managing commercial enterprises.6 This is most obviously the
case in military dictatorships, but even in regimes with nominally civilian leaders, the military
may be the only national institution efficient enough to handle most of the business of the
state.64
Where leaders prioritize these sorts of domestic tasks, they will deviate from the best
practices in political intervention just described. Additionally, even where leaders prioritize
external combat effectiveness, they may have mistaken beliefs about which practices will best
achieve this goal. The conditions under which these deviations might occur are discussed in
more detail at the end of this section, but the key point to keep in mind is that for a variety
of reasons, it is difficult, if not impossible, to systematically predict ex ante the particular
forms of intervention that leaders will choose to adopt. As a result, I focus less on the causes
of deviation from best practices than on the actual content and consequences of such
deviations. What are the alternative models of political intervention that leaders may adopt in
response to internal threats, and in what ways do they impact the components of battlefield
effectiveness?
A dequate Militaries: Mixed Practices and Reduced Efetiveness
In some militaries, political leaders orient their intervention away from best practices
and towards other policies regarding promotions, training, command, and information
6 On the Nazis, see Forster, "The Dynamics of Volkcgemeinschaft..."; Messerschmidt, "German Military
Effectiveness..."; and Williamson Murray, "Net Assessment in Nazi Germany in the 1930s," in Ca/c/daions: Net
Arsessment and t/e Comning of/Wor/d IV ar I, ed. Villiamson Murray and Allan R. Millett (New York: Free Press,
1992), p 85. On the Israelis, see Herzog, The Arab-Isiaeli "ars; and Martin van Creveld, The Swore/and the Oire: a
Critical Histoy o/ the Israeli DIe/nse Force (New York: Public Affairs, 2002).
6 Kristina Mani, "Militaries in Business: State-Making and Entrepreneurship in the Developing World," Armed
Forces and S'ociety, Vol. 33, No. 4 July 2007), p. 591-611.
6 Samuel Finer, The Alan on Horreback: The Role of/be Mi/itary in Politics (New York: Praeger, 1962); and Roman
Kolkowicz and Andrzej Korbon ski, eds.,So/dier,, Peasants, and 13ureaucrats: Civil/-Military Relations in Communnist and
AModernizing Societies (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1982).
policies that the leader may believe afford some protection against internal threats or some
advancement toward internal goals. These changes do not necessarily decimate battlefield
effectiveness, but the need to attend to a mixed set of missions, both internal and external,
does reduce the military's ability to conduct complex operations.
First, civilians in these situations are still involved in shapingpromotionpatterns, but
considerations of political loyalty weigh much more heavily in their decision-making. This
does not mean that merit plays no role in the process, only that merit considerations become
relevant only within a much more narrow pool of politically reliable officers-a pool likely to
be formed on the basis of ascriptive traits, such as race, class, ethnicity, tribe, or regional
background. Political leaders often believe they have to be much more concerned about
these aspects of the officer corps' composition if there is a serious risk of a coup, or if the
military is conducting internal counterinsurgency operations or engaged in repression against
the domestic population.
Whatever the motives, where military leaders are selected based on criteria other than
battlefield performance and experience, the human capital of the officer corps is likely to
suffer. Even if considerations of merit are not irrelevant, this sort of officer corps is
inherently less likely to be able to properly plan and conduct complex operations and is also
unlikely to have the full trust of its soldiers, who may perceive their leaders as dangerously
ill-prepared cronies of the regime. Both of these factors should reduce the ability to conduct
complex operations.
Additionally, when political leaders alter training regimens to bar large-unit or multi-unit
exercises, the military's ability to perform complex operations will degrade further. Political
leaders may implement such restrictions because they believe small-unit skills are less likely
to be useful in a coup, or because they are more relevant to domestic operations. After all,
there is very little need to practice things like division-size maneuvers when conducting a
campaign against guerillas or unarmed dissidents. Such exercises could also provide
opportunities for conspiracy or disguise a coup. But whatever the reason, militaries under
these restrictions are unlikely to develop competence at combined arms operations or other
activities that require practiced coordination across different parts of the military.
Nevertheless, if the military still conducts rigorous, realistic, and frequent training at the
small-unit level, it is likely to retain some basic tactical proficiency, especially if officers are
still chosen with at least some consideration for merit.
Adequate militaries are also likely to have political leaders who increasingly centralize
comimand arrangements. Rather than encouraging devolution of decision-making authority to
battlefield commanders, political leaders are likely to seek to retain control of even basic
tactical activities. As a result, units under this sort of constraint will not be able to conduct
fast-moving complex operations that require initiative and improvisation on the battlefield.
Nevertheless, there is no reason they cannot be proficient in performing pre-planned (and
pre-approved) operations, or why they should not be proficient in performing basic tactics.
Lastly, political leaders under these practices will continue to emphasize the need for
vertical and civil-military communication, but they also may introduce some restrictions on
horizontal communication in the military, thereby worsening inorvation m//anagem/ent. For
example, political leaders may prohibit large gatherings of officers in the absence of political
officials, prohibit the dissemination of information from one unit to another, or monitor all
communications traffic between units. Again, these restrictions may stem from fears that
extensive communication among different military units poses a coup risk to the regime, or
simply from the belief that such communication is not necessary if the military is engaged
only in smaller-scale operations against domestic opponents. Whatever the reason, where
this sort of restriction exists, it is another impediment to conducting complex operations,
even though militaries should still be able to perform basic tactics. Examples of militaries
that fall under this heading include the Egyptian army in 1973 and the Chinese army in the
1979 war against Vietnam.
Mediocre Militaries: Worst Practices and Minimal Effectiveness
What forms of political intervention might cause a military to move even further
down the effectiveness spectrum, to a point where it might remain cohesive but prove
unable to perform even very basic tactics, much less conduct complex operations? This sort
of minimal effectiveness is likely in militaries where political leaders engage in what I call
"worst practices"-more than simply the absence of best practices or a mix of good and bad
practices. Worst practices are a particular series of political interventions regarding
promotion, training, command, and information that all but eliminate the military's
proficiency in even basic tactics, much less complex operations. They may or may not leave
room for a military to retain some basic cohesion, but overall military performance will be
quite poor.
First, regardingpromotionpatterns, political leaders are likely to shift the criterion for
officer selection, promotion, and demotion entirely to political loyalty, and even to select
actively against proven combat prowess. In other words, it is not simply that political leaders
strongly consider ascriptive traits or loyalty in their hiring and firing, but that they actually
seek to reduce or eliminate the presence of competent officers. Political leaders may take this
step because they believe competent officers pose a coup threat, or because they want to
cultivate an officer corps that is more focused on other tasks, such as internal governance.
Whatever the reason, where political leaders are actively intervening in the promotion
process in an attempt to weed out officers with actual military skills, particularly through
widespread purges, battlefield effectiveness will be nearly impossible. The officer corps will
lack the capability to instill even basic tactical skills in their units, much less conduct complex
operations.
Similarly, under worst practices political leaders introduce even stronger restrictions
on training, limiting both large- and small-unit activities. They can take this step for a variety
of reasons. They may be so focused on the use of the military for internal, governance-
related tasks that they consider its development as a combat force, even at the small-unit
level, to be a waste of time. Or, they may fear that the development of any tactical skills,
even at the small-unit level, could present an opportunity for conspiracy or coup. Or, some
leaders may actually want a skilled military force-either for external use, or for internal use
against domestic enemies, including potential coup plotters-but they simply may not
understanding that training is necessary to achieve it. For example, one might suppose that
even leaders who fear coups would still want some part of their military organization to be
well-trained in order to defend them against this threat. But as we will see, this is not always
the case, and training restrictions may persist. This phenomenon speaks again to the highly
contingent relationship between leaders' threat perceptions and their adoption of particular
forms of intervention in the military.
Whatever the driver, where political leaders introduce comprehensive restrictions on
training, limiting both large- and small-unit activities, tactical proficiency is likely to decline
dramatically. Without regular and realistic practice, small units are unlikely to be able to
develop even very basic skills like weapons handling or the use of terrain for cover and
concealment. Without these building blocks, complex operations are impossible, and even
simple operations are likely to be beyond reach. Again, the problem is not that political
authorities are necessarily any more or less involved in the training process than they are
under any other arrangement, but rather that the nature of their involvement prevents the
development of specific skills relevant to external effectiveness.
Under worst practices, political leaders both centralize and fracture command
arrangements. First, they centralize command by locating the majority of military decision-
making authority in their own hands, even regarding tactical matters. In so doing, they retain
personal control over their armies' movements but at the price of commanders' ability to
make decisions and rely on initiative during battle, presenting a major obstacle of the
conduct of complex operations.
Second, political leaders under worst practices fracture their command structures by
purposely dividing whatever decision-making authority is not in their own hands among
multiple commanders. Political leaders may establish several overlapping chains of command
and rotate officers through these commands frequently. They may do this so that none of
the commanders has a big enough force or base of loyalty to overthrow the regime. Or
political leaders may fracture command structures because such arrangements are simply
better suited to internal missions the military needs to perform. For example, it makes sense
for each commander to have a separate, largely-self contained military apparatus with its own
chain of command if its intended use is policing a particular province or fighting insurgents
in a well-defined area.
Whatever the motivation, worst practices in command arrangements are likely to
make the cross-unit coordination at the heart of complex operations essentially impossible.
Absent an integrated command structure, conducting combined arms or interservice military
activities is undoable, even if the manpower and weapons are available.
Finally, in mediocre militaries political leaders also alter their information management
policies to reduce internal military communication and to keep themselves informed of all
officer activities. They implement more severe restrictions on horizontal communications
among officers, backed up with an internally directed intelligence apparatus to detect and
punish any transgressors. While in some sense political leaders are still very interested in
maintaining what we might call civil-military communication, they are mostly seeking
information about the military itself-in particular, its loyalty to the regime and/or its role in
domestic affairs-rather than about the military's capabilities in external conflict.
Indeed, leaders in these circumstances often demonstrate reluctance to hear candid
assessments of the military's external battlefield performance, creating a "shoot the
messenger" climate in which officers are reluctant to report information that they believe
their political leaders do not want to hear. These information management policies
compound the effects of the policies already described regarding personnel, training, and
command, resulting in military units that are likely to be incapable of tactical proficiency,
unable to conduct complex operations, and poorly situated to self-correct these deficiencies
even in the face of battlefield setbacks. Examples of states with these forms of political
intervTention in place include the Soviet Union immediatelv after the purges in the late 1930s,
as well as Republican Spain during the Spanish civil war.'
" On the Soviet Union, see "Attach6 Assessments of the Impact of the 1930s Purges on the Red Army," (no
author) Journal of Soie/ Ailitaiy Studies, Vol. 2 (1989), p. 425; John Brickson, The Soviet I Jhih Command: A Military-
Political History, 1918 -1941 (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001); John E. Jessup, "The Soviet Armed Forces in the
Great Patriotic War, 1941-5," in Murray and Millet, Vol. III, pp. 256-276; and Brian Taylor, Politics and the
Russian A rmly: Civil-iitary Relations, 1689-2000 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). On Republican
Spain, see Helen Graham, The Spanish Civil fair: A Ver S)hor/ Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press,
The only saving grace of mediocre militaries is that their political leaders also choose
to adopt coercive command measures toward soldiers and officers in order to enforce some
cohesion. For example, draftees know they will be caught and punished, soldiers know that
their officers will shoot them if they attempt to flee the battlefield, and officers know they
will be thrown in prison or worse if they lose a battle. As a result, once in battle these sorts
of militaries are likely to continue offering at least token resistance to the enemy, even when
they know they lack the tactical skills needed to do so effectively. In this sense, units may
remain somewhat cohesive even when they are operating under an otherwise pathological
model of political intervention. This is not to say they are skilled or have much hope of
prevailing-important sources of strong cohesion in adequate and excellent militaries-only
that they are unlikely to desert or refuse to fight.
Poor Militaries: Worst Practices and Total Ineffectiveness
Theoretically, there is a distinction between militaries that can maintain cohesion
even in the absence of tactical proficiency (mediocre militaries, on the spectrum of the
dependent variable) and those that have neither cohesion nor tactical proficiency (poor
militaries). Empirically, however, this is a very fine line. There is little reason for units to
remain cohesive when they know themselves and their commanders to be tactically inept, as
would be the case in almost any military whose political leaders had adopted the "worst
practices" just described.
The only question is whether political leaders choose to coerce their own soldiers
and officers into continued fighting. Where soldiers and officers enjoy impunity even if they
avoid military service, flee the battlefield, or refuse to engage in combat, cohesion is likely to
collapse entirely. This is the crucial difference between the third and fourth models of
political intervention. In this final forms, the military actually can be said to be totally
ineffective-lacking the ability to conduct complex operations, to perform basic tactics, or
to maintain even a shred of cohesion. These are the truly terrible militaries or military units
that simply break and collapse when they encounter the adversary. Some units from both the
Iraqi military in 2003 and the Argentine military in 1982 fall into this category.
Summary ojH ypotheses
The chart below summarizes the main implications of the theory for battlefield
effectiveness in states with different forms of political intervention in the military. It is
important to note that there are ideal-types, and no military is likely to fit perfectly in a single
box. However, in the analysis of a given military, and particularly in the analysis of specific
military units, it is possible to establish the presence or absence of particular forms of
intervention regarding each of the four sets of military activities. When the majority of
indicators for a particular category are present, we can generate a prediction about the likely
resulting performance on the battlefield.
Generally speaking, the more of a military's units are subject to best practices, the
higher the overall battlefield effectiveness of that military should be. Additionally, if and
when political leaders shift their forms of intervention over time, there should be observable
shifts in battlefield effectiveness. Certainly, some changes can occur faster than others. For
example, political leaders can change commanders relatively quickly (even during a battle),
but it takes more time to alter training practices. As a result, although it is possible to predict
2005); Helen Graham, The Spanirh Republic at War, 1936-1939 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002);
and Gerald Howson, Armisfor Apain: The Untold Story oftbe Spanish Civil War (London: J. Murray, 1998).
the general direction of the change in effectiveness that should occur following a shift in the
forms of political intervention, there are likely to be differences in the speed of that shift
depending on the specific changes made.
THE THEORY
Independent Variable: Dependent Variable:
Forms of Political Intervention in the Military Battlefield Effectiveness
EXCELLENT Militaes:
Best Practices and Maximum Effectiveness
* Promotion: based on competence Highly cohesive
e Training: rigorous, realistic, frequent, both large- and small- Tactically proficient
unit e Capable of complex
* Command: decentralized operations
e Information: vertical and horizontal, political-military
communications all strongly encouraged
ADEQUATE Militaries:
Mixed Practices and Redueed Effectiveness
" Promotion: based on a mix of competence and political loyalty Cohesive
e Training: rigorous, realistic, but restrictions on large-unit Tactically proficient
training No complex operations
* Command: increasingly centralized
" Information: horizontal communications monitored and at
least partially restricted
MEDIOCRE Militaries:
Worst Practices and Minimal E&ffectiveness
e Promotion: based entirely on political loyalty, with active 0 Somewhat cohesive
selection against competence; purges likely Not tactically proficient
e Training: restrictions on both large- and small-unit training No complex operations
" Command: highly centralized and fractured, plus strong
coercive measures in the field
e Information: horizontal communications heavily restricted,
shoot the messenger problem, large internally directed
intelligence apparatus
POO R Militaries:
Worst Practices and No Effectiveness
" Same practices as mediocre militaries, minus coercive Not cohesive
command measures in the field * Not tactically proficient
No complex operations
Given these caveats, it is possible to establish some broad hypotheses about the sort
of variation that should exist if the theory just espoused is correct, versus the variation we
should see if the other theories already discussed-those focused on the roles of wealth,
demography, external threat, regime type, culture and society, and civil-military relations
are correct. Figure 1 (see Figures & Maps) provides a concise list of each theory's hypotheses
about the existence and likely nature of the three types of variation in battlefield
effectiveness: cross-national; sub-national, over time; and sub-national, across different
military units. In the last row is a list of hypotheses about the sort of variation we should see
if the theory focused on political intervention in the military over the military is correct.
With these broad hypotheses established, it is possible to move toward a research
design that enables us to test them against one another. I describe such a design in the fifth
and final section of this chapter. First, though, it is important to address the question of the
why leaders choose particular forms of intervention, and also to discuss my strategy my
strategy for measuring the variables discussed in these hypotheses.
Choosing Different Forms of Intervention
If the choice of how to intervene reflects leaders' beliefs about the nature and
severity of internal and external threats, is it possible simply to examine other variables that
might correlate with the threat environment, in order to predict the state's likely battlefield
effectiveness? For example, is it the case that autocratic leaders, leaders of poorer nations, or
leaders from particular cultures have an inherent tendency to select into or away from best
practices in intervention? Or is it possible that different forms of political intervention
simply stem from the threat environment?
In a word: no. Leaders' choice of intervention practices is highly contingent and not
easily predicted ex ante by examining other large structural variables in a given case. The
choice of how to direct their political intervention depends fundamentally on leaders'
perceptions of both the nature and relative intensity of internal and external threats, and on
their beliefs about which practices generate effectiveness.66 So if we have perfect information
about these threats, and more importantly about how leaders perceive these threats and the
appropriate responses to them, then we might be able to make some educated guesses about
the forms of political intervention they will adopt.
But three problems complicate the process of making such guesses. First, leaders
themselves often have inaccurate information, leading them to miscalculate which forms of
political intervention are optimal. Second, the mix of threats facing states is sometimes so
intense and diverse that there is no single, optimal set of practices that leaders necessarily
should be expected to adopt.6 Third, even arrangements that are optimal when adopted may
become less optimal over time but prove "sticky" or resistant to change. Hence it is hard to
predict forms of political intervention solely by examining the broad features of a given case
at a particular point in time.
First, as mentioned, leaders' perceptions of the threat environment can frequently be
wrong, and in a variety of ways. At times leaders inflate internal threats, optimizing their
political intervention to fight imaginary domestic enemies, while at other times they optimize
it for external battlefield performance but leave themselves vulnerable to overthrow or
" This idea draws on the work on alliance decisions in Steven R. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment,"
Forld Politics, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Jan. 1991), pp. 233-256; and Steven R. David, Choosinga'ides: A/i gnment and
Realignment in the Third IF'orld (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), vhich in turn draws on
Stephen M. Walt, The Origins o0/ //liances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).
6 For many states, of course, there is a large margin of error in deciding which practices to adopt, at least in
terms of the consequences for battlefield effectiveness against external adversaries. In much of the world, the
chances of a challenge to the state's external borders is minimal. On these questions, see Tanisha M. Fazal, )State
Death: the Politics and Gegraphy of Con quest, Occupation, and Annexation (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2007); Jeff Herbst, "War and the State in Africa," InternationalSecnrity, Vol. 14, No. 4 (1990), pp. 117-139;
Herbert Howe, Amllbln1ous Order- Military Forces in Ap-ican States (London: Lynne Rienner, 2005); David R. Mares,
ed., Civil-Military Relations: Building DIemocracy and Regional S'ecnrity il Iatin America, Southern A sia, and Central Europe
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1998); and Paul Sigmund, "Approaches to the Study of the Military in Latin
America," Comlparative Politics, Vol. 26 (1993), pp. 111-122.
unrest at home. For instance, Stalin and Mao both seem to have over-estimated the internal
threats they faced while under-estimating external ones. In the late 1930s, Stalin engaged in
extensive purges of the officer corps to protect himself against coups, even though decades
of subsequent historical research have been unable to uncover credible evidence of a military
plot to overthrow him, and other evidence suggests that the general population's support for
his rule was actually quite robust, despite his beliefs otherwise.68 Stalin's dismantling of the
officer corps is all the more puzzling because it occurred at a time when the Soviet Union
was diplomatically isolated and facing dire threats in both the east (Nazi Germany) and the
west (imperial Japan)-an environment that should have produced strong incentives for best
practices in terms of political intervention toward the military. Similarly, at the height of the
Cold War, China faced potentially existential threats from both the United States and the
Soviet Union. But Mao chose to disrupt the external focus of the PLA and use the army to
engage in state-building, while also relying on it to destroy the regime's domestic political
opponents-even though there is, again, little credible evidence that of actual threats to
Mao's rule.69
Other leaders have made the opposite mistake, under-estimating internal threats and
over-estimating external ones. Despite being surrounded by countries still reeling from
World War 1, for example, Hitler believed that Germany had to engage in a highly revisionist
and risky foreign policy in order to be secure. Meanwhile, although he himself had engaged
in a putsch attempt in the 1920s, Hitler apparently was not as well protected from this threat
as he could have been-his own officers nearly succeeded in killing him in 1944.70 Mussolini,
too, for some reason believed that the greatest dangers he faced were British and American
domination of the Mediterranean, even though what actually removed him from power was
a revolt of his officers in 1943.71
All of this is to say that calculating threats is hard, and leaders often don't do it as
well as historians. This reality makes it difficult to predict what forms of intervention leaders
will adopt, even if we have significant information about the threat environment and about
other large structural factors such as regime type. Other things being equal, of course, we
might expect that leaders of wealthy, Western democracies would be less likely to face
internal threats, and therefore less likely to adopt worst practices in political intervention.
But other things often aren't equal, and where democratic leaders adopt worst practices, we
should expect to see the same results found in autocratic regimes that adopt such measures.
One might in fact argue that this was exactly the result seen in some of the more notorious
instances in which democratic armies turned in disappointing battlefield performances:
interwar France, Republican Spain, or early post-independence India.
( David Glantz, Stamiling Colossus: The Red Army on the Ive o/ forld IW'ar (Lawrence, KS: University Press of
Kansas, 1998); and Donald Cameron Watt, "The High Command: Who Plotted against Whom? Stalin's Purge
of the Soviet High Command Revisited," Journal/ o et Mi/itary Atudies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1990), pp. 46-65; and
Earl F. Ziemke, "The Soviet Armed Forces in the Interwar Period," in Murray and Millet, Vol. 1I, pp. 1-38.
)( Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, Mao's Last Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 2006);
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By the same token, democracies do not have a monopoly on regime consolidation.
Some autocratic leaders have presided over highly legitimate, well-functioning states that
have had relatively little need to devote security resources to internal tasks. One could argue
that Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi Germany, and North Vietnam all fell into this category.
Where autocratic leaders adopt best practices in political intervention over the military, we
should expect very high levels of battlefield effectiveness, comparable to any democracy with
the same resources. In both scenarios, the key point is that the forms of intervention
themselves, adopted in response to leaders' perceptions of the threat environment, drive the
key variations in battlefield performance. But there is not a necessary correlation between
the choice of particular forms of intervention and the large structural variables often
examined in studies of military performance.
Furthermore, as mentioned, even where leaders correctly perceive the threat
environment they face, there may be no objectively optimal configuration of practices that
can protect them from both internal and external dangers simultaneously. Some states may
face such a diverse array of both internal and external challenges that any arrangement
adopted to cope with some of these problems creates vulnerabilities to others. In a situation
where all options are equally bad, there is no way to make a reasonable prediction about
which forms of intervention a leader should or will adopt.
Lastly, even if we believe that leaders' perceptions of the threat environment are
perfectly accurate at some initial point in time, leaders can choose the wrong forms of
intervention in response, or the chosen forms can outlive their usefulness. Like many other
institutional arrangements, political-military relations can be "sticky"-they may be optimal
or rational at the time they are adopted, but they can become very difficult to change even
when the threat environment warrants a shift. Indeed, a large literature suggests that external
threats at the time of state formation lock in particular domestic institutional arrangements,
particularly those related to military organization, and there is no reason to believe that
internal threats could not have the same effects. -2So, for example, leaders may adopt forms
of intervention designed to guard against a particular type of internal threat but then find
that external threats grow unexpectedly, and faster than they can reorient their military
organizations to cope with them. Or the reverse may happen.
For all of these reasons, my approach focuses directly on the forms of intervention
themselves and on their consequences for battlefield effectiveness, rather than on the highly
contingent and sometimes opaque processes that lead to the adoption of those forms.
Where leaders deviate from or gravitate toward the best practices described above, there
should be observable consequences for wartime performance. It is these consequences that
the empirical research investigates.
IV. Research Design
Measuring and Coding the Vaiables ofInterest
2 Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics,"
International Oganization, Vol. 32, No. 4 (1978), pp. 881-911; Otto Hintze, "Military Organization and the
Organization of the State," in Felix Gilbert, ed., The 1Historica/Essay's of/Otto Hintze (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1975); Charles Tilly, Coer/on, Capital, and Enropean States, Ad 990- 1992 (Cambridge, NIA:
Blackwell, 1992); and Charles Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making," in Charles Tilly,
ed., The Form,,ation of NationalStates in JKestern Einrope (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).
Before we can test any of the above claims against possible competing explanations,
we have to be able to measure the variables of interest. Above all, we need a satisfying way
to measure battlefield effectiveness-some means of actually tracking variation in unit
cohesion, tactical proficiency, and the ability to perform complex operations. In this section
I explain why qualitative indicators best enable us to gather meaningful information about
the components of the dependent variable. I then turn to possible means of measuring the
independent variables of interest, again concluding that qualitative evidence is most useful.
In order to measure battlefield effectiveness some studies rely on the loss-exchange
ratio of the two sides-attacker casualties divided by defender casualties.73 This figure serves
as both a definition and a measure of battlefield effectiveness; the two are treated as
synonymous. The side that is most effective is, by definition in these studies, the side that
suffers the least casualties, adjusting for the fact that offense is almost always a more
casualty-intensive endeavor than defense.
Unfortunately, measures of the dependent variable based on battle deaths sometimes
obscure as much as they reveal, even when they are adjusted to account for differences in
states' material resources or the sizes of the armies they field for particular wars.74 Battle
deaths as a measure of effectiveness present the classic inferential problem of observational
equivalence: very different actions produce the same observed result in terms of casualties,
making casualties a poor way of detecting the phenomena of interest. For example, low
casualties may result from the ability to conduct sophisticated operations that shield soldiers
from their enemies' firepower, which many observers pinpoint as the cause of the extremely
low American casualties in the Gulf War.75 But low casualties also can result from armies
surrendering, retreating, or simply collapsing in the face of enemy contact, which occurred in
the South Korean army after the invasion from the North in 1950.76 Likewise, high casualties
can result from incompetent armies repeatedly attempting the same ill-advised tactics, which
many observers blame for the extraordinarily high number of battle deaths suffered by the
belligerents on the Western front in World War I. But high casualties can also result from
very skilled units motivated to fight to the death, as the Wehrmacht proved in the winter of
1944-45.7 In short, whether armies' battle deaths are high or less tells us very little about
how cohesive, tactically proficient, and operationally sophisticated that army is, in the
absence of any other contextual information.
7 For example, Biddle and Long, "Democracy and Military Effectiveness"; and Beckley, "Economic
Development and Military Effectiveness."
74 For a detailed discussion of quantitative measures of battlefield effectiveness and why I choose not to use
them, please see Appendix A.
SFor a discussion of these issues, see Daryl Press, "Lessons from Ground Combat in the Gulf," International
Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 137-146; Stephen Biddle, "Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War
Tells Us about the Future of Conflict," InternationalSecurity, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996) pp. 139-179; Stephen
Biddle, "The Gulf War Debate Redux" InternationalSecurity, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 163-174; and
Thomas G. Mahnken and Barry D. Watts, "What the Gulf War Can (and Cannot) tell Us about the Future of
Warfare," InternationalSecurity, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997) pp. 151 -162.
-' Korea Institute of Military History, The Korean Ifar, IVol. 1, Allan Millett, ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 2000-2001).
Trevor Dupuv, David Bongard, and Richard Anderson, Hit/er's Last Gamble: the Battle oJthe Bulge, December
1944 january 1945 (New York: Harper Collins, 1994); and Charles MacDonald, A Timefor JTrumpets: the Untold
Story ofthe Battle ofthe Bii/kie (New York: Morrow, 1985).
78 On the value of context-dependent evidence, see Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and
Theory Derelopment in the Social)Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), p. 19.
Because of these problems, I choose to rely on qualitative rather than quantitative
measures of the dependent variable. Specifically, I want to gather evidence to answer the
questions listed earlier as indicators of the three components of the dependent variable: unit
cohesion, tactical proficiency, and complex operations. I seek to answer these questions with
respect to individual military units of a variety of sizes ranging from corps- and division-level
down to brigades and battalions. What I am seeking to detect are changes in the
performance of units over time or variation in the performance of different units within the
same war, campaign, or battle, as well as overall differences in military performance between
one state and another. Another advantage of qualitative measurement of the dependent
variable is that it enables me to gather data from these sorts of heterogeneous units of
observation-that is to say, evidence that would be aggregated and lost in quantitative
measurements that require a homogeneous unit of observation, such as a single army
fighting a single war.79
What about measuring the independent variable, political intervention in the
military? To do this, the case studies examine the nature of political intervention both over
time and across units, in the context of particular cases. 80 Specifically, the empirical research
looks for answers to the following questions:
[SEE NEXT PAGE]
7 For more discussion of this point, particularly in regards to existing datasets of battle deaths, please see
Appendix A.
80 There are some existing quantitative measures of political intervention in the military, and it is important to
understand why none of these actually captures the variation of interest to this study. Interested readers are
directed to Appendix B.
CODING THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:
POLITICAL INTERVENTION IN THE MILITARY
Regarding Promotion Patterns
What are the primary criteria for promotion in the senior officer corps, junior officer corps,
NCO corps, and among enlisted personnel?
What is the relative weight given to political loyalty versus demonstrated military
competence in the promotion process?
How important are sectarian background and/or ideological credentials for advancement?
Is a strong performance in training or on the battlefield good or bad for an officer's
prospects for advancement? What happens to commanders who preside over battlefield
disasters?
Are there-mass firings that amount to purges, and if so, how often do they occur?
Regarding Training Regimens
Which skills are emphasized in training?
What size units engage in training exercises? Is it all small-unit, or are there efforts to
practice coordination of large-unit activities?
Is training rigorous and intensive, or largely perfunctory? Does specialized training occur?
Is training realistic? How closely does it mirror the battlefield environment? Are there live-
fire exercises?
Does the content of training remain static, or does it evolve in response to new information
from the battlefield?
Are training commands run by experienced and competent officers?
Regarding Command Arrangements
Are there clear, institutionalized procedures for conveying orders during battle?
To what extent does command authority reside with those not present on the battlefield?
For example, how many layers of approval are required before commanders can execute a
tactical decision?
Are command arrangements generally described as prioritizing central oversight of
battlefield developments, or as devolving authority to officers in the field?
Are there "dual command" arrangements, for example, commissars alongside regular
officers who are given a veto over battlefield decisions?
Are officers ever fired or shuffled among commands, and if so why?
What punishment do deserters face, if any?
Regarding Information Management
Are separate units fighting on the same battlefield regularly able to communicate with one
another via horizontal channels?
Are political leaders regularly updated on battlefield events as they happen, via vertical
channels of communication?
How often do military and political leaders interact, and what is the format and substance of
their communication?
Are commanders encouraged to deliver candid assessments of battlefield performance to
political leaders?
Is there an internally directed intelligence gathering organization that reports on the military
to political leaders?
With these and the other indicators in mind, it is possible to trace qualitatively both
the causes and effects of the forms of political intervention outlined in the theory, and to
compare the influence of those mechanisms on battlefield effectiveness to the impact of the
variables emphasized in other theories. After all, the argument I have presented is about
causal processes, not simply causal effects.8i Therefore I seek not just to test the general
direction and strength of the relationship between my variables-akin to the logic of cross-
tabulations and regression, or congruence tests-but also to test whether the actual steps
constituting that relationship are in fact what I have theorized them to be-a different logic
that Brady and Collier have called a "causal process observation."2 This is exactly the
situation in which qualitative work is most useful.
Case Selection
If battlefield effectiveness is about "what states do with what they have," then the
most important feature of the research design should be holding constant "what states have"
in the face of variation in the factors of interest. As mentioned, there are three kinds of
variation in the dependent variable that can provide analytical leverage: variation in the
performance of the same military across time, variation across the units of a particular
military at a particular point in time, and variation between one nation's military and another.
The first two kinds of variation are within-country, which almost automatically holds
constant demography and culture, and usually wealth and regime type. In these sorts of cases
it is easier to pinpoint variation in what states do with what they have, because what they
have-their key resources, wealth and demography-are held constant, as are at least some
of the other variables usually said to influence effectiveness.
The third kind of variation is cross-national, however, making differences in
resources (as well as the other variables said to matter for translating resources into fighting
power) much more likely to arise.8 Such variation has the potential to confound the analysis,
because gaps in resources rather than differing values of my independent and intervening
variables might explain most of the apparent differences in performance.
The key to solving this problem in cross-national comparisons is to examine states
trying to undertake similar tasks on the battlefield with similar material endowments. Such
comparisons are a bit harder to control than within-country comparisons, but they also
expand the theory's potential generalizability. As a result, my research design seeks to
examine militaries that, taken individually, provide opportunities to probe the two kinds of
within-country variation, and, taken collectively, also provide opportunities for cross-
national comparison.
Thus, to the extent possible I seek to hold constant within and across cases the other
non-material variables said to explain effectiveness: regime type, external threats, culture and
society, and the general level of military autonomy or civilian control (though not the
specific forms of political intervention). Where I cannot hold these other variables constant,
I at least seek to find cases where the values of these variables are not an obvious
8 In other words, I am not attempting to prove a covering law. I do posit that certain values on the
independent variable regularly lead to certain values on the dependent variable, but the theory is really about
the intervening causal mechanisms by which this process happens. Alexander George and Andrew Bennett,
Case Studies and Theog Dere/opment in the Socialciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), pp. 12, 134-6, 207.
12 Henry Brady and David Collier, Rethlikin, SocialJniy: Dilere Tools, Shared Standards (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2004).
3 On the value of within-country versus cross-national comparison, and the difficulties of the latter, see
George and Bennett, Case Studies.
explanation for the state's battlefield effectiveness, in order to avoid the aforementioned
problem of overdetermination. For example, if regime type varies between two states, but
the more autocratic state is more effective on the battlefield, then the variation in regime
type, though it clearly exists, cannot be the explanation for variation in the dependent
variable. This sort of puzzle would actually make the case more rather than less valuable as a
potential target of analysis.
In order to pick cases, I began by identifying all instances of interstate conventional
wars during the period 1945-1991. I selected 1945 as a starting date because the style of
warfare on which I based the definitions of the dependent variable had clearly emerged by
the end of World War II. I selected 1991 as an end date simply because that is the cut-off
point for the Correlates of War (COW) dataset, the most widely used standardized listing of
wars in the social sciences. From the COW data, I composed an initial list of conflicts that
had caused more than 1,000 battle deaths. In several instances I broke up into multiple
observations conflicts that COW listed as single wars. For example, COW lists the Korean
War as a single conflict, when it is probably better understood as 3 distinct wars: a war
between North and South Korea following the North's invasion; a war between North
Korean troops and the United States, leading a coalition that included South Korean forces;
and a war between the United States and Chinese forces, leading a coalition that included
North Korean troops. I engaged in this procedure to make the units of observation as
similar, fine-grained, and numerous as possible.
I also put the data in dyadic form, that is, I converted each observation into a pair in
which one state was fighting another. In instances where allied forces were under a truly
integrated command structure (for example, the United States and its partners in the Korean
War, or Lebanon and Syria in 1948), I aggregated the data and listed the leader of the
coalition. This procedure produced 35 dyads, although some of them repeat a single country
fighting the same war more than once, because that country fought multiple opponents. The
dyads are listed in chronological order in the chart below.
POTENTIAL CASES:
Pairs of States Engaged in Conventional Interstate Wars, 1945-1991
(Year listed is initialyear of the war.)
1. Pakistan vs. India, 1947
2. Israel vs. Lebanon, 1948
3. Israel vs. Jordan, 1948
4. Israel vs. Egypt, 1948
5. South Korea vs. North Korea, 1950
6. United States vs. North Korea, 1950
7. United States vs. China, 1950
8. Israel vs. Egypt, 1956
9. USSR vs. Hungary, 1956
10. South Vietnam vs. North Vietnam, 1961
11. China vs. India, 1962
12. United States vs. North Vietnam, 1965
13. Pakistan vs. India, 1965
14. Israel vs. Jordan, 1967
15. Israel vs. Syria, 1967
16. Israel vs. Egypt, 1967
17. Israel vs. Egypt, 1969
18. El Salvador vs. Honduras, 1969
19. India vs. Pakistan in the West, 1971
20. India vs. Pakistan in the East, 1971
21. Israel vs. Syria, 1973
22. Israel vs. Egypt, 1973
23. Israel vs. Iraq, 1973
24. Turkey vs. Cyprus, 1974
25. South Vietnam vs. North Vietnam, 1975
26. Ethiopia vs. Somalia, 1977
27. Tanzania vs. Uganda and Libya, 1978
28. Vietnam vs. Cambodia, 1978
29. Vietnam vs. China, 1979
30. Iran vs. Iraq, 1980
31. Israel vs. Syria, 1982
32. United Kingdom vs. Argentina, 1982
33. Vietnam vs. China, 1987
34. Iraq vs. Kuwait, 1990
35. Iraq vs. United States, 1991
In order to select actual case studies from this long list, I conducted initial research
on each war and ruled out conflicts in which the apparent values of the dependent variable
for one or both of the states seemed easily predicted by the existing literature.84 So, for
example, I eliminated from consideration all of the dyads involving Israel, a democracy,
outfighting its generally poor, autocratic, Arab neighbors. The outcomes of these cases, as
discussed, seem overdetermined, making the cases of limited methodological utility for my
purposes. For similar reasons, I also removed from consideration the wars between India
and Pakistan, as democracy and wealth seemed again to be major confounding variables that
could explain the variation in the two countries' battlefield effectiveness.
To be clear, if the argument I have presented is correct, differing forms of political
intervention in the military are probably still a very important driver of variations in the
battlefield effectiveness between Israel and the Arab states, and between India and Pakistan.
And in fact, these could be useful cases to examine in additional research. But for the
purpose of initially testing the theory, these dyads do not provide the sort of clean, strong
tests that would lead to clear support for or rejection of my argument, because they make it
very hard to isolate the variable of interest, political intervention, from major other factors
that are said to influence effectiveness. Hence my methodological decision to remove them
from consideration, which reduced the number of dyads to 19, as shown below.
POTENTIAL CASES:
Pairs of States Engaged in Conventional Interstate Wars, 1945-1991
1. South Korea vs. North Korea, 1950
2. United States vs. North Korea, 1950
3. United States vs. China, 1950
8 In addition to all of the empirical sources already cited in this chapter, my primary resource in learning about
wars with which I was not familiar was Clodfelter, 'ar/are and/1Armed Con/i/ct.
4. USSR vs. Hungary, 1956
5. South Vietnam vs. North Vietnam, 1961
6. China vs. India, 1962
7. United States vs. North Vietnam, 1965
8. El Salvador vs. Honduras, 1969
9. Turkey vs. Cyprus, 1974
10. South Vietnam vs. North Vietnam, 1975
11. Ethiopia vs. Somalia, 1977
12. Tanzania vs. Uganda and Libya, 1978
13. Vietnam vs. Cambodia, 1978
14. Vietnam vs. China, 1979
15. Iran vs. Iraq, 1980
16. United Kingdom vs. Argentina, 1982
17. Vietnam vs. China, 1987
18. Iraq vs. Kuwait, 1990
F 19. Iraq vs. United States, 1991
I then sought to narrow the list further by examining the length of the remaining
wars. I ruled out extremely short wars that lasted only a few days or weeks and contained
only a very small number of engagements, because they offered little or no opportunity to
test my claim that there should be over-time variation in battlefield effectiveness given shifts
in the forms of political intervention. Again, this does not mean that my theory does not
necessarily apply to short wars, only that such wars usually offer the chance for only one
initial reading of the value of the independent variable, when it would be much more
methodologically useful to have cases that could allow us to probe the effects of multiple
values of the independent variable over time in the same state, where other potential
confounding variables still would be held constant. This limitation left the following list of
viable cases.
POTENTIAL CASES:
Pairs of States Engaged in Conventional Interstate Wars, 1945-1991
1. South Korea vs. North Korea
2. United States vs. North Korea, 1950
3. United States vs. China, 1950
4. South Vietnam vs. North Vietnam, 1961
5. United States vs. North Vietnam, 1965
6. South Vietnam vs. North Vietnam, 1975
7. Ethiopia vs. Somalia, 1977
8. Tanzania vs. Uganda and Libya, 1978
9. Vietnam vs. Cambodia, 1978
10. Vietnam vs. China, 1979
11. Iran vs. Iraq, 1980
12. United Kingdom vs. Argentina, 1982
13. Iraq vs. United States, 1991
From this list of 13, I then began to rule out cases for which there simply were not
adequate sources to reliably gauge the values of the key variables, especially the independent
variable. This consideration eliminated the wars in Africa and the wars involving China and
Vietnam in which the United States played no role, narrowing the list further.
POTENTIAL CASES:
Pairs of States Engaged in Conventional Interstate Wars, 1945-1991
1. South Korea vs. North Korea
2. United States vs. North Korea, 1950
3. United States vs. China, 1950
4. South Vietnam vs. North Vietnam, 1961
5. United States vs. North Vietnam, 1965
6. South Vietnam vs. North Vietnam, 1975
7. Iran vs. Iraq, 1980
8. United Kingdom vs. Argentina, 1982
9. Iraq vs. United States, 1991
From the remaining list of 9 cases, I began to consider which ones seemed especially
puzzling in light of the existing theories of military effectiveness. Two dyads immediately
stood out: South Korea vs. North Korea during 1950, and South Vietnam vs. North
Vietnam during the period 1961-1975. These pairs of participants seemed to display
significant variation in their fighting capabilities despite being "separated at birth" and
having extremely similar values for all the variables cited in existing theories. There is no
obvious theoretical explanation for the variation in their performance, although communism
was one potentially important difference between the two sides of the dyad in each of those
wars.
Another conflict that seemed to radically confound the predictions of the existing
theories was the Iran-Iraq War: despite being economically weaker, less populous, more
autocratic, and culturally Arab, Iraq was ultimately arguably more effective on the battlefield
than Iran.
The Korean War after American entry also seemed to pose two anomalies. The
United States, an economically advanced democracy, was at different points in the war
arguably outfought by both North Korea and China, highly autocratic regimes with minimal
levels of economic development.
The remaining observations were less intuitively puzzling. The Falklands War and
the Gulf War both involved large Western democracies steamrolling poorer autocracies (in
the latter case, an autocracy with an Arab culture as well). Meanwhile, the course of the
United States' war against North Vietnam seemed to stem at least in part from the doctrinal
mismatch problem already discussed in this chapter, making it a less useful opportunity to
examine battlefield effectiveness in conventional operations, especially prior to 1968.
Given all of these considerations, the cases that seemed most worth further
examination were North Korea vs. South Korea, North Vietnam vs. South Vietnam, Iran vs.
Iraq, the United States vs. North Korea, and the United States vs. China. Out of these cases,
I chose to examine North vs. South Vietnam and Iran vs. Iraq. I made this decision primarily
because these wars were longest with the most diverse array of military units taking on
different types of operations, enabling me to test my hypotheses more thoroughly.
Additionally, more detailed information was available about both sides of both of these wars,
enabling me to wring the maximum amount of data out of the examination of single wars.
Lastly, all four of these states were non-democratic, and all experienced high levels of
political intervention into their militaries as they fought large-scale ground wars. These
commonalities make the cross-national-and, as will be discussed below, sub-national-
variation in their battlefield effectiveness all the more puzzling. According to existing
theories of effectiveness, there should have been very little variation of any type across or
within these four states. Indeed, as the chart below suggests, these two pairs of states are
remarkably closely matched along the dimensions said to matter for battlefield effectiveness.
To the extent that the pairs were "mismatched," i.e., they had different values for any
of the independent variables of interest, these differences deepen rather than resolve the
puzzle of variation in their battlefield effectiveness. For example, North Vietnam was more
authoritarian than South Vietnam-a factor that should have hindered the generation of
military power-yet it produced a more effective army. Similarly, Iraq had a smaller
population and a pervasive Arab culture-both factors that existing theories predict should
hinder performance-yet it ultimately proved far more innovative and tactically proficient
than its more populous Persian adversary, Iran.
THE CASES
North Vietnam vs. Iraq vs. Iran, 1980-88
South Vietnam, 1961-1975
Wealth Roughly equal levels of economic Roughly equal levels of economic
development and human capital development and human capital;
Iran wealthier
Demography Roughly equal populations Iranian population three times that
of Iraq
Regime Type Both autocratic, North more so Both autocratic, Iraq more so than
than South Iran
External High for both, but higher for High for both
threats South
Culture and Not identical, but very similar Different: Iraq Arab, Iran Persian
Society___________________
Civil-military Similar: extensive political Similar: extensive political
relations intervention in the armed forces in intervention in the armed forces in
both societies both societies
As the chart emphasizes, this case selection strategy deliberately tries to move away
from the sorts of cases whose values of the dependent variable are over-determined-the
kind that dominate much of the existing effectiveness literature. It moves the study of
ineffectiveness out of the Arab world, to southeast Asia; and it moves the study of
effectiveness away from rich, western democracies, to autocracies, including an Arab
autocracy in the Middle East. It tries to explain the cases that need explaining.
Structured, Focused Comparisons Using Primay Documents
To examine political intervention and battlefield effectiveness in these four states,
the empirical chapters rely extensively on primary documents, often ones not examined in
existing work on these wars. For the Vietnam cases, the documents include from U.S.
military and civilian records, translated histories and captured papers, contemporary news
accounts, biographies, memoirs, and secondary material. For the Iran-Iraq cases, the
documents include recently released and translated records and audio tapes captured from
the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, in addition to declassified U.S. documents on the war
and secondary material. In general, the approach was to "triangulate" the questions of
interest using multiple sources wherever possible.
Each comparison begins with an overview of the war, explaining the puzzle of
battlefield effectiveness in more detail for the particular case and discussing the inadequacy
of the existing theoretically-driven explanations in accounting for all the observed variation.
Then, drawing on documentary sources, the chapters establish the values of the independent
variable for the armies of both sides. After coding each regime's forms of political
intervention according to the criteria set out above, the chapters generate predictions about
how each side should have performed in battle if the theory is correct. They also pay
particular attention to identifying what would count as disconfirming evidence.
Then the study turns to a close examination of the battles each pair of states fought.
I discuss the selection of battles in more detail in the chapters, but the general principle was
to cover all of the major ground battles for each war in which third parties did not play a
major role. So, for example, the chapters avoid focusing a great deal of attention on Vietnam
War battles that involved large numbers of U.S. combat troops, or Iran-Iraq War battles that
involved large Kurdish forces. In so doing, the analysis is able to eliminate a major potential
confounding variable and further isolate the possible impact of political intervention. The
chapters also seek to examine a range of battles that fully captures each military on both the
offense and defense.
For each battle, the chapters provide basic background, a discussion of the tactical
orientation and goals of each side, the weapons and manpower of each, and their losses.
After relaying the battle's major events, the chapters then code each military according to the
three components of battlefield effectiveness: unit cohesion, tactical proficiency, and the
ability to conduct complex operations. The chapters then compare these outcomes with
those predicted based on the theory. Each chapter also addresses case-specific alternative
explanations beyond those generated by the existing theoretical literature.
Overview of the Findings
The empirical evidence generally provides strong support for the political
intervention explanation. The comparison of North and South Vietnam offers an instance in
which two states should have performed very similarly in war but in fact displayed
tremendous cross-national and within-country variation. As mentioned in the Introduction,
South Vietnamese leaders generally adopted worst practices in political intervention, which
accounts for their poor performance against the North Vietnamese, despite the fact that the
two countries had almost identical levels of economic development, the same size
populations, similar colonial legacies, and very high stakes in the war.
If anything, in fact, the stakes in the war were higher for South Vietnam, and it
should have performed especially well given the massive infusion of American aid it
received. But the empirical evidence reveals that the ways in which South Vietnamese leaders
intervened in their military consistently foiled battlefield effectiveness. Meanwhile, the forms
of North Vietnamese intervention, though no less extensive or "political," had the opposite
effect and maximized fighting power.
Interestingly, however, where South Vietnamese political leaders varied their forms
of intervention-notably, with respect to the 1" Division, which was consistently subjected
to mixed or best practices rather than worst practices-battlefield effectiveness was much
better. Indeed, an analysis of the major battles of the war shows that the 1" Division's
military performance proved to be virtually indistinguishable from that of North Vietnamese
units. This convergence suggests just how differently the war could have turned out, and
how much sooner it could have ended, had South Vietnamese leaders adopted best practices
with respect to their entire military rather than a single division. It is open to question, of
course, why South Vietnamese leaders did not believe that this alternative was open to them,
and this question is discussed in more detail in the empirical chapters. Still, the excellent
performance of the South Vietnamese 1" Division suggests the limits of traditional
explanations of the war's outcome, including communist ideology, the benefits and
disadvantages of fighting on one's own territory, and the role of outside powers. Even with
these other factors in play, South Vietnamese forces could fight surprisingly well when
political leaders adopted best practices.
In the Iran-Iraq cases, political leaders in both states initially adopted worst practices
with respect to political intervention in the military. The result was that for most of the war
neither side was able to capitalize on the advantages that it possessed-in Iran's case,
superior economic wealth and a three-fold population edge, and in Iraq's case, far stronger
allies and a far greater quantity and quality of weapons. Most of the first six years of the war
were a bloody military stalemate.
That said, in the early years of the war Iran's regular forces do seem to have
benefited from the slightly better practices in political intervention that the Shah had
employed, not all of which Iran's revolutionary leaders had yet been able to dismantle. In
particular, Iranian units drawn from the pre-revolutionary regular army, which had received
American training during the 1970s, displayed noticeably better tactical proficiency in the
initial battles than the revolutionary masses roused by Shia clerics to become martyrs.
Unfortunately for Iran, however, its leaders never successfully integrated pre-
revolutionary and revolutionary armed forces, and in fact mistakenly credited the
revolutionary forces rather than the legacy regular units with their country's early battlefield
successes. As a result, Iran's leaders only deepened their imposition of worst practices as the
war went on, decimating whatever legacy lingered from the Shah's era. They instead relied
on soldiers who were ideologically motivated to be cohesive but who lacked any ability to
convert that cohesion into tactical proficiency or complex operations.
With two belligerents both under the full grip of worst practices, the war devolved
into deadlock from roughly 1982-1986. Finally, however, in 1986-several long years after
the disastrous effects of worst practices had been evident, even to him-Saddam Hussein
endeavored to shift the nature of his political intervention into the Iraqi armed forces.
Specifically, he adopted something very close to best practices with respect to his Republican
Guard units, even as he kept worst practices with respect to other units. The result of this
shift was a relatively rapid improvement in the battlefield effectiveness of the Republican
Guard.
Indeed, once subject to different forms of political intervention, these Iraqi units'
effectiveness improved so significantly that they were able to beat their larger, wealthier,
more populous neighbor in a succession of quick battles that ended the war in 1988. These
victories occurred despite the fact that the Iraqi military experienced no great increase in its
autonomy, and the fact that it obviously retained its Arab culture, a trait sometimes maligned
in the effectiveness literature as hindering military performance.
Put simply, both Iran and Iraq performed poorly when their militaries were
uniformly subject to worst practices: in the Iranian case, after about 1982, and in the Iraqi
case, before about 1986. By contrast, in the period before these practices were fully imposed
on the regular military in Iran and in the period after these practices were lifted on the
Republican Guard units in Iraq, military performance by those forces was noticeably better
compared both to the opponent's military and to other units drawn from the same state. The
contrast was subtle in the Iranian case but dramatic in the Iraqi case.
These distinctions-similar to those seen in the Vietnam comparisons-suggest
again the power of the political intervention variable in explaining battlefield effectiveness,
even across a range of states with very different national institutions. It is to the Vietnam
cases that we now turn.
APPENDIX A: Quantitative Measures of Battlefield Effectiveness
As discussed above, the study relies on qualitative rather than quantitative measures
of battlefield effectiveness. But are there quantitative indicators of battlefield effectiveness
that would enable better measurement of the dependent variable? Clearly, raw casualty
figures do not quite capture the general concept of effectiveness I described above, as what
states do with what they have. The fact that a particular military suffered many more
casualties than the other in battle would not constitute any sort of puzzle for effectiveness if
this difference were explained entirely by an imbalance in material resources between the
two sides. Any measure capturing true effectiveness would have to convey not just the losses
suffered by each side, but the extent to which these figures diverged from our expectations
of what each side's losses should have been, based on each side's resources.
Earlier in the chapter I presented one possible method of tracking this divergence:
examining whether or not the two sides' ratio of battle deaths was the inverse of the ratio of
their CINC scores, and if not, by how much each side exceeded or fell short of the expected
ratio. After all, if material power translates directly into the ability to inflict battle deaths on
the other side, then the ratio of battle deaths should be inversely proportional to the ratio of
CINC scores, and any gap that arises suggests that need for further examination.
CINC scores are very blunt, however, reflecting an extremely broad measure of a
state's resources, many of which might not be relevant to a particular war. For example, in
the Sino-Indian border war of 1962, neither side had even close to its entire armed forces
involved in the fighting. Similarly, during the Cold War the United States fought only limited
conflicts that always left the majority of its forces western Europe, South Korea, and Japan.
As a result, a second approach to measuring battlefield effectiveness with casualty data
would be to record the battle deaths that a state suffers out of the fielded forces it commits
to a particular war.
I pursued both this approach and the CINC-based approach using a dataset of all
interstate war participants between 1945 and 1991. 1 gathered data from a variety of sources
to compute two figures for each observation of a country fighting a war: 1) how different its
military's battlefield deaths were from what one would expect based on its CINC score (as
discussed earlier in the chapter), and 2) the battle deaths each military suffered out of the
total number of troops it committed to the war.85 1 chose the unit of observation as country-
war rather than country-battle because there is no dataset of individual battles appropriate
for my purposes. I was then able to create distributions ranking all militaries according to
85 As mentioned earlier, CINC scores were taken from the National Militarx Capabilities dataset, v. 3.02. I took
my initial list of wars from the Correlates of War Inter-state War Data, v. 3.0, which appears in Meredith Reid
Sarkees, "The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997," Co//lict ianagement and Peace Science, Vol.
18, No. 1 (2000), pp. 123-144. Also as mentioned, I broke several wars that C(O)W codes as single conflicts into
smaller, separate conflicts, to better capture the nature of the actual events and gather more precise data. I also
excluded observations that did not have a significant ground component (that is, they consisted almost entirely
of air or naval engagements), because the theory here focuses on armies. So, for example, I excluded the
French and British strikes against Egypt in 1956, but I did include the ground war in the Sinai between Egypt
and Israel that year. For battle death data, I counted only battle-rclated military fatalities, not civilian deaths. I
amended almost all of the COW figures, as further research revealed most of them to be of questionable
accuracy. Specific coding decisions and sources arc available upon request, but most battle death data were
gathered from Clodfelter, Wlaiire and Armed Conu/licts. For coalitions, I aggregated the battle deaths and CINC
scores of the two sides.
8 The two datasets commonly said to have reliable battle data are not well suited to the questions of interest
here. The PRIO dataset tracks all deaths, military and civilian, for a given year in a given war, for both sides-
these two different casualty-based measures of effectiveness.87 Below are the results, along
with a baseline distribution based solely on raw casualty ratios.
Ranking of Armies' Battlefield Effectiveness Using Three Quantitative Measures
Note: The state listedfirst in each dyad was more "effective" than its opponent according to the measure used. Gaps in peijrmance between the two sides of a dyad
narrow as the list descends, meaning that at the top of the list the first side significantly out-pefrrmed the othei; but at the bottom of the list efectiveness scores weere
nearly even. This table shows only the tot) halftofthe distribution; the bottom half/is a mirror, with the direction of each dyad reversed.
Ratio of Raw Battle Ratio of Battle Deaths Ratio of Battle Deaths
Deaths Discounted for Ratio of Discounted for Ratio of
CINC Scores Fielded Forces
1. United States vs. Iraq, 1991 1. Iraq vs. United States, 1991 1. United States vs. Iraq, 1991
2. Israel vs. Egypt, 1967 2. North Korea vs. United States, 2. Israel vs. Egypt, 1967
1950
3. South Korea vs. North Korea, 3. Hungary vs. USSR, 1956 3. USSR vs. Hungary, 1956
1950
4. Tanzania vs. Uganda and Libya, 4. Cambodia vs. Vietnam, 1978 4. South Korea vs. North Korea
1978
5. Israel vs. Egypt, 1969 5. Israel vs. Egypt, 1948 5. Vietnam vs. Cambodia, 1978
6. Vietnam vs. Cambodia, 1978 6. North Korea vs. South Korea, 6. Israel vs. Lebanon, 1948
1950
7. United States vs. China, 1950 7. Somalia vs. Ethiopia, 1977 7. Tanzania vs. Uganda, 1978
8. Israel vs. Egypt, 1973 8. Cyprus vs. Turkey, 1974 8. Ethiopia vs. Somalia, 1977
9. Israel vs. Egypt, 1956 9. Pakistan vs. India in the East, 1971 9. South Vietnam vs. North
Vietnam, 1961
10. Israel vs. Syria, 1967 10. Vietnam vs. China, 1979 10. Israel vs. Syria, 1967
11. Ethiopia vs. Somalia, 1977 11. Argentina vs. United Kingdom, 11. Israel vs. Egypt, 1969
1982
12. Israel vs. Syria, 1973 12. Pakistan vs. India in the West, 12. United States vs. North Vietnam,
1971 1965
13. United States vs. North Korea, 13. China vs. United States, 1950 13. Iraq vs. Iran, 1980
1950
14. United States vs. North Vietnam, 14. Vietnam vs. China, 1987 14. United States vs. North Korea,
1965 1950
15. Israel vs. Syria, 1982 15. Egypt vs. Israel, 1967 15. India vs. Pakistan in the East,
1971
16. USSR vs. Hungary, 1956 16. North Vietnam vs. United States 16. United Kingdom vs. Argentina,
1982
17. United Kingdom vs. Argentina, 17. Syria vs. Israel, 1973 17. Israel vs. Jordan, 1967
1982
18. South Vietnam vs. North 18. Syria vs. Israel, 1967 18. United States vs. China, 1950
Vietnam, 1961
19. Israel vs. Lebanon, 1948 19. Jordan vs. Israel, 1967 19. China vs. India, 1962
20. India vs. Pakistan in the East, 20. North Vietnam vs. South Vietnam, 20. Israel vs. Egypt, 1956
1971 1961
21. Iraq vs. Iran, 1980 21. Syria vs. Israel, 1982 21. Pakistan vs. India, 1965
22. Pakistan vs. India, 1965 22. Lebanon vs. Israel, 1948 22. Israel vs. Syria, 1982
23. Israel vs. Jordan, 1967 23. Egypt vs. Israel, 1969 23. Israel vs.Jordan, 1948
not very conducive for pinning down the battlefield effectiveness of the two militaries. The HERO dataset,
compiled by the Historical Evaluation and Research Organization (HERO) for the U.S. Army, covers
individual battles from 1800 to 1982. But this dataset does not constitute a random sample and therefore
cannot be the basis of externally valid statistical inferences. The Army picked observations based on its own
definition of what constituted a "major" battle. A majority of the observations involve the United States, Israel,
or Germany, while there are no observations of many other states such as India and Pakistan, even though they
fought multiple wars during the relevant time period. The HERO compilers reduced the various conflicts in
Indochina, which spanned more than two decades and involved three great powers, to a single 1972
observation, while the Yom Kippur war, which lasted 20 days, is the subject of 32 observations.
7 Each observation was a directed dyad, that is, one side fighting a war against an opponent. The total N was
70.
24. Cypress vs. Turkey, 1974 24. India vs. China, 1962 24. India vs. Pakistan in the West,
1971
25. India vs. Pakistan in the West, 25. Pakistan vs. India, 1947 25. Iraq vs. Kuwait, 1990
1971
26. Kuwait vs. Iraq, 1990 26. Uganda vs. Tanzania, 1978 26. Israel vs. Egypt, 1948
27. Iraq vs. Israel, 1973 27. Egypt vs. Israel, 1973 27. Egypt vs. Israel, 1973
28. Pakistan vs. India, 1947 28. Kuwait vs. Iraq, 1990 28. South Vietnam vs. North
Vietnam, 1975
29. China vs. India, 1962 29. Pakistan vs. India, 1965 29. Turkey vs. Cyprus, 1974
30. South Vietnam vs. North 30. Iran vs. Iraq, 1980 30. Israel vs. Syria, 1973
Vietnam, 1975
31. Israel vs. Jordan, 1948 31. Honduras vs. El Salvador, 1969 31. Vietnam vs. China, 1979
32. China vs. Vietnam, 1987 32. Israel vs. Iraq, 1973 32. El Salvador vs. Honduras, 1969
33. El Salvador vs. Honduras, 1969 33. North Vietnam vs. South Vietnam, 33. India vs. Pakistan, 1947
1975
34. Egypt vs. Israel, 1948 34. Egypt vs. Israel, 1956 34. Vietnam vs. China, 1987
35. Vietnam vs. China, 1979 35. Jordan vs. Israel, 1948 35. Iraq vs. Israel, 1973
The distributions revealed by these three quantitative measures of the dependent
variable raise more questions they answer, however. For example, as anticipated, the raw
battle death ratios comport poorly with the substantive understanding of effectiveness
described earlier in this chapter. According to this measure, the surprised, disorganized, and
nearly defeated South Korea in 1950 turned in the third most effective military performance
in the period 1945-1991. Another way of stating this is that the North Korean communists
were, according to this measure, nearly the worst army in the dataset. The raw deaths
measure also ranks South Vietnam as significantly more effective than North Vietnam in
both the 1961-1965 period and as somewhat better in 1975. It seems unlikely that most
experts on these wars would concur with these appraisals of the two sides' military
performances.
Indeed, in both wars, the side that suffered more casualties is rated as the better
fighting force. But South Korea's and South Vietnam's low casualties resulted from poor
unit cohesion, not from skilled performance of complex operations. North Korea's and
North Vietnam's high casualties were the result of highly cohesive units that fought to the
death. (Another factor that might have mattered is that both North Vietnam and North
Korea were on the strategic offensive, although their opponents did attempt to conduct
counteroffensives, so it is not clear that the offense-defense distinction necessarily accounts
for the disparity in battle deaths.)
Do the other two measures that attempt to refine the raw casualty data resolve these
sorts of anomalies? The second measure, which examines how different each side's battle
deaths were from what we would expect based on the ratio of their CINC scores, does seem
to produce more reasonable rankings of the belligerents in the Korean War and the Vietnam
War during the period 1961-1965. But the new measure introduces new anomalies, too: it
positions Iraq in 1991 as the most effective army in the dataset, Argentina as fighting much
better than Britain in the Falklands, and India as out-performing China in 1962. Again, these
rankings fly in the face of these armies' actual abilities-or inabilities-to perform the tasks
relevant to battlefield effectiveness. Only small parts of the Iraqi and Argentine militaries
were cohesive and capable of complex operations, for example. The Sino-Soviet border war
was also a lopsided battlefield defeat for India, one so stunning that it resulted in sweeping
and permanent defense reforms in the country."8
,, See references to India in footnote 31.
This second measure produces numerous other puzzles too. It has Pakistan out-
performing India in all of the wars on the subcontinent; Arab states almost always
outperforming Israel; Egypt performing worse in 1973 than in 1967; and North and South
Vietnam engaged in an extremely close fight in 1975. Most military historians would
probably counter that, in fact, India has consistently turned in superior battlefield
performances against Pakistan; that the Israelis have generally performed better than their
Arab opponents; that Egyptian performance improved significantly between 1967 and 1973;
and that North Vietnam rapidly crushed South Vietnam on the battlefields of 1975. All of
this seems to suggest that the measure does little to capture variation in the actual
components of the dependent variable.
What about the third measure, then, which simply asks which side suffered more
battle deaths out of the forces that it committed to a particular war? This measure resolves
many of the anomalies that arose with the first two. It ranks the United States as fighting
better than Iraq in 1991, for example, Israel as fighting better than the Arab states most of
the time (though not against Egypt in 1973), China as doing much better than India in 1962,
and the United Kingdom out-performing Argentina in 1982. All this comports with the
actual histories of these wars and what we know about the fighting capabilities of the parties
involved.
But again, strange new outliers appear with the new measure. South Korea appears
to have clobbered North Korea in 1950. The United States appears to have fought much
better than North Vietnam during the period 1965-1973, and also to have fought much
better than both North Korea and China during the Korean War. While there is no disputing
the literal meaning of the data-that the "less effective" side in all of these cases lost more
of its fielded forces to the enemy than the other way around-it is hard to make the case
that these rankings are substantively meaningful. None of the three measures seem to
capture actual variation in the performance of the tasks relevant to battlefield effectiveness,
primarily because casualties present the problem of observational equivalence mentioned
earlier. For these reasons, I rely on qualitative measures of the dependent variable and
examine casualty data only within this larger qualitative context.
APPENDIX B: Quantitative Measures of Political Intervention in the Military
The study relies on qualitative indicators of the independent variable because no
existing dataset codes the actual political intervention variable specified in the theory, and
because coding all states according to that variable on my own would be prohibitively time-
consuming.
What measures of political intervention exist in the literature, and why do these not
serve as useful proxies for the independent variable in the theory? One approach, relying on
the Arthur Banks dataset, simply distinguishes among regimes that have "strong" civilian
control, "weak" civilian control, and "military government."89 Unfortunately, this method
makes it impossible to test the argument that it is the form of control-that is, the nature of
political intervention, rather than just the degree-that may matter for effectiveness.
For example, Banks codes Iraq under Saddam Hussein in 1991 as an instance of
"weak civilian control," likening the regime to a near-military dictatorship because Saddam
donned a military officer's uniform. This coding misses the fact that Saddam actually feared
his military and most of his population, and intervened in his armed forces to guard against
coups and internal conspiracies by the majority Shia. As the empirical research in the project
will show, Saddam never served a day in the armed forces and was a general only because he
had received an honorary degree from Iraq's military academy in 1970.9t Not only was his
regime an instance of extremely strong civilian control adopted in response to high levels of
internal threat, but to understand what made the Iraqi regime different from, say, its
opponent in 1991, the United States, which also had very strong civilian control of the
military, it is necessary to move beyond the distinctions Banks provides.
Other scholars rely on the presence or absence of recent coups as the key indicator
of political-military relations.92 The problem with this measure, also drawn from the Banks
dataset, is that the presence or absence of actual coups again tells us nothing about the
presence or absence of political intervention in the armed forces, much less its character. To
continue the example from above, in 1991 neither the United States nor Iraq had had a
military coup during the previous decade, so according to this approach both would be
coded as having "harmonious" rather than "conflictual" civil-military relations. But this
commonality obscures crucial differences in the reasons that the two states had not
experienced recent coups: in the American case, because the military posed no internal threat
to the survival of the state or the leader; in the Iraqi case, because Saddam Hussein had
intervened in the military specifically to ensure that his military could not topple him as it
had other Iraqi leaders.
Recognizing this problem of observational equivalence, wherein the same indicator
actually masks two very different underlying phenomena, other scholars have moved closer
to directly measuring forms of intervention. For example, Aaron Belkin and Evan Schofer
8 Todd Sechser, "Are Soldiers Less War-Prone than Statesnen?" Journal ofCon/ict Resolntion, Vol. 48, No. 5
(October 2004), pp. 746-774. The dataset upon which Sechser relies is Arthur Banks, (ross-National Time Seies
Data A1rchine, 1815-1999 (Binghamton, NY: Computer Solutions Unlimited).
(" Ahmed I lashim, "Saddam I lusayn and Civil-Military Relations in Iraq: The Quest for Legitimacy and
Pos wcr," Middle IastJournal, Vol. 57, No. 1 (2003), p. 27; and Cordesman and Wagner, The Lessons..., p. 68.
91 Biddle and Long, "Democracy and Military Effectiveness...". This is, of course, a very useful measure when
the topic of interest actually is violent regime change, as in Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Randolph NI. Siverson,
and Gary Woller, "War and the Fate of Regimes," American Po/iticalScience Reiien, Vol. 86, No. 3 (September
1992), pp. 638-646.
code the number of military branches and the size of states' paramilitary forces, arguing that
increases in these indicators reflect increased regime concern with coups. One problem is
that these data are available only for a very limited time span, 1966-1986. More importantly,
though, these indicators lack context. The United States has a large number of military
branches, for example, but this is because it has a military organization with a variety of
specialties, not because civilians divide the military as a way to control it.
Barbara Geddes has come closest to actually coding regimes according to their forms
of political intervention in the military.92 She examines all authoritarian regimes since 1945,
answering a series of questions about each in order to classify them as single-party
(communist), personalist (run by an individual civilian dictator), military dictatorships
(regimes in which the corporate entity of the military runs the state), or other. Many of her
questions relate to the relationship between political authorities and the armed forces. Jessica
Weeks has drawn attention in particular to Geddes' coding of personalist regimes, in which
the leader personally controls the security apparatus and personally controls appointments to
high office.9 These seem to be reasonable proxies for at least some of the forms of political
intervention outlined in the theory. Unlike the other coding approaches described, for
example, this one does capture the difference between the United States and Iraq in 1991.
Both sides had high control over their militaries, but President Bush's control was
institutional, whereas Saddam Hussein's control rested entirely on his personal authority.
That said, as argued above, even personal control over the armed forces is not always
bad for effectiveness, depending on exactly how the leader intervenes. The question is the
ends to which personal control is put. As discussed above, Adolf Hitler intervened deeply in
his military. For example, he did personally control many military promotions. But unlike
Saddam, or Stalin through 1941, Hitler hired and fired officers largely on the basis of combat
performance, not internal political loyalty, especially before the assassination attempt against
him in 1944. 9 David Ben-Gurion led Israel in a very similar fashion during its early years,
maintaining very close personal control of the armed forces yet producing the foundation of
what seems to have been a very effective army."5 So it is not clear that even the
Geddes/Weeks' notion of "personalism" tracks the sort of variation in political intervention
of interest to the theory here.
92 Barbara Geddes, untitled paper on authoritarianism, presented for presentation at the 1999 American
Political Science Association Conference, available at http://www.uvrm.edu/~cbeer/geddes/APSA99.htm; see
also Paradig'ms and Sand Castles: Theorj' Bni/dingl and Research Designli in Comnparative Politics (iAnn Arbor, MII:
University of Michigan Press, 2003).
9 \Weeks, "Autocratic Audience Costs."
9 Knox, CoImon Destiny, chapter 5; Seaton, The Germnain rmy.
9 Cohen, Supremve Conmmand, chapter 5; Moshe Lissak, "Paradoxes of Israel Civil-Military Relations: an
Introduction,"Journa/o/Strategc Studies, vol. 6, no. 3 (September 1983): 1-12; Yoram Peri, "Party-Military
Relations in a Pluralist System," Joni ofStrategic Stndies, vol. 6, no. 3 (September 1983): 46-63; Amos
Perlmutter, "The Israeli Army in Politics: The Persistence of the Civilian over the Military," IV'or/d Politics, Vol.
20, No. 4 (1968), pp. 606-643.
CHAPTER 2
Political Intervention in the Militaries of North and South Vietnam
The contrasting battlefield performances of North and South Vietnam during the
period 1954 to 1975 present an enduring puzzle in the history of warfare. Why did these two
states, seemingly so similar in most respects, generate armies displaying such tremendous
variation in battlefield effectiveness? North Vietnam is still renowned in the annals of
warfare for its ferocious fighting capabilities. South Vietnam is nearly as famous as an icon
of incompetence and cowardice, disparaged for its seeming inability to build even a mediocre
military despite a massive infusion of U.S. aid.
While the reality of both sides' performances was more complicated than these
pervasive images suggest, the stereotypes do capture a basic puzzle. Why was North Vietnam
able to generate cohesive, consistently tactically proficient armed forces, capable of
conducting complex operations, while South Vietnam proved unable to do so? As we will
see, the existing theoretical explanations of military effectiveness do not provide a satisfying
answer to this question. Indeed, the contrast between North and South Vietnam becomes
more rather than less puzzling the more one learns about the two states and the war they
fought.
The existing explanations, both theoretical and case-specific, have particular
difficulty accounting for variation within the South Vietnamese military. While South
Vietnam's overall performance was clearly inferior to the North's, its armed forces were not
uniformly terrible, as often assumed. South Vietnam never developed the ability to
consistently conduct the most difficult complex operations, particularly large-scale offensive
operations. But some of its units proved to be cohesive, tactically proficient, and capable of
more operational sophistication than usually recognized. These units contrasted with other
parts of its military that were indeed unable to meet even basic standards of cohesion and
tactical proficiency. Any explanation of the contrast in performance between North and
South Vietnam has to be able to account not just for the general variation between the two
states but also for these other sorts of variation that occurred within the South Vietnamese
military itself-variation that is crucial in explaining the course, costs, and ultimate outcome
of the war.
This chapter and the next argue that it is impossible to make sense of all the
observed variation, both cross-national and sub-national, without reference to the differing
ways in which the two sides' political leaders intervened in their military organizations. In
both regimes, political leaders sought to keep a very tight hold on their armed forces-but
the mechanisms they used to actually execute this intervention contrasted sharply and had
very different implications for the battlefield effectiveness of the two regimes.
North Vietnamese leaders implemented almost all of the best practices described in
the first chapter, utilizing a model of political intervention that consistently and expressly
maximized external combat performance. By contrast, South Vietnamese leaders oriented
much of their military toward internal tasks related to coup protection, governance, and
domestic repression of dissidents, mostly adopting worst practices that sacrificed external
combat performance in order to execute other missions. There were some exceptions to this
rule, however-units where the nature of political intervention differed, which in turn
performed noticeably better in battle. A comparison across units reveals just how important
variations in political intervention really were in explaining the variation within the South
Vietnamese military and between North and South Vietnam overall, providing important
support for the theory outlined in Chapter 1.
This chapter proceeds in three main parts. The first section provides background,
discussing the origins and basic course of the Vietnam War after the end of French rule and
sharpening the puzzle presented by the contrast in North and South Vietnamese battlefield
performance. The second section establishes the values of the independent variable with
respect to South Vietnam, drawing on a variety of documentary sources from both the
United States and South Vietnam to answer the series of coding questions presented in
Chapter 1. After providing a brief overview of the history and structure of the country's
military, the section marshals evidence about the nature of political intervention in the four
key areas of military activity: promotion patterns, training regimens, command arrangements,
and information management. It then generates predictions about how different units within
the South Vietnamese military should have performed according to the different theories
presented in the first chapter, including the political intervention theory.
The third section of the chapter repeats this procedure with respect to political
intervention in the military of North Vietnam, again drawing extensively on primary
documents, including official histories, captured materials, and other studies and records
from both the United States and North Vietnam. Chapter 3 then turns to the empirical
evidence needed to adjudicate amongst these predictions, examining a series of battles
between North and South Vietnam during the period 1962-1975.
A note about terminology is important at the outset. Throughout this manuscript,
the two primary actors of interest are described as North and South Vietnam. Historical
research makes it increasingly clear, however, that many native southerners supported and
even helped lead the communist party based in Hanoi, while as many as a million
northerners also had fled communism to live in the south.' As a result, the use of the terms
"North" and "South," and references to "Northern" and "Southern" forces, should not be
taken as literal geographic references, but as shorthand for the governments in the two
capitals and the military apparatuses they directed. This is the most neutral way to refer to
what otherwise might be called communist and non-communist forces, and it achieves the
same objective, which is to delineate the existence of two competing governments within the
territory of Vietnam.
I. Background: The Vietnam War
The Ongins of the Warfromv the French Anival to 1954
In order to have some context in which to assess political intervention in the North
and South Vietnamese militaries, it is necessary to establish some background about the two
states that emerged in 1954 from the remnants of French Indochina.2 The French had first
established themselves in Saigon nearly a hundred years earlier, in 1859, moving within a
decade to control all of Cochinchina, Vietnam's southernmost region, and soon thereafter
the middle and northern regions of Tonkin and Annam as well (see map 1).3 French
interests in Vietnam were primarily economic, rooted in the belief that the region could
serve as both a source of raw goods and a market for French manufactured products.
Robert K. Brigham, "Why the South Won the American War in Vietnam," in l1hy the North Ihon the Vietnami
W1ar, ed. Marc Jason Gilbert (New York: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 97-99, 107, 113.
2 This section draws heavily on Anthony James Joes, The IWarfbr South Vlietnav (New York: Praeger, 1990).
3The French did establish different governing structures over the three regions, with the tightest control in
Cochinchina, which was ruled directly from Paris. The region of Tonkin was not a colony, but instead a direct
protectorate with a French governor ruling in place of the emperor. The northernmost region of Annam was
ruled by its own emperor.
Ultimately the French venture in Indochina became more of an economic drain than a boon,
but France still held tightly to Vietnam through the rest of the nineteenth century and the
upheavals of World War I.
The experience of French imperial rule had profound consequences for Vietnam's
political development. Perhaps the most important of these was the political awakening it
stirred and then frustrated among the Vietnamese elite. By the 1920s a large crop of
Vietnamese had been educated in France and had served in the French army during World
War I. But they found that positions of authority in their own country remained closed to
them, open only to better paid, often less educated Frenchmen. The resulting resentment
among urban Vietnamese surfaced in a variety of forms during the interwar years, although
only the nascent Vietnamese communists possessed the tight organizational discipline
needed to evade French repression. Indeed, as historian Anthony James Joes has noted, "It
is another one of the rich ironies of the whole Vietnamese revolution that the French would
search desperately in the 1950s for an effective nationalist alternative to the communists, an
alternative that, by their persecution from the 1920s to the 1940s, they had all but
eliminated."4
The Japanese occupation of Vietnam during the period 1940-45 provided the
opening for which the communists and other revolutionaries had waited. In 1941, they
established the League for the Independence of Vietnam, or Viet Minh, an organization that
temporarily put aside the goal of class struggle and focused exclusively on the nationalist
objective of evicting the Japanese and establishing an independent Vietnamese state. Because
the Japanese army controlled the cities, this revolutionary organization focused on the
countryside, promising land redistribution as a way to recruit peasants to the cause.
For most of their occupation, the Japanese were content to rule through the French,
but in March 1945 they imprisoned French officials, interned French forces, and offered the
Annamese emperor Bao Dai independence. He accepted, declaring the independence of
Annam and Tonkin, while the Japanese continued to rule Cochinchina. When the Japanese
surrendered to the Allies on August 15, however, a power vacuum emerged. Viet Minh
troops moved into Hanoi, forced Bao Dai to abdicate, and declared the independence of
Vietnam under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh.
The success of this August Revolution was short-lived, as the French soon re-
asserted their authority, especially in the south. Knowing that the Viet Minh were not yet in a
position to defeat the French, Ho again compromised, signing an agreement with the French
representative Jean Sainteny in 1946. The Ho-Sainteny agreement did not grant Vietnam full
independence, but it recognized the legitimacy of Ho's rule over Tonkin and Annam in a
government now called the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV).5
The Viet Minh did not give up on the task of truly evicting the French, however. The
1949 victory of Mao's forces across the border brought them an infusion of better weapons
and equipment, improving the Viet Minh's odds of military success against the French
considerably. But this new friend brought a new enemy. Worried about the spread of
communism via China's assistance to the Viet Minh, the United States established the
4 Joes, The War, p. 9.
5 Joes, The War, chapter 2.
Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) as a means of channeling an ever growing
steam of military aid to the Franco-Vietnamese forces.6
For their part, the French belatedly recognized that they would never again rule
Vietnam, but they shared with the United States the goal of a non-communist successor
regime. After protracted negotiations, the French came to support a government led by Bao
Dai, who broke with the Viet Minh and was recognized by the French as ruler of an
independent State of Vietnam, including Cochinchina, in June 1948. The French military
effort then focused on defending this government. By mid-1949, 41,500 Vietnamese troops
had joined the French in the campaign, troops that would eventually become the nucleus of
the future Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN).7
Unfortunately, the next several years produced little more than bloody stalemate.8
Finally, in the spring of 1954, the war culminated in the famous battle for Dien Bien Phu, an
isolated French base in a remote corner of Tonkin near the Laotian border. The French
defenders, outnumbered and outgunned, capitulated in May, shattering French domestic
support for the war.
The Geneva Conference ensued, partitioning Vietnam into two states. Territory
north of the 17 th parallel, essentially the region of Tonkin, was to be ruled by Ho Chi Minh,
while land south of that parallel, essentially the regions of Annam and Cochinchina, was to
be ruled by Bao Dai, who would soon appoint Ngo Dinh Diem as his prime minister.9 For
one year there was to be free migration across the demilitarized zone so that people could
settle under the government of their choice. Despite Hanoi's violent obstruction of this
migration, something close to a million Northerners resettled in the South, among them
many Christians and intellectuals.'(
For its part, the Diem government adamantly opposed holding the elections called
for (albeit vaguely) in the Geneva agreements." They argued that the French had had no
right to commit the State of Vietnam to such elections, nor to partition Vietnam in the first
place. They also knew that because the population of the DRV was slightly larger, and
because Ho's sympathizers could rig the vote in their own territory, any "plebiscite" would
result in a communist takeover of all of Vietnam." The stage was set for further military
confrontation.
An Overview of the War Between North and South Vietnam
Historical debate continues about the origins of the insurgency in South Vietnam,
and, indeed, leaders in Hanoi were themselves divided in the period after Geneva regarding
whether to prioritize building socialism at home or carrying the revolution to the south.13
6 Arthur j. Dommen, The Indochinese E.perience of the Fiench and the Amiericans: NationalisI and Conmmyunism, in
Cambodia, Laos, and Vlietnam, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), pp. 196, 469. At this time MAAG
was limited to a total of 685 militar personnel.
Dommen, Indochinese Experience, p. 195.
O These events are chronicled in much greater detail in Dommen, Indochinese Experence, chapter 4.
9 Joes, The If'ar, chapter 3. For background on Diem, see Jacobs, Seth. 2006. Cold Itar' andain: Ng Dinh Die
and the OIlins of Amllerica's W'ar in f 1etnamn, 1950-1963 (New York: Rowman and Littlefield).
0" Dommen, Indochinese Experience, chapter 5.
" For background on the legal complexities surround the supposed requirement for elections, see Dommen,
Indochinese E\perience, pp. 343-348.
2 Joes, The lV1ar, chapters 4-5.
13 George I Ierring, Amierica's Longest IWan the United States and Vlietiali, 1950-1975 (New York: McGraw Hill,
2002), p. 81; and Tuong Vu, Paths to Devlopnment il Asia: Souh Korea, iletnamn, China, and Indonesia (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 124.
What is known is that an insurgency was well underway by the late 1950s, aimed primarily at
local administration and the middle class of South Vietnam. State officials, teachers, medical
personnel, and social workers were all targets of intimidation, kidnapping, and assassination
in a campaign that had killed 20 percent of all village chiefs by 1958. The insurgency had
Hanoi's blessing but was also clearly fueled by indigenous grievances with the Diem
government, and in fact, those in the south often sought revolution at a faster pace than
leaders in Hanoi thought wise.'1
Sensing momentum, however, party leaders started to infiltrate more heavily armed
units to South Vietnam in 1959. They also formed the National Liberation Front (NLF) in
December 1960 as a way to unify efforts to overthrow the Diem government and to appeal
directly to Southern nationalism.1 This move continued Ho's long-running willingness to
follow the Leninist principle of the united front: temporarily allying with potential non-
communist adversaries in order to achieve intermediate objectives, with the full recognition
that today's comrades would become tomorrow's targets.6 The NLF also helped Hanoi
conceal its direction of the war in the South-something it denied at the time but
proclaimed heavily once the war was over.17
The NLF's studious avoidance of communism as a stated goal did little to assuage
U.S. concerns about the fate of South Vietnam. President Kennedy more than tripled the
size of the MAAG in his first seven months in office, to 1,905 personnel. He also introduced
additional personnel to directly support struggling South Vietnamese forces and moved to
establish a command structure that could encompass combat troops in addition to advisors
and support personnel. The result was the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV),
formed in February 1962.1> In addition to ramping up military operations, MACV assisted
Saigon in attempting to secure the villages, most notably through the Strategic Hamlet
Program.21 MACV also sent numerous South Vietnamese officers to America for training
and established dozens of training centers in South Vietnam.21
The year 1963 proved fateful for the Republic of Vietnam. It began with the
ARVN's disastrous performance in the battle of Ap Bac, a battle discussed in more detail in
the next chapter. The year ended with President Diem dead at the hands of his own officers.
Thus began two years of intense instability in which the clique of officers that had initiated
the coup, known as the Young Turks, proceeded through no fewer no fewer than seven
' William J. Duiker, "Victory by Other Means: the Foreign Policy of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam," in
Why the North, ed. Gilbert, pp. 58-9; and Brigham, "Why the South," in Iy the North, ed. Gilbert, pp. 98-99,
102.
5Dommen, Indochinese Experience, p. 423-4.
1 6 Duiker, "Victory by.., p. 50.
William J. Duiker, "Foreword: the History of the People's Army," in The Military History Institute of
Vietnam, V ictory in/ Vlietnam: the Official History ofthe People's Ar/) of V ietuam, 1954-1975, trans. Merle L.
Pribbenow (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2002), pp. ix-xvi.
I Duiker, "Victory by...," p. 60.
19 Dommen, Indochinese E.xperience, p. 475.
2" Dommen, Indochinese Fxperience, p. 501. This program was not the first of its kind. Diem had pursued the
creation of "agrovilics" in the late I 950s along similar lines, although there was important differences. Both
programs faced serious implementation problems. Joes, The War, chapters 5-6; and Ronald Spector, Advice and
S'pport: the Ear/y Years, 1941-1960 (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2005), pp. 332-3.
21 James Lawton Collins, Jr., The Development and I'raining ofthe South V ietnamnese Alrmy, 1950-1972 (Washington,
DC: Department of the Army, 1975), p. 123.
additional changes of government, including five separate coups. 22 By 1965 the situation had
stabilized somewhat, with an original Young Turk, General Nguyen Van Thieu, now serving
as president, and Air Vice-Marshall Nguyen Cao Ky serving as premier.23 They presided over
a new military governing body made up of several dozen generals known as the Committee
for the Direction of the State, or the Directory.24
Nevertheless, the political instability of 1964-5 convinced U.S. policymakers that
merely advising Vietnamese forces would not be enough to ensure the survival of a non-
communist regime in the South. The United States had already inserted more than 23,000
soldiers into South Vietnam by 1964.25 By the end of 1965, the U.S. commitment to South
Vietnam escalated to 184,000 soldiers, including four full combat divisions that initiated a
new series of offensives to find and destroy the elusive North Vietnamese guerrillas.26 By
1967, neither side had won, but the casualties the Americans incurred did manage to lay the
foundation for profound U.S. domestic opposition to the war. During this time the United
States also massively increased its effort to train and equip the Republic of Vietnam Armed
Forces (RVNAF), growing it to an authorized strength of over 600,000 men by 1967.27
For its part, Hanoi believed by 1968 that it had reached the crucial point at which it
could shift from a Maoist revolutionary strategy focused purely on the countryside to a
Leninist approach that would seek to cause an uprising against the Thieu-Ky regime in the
cities. The result was the Tet Offensive, a series of coordinated attacks throughout Vietnam.
But although tactically impressive, Tet only hardened South Vietnamese antipathy for the
North. It also enabled the United States to bring its full combat power against its suddenly
exposed guerrilla opponents, mauling them so badly that they never regained their previous
influence in the South.
It would be four long years before the North attempted another major offensive,
although the interlude was hardly peaceful. The two sides fought numerous battles in South
Vietnam during this period, reflecting the increasing willingness of the People's Army of
Vietnam (PAVN) to confront the United States and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam
(ARVN) in direct battles for control of territory. During this time South Vietnam and the
United States also mounted several operations to disrupt the PAVN's foreign supply routes,
collectively known as the Ho Chi Minh trail. These operations included a somewhat
successful incursion into Cambodia in 1970 and a disastrous invasion of Laos in 1971.
Neither of these ventures stopped the North from launching the 1972 Easter
offensive, a coordinated series of assaults across multiple provinces in South Vietnam. Here
again, Hanoi failed to provoke the much-sought urban uprising, but it smelled blood. South
Vietnamese combat performance revealed itself to be uneven at best and remained heavily
reliant on American leadership and support. More importantly, the North knew that this
leadership and support would not last forever. Having already heavily shifted much
responsibility directly to the South Vietnamese through the policy of "Vietnamization"
begun in 1970, the Nixon administration soon signed the 1973 Paris Peace Accords,
officially ending the U.S. combat role in the war.
Nguyen Cao Ky, Ho)w' Ie Lost the Vietnam, IV'ar (New York: Cooper Square Press, 2002), p. 48; and Jeffrey D.
Clarke, Advice and Vapport: the Final Yeai, 1965- 1973 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History,
1988), p. 8 1 .
23 This uneasy arrangement was ratified by a flawed but accepted election in 1967. Joes, The War, chapter 7.
24 Clarke, Advice and Support, p. 23.
25 Clarke, Advice and SuIpport, p. 13.
26 Clarke, Advice and Vupport, p. 109.
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After the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces, the South Vietnamese were left to
defend themselves, albeit with a large stockpile of U.S. military equipment.28 In the early
1970s alone, for example, Saigon had received an additional $753 million of new airplanes,
helicopters, tanks, artillery pieces, and other military equipment.29 In January 1975, however,
the North launched a final series of offensives. By May 1 of that year, PAVN divisions were
patrolling the streets of Saigon, and the Republic of Vietnam was no more.
The Puzzle of Battlefield Effectiveness in North and South Vietnam
For nearly thirty years, scholars have focused on the war between North Vietnam
and the United States, with many trying to explain the North's combat prowess or the
United States' inability to adapt to the demands of a counterinsurgency. 30 Far fewer works
have examined the war's even more startling contrast between North Vietnam and South
Vietnam-the two actors who actually sealed the country's fate after more than thirty years
of conflict involving France, Japan, the United States, Laos, Cambodia, China, and the
Soviet Union.
Why did the countries demonstrate such varying levels of battlefield effectiveness?
Having been "separated at birth" in 1954 and sharing so many important traits, North and
South Vietnam should have generated roughly comparable armies, at least according to
existing theories of military effectiveness focused on wealth, demography, regime type,
external threats, culture and society, and civil-military relations. For example, both states
exhibited low levels of economic development, with their populations consisting primarily of
rural peasants unable to read or write. Of the two, the South actually had a larger educated
urban elite. North and South Vietnam also were almost exactly the same size with roughly
equal populations.3
Similarly, both states were autocratic. The two regimes were not identical, of course:
North Vietnam was a totalitarian state nearly on a par with Pol Pot's Cambodia or Mao's
China, while South Vietnam might more accurately have been described as weakly
authoritarian. But neither could have been described as a democracy. Neither could have
been said to derive any aspect of its military performance from the purported democratic
advantages in strategic assessment or from a liberal political culture.32 If anything, the
supposed disadvantages of autocracy should have weighed more heavily on North Vietnam.
Additionally, both states faced threatening external environments that should have
induced strong pressures for effective military organization. While many observers do point
to this motive as an explanation for the North's performance, it is unclear why the external
25 James 11. Willbanks, A bandonina V ietnam: Hon America I.e/t and South V ietiam Lost its War (Lawrence:
University of Kansas Press, 2004), pp. 2 9 -31.
\Willbanks, AIbandonh Ig ietnam, p. 202.
For example, Michael Lee Lanning and Dan Cragg, Inside the I'C and the Al 'A: the Real Story ojNorth
i ietnam's A/lrmed I orces (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008; and Andrew Krepinevich, The
A1rmy and I Vietnam: (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1988).
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threat environment did not have a similar impact on the South. After all, South Vietnam did
not lose the war in a bolt-from-the-blue surprise attack-it was defeated in 1975 by an
adversary it had been fighting in one form or another for over 20 years, one who had
attacked along the usual routes of advance, seeking objectives it had aggressively pursued
from the first day of independence. South Vietnam surely had both motive and opportunity
to introduce any needed military reforms.
Furthermore, it is important to remember that the North's objectives included not
simply control of territory or the capture of key national resources but also complete
political transformation of South Vietnam in a direction that many South Vietnamese did
not want. By the late 1950s South Vietnam contained close to a million internal refugees
who had reluctantly left their ancestral homelands in the North to flee communist rule.33
Many of them had actually fought with the Viet Minh against the French but had decided
they were now willing to live under a largely pro-French regime in the South.3 This exodus
presaged the one that occurred in the face of the North's final offensives in 1975, when
again millions of people struggled to move south, beyond the reach of communism.35
All of this is to say that many of South Vietnamese showed little desire to be under
rule from Hanoi.36 Every time they had the chance to rise up and join a Northern
offensive-in 1968, 1972, and 1975-they declined. Many South Vietnamese were clearly
terrified of the possibility of conquest by the North, a situation that should have induced
pressures for military performance at least as strong as those said to operate in the case of
North Vietnam.
Cross-national cultural or social differences also do not seem like a plausible
explanation for variation between North and South Vietnam. Clearly, the two states were not
identical, and for most of their history the two regions were not unified. As Joes has
observed, "North Vietnamese see themselves as dynamic and southerners as rather lazy and
slow-witted. Southerners view northerners as aggressive, money-hungry, harder-working,
and more enduring. They perceive themselves as more pacific than the militant inhabitants
of the Red River Delta, possessing in their enjoyment of the bounties and beauties of nature
the true secret of happiness."37
Nevertheless, North and South Vietnam were more alike than different on the
cultural and social dimensions that are said to matter for military performance-and
certainly much more alike than most opponents facing each other in war. They shared a
common religious legacy from long-standing Buddhist, Confucian, and Taoist influences, all
introduced by China. For centuries they had also shared a common social hierarchy, as well
as the experience of French colonial rule.38 Both were largely ethnically homogenous,
13Joes, The lWar, p. 35
3 Maj. Gen. Nguyen Duy Hinh and Brig. Gen. Tran Dinh Tho, The South ijetnamnese Society, Indochina
Monograph (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980), p. 23.
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'ietnau (New York: Random House, 1977).
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although in South Vietnam there were significant religious divisions between Buddhists and
Catholics, as well as political tensions between native-born southerners and refugees from
the North.39
Ideology-not only communism, but also nationalism-did constitute an important
social difference between the two states, and it will be discussed in more detail at the end of
Chapter 3. But it is important to note that although North Vietnam marshaled a clear
ideological advantage, it is unclear how this alone translated into better battlefield
capabilities. It might explain why those who fought for Hanoi were better motivated and
therefore had better unit cohesion, but it is harder to explain how this factor also could have
produced such big cross-national differences in tactical proficiency and the ability to conduct
complex operations. Additionally, the absence of nationalism or communism cannot explain
the variation seen across different units of the South Vietnamese military, again suggesting
that something besides ideology alone was at work.
Lastly, the level of civilian control over the military is not a convincing explanation
of either the cross-national or within-country variation in battlefield effectiveness in these
cases. First, in neither state was the political leadership purely civilian, as we shall see. South
Vietnam was essentially a military dictatorship after 1963, while in North Vietnam most key
leaders held military and political roles simultaneously. In short, the normal distinctions
between civilian and military leaders fit poorly with the realities of political control over the
military in these cases.
That said, political leaders in both states did seek and exert very tight control over
their military organizations. What varied were the forms of intervention and the effects on
four sets of key military activities: promotions, training, command arrangements, and
information management. The remainder of this chapter will examine the nature of political
intervention in the militaries of both South and North Vietnam and the effects this
intervention should have had if the theory from Chapter 1 is correct.
II. Political Intervention in the South Vietnamese Military and Its Predicted Impact
on Battlefield Effectiveness
What policies did South Vietnam's political leaders adopt regarding the military's
promotion patterns, training regimens, command arrangements, and information
management? What kinds of outcomes should these policies have produced in terms of
battlefield effectiveness, if the theory presented in Chapter 1 is correct? How do these
predicted results differ from what we would expect to see if political intervention were
irrelevant to explaining battlefield effectiveness, or if other variables were more important?
By and large, South Vietnamese leaders adopted what were identified in the first
chapter as worst practices in political intervention. This is not to say that South Vietnamese
leaders were uninterested in military matters, disengaged from management of the war, or
class. 1inh and Tho, Sonth V ietniaIese Society, p. 9. These differences clearly mattered for some things, like how
receptive the two regions were to communism, but they do not seem to shed much direct light on variation in
military performance between the North and the South.
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Cambodians, Chinese, and Montagnards. I Hinh and Tho, South 'ietnamese Society, p. 96. On religious differences,
see linh and Tho, The South Vietnamvese Society, p. 142. For examples of regional differences and their influence
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unaware of the country's daunting security challenges-quite the opposite. South Vietnam's
political leaders were highly attuned to military activities and profoundly concerned with
directing them. The problem lay in the ends to which their political intervention was
oriented: protection of the regime from coups, suppression of opposition groups, and
domestic governance. Repeatedly, political leaders prioritized effectiveness at these tasks
over actual battlefield effectiveness, controlling the military in ways that should have
undermined cohesion, tactical proficiency, and the ability to conduct complex operations
against North Vietnam, if the theory in Chapter 1 is correct.
As a result, overall South Vietnamese military performance should have been quite
poor, falling into either the "mediocre" or "terrible" categories identified in the first chapter.
Nevertheless, if and when South Vietnamese military units were exempt from these forms of
intervention, either by design or by accident, battlefield effectiveness should have been
substantially better, with units demonstrating much greater cohesion and tactical proficiency.
Crucially, the theories based on variables besides political intervention practices
predict that we should observe very little variation at all: the South should have performed
about the same as the North, and within the South Vietnamese military there should not
have been wide differences in performance across units. To the extent that we observe either
significant cross-national or cross-unit variation, it casts doubt on the explanatory power of
these other theories.
Nevertheless, merely detecting such anomalies does not provide evidence in favor of
the intervention explanation. For example, if it were the case that instances of excellent
battlefield performance coincided with the imposition of worst practices in political
intervention, or that instances of terrible military performance coincided with best practices
in political intervention, that would constitute strong evidence against my explanation. But
to detect such disconfirming evidence, we first have to know much more about the value of
the independent variable in South Vietnam-about the actual policies that the country's
political leaders adopted towards its military.
This section briefly reviews the basic structure and history of the South Vietnamese
armed forces. Then it examines forms of political intervention in the four areas of interest:
promotions, training, command, and information, using the coding questions presented in
Chapter 1. In each of the four areas I outline the general policies that South Vietnam's
leaders adopted, while also exploring exceptions to these policies. I conclude with
predictions about how different parts of the military should have performed in battle if the
intervention theory is right or wrong, and if the other theories are right or wrong.
Background on South Vietnamv and Its Militay
In its short life, the Republic of Vietnam lurched through several tumultuous
experiments in governance: the period in which Diem took power from Bao Dai and initially
consolidated his rule, from 1954 to 1955;4" the period between this consolidation and the
coup, from 1956 to 1963; the interregnum following the coup, in which South Vietnam
experienced a quick succession of military-led governments, from 1963 to 1965; the period
in which Thieu and Ky attempted to consolidate the regime that finally emerged in 1965,
lasting through the election of 1967; and the period from that election to the conquest of the
regime in 1975, during which Thieu's power grew and Ky's declined.
4" The Republic of Vietnam officially came into being on October 26, 1955, with Diem as President. Lt. Gen.
Dong Van Kbuyen, Th)e RVNAF (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military I History, 1980), p. 8.
What is most remarkable about South Vietnam is that despite all of these changes-
or perhaps because of them-the forms by which the country's political leaders intervened
in their armed forces were remarkably consistent. The leaders themselves changed, and the
civilian or military character of the regime vacillated, yet the actual content of political
intervention in the military always hewed relatively closely to the worst practices that Diem
adopted in the early years of the Republic.
Those policies sprang from Diem's belief that his new regime faced a greater threat
from military coups, domestic opposition groups, and a sheer lack of governance than it did
from North Vietnam. Almost immediately upon coming to power, for example, Diem found
himself facing a challenge from General Nguyen Van Hinh, the Chief of the General Staff of
the National Army.41 In September 1954 Hinh "declared openly that he needed only to pick
up the telephone to unleash a coup d'6tat."42
Hinh's words were not an idle threat. The French Expeditionary Corps were still in
Saigon.4 Hinh had been a major in the French Air Force, was a French citizen, had a French
wife, and had been picked by the French to lead the National Army. Fortunately for Diem,
American pressure forced Hinh into exile in France. But the incident taught Diem an early
lesson on the importance of loyalty among his military commanders, especially when so
many were former officers in the very colonial army that Diem had so staunchly opposed.44
The French had left other problems for Diem as well. In their quest to destroy the
Viet Minh, they had cultivated the Binh Xuyen, a mafia-like armed gang in Saigon. The Binh
Xuyen's private army did not disappear with the Tricolor. In 1954 it still had 2,000 regular
troops near Saigon, organized into five main battalions, plus another 1,500 crack assault
troops, and 10,000 other followers.4 When Diem refused to renew the licenses for Binh
Xuyen's casinos and brothels, they united with the forces of two religious sects, the Cao Dai
and Hoa Hao, in seeking his overthrow.46 Diem spent much of the first half of 1955 peeling
away the religious sects from this alliance (mostly with bribes) and then sending government
forces to root out the hard core of Binh Xuyen fighters in block-by-block fighting.4
The ARVN did manage to crush the Binh Xuyen by May 1955. During the following
year Diem also ordered massive anticommunist sweeps, decimating the party's presence in
the south.48 And, indeed, it is hard to argue that Diem should have done anything other than
tackle these domestic threats first. Still, most of the ARVN divisions "existed largely on
paper; even those which had begun to function lacked their full complement of men and
material. Virtually all of the divisional and regimental commanders were new to their units
and did not know their men or their subordinate officers. Few had ever commanded
41 General Cao Van Vien, Leadershiph, Indochina Monograph (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military
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Operations Research Office,July 7, 1965), unclassified assessment available at the Center of Military History,
Fort McNair, Washington, DC, pp. 27-34.
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anything larger than a battalion. All lacked experience in the use of artillery and other
supporting arms."49
Over the next several years, and after considerable wrangling, Diem and the MAAG
managed to devise a new force structure. By 1960, the ARVN consisted of seven standard
infantry divisions organized under three major corps headquarters, one for the northern,
central, and southern regions of the country. These divisions each had roughly 10,000 men
and were tasked largely with static defense of their particular geographic areas. Separate
armor, airborne, marine, and aviation components of the ARVN were envisioned as more
mobile forces that could engage in combat throughout the country, reacting to major
conflagrations or conducting offensive operations. Local security (or "pacification duties," as
it were called at the time), would continue to be provided by the separate Territorial Forces,
consisting of small Civil Guard units at the province level and the Self-Defense Corps at the
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Despite the establishment of this force structure, the specter of both coups and
internal opposition continued to haunt the regime. Indeed, Diem evaded an assassination
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attempt in 1957. Then on November 11, 1960, three airborne and one marine battalion
attempted a coup against him. Diem was saved only when the 7th, 9 th, and 21" divisions
converged on the capital in his defense.54 On February 22, 1962, two VNAF pilots bombed
the Presidential Palace, again attempting to kill Diem.
The coup of November 1963 eventually succeeded where these efforts failed, but it
was against the backdrop of these earlier threats that Diem adopted his initial patterns of
political intervention regarding promotion, training, command, and information. As we will
see, these patterns by and large involved worst practices. They were also continued under
Diem's successors, even as the RVNAF grew from a 150,000 man force in the early 1960s to
over a million men by the early 1970s, adding a new corps, appending new independent
regiments and divisions to the existing corps, and gaining other types of forces as well (see
chart below and map 2).
[SEE NEXT PAGE]
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staff, General Cao Van Vien, Diem personally
reviewed the promotion of all high-level officers and others in positions he considered
important. 1 This in itself is not surprising, as many civilian wartime leaders keep a close eye
on officer appointments. But from the earliest days of the American advisory mission,
-- Data from Cantwell, "The Army...," pp. 153-5.
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observers noted that Diem hired and fired officers primarily on the basis of political loyalty
to him, not ment.
In fact, Diem often intentionally selected against competence in the officer corps. Lt.
Gen. Samuel T. Williams, the head of the MAAG, noted as early as 1957, "Officers who are
performing their duties efficiently are relieved and transferred to other duties."62 In 1964,
Col. Wilbur Wilson, the senior advisor to III Corps, made the same observation: "The
generals got to be generals by virtue of their ability in political intrigue, not as a result of their
ability as military men," resulting in a case of "the blind leading the blind."63 Brigadier
General James Lawton Collins, who served in a number of assignments in South Vietnam in
the 1950s and 60s, also concluded that "the greatest obstacle in improving and training the
armed forces was the lack of qualified leadership at all levels, both officer and
noncommissioned officer," primarily due to the nature of the promotion system. "U.S.
advisers continually cited poor leadership as the foremost reason for unit ineffectiveness."64
A popular line in South Vietnam in the late 1950s contended that to be an officer in
the ARVN required a man to have "the three D's": D not only for Diem, as in the officer had
to be loyal to Diem and not considered a threat to the regime, but also D for Dao, the
Vietnamese word for religion, meaning the officer had to share Diem's Catholic faith; D for
Dang, the Vietnamese word for party, meaning the officer had to belong to Diem's political
party, the Can Lao; and D for Du, a designation for Central Vietnam, meaning that the
officer had to have the same regional origins as Diem's family.65 Performing well in battle
was at best a secondary consideration among these requirements, and often officers realized
that demonstrating too much battlefield competence could result in demotion.
These trends continued under the Thieu regime. As Allan Goodman, a civilian
researcher who spent substantial time in South Vietnam, wrote in 1970, "The portrait of the
RVNAF officer of a decade ago remains essentially unchanged.... Political loyalty, not
battlefield performance, has long dominated the promotion system in the officer corps, with
the result that there is often an inverse relationship between rank and military skill. Morale is
low."" South Vietnamese officials themselves after the war made this same connection
between the incompetent leaders that Thieu elevated and the broader problems in the army:
"the majority of the high-ranking commanders were servants to the Thieu regime," they
noted. The result was "a number of lazy, corrupted, and unqualified generals" who
succeeded only in "destroying the fighting morale of the young ARVN officers.""
Under both Diem and Thieu, these politically favored officers often fled the
battlefield or chose never to set foot on it at all, which undermined the motivation of their
units and made it difficult for the officers to command efficiently." One observer noted that
it was not simply that Thieu cared about political loyalty, but that he truly attempted to weed
out those who might be competent enough to threaten him: "Thieu did not want good men
in leading military positions because he was afraid that once they were in such positions they
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would mount a coup against him."9 An internal Pentagon report noted as late as October
1969 that "RVNAF commanders in the field appear to be least favored in terms of
promotion."70
Indeed, before 1966, the RVNAF did not have even the appearance of an objective
promotion or officer evaluation system.71 A popular story recounts that during the political
turbulence of 1964, one high-ranking general tried to buy himself protection simply by
visiting his old units and distributing rank insignia from a bag he had brought, "as if they
were souvenirs."72 Whether literally true or not, the tale was certainly believable.
In 1966, Thieu acceded to MACV's pressure for a more regularized promotion
system, and four kinds of promotions were established: annual normal, battlefield, and
special. Nevertheless, despite the formal creation of this promotion pathway for those who
demonstrated skill on the battlefield, less than 2 percent of all officers promoted in 1968
actually owed their rank to combat performance.73 A Pentagon report that year stated, "The
Vietnamese simply will not promote on the basis of battlefield performance."74 Another
report in January 1969 noted, "Service in battle is clearly not the path to success in the
ARVN."7s Another report in the same series in 1970 noted, "While the Vietnamese have a
better promotion system on paper, it has changed little in the way it operates."76 As a result,
most promotions for field grade officers and above still depended either on time in grade, or
fell into the "special" category, meaning they occurred without regard to rank, length of
service, or experience at all.77
In fact, the criteria for promotion based on combat prowess were intentionally made
so exacting that few officers could meet them. Candidates for the rank of lieutenant colonel
or colonel, for example, were required to have three separate citations, including one at the
army level-a very hard bar for almost anyone to meet.78 Moreover, even when officers were
promoted on merit, they often found they were not given actual jobs in their new units.
According to Lt. General Dong Van Khuyen, the last chief of staff of the Joint General
Staff, "Most RVNAF commanders had the habit of using old cronies, those with ranks
below TO&E authorization, whom they considered more pliable and easier to motivate than
officers with full authorized ranks.... Even when an officer with appropriate rank was
transferred to a unit that had a vacancy in his rank, he had to wait for some time before he
6 Tran Van Don, quoted in Hlosmer et al, The Fa/, p. 45.
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would be given a suitable assignment because all positions has [sic] already been filled by the
'right' officer."79
Just as important, neither Diem nor Thieu made a point of removing commanders
who revealed themselves to be incompetent. To be sure, U.S. advisors faced incentives to
inflate the effectiveness ratings of the units with which they worked-after all, if the
RVNAF commanders were ineffective, it reflected almost as poorly on the advisor as it did
on the commander-so at times it could be difficult to know who deserved to retain
command. Yet that makes it all the more startling that even in instances where everyone
agreed South Vietnamese commanders were inept, they retained command. In 1967, for
example, American advisors rated the commanders of the 5th, 1 8 h, and 2 5 t Divisions "flatly
incompetent"-and the Directory generals agreed. Yet the division commanders were not
replaced because they were vital political supporters of the Thieu regime.80
As the U.S. Army history of the period notes, "The actual basis for Vietnamese
intransigence lay in the political role of the officer corps and the desire of the senior generals
to control its composition. Rapid promotions would destroy the existing network of local
ties and personal loyalties that not only provided the current leaders with their political
power but also formed the economic and social underpinnings of the Saigon regime"81
Indeed, even in the few instances in which incompetent commanders were inadvertently
removed for other reasons, their replacements proved equally inadequate.82
In short, despite a great deal of political tumult in South Vietnam, by and large its
leaders adopted a very consistent set of worst practices in political intervention regarding
promotions. These policies should have produced inherent obstacles to the development of
an officer corps capable of planning and conducting complex operations. The poor quality
of officers also should have undermined unit cohesion by making soldiers skeptical of their
leaders' competence.
There was one major exception to this pattern, however: the ARVN 1" Division, and
particularly its rapid reaction force, known as the Hac Bao, or "Black Panther" Company.
Starting in 1966, President Thieu selected commanders for this division, and in particular for
the elite airmobile unit within the division, based on proven battlefield prowess. His first
pick was Colonel Ngo Quang Truong, universally hailed as a highly competent officer and "a
born leader of men."83 He had a proven combat record as a skilled officer, and he in turn
selected his battalion commanders on the basis of their combat records.84
In some ways, Thieu's differing selection criteria for the 1" Division might not seem
especially surprising. The 1't Division was responsible for the territory closest to the border
with North Vietnam, notably the provinces of Thua Thien, which contained the historic city
of Hue, and Quang Nam, home to the key port of Da Nang. On the other hand, given the
mobility afforded by the Ho Chi Minh trail, other parts of South Vietnam were just as
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vulnerable to an attack from the North as was Quang Tri. Of the five provinces where most
of the conventional fighting was occurring, only two (Quang Tri and Thua Thien) were in
Corps Tactical Zone I, where the 1" Division operated; the rest (Kontum, Tay Ninh, and
Chau Doc) were spread out across the other Corps Tactical Zones (see map 2).85 Hence
there is no obvious reason that the quality of leadership in this division was any more
important than in any other part of the army.
Additionally, Hue had been the site of a major Buddhist uprising in 1966-an
uprising in which many members of the 1" Division had sided against the government.8 6
This uprising had almost toppled Thieu's regime, so if there were any division in which
domestic political loyalty should have mattered, it was the 1" Division. Yet although Col.
Truong clearly was loyal to the government-he had been the deputy commander of the
Airborne units that had helped restore order in Hue-it was his combat skills that mattered
most, and he was allowed to promote other officers under his command according to this
same standard. Indeed, the same internal Pentagon report that noted the promotion
problems plaguing most of the ARVN noted that in Military Region I, where 1t Division
operated, "RVNAF leadership is good and the units are excellent."87
2. Training regimens
South Vietnam's leaders also generally adopted worst practices with regard to
training. Very little rigorous, realistic, large- or small-unit training of any type occurred
during the entire war. Despite numerous opportunities to push for such training, both the
Diem and Thieu regimes refrained from doing so. Political leaders were more concerned
with maintaining the military as a governing institution capable of providing local security
and services-a mission from which training for external warfare would have distracted.
To be clear, the problem was not that the country lacked the infrastructure or
resources needed to conduct rigorous training at both the large- and small-unit levels.
Training was a top priority for the MAAG and later for MACV, and the United States grew
the number of Vietnamese training centers from one in 1956 to 33 by 1970. It also
established an additional 25 different military schools and sent South Vietnamese officers to
undergo military training in the United States. Unit training was a major focus of U.S.
advisors working with their Vietnamese counterparts at all levels of command.88
Nevertheless, as one senior U.S. officer later reflected, "Headway in this area was
generally extremely slow."89 As late as 1970, U.S. advisers lamented that the South
Vietnamese officers paid "only lip service to practical training," which had a ripple effect
down the chain of command, producing apathy among the troops. 9 1 After the war a number
of generals stated flatly that "leadership of service schools in South Vietnam was a sort of
elegant exile for unwanted commanders, often of limited competence."91 For example, the
National Military Academy at Da Lat was run by General Lam Quang Tho, described as
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"one of the least effective South Vietnamese general officers."92 Even Westmoreland
observed that the academy was "a dumping ground for inept officers.""
In fact, the entire enterprise of training was perfunctory at best. In 1966, for
example, "MACV proposed a six-week refresher training program for all South Vietnamese
infantry battalions.... Only a few battalions actually received the training, and the instruction
for those that did was marginal. Unit commanders at all levels showed little interest in the
program.... Commanders simply were not interested in training and found excuses to avoid
it."94 For example, during the first half of 1969, 66% of maneuver battalions conducted no
training whatsoever; 15% conducted 10 days or less; and only 4% conducted a month or
more of training."
Those commanders who did participate in training often viewed the time as a break
from normal military duties and an opportunity for rest and relaxation.9 More than a decade
into the war, "no 'proficiency in training' evaluations had been enforced, which meant that
in most cases a new recruit 'graduated' from basic combat training based solely on the fact
that he had been 'present for duty' during this five week period."97 ARVN soldiers rarely
received practical instruction on most topics and almost never had the opportunity to engage
in realistic simulations of interservice or combined arms operations, which in turn directly
impacted the motivation to fight. Soldiers were well aware that they had not been prepared
for battle.98
At the root of these general training problems lay political leaders' reliance on the
military as an instrument of governance. Rather than pushing military officers to engage in
training, South Vietnam's political leadership allowed corps and division commanders to
refuse to release the forces under their command for training."9 After all, even under Diem,
who ran a nominally civilian regime, "only 5 province chiefs were civilians; the remaining
ones were all military."()( By 1970, the situation had not changed: "the RVNAF [was]
frequently the government's sole representative and development agent in the rural areas."'1"
The result was military officers who felt more pressure to govern their districts,
provinces, or regions than to train effective combat forces. Gen. Cao Van Vien, Diem's chief
of staff and later the chairman of the Joint General Staff under Thieu, noted that there was
more to the job than commanding large units:
A province chief had to be an able administrator also. Ie had to supervise
a large bureaucracy, prepare and execute a provincial budget, regulate
trade and commerce, and protect national resources under his custodv....
He had to plan for and meet the objectives set forth for security and
development, and this required his involvement in countless programs
and projects whose implementation needed his constant supervision and
guidance. Toward the people he governed, a province chief had to show
he was a sensitive leader who listened to their demands and grievances,
cared for lives and welfare, and responded to their aspirations.... In the
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exercise of his duties... he had to receive guests, brief visitors, and escort
dignitaries on tours.... No matter how devoted he was, he simply could
not perform all of his duties effectively.1 2
After the war, other generals similarly reported that the main directives they received
concerned governance rather than making use of the large training infrastructure established
by the MAAG and later MACV.111 Even Westmoreland was ultimately hesitant to push
harder for progress in this area. As a 1967 MvACV study admitted, "The military was the only
body in South Vietnam with the experience and administrative skills to run the country."04
One might suppose that at least elite units would have received better, more rigorous
training. After all, MAAG had urged the formation of specialized airborne, armor, and
marine units exactly for this reason-to provide more highly skilled mobile strike forces that
could complement the more static corps formations that roamed each of the three
(eventually four) military regions of South Vietnam.105 Unfortunately, the elite units'
ostensible specialization instead became the prevention of coups: both Diem and Thieu used
them as counterweights to the regular army. Surprisingly, however, the units still received
little actual military training, despite their supposed role as specialized forces intended to
remain in Saigon guarding the Presidential Palace and other key spots.16
This oddity speaks again to the highly contingent, even irrational, nature of leaders'
decisions about how to intervene in their military organizations. For example, Diem formed
new armored units after the coup attempt in 1962, stationing them with the 7 t' and 21"'
divisions outside Saigon. But although these units had the newest armored personnel carriers
and appeared frequently in presidential parades, they rarely trained in actually using the APCs
with infantry. 117 The creation of Ranger units followed a similar pattern. Against U.S. advice,
Diem simply took the fourth company out of each infantry battalion and redesignated it a
Ranger battalion. But beyond the title, Rangers received no special training." The Airborne
had the same problems.," While "elite" status often indicated that a unit was volunteer-only,
or had better pay and access to medical care, it rarely meant that the unit's training differed
from those of any other army units, even when such training seemed like it might have
benefited regime security, evaluated objectively.
The 14 Division was again a noticeable exception to this pattern. Its Hac Bao
Company was the closest thing the ARVN had to functioning special forces, and it did
engage in regular and realistic exercises."(
3. CoNmand arrangements
South Vietnamese political leaders also intervened extensively in their military's
command arrangements. Again, however, this intervention was oriented more toward
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combating internal threats and securing the regime in power than maximizing battlefield
effectiveness against North Vietnam. Leaders in South Vietnam both centralized and
fractured the system for giving and receiving orders within their military organization.
First, by any standard, command arrangements over the ARVN were excessively
centralized. Diem initiated this method of political control by establishing a personal chain
of command directly from the presidential palace to corps and division commanders."'
Frequently he used this radio net to send orders "from a van in the garden of the presidential
palace... directly to combat regiments, bypassing the Department of National Defense, the
General Staff, and the field commands."12 This sort of personal chain of command acted as
an automatic brake on activities in the field.
Diem was particularly cautious about authorizing operations that might incur
casualties because he believed that losses suffered during failed offensives had been the
underlying cause of the coup attempt against him in 1960.m This belief was incorrect-again
highlighting the contingent nature of leaders' motives for various forms of political
intervention-but the highly centralized command arrangements and resulting climate of
officer passivity that this belief engendered persisted even long after Diem was gone."4
Coffins noted years later that one of the major problems in the ARVN was that few officers
who had come up in the Diem system were willing to do anything "in the absence of
detailed orders., 15
Second, at the time that South Vietnamese leaders centralized command in some
ways, they intentionally fractured it in others. For example, Diem and later Thieu maintained
separate chains of command for elite forces, notably the airborne, marines, and rangers. In
this way they could ensure that even if one of these factions turned against the regime, the
others could be contacted to counteract it. Similarly, they maintained a separate chain of
command to the Civil Guard (later named the Regional Forces) through the Ministry of the
Interior, bypassing the Joint General Staff in the Ministry of Defense. Because of these
arrangements, it would have been very difficult for any single commander to usurp
command of all of the military forces in South Vietnam at any given time.' But the
arrangements also should have made it hard for these forces to communicate with one
another or to coordinate action effectively in battle.
Diem and Thieu also frequently shuffled command assignments within the officer
corps. This approach had the benefit of preventing the development of independent bases
of loyalty in the armed forces-bases that might be used to launch coups-but it also
"prevented commanders from gaining the full support of their troops."" Junior officers
could expect to have a new supervisor "every one or two months," limiting their
accountability with respect to any long-term tasks."'
Diem and then Thieu also created overlapping chains of command to constrain
military commanders. As one U.S. Army study of the system noted, the command structure
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seemed designed to intentionally inhibit operations, containing "conflicting, duplicating
chains of command and communication and... various major agencies... installed in widely
separately areas so as to hamper coordination, rapid staff action, and decision-making.""
Commanders often received orders from multiple different military and/or civilian
authorities. For example, under Diem, many units were only nominally commanded by the
military, with the real orders coming from a Can Lao party member who had been installed
by Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Can.12o Even when Diem and the Can Lao were gone, the
average battalion commander could expect to receive orders in battle from both the
commander of his regiment or division, as well as from the commander of the military
region in which he was operating.121 When these orders conflicted, it was safest to do
nothing.
Unfortunately, South Vietnam's political leaders did little to punish those who
declined to fight in this corrosive command environment. As early as 1956, a report on the
ARVN noted that "insubordination was rampant; orders were freely disobeyed, and senior
officers were reluctant to punish subordinates who might have powerful political
connections."122 More than 20 years later, after the war, Lt. Gen. Dong Van Khuyen
observed that these attitudes never really changed. A military justice system eventually
emerged, but it was too small to cope with violations in an army of the ARVN's size, and its
powers of punishment were very limited.123 On the off chance the average deserter was even
caught, he could expect to return to his unit without formal sanction. 124Small unit leaders
reported that this climate of impunity was a major hindrance to exercising effective
command. 125For the most part, desertions rose steadily throughout the period of the war,
even among non-combat units.126
4. Infornation management
South Vietnam's political leaders by and large also adopted worst practices with
respect to information management. Although the country's political leaders were quite
concerned with managing the flow of information within the military and between the
military and political leaders, the actual policies they adopted focused on gaining information
about potential internal threats, particularly coup plots, rather than on the external threat of
North Vietnam. This emphasis detracted from monitoring information relevant to
professional military activities and combat effectiveness. As with the other forms of political
intervention, this pattern originated with Diem but continued and even intensified under his
successors.
First, South Vietnam's political leaders always maintained a large intelligence
apparatus designed primarily to monitor communications in the officer corps. In the early
years, there were at least six major and several minor intelligence-collecting groups in South
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Vietnam, according to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).127 Additionally, as mentioned,
Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Can, led a secret political party of Diem supporters known as the
Can Lao. He managed to place numerous Can Lao members in the Defense Ministry, where
they provided Diem with frequent information about officer sentiment and military
activities. Can also helped handpick party members for division and corps commands, from
which they continued to feed Diem information.
Furthermore, "cells or committees of the Can Lao existed at all echelons of the
army, frequently without the knowledge of the unit commanders. The staffs of senior
commanders were so riddled with Can Lao operatives and informers that some generals...
hesitated to plan any real operations with their staffs."128 Unfortunately, this type of
intelligence apparatus had a tendency to produce only the sort of information that spies
believed Diem wanted to hear. Even as the Viet Cong grew in strength during the period
1959-1960, for example, Diem continued to believe that the regime was enjoying increasing
battlefield success against them.129
Although the Can Lao disbanded after Diem's fall, the Thieu regime continued to
keep close tabs on officers, with similar results."" Premier Ky ran both the Central
Intelligence Office, South Vietnam's equivalent of the CIA, as well as the more mysterious
Military Security Service (MSS). Both of these organizations purported to gather intelligence
on the enemy, but in reality they focused on potential dissent among military officers and
local officials.131
The Thieu regime also took further measures to prevent communication among
military commanders.112 For example, Thieu actively discouraged them from meeting with
one another. As one general explained after the war, "He was all the time afraid of a
government by the generals.... He had in mind that if all these people got together to talk
about the military situation, they would also discuss the political situation and make a
coup."m3 As a result his commanders often had little idea what their counterparts in the next
province or region were doing-or any access to their information about the adversary. In
sum, South Vietnam's political leaders adopted worst practices with regard to information
management, much as they generally did regarding command arrangements, training, and
promotion.
Piredictions Ifthe Political Intervention Explanation Is Rit: Confirming Evidence
e Regular ARVN units, including infantry divisions, the airborne, the Rangers, the
Marines, and the armor squadrons should have performed poorly, demonstrating
virtually no effectiveness: no ability to conduct complex operations; little to no tactical
proficiency; and, because the regime did not employ internally directed coercive
measures, very little cohesion.
- The ARVN 1 Division, including the Hac Bao Company, should have displayed at least
adequate effectiveness. Because political leaders adopted different training and
promotion policies toward these units, they should have demonstrated at least basic
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tactical proficiency and solid unit cohesion, compared to the other South Vietnamese
units.
Predictions If the Political Intervention Explanation Is Wrong: Disconfirming Evidence
* Regular ARVN units that proved cohesive or demonstrated tactical proficiency would
cast doubt on the intervention explanation, because they would show that units could
still be effective even in the face of worst practices.
* Instances in which the ARVN 1" Division, including the Hac Bao, failed to execute basic
tactics or remain cohesive, would also disconfirm the intervention theory, because they
would suggest that mixed practices in political intervention did not produce even basic
improvements in battlefield effectiveness.
Predictions If the Alternative Explanations Are Right: Additional Disconfirming Evidence
" There should have been very little variation across units in the ARVN.
* There should have been very little cross-national variation between the performance of
ARVN units and that of North Vietnam.
II. Political Intervention in the North Vietnamese Military and Its Predicted Impact
on Battlefield Effectiveness
What policies did North Vietnam's political leaders adopt regarding the military's
promotion patterns, training regimens, command arrangements, and information
management? What kinds of outcomes should these policies have produced in terms of
battlefield effectiveness, if the theory presented in Chapter 1 is correct? How do these
predicted results differ from what we would expect to see if political intervention were
irrelevant to explaining battlefield effectiveness, or if other variables were more important?
By and large, North Vietnamese leaders adopted what were identified in the first
chapter as best practices in political intervention. They sought to maintain a very tight grip
on the military, but the nature of their intervention differed substantially from that practiced
in Saigon. Political loyalty certainly mattered for entry into and promotion within the PAVN
officer corps, for example, but so did competence. Officers were chosen primarily on the
basis of merit, and performing well in battle was a ticket to advancement. In further contrast
to South Vietnam, North Vietnam put its soldiers through rigorous, realistic, and often
highly specialized training regimens.
Furthermore, North Vietnamese political leaders structured command arrangements
to devolve substantial authority to officers on the battlefield, despite the presence of political
commissars. They also encouraged regular flows of information both horizontally and
vertically within the military, and between the military and political authorities. As a result,
overall North Vietnamese military performance should have been excellent or least very
good. Units should have demonstrated consistently strong cohesion, tactical proficiency, and
the ability to conduct complex operations. There should not have been dramatic variation in
effectiveness across different combat units, of the type observed in the ARVN.
This section briefly reviews the basic history and structure of the North Vietnamese
armed forces. Then it examines political intervention in the four areas of interest:
promotions, training, command, and information. In each of these four areas the section
describes the general policies that North Vietnam's leaders adopted. It concludes with
predictions about how the military should have performed in battle if the intervention theory
is right or wrong, and if the other theories are right or wrong.
Background on North Vietnam and Its Militay
Just as the struggle for independence left distinctive marks on the ARVN, so too did
the PAVN bear an organizational imprint from events that had occurred prior to its formal
establishment in 1955. The PAVN's origins lay in the 1930 formation of the Indochinese
Communist Party, the first attempt to gather communists under one political banner in
Vietnam. 13 The ICP publically disbanded in 1945 in an attempt to gain nationalist support
through the Viet Minh Independence League, but it never actually dissolved, and it re-
formed in 1951 under a new name, the Vietnamese Workers Party, or the Dang Lao Dong.3 5
The party was led by Ho Chi Minh and his coterie of trusted associates, including
future PAVN generals Vo Nguyen Giap, Song Hao, Nguyen Chi Thanh, and Van Tien
Dung. They continued to recognize the importance of mass mobilization in addition to
party-building, and they formed or participated in several popular front organizations
between 1930 and 1954, reflecting what one observer has called a strategy of
"accommodation" during the process of state formation.13 Gradually the true political aims
of their efforts became clear, but the most recent histories convincingly demonstrate that it
was only in the second half of the 1950s that the Ho and his followers overcame the
"organizational anarchy" of the nationalist movement and asserted their own transformative
vision of the new Vietnamese state.137 It was during this time that "party leaders carried out a
massive purge of their organizations and destroyed half of the party and state apparatuses
from the provincial level down" in an effort to consolidate and centralize party control."'
In December 1960, they also created the National Liberation Front (NLF) as a mass
mobilization organization in the south. As had so often been the case since 1930, though,
Hanoi continued to emphasize this organization's nationalist rather than purely communist
agenda, seeking to build a big tent. In 1962, a communist party of South Vietnam also was
formed, named the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP), but again its connection to Hanoi
was not publicized. Most importantly, the NLF acquired its own armed forces, called the
People's Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF).19,
As with the NLF and the PRP, Hanoi strove to make the PLAF appear autonomous
and indigenous to South Vietnam, when in fact it was tightly aligned with Hanoi.1' ln fact, at
every level of the PLAF, "a Party control unit was implanted to direct the political activities
of each unit and assure its compliance with Party directives.""' Furthermore, although it is
true that most of the early PLAF recruits were from the south, they were usually led by
Northern regroupees who had infiltrated south. As historian William Duiker has noted,
"Their numbers were no reflection of their importance, for they often served as political
cadres or officers, providing an element of experience and ideological steadiness to the
134 BDN Corporation, A Study of Strategic Lessons I earned I Vietnamn, V ol. I: the Eneiy (BDM Corporation:
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young and frequently untrained recruits in rural areas."142 Northerners were in fact so
influential in the PLAF that their dominance at times led to vocal complaints on the part of
southerners in the NLF.14 For this reason, PLAF units are included below in the analysis of
North Vietnamese military effectiveness during the war, especially as they were responsible
for the majority of fighting against South Vietnam during the period 1961-1965 and their
command structures with the PAVN were increasingly unified after that.14
Beginning in 1955, Hanoi sought to turn what had been its anti-French fighting
organization into a modern regular army. Historian Douglas Pike notes that by this time, in
fact, "the basic structure of the PAVN as a national armed force had been established. It
remained only for the Party to 'regularize' it. Gradually control mechanisms were introduced
and perfected, and PAVN became less and less united front, more and more Party."14 The
PAVN formed its first six divisions in 1955 simply by re-designating units from the war
against the French. Hence the 3 0 8 ', 3 0 4 ", 3 1 2 t', 3 1 6 ", 3 2 0t', and 2 3 5 h were born, each with
an authorized strength of about 8,700 troops. Each division included three infantry
regiments, a composite artillery regiment, an engineer battalion, a signal battalion, a military
medical battalion, and a truck transportation company.14 6
Some of the experienced leaders from each of these new divisions then assisted in
the formation of eight additional new PAVN divisions and five new independent infantry
regiments. These included the 3 5 0 th 3 2 8th, the 332"nd, the 3 0 5 h, the 3 2 4 h 3 3 0t1 3 3 5th, and the
3 3 8 th. Again, although officially these divisions were new, many contained entire companies,
battalions, and even regiments that remained intact from the war against the French. The
3 2 4t', the 3 3 0 th, and the 3 3 8t' had particularly high numbers of veterans. 4 7
During 1954-5, the PAVN also established additional independent infantry
regiments, three artillery divisions, an anti-aircraft division, four engineering regiments, three
signal battalions, and two transportation regiments-again, largely by re-designating existing
forces from the war with the French. 148This effort brought the total number of divisions to
eighteen, although only fourteen of these were infantry. Throughout the rest of the 1950s,
Hanoi worked to standardize and modernize its army, seeking "to transform what was still a
rather loosely led 'people's army' into a centralized, hierarchically organized, conventional
armed force."11
Like the ARVN, the PAVN actually comprised three different types of troops: highly
mobile Main Force units; regional or local force units organized within particular
geographical constraints, akin to a national guard or standing reserve; and militia/self
defense forces, organized along very decentralized lines around villages or factories. By and
142 William Duiker, The CoImmnist Road to Poner in Vietnamn (Boulder: Westvicw Press, 1981), pp. 212-13.
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large, however, it was the Main Force units that fought in South Vietnam. For this reason,
PAVN forces are generally classified as falling into two categories: regular military forces and
paramilitary forces, with the Main Force being the former and everything else being the
latter.i1SO
As Pike argues, "This division into two elements appears to be employed by PAVN
generals themselves in their strategic thinking."15 Regular military forces included the
People's Army, by far its largest component, as well as a People's Navy and People's Air
Force, which lacked independent service status. Among the Paramilitary Forces were the
People's Regional Force at the provincial level; the People's Self-Defense Force in the cities,
and People's Militia in rural district areas; the Armed Youth Assault Force; and additional
reserves.
15 2
Again, however, because these latter forces largely stayed in North Vietnam, the
primary PAVN forces of interest were the so-called regular forces, or the Main Force units.
Unlike South Vietnam's provincial and local forces, North Vietnam's homeland defense
troops had little ability to participate directly in the war because of their location. So while it
makes sense to "count" such forces in the calculation of South Vietnam's manpower during
the war, it makes less sense to do so for North Vietnam.
According to the PAVN's own history, by 1960 it had a Main Force troop strength
of 160,000 soldiers. This number grew to 204,000 in 1966, to 278,000 in 1967, and
considerably higher by the end of the war in 1975, by which time many of the divisions had
been organized into corps-level formations.13 Below is a table showing the various sizes of
PLAF and PAVN forces over time. It bears noting that South Vietnam and North Vietnam
were roughly evenly matched at the start of the war, but South Vietnamese forces quickly
outstripped the North in terms of numbers.
[SEE NEXT PAGE]
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ESTIMATED GROWTH OF NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES, 1960-1968
1960 1964 1968
PLAF Main Force Negligible154 At least 27,000,15 125,000156
PLAF Guerrillas and Irregulars 15,000157 At least 115,000158 115,000159
PLAF Total 15,000160 221,000161 240,00162
PAVN Main Force 160,000163 At least 200,000164 278,000165
TOTAL NORTHERN FORCES: 175,000 421,000 518,000
PLAF and PAVN available for
combat in South Vietnam
PAVN Total including additional 200,000166 300,000167 700,000168
Paramilitary Forces in the North
Almost any North Vietnamese force, whether from the PLAF or PAVN, Main Force
or otherwise, was at times referred to by the contraction "Viet Cong," reflecting recurring
confusion on the part of the ARVN and the U.S. Army regarding which forces they were
facing.169 This analysis avoids such terminology where possible (instead generally using the
term PLAF prior to 1965 and PAVN afterwards), both because "Viet Cong" was intended
to be derogatory and because it is short for Viet Cong-san, meaning Viet Communist, when
in fact not all NLF members participating in the PLAF would necessarily have called
themselves communist.17(l Ultimately, for purposes of this analysis, the distinction is not
essential. All of these military organizations were subject to similar forms of political
intervention from Hanoi and therefore should have displayed very little if any divergence in
fighting capabilities.
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Indeed, throughout all of these efforts, the one theme sounded explicitly and
unceasingly was the need for the party to main absolute, direct, and complete control over
the armed forces.17, As General Giap wrote in a very typical 1961 proclamation, "The most
fundamental principle in the building of our army is to put it under the Party's leadership, to
ceaselessly strengthen the Pary's leadership of the army. The Party is the founder, organizer, and
education of the army" [emphasis in original].172
North Vietnamese leaders viewed the PAVN as inherently politicized and war itself
as inherently political.173 As one official put it, "The Party Committee is unable to accomplish
professional and technical [military] tasks, but these tasks cannot be effectively performed
[by the military] unless they are directed and guided by a political brain."174 In other words,
conquering South Vietnam required a modern army, but this army had to be subject to
thorough and ever-present political intervention. As this same official noted in his journal,
most likely after attending a training conference in the South, "The leadership of the Party
over the armed forces should... be absolute, direct, and complete."175
His was far from an isolated viewpoint. As one senior PAVN general explained in
1959, "The Army must absolutely obey and accept the tight control of the Central
Committee headed by Comrade Ho Chi Minh, and correctly carry out all policies of the
Party."176 Close party leadership was, according to this view, central to fighting effectiveness.
"It has been proven," the general argued, "that those units that have a good Party
Committee leadership have a sounder ideology, better discipline, a more positive attitude,
and consequently their fighting and building achievements are bigger."177
The subordination of the military to political leaders was, quite literally, the party
line, one whose repetition reflected its widespread acceptance. William Turley, one of the
foremost experts on the PAVN, goes so far as to describe this emphasis on political control
of the military as part of an "unshakeable consensus" in North Vietnam. Although party
leaders and military officers at times debated the best way to implement party control, the
principle itself was never questioned, making coups virtually a non-issue for North
Vietnamese leaders.' 1
Indeed, Turley argues that "Party leaders had little need to worry about the loyalty of
the military leadership, as this leadership was drawn from the top ranks of the party."" In
his view, "the distinction between military and civilian roles before 1945 was extremely
1 For a representative example, see "Political Achievements Within the Armed Forces to Be Perpetuated,"
translation of article by To Van Vien in Hoc lap, no. 12, December 1964, p. 39, available through the Vietnam
Archive, Texas Tech University, document number 2321310012.
-2 General Vo Nguyen Giap, People's War, People'r Army (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), p.
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I-Muoi Khan, "Notebook I: Notes Taken by Muoi Khan: Some Matters Pertaining to Organization and
Working Methods for Strengthening the Leadership of the Party over the Troops and the Armed Forces,"
contained in IVietnam: DoNuments and Research lNotes, Document No. 34, produced by the United States Mission in
Vietnam, May 1968, p. 10, available through the Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, document number
4080316008.
Khan, "Notebook II," p. 3.
6 General Nguyen Chi Thanh, quoted in Khan, "Notebook II," p. 4.
Thanh, quoted in Khan, "Notebook II," p. 7.
" William S. Turley, "Civil-Military Relations in North Vietnam," Asian. Sangc)', vol. 9, no. 12 (December 1969),
p. 880.
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blurred, if it can be said to have existed at all."180 Unlike some revolutionary regimes, the
Vietnamese did not inherit a military organization of questionable loyalty; rather, they built
their organization and its associated military forces essentially from scratch. According to
Turley, "The Vietnamese did create a party organization within the armed forces and
appointed political officers in accordance with established Communist procedure.... But this
political apparatus was created primarily for the purpose of indoctrinating peasant recruits
and for recruiting new party members, not for guaranteeing the loyalty of military
commanders."181
After the August Revolution of 1945, the massive expansion of the military required
for the struggle against the French necessitated the elevation of non-communist officers. To
be sure, this development led Ho and his followers to seek close political supervision of their
new comrades. "A decision was made," according to Turley, "to strengthen the party and
political work system in the army and to insist on the countersignature of military orders by
political officers."182 But even this measure was implemented only sporadically until the late
1940s due to the sheer shortage of political officers relative to the size of the armed forces.183
In what would become a pattern, Hanoi clearly preferred officers with communist
credentials but was willing to bend considerably on this point when it conflicted with the
goal of expansion.
After 1955, North Vietnamese leaders developed a more institutionalized system of
controls over the military. By this time there did exist a set of non-party, state institutions
such as the National Assembly, Ministry of Defense and National Defense Council, but all
real authority after 1955 rested with the eleven-member Politburo. The Politburo, in turn,
acted on the advice of the party's Central Committee, led by Party President Ho Chi Minh
and his second-in-command (and successor after 1969) Secretary General Le Duan.184
The Central Military Party Committee (CMPC) then served as the key intermediary
between these political institutions and the Military High Command. ss The Military High
Command oversaw five Military Directorates, the most important of which by far was the
Military General Staff Directorate, analogous to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Pike describes
this General Staff as "the nerve center of the army, the most important military agency in the
armed forces" of North Vietnam.186 Of the other four Military General Directorates, the
most important was the General Political Directorate, which worked most directly to
implement guidance from the CMPC through the activities of party committees, attached to
all subordinate levels of the military command.,-
The Central Committee also directed efforts in South Vietnam through the Central
Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), which maintained a direct command link to the
Politburo in the North.118 Established in 1951, the COSVN supposedly answered to its own
political party, the PRP, in South Vietnam, but much of this seems to have been a fiction
designed to perpetrate the myth of non-involvement by Hanoi. As a COSVN defector stated
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in 1968, "There is no such organization as a PRP with a Central Committee, a Standing
Committee, etc., this organization exists only in name."189
In fact, despite all the apparent complexity and dissembling, the nature of North
Vietnamese political intervention in the armed forces was in some sense remarkably simple
and stable. As Pike observed:
In actual practice this 'highest level' High Command arrangement is not
as complicated as it might appear since single individuals hold more than
one position at the same time, some holding as many as six. Thus, both
policy determination and operational authority is vested in perhaps a
dozen individuals who, among themselves, hold complete and
unchallengeable control of the Vietnamese armed forces. 190
For example, Giap, easily the most famous communist general of the war, actually held six
different positions within the DRV government: he was simultaneously a member of the
Politburo Central Committee; DRV vice prime minister; deputy chairman of the DRV
National Defense Council; secretary of the Central Military Party Committee; DRV Minister
of National Defense; and Commander in Chief of PAVN.191
These sorts of dual political and military roles were common among senior generals
in the PAVN, leading Turley to conclude that "leaders of the central command are not
military leaders so much as they are uniformed party leaders of the military."192 Not only was
the PAVN leadership remarkably stable, but so was the Politburo, whose membership
underwent only two changes during the period 1946-1975, necessitated by the deaths of Ho
Chi Minh and General Nguyen Chi Thanh.93 To summarize, North Vietnam's political
leaders actively, consistently, and frequently intervened in their armed forces, but the nature
of this intervention differed considerably from the forms employed in South Vietnam.
1. Promotion patterns
Political leaders clearly intervened in the promotion patterns of the PAVN and
PLAF, but in a manner entirely consistent with best practices. Merit remained the foremost
criterion for advancement among the enlisted men and the officer corps. It was not enough
simply to be a party member or of the right social class; those who wished to advance in the
army had to demonstrate actual military competence. Furthermore, when these two
imperatives clashed, considerations of military skill usually trumped loyalty as key driver of
personnel decisions within the PAVN and the PLAF.
To be sure, being a party member guaranteed "at least some career success for a
soldier," while expulsion from the party was "the certain road to career oblivion."" But it is
important to note that party membership seems to have been a necessary but not sufficient
condition for leadership at the company level and above.'e Although full party membership
was hard to obtain, basic party membership was widespread. For example, youths aged 16-
25 who had joined Labor Youth Groups to receive political education and indoctrination
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were considered "party members." In some PAVN units, 90 percent of the soldiers were
party members, many of them relying on their participation in Labor Youth Groups to
qualify for this status. 96 As such, the role of party membership in the promotion process
should not be overstated.
Furthermore, internal debates about the qualifications for officership repeatedly
stressed the need for proven military expertise in addition to political loyalty. For example,
General Song Hao, one of the most senior generals of the PAVN, wrote that "our Party has
attached importance not only to leading our Army in building itself politically, ideologically,
and organizationally, but also in leading the formulation and development of our military
art."'1 He noted that the best officers were always "men with revolutionary consciousness")
as well as "scientific and technical capacity." 198A similar view apparently filtered all the way
down to a captured North Vietnamese platoon leader, who noted that a good officer had to
have both "talent and virtue": the talent to fight the war competently, in addition to the
virtues of a correct temperament. 9 9 Political loyalty was considered important not because it
would help prevent a military coup against the regime, but because it was believed to
improve the fighting spirit of the soldiers.2"" Indeed, Pike notes that the "PAVN has always
accepted its role and deferred to the Party, more so than in other communist countries."21i
Despite this ideal, considerable evidence suggests that when push came to shove,
military merit took precedence over communist bona fides in the selection of leaders within
the PAVN and the PLAF. As mentioned, this pattern was set early, when the demands of
the Viet Minh war created a "need for commanders with high levels of military competency
who knew strategy and tactics and could win batdes."2o2 The trend intensified after 1955,
when the need to grow the army was so great that there was active promotion of "cadre
from other classes who have been tested and have demonstrated a progressive attitude and
loyalty to the revolution."203
Known as the "red vs. expert" debate, internal North Vietnamese discussions about
the appropriate qualifications for officers continued well into the 1960s, but Pike concludes
that the debate was essentially "settled in favor of the expert."2,4 Although political
commissars remained attached to virtually all units (as will be discussed in more detail
below), these officials were subordinate to military commanders when it came to combat
decision-making.205 Particularly as the Vietnam War escalated, PAVN POWs and defectors
"indicated either that the military commander was unquestionably supreme or that an uneasy
division of labor and authority had been worked out between the two in which the Political
Commissar carefully kept out of combat decision making."2"6 These reports again attest to
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the importance of military competence rather than just political loyalty in the selection of
combat leaders.
In general, leadership in the PAVN and PLAF were described as excellent and the
cornerstone of cohesion in the North Vietnamese armed forces-a major point of contrast
with the ARVN.2o7 The party directly intervened in "selecting, assigning, and promoting
personnel," but did so based on criteria consistent with best practices.2z8
2. Training regimens
Training in the PAVN and PLAF also contrasted sharply with the forms used in the
ARVN. While North Vietnamese training certainly included political indoctrination, leaders
there were most interested in instilling actual military skills in their soldiers. Political leaders
in North Vietnam actively directed the development of a rigorous, realistic, and frequent
combat training system at both the small- and large-unit levels. They also saw to the
development of numerous forms of specialized training and pushed for new training
methods in response to lessons learned on the battlefield. Proven and experienced officers
were put in command of the training system, which generally provided a very challenging
course for soldiers. In short, the PAVN and PLAF largely adopted best practices with regard
to training, not withstanding the additional emphasis on political indoctrination.
To be sure, DRV leaders heavily emphasized the importance of instilling communist
ideology in soldiers. In 1961, for example, General Giap noted, "The People's Army must
necessarily see to the strengthening of the leadership of Party and political work.... The
Party has during the last two years, given a prominent place to the activities of its
organizations as well as to the political work in the army. Officers, warrant officers and
armymen, all of them have followed political courses.... " A later Communist history of the
period also reported that starting in the 1950s:
Basic subjects in Marxist-Leninist theory..., Party history, Party
building, and political activities within the army were all developed into
systematic programs of study at the army's schools and institutes, and
study documents on these subjects were prepared for on-the-job
training of cadre and soldiers. Political activities during training and
during combat were subjects taught at basic and supplementary training
schools for both military and political cadre. With a regular and rather
systematic program of education in Marxist-Leninist theory and in the
major aspects of the political and military policies of the Party, the level
of political awareness and the ideological methods of the cadre and
soldiers of our armed forces were improved to a significant extent.2"1 1
Nevertheless, these same sources harp on the high priority attached to actual military
training. For example, Giap was well aware that ideological training alone was of little use in
the army: "It is necessary to carry out regular training systematically and according to plan,"
he wrote. "To meet the requirements of modern war, the army must be trained to master
modern techniques, tactical use of arms, coordinated tactics and modern military service.""
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North Vietnam's own post-war history confirms this attitude, noting that "the Central
Committee of the Party advocated the development of a strong standing army of high
quality," which required five-year army plans with a heavy emphasis on training in military
subjects, including the training of technical personnel.212
The history goes on to report that as soon as the war with the French was over, the
Party Central Committee had "clearly stated that training was the central requirement for the
completion of the work of building an army in peacetime."213 The history discusses in
considerable detail the manner in which "training activities systematically began to turn the
army into a regular force."214 According to the history,
Soldiers studied weapons theory and were trained in shooting techniques,
the use of bayonets, grenade throwing, and breaching and overcoming
obstacles. In addition to basic weapons training, practice fire and night
firing lessons were incorporated into the training program. Training in
physical fitness and sports was considered a part of the technical training
program. With regard to tactics, all units were trained from the squad up
to the battalion level in offensive and defensive combat in regular terrain,
and steps were taken to study and begin training in combat methods for
use in mountain jungle terrain, in swampy rice fields, in river crossings,
and night combat operations. 215
Furthermore, military training almost always trumped political training when soldiers'
time was limited.21 According to Turley, the senior officer corps recognized by the late
1950s "that more attention to professional and technical training, instead of political
activities, was necessary.... Time spent on training in military subjects increased and time
spent on political subjects declined."m During this period, "The General Staff and the
military regional and divisional headquarters also held many short-term classes, providing
supplemental training to company and battalion-level cadre and supplying basic training
lessons and training methods for technical affairs and tactics at the subunit level. Training
sites suited to the terrain and to unit training programs were constructed in areas where
troops were stationed." 218
By the early 1960s, according to North Vietnam's official history, "the school system
of the armed forces was strengthened and expanded. In North Vietnam there were two
study institutes, eight officers training schools, one basic education school, and five military-
political schools at the military region level." The party also directed the establishment of
military training schools in South Vietnam under the control of the COSVN and dedicated
to training company, platoon, and squad leaders.219 According to another history, the average
soldier now received three months of initial training in infantry tactics, including infantry
12 Military History Institute, Victory I Vietn;am, p. 22-3.
21 Military History Institute, V ictoI'li I Vietnal, p. 39.
114 Military History Institute, Vlicto /'In Vi etnam, p. 39.
11 Military History Institute, Vlictory in Vlietnalm, p. 39.
11 This policy was not without its detractors. The debate over whcther to emphasize political indoctrination or
modern tactics in training was vociferous in the mid-1950s, with General Giap seeking to focus on the latter
and Truong Chinh, Secretary General of the Party until 1956, believing the former was more important. Giap
won this argument. Turley, "Civil-Military Relations," p. 882.
Turley, "The Vietnamese Army," in Comiminist -Anlies, ed. Adelman, p. 72.
21 Military History Institute, Victo i etnam, p. 14.
211) Military History Institute, V i'ctory in Vietnami/, p. 100.
assault, basic air defense, using the bayonet and grenades, marksmanship, and movement,
with only about two weeks of that time devoted to political subjects.22
Melvin Gurtov, a civilian researcher who conducted extensive interviews with former
members of VC Main Force battalions during the 1960s, drew a similar conclusion about the
importance of combat skills in the training process, noting that "in theory, the Viet Cong
believed that political and military training should be given equal consideration, but in
practice, military training received more emphasis."221 Gurtov's interview subjects reported
that "for the most part, military training took precedence even though political doctrine
might, under less pressing circumstances, have seemed indispensable."222 While cautious
about drawing over-broad conclusions from his limited sample, Gurtov wrote, "What does
seem fairly certain is that political training for most of the units in question was subordinated
to military training.... Indoctrination yielded to establishing battlefield proficiency among
new recruits. The priority given to war skills was reflected in the ignorance of interviewees,
including cadres, about political matters."22
North Vietnam's training system was also highly rigorous, heavily emphasizing the
demonstration of actual proficiency rather than rote learning or pro forma drills.224 Captured
documents for a training program "reveal a well-organized and ambitious schedule" focused
on "close-order drill, firing positions, bayonet drill, and grenade throwing," as well as "use
and maintenance of weapons, ... fortifications and camouflage; movement procedures;
individual, cell, and squad tactics; sanitation; protective measures against toxic chemicals;
military discipline; guard and patrol duty; liaison; reconnaissance; and POW escort," and
"marksmanship and weapon familiarization, techniques of armored vehicle destruction,
ambush tactics, surprise attack, anti-heliborne or paratroop tactics."225 The Communists also
developed longer-term and more specialized training for operators of crew-served weapons,
signals operators, communications specialists, sappers, and so on.2 6
Once in the field, soldiers could also expect further on-the-job training and careful
practice of imminent operations. One history notes that "rehearsals for [an] operation began
on sand tables and progressed to practices on stake-and-string replicas of the target.
Depending upon the difficulty of the objective, this phase lasted from three days to well over
a month."2' Another soldier reported, "Before any operation a few among us would be sent
out to make a study and survey of the battlefield, and then a plan of operation would be
drawn up and presented to all the men in the unit. Each would then be given a chance to
contribute ideas and suggestions. Each squad, each man, would be told what action to take if
the enemy was to take such-and-such a position."2'
During the late 1950s and early 1960s, training advanced to cover more complex
operations. For example, troops progressed from learning positional to mobile defenses,
" J anning and Cragg, Inside the V C, p. 41.
Lanning and Cragg, Inside the VC, p. 55.
Gurtov, llarin the Delta, p. 18.
This conclusion could reflect some selection bias, in that the least politically indoctrinated soldiers might
have been the most likely to defect and therefore to end up speaking with Gurtov. Nevertheless, his
conclusions are consistent with evidence from Northern leaders' own discussion of their training curriculum,
cited above. Gurtov, llar in the Delta, p. 21.
' Lanning and Cragg, Inside the V"C, p. 42.
-_5 Lanning and Cragg, Inside the VC, p. 54.
-6 Lanning and Cragg, Inside the V C, p. 55.
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coordinated with combined arms counterattacks.229 Troops also began to learn envelopment
and flanking maneuvers and to fight on different types of terrain both offensively and
defensively.230 The North Vietnamese ensured realism in training by conducting regular
exercises at all levels of command, across different combat arms, and on the offense and
defense.23 As their history notes, "The phrase 'sweat on the exercise field to lessen
bloodshed on the battlefield' became a slogan in our army."232 It was not unusual for Ho Chi
Minh himself to attend live fire exercises.m3
Furthermore, North Vietnam put many of its best and most experienced officers in
charge of training and exercises.24 These leaders based the development, execution, and
adjustment of their battlefield preparation plans on lessons learned from the war against the
French and experience the North Vietnamese were acquiring in South Vietnam and Laos. 235
As the war went on, they also periodically re-drafted training regulations to reflect new
information learned in the field and further analysis of the lessons of past military
experience.236 Clearly, North Vietnam followed best practices with respect to training, in a
sharp contrast to the forms of intervention used by South Vietnamese leaders in this area of
military activity.
3. Command arrangements
North Vietnamese command arrangements also hewed closely to best practices,
emphasizing the authority of officers on the battlefield. To be sure, party control of the
military's command structure was an "immutable principle," and even small units always
contained some type of political officer.m3 But these officers usually lacked actual command
authority, which was entrusted to officers selected on the basis of military competence.
As early as the 1930s, "the Party stipulated that all units from squad level up must
have a Communist Party representative on the command."238 This system arose because of
the ever-present North Vietnamese worry that participation in a united front organization
left the armed forces vulnerable to usurpation by non-communist revolutionary
movements.239 This concern intensified during the war against the French, when there simply
were not enough party members to fill all leadership positions, and "large numbers of
officers with only military competence began filling PAVN officer ranks." As a result, in
1952 party leaders instituted what was known as the "two-commander system," essentially
requiring that political officers down to the platoon level sign off on all orders.24"
Pike reports that this system resulted in significant friction within units and that
during the early 1960s, "the struggle for power between these two figures seesawed back and
forth." However, as the Vietnam War escalated, the balance of power "tilted toward the
military commander," and political officers were careful from then on not to interfere with
229 Military H istory Institute, Victory in Vietnami, pp. 39-42.
23" Military History Institute, Victory in VI ietnam, pp. 104, 106.
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combat decision-making.241 Captured documents attest to this arrangement, with one officer
reporting that "in the military and administrative fields, [the political commissar] is
subordinate to the military commander" at his same level of command.242 In short, despite
the formal existence of a dual-command system, in reality the military commander selected
on the basis of military qualifications made the key combat decisions in the PAVN and
PLAF.
The arrangement was not perfect, of course, with one officer admitting that
in certain places and at certain time [sic], differences exist in the
understanding of military missions and working procedures.... In other
places, the working procedures are not appropriate. The Party Committee
dedicates too much attention to military affairs, discussing and deciding
too many matters without allowing the military agencies to develop their
functions, or the Party Committee leaves all military affairs to the military
agencies without giving them due attention. Often the working
procedures and behavior of Party Committee members differ from those
of the military commanders. Discrepancies may develop.... In some
places, important matters and deficiencies go unnoticed. A thorough
understanding does not develop between Party Committee members and
military commanders.241
Similarly, Pike notes that there were "occasional bouts of open confrontation" within the
dual-command system, "including a few reliable reports of battlefield disputes in which the
military commander shot his Political Commissar."244
Clearly, the party's desire to maintain political officers in all units sometimes clashed
with military imperatives. Even as late as 1974, an article by General Le Quang Dao,
PAVN's chief political commissar, indicated that the army still had to deal with "the
problem developing out of the dual control system existent within PAVN, the military
command structure vs. the Party leadership within the armed forces, the military commander
vs. the political commissar."2- Furthermore, the dual control system was officially abolished
after the war, suggesting that North Vietnamese leaders believed it had more problems than
virtues.2*4
Still, the system afforded considerable latitude to most battlefield commanders in the
PAVN and the PLAF. They had to report their activities to political officers and be
accountable for them, but political officers did not enjoy a veto over these decisions.2
Indeed, it is important to understand that although political officers existed in almost all
units, their role was not solely to maintain political loyalty but also to fill the roles served in
Western armies by the chaplain, the troop information and education officer, or the special
services officer. Pike notes that "in PAVN and PLAF units in the South [the political
officer's] duties were many and varied but chiefly involved political indoctrination, personal
'4' Pike, PAI 'N, p. 167.
141 Khan, "Notebook II," p. 9.
24 Khan, "Notebook II," p. 15.
244 Pike, PAT 7, p. 167.
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24 Pike, PA f i, pp. 159-60, 166.
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problem solving, and generally attending to his unit's morale."248 While no less politicized or
interventionist, this system again contrasts with that of South Vietnam.
4. Information management
In general, North Vietnam seems to have adopted best practices with regard to
information management. First, PAVN and PLAF units seem to have been free to
communicate horizontally with one another. The North Vietnamese history notes that the
CMPC emphasized to its tactical commanders that they needed to "exercise independence in
battle, take the initiative in cooperating with and supporting friendly units, [and] maintain
close coordination."249
Second, within individual units, North Vietnamese political leaders also required
extensive use of what were called "self-criticism sessions," that is, meetings in which
personnel discussed recent performance and areas in need of improvement. Such sessions
ensured that soldiers and officers shared feedback from battlefield experiences. They also
reassured soldiers that problems were being aired and addressed, strengthening their
commitment to the fight, while nevertheless reinforcing the politically convenient
implication that military leaders were, in fact, fallible.25o Over and over, North Vietnamese
documents reflect a military in which political leaders encouraged candid discussion of
weaknesses and ideas for improvement; there was no prize for hiding problems or
punishment for delivering unfavorable information. 251
Beyond the self-criticism sessions, there is also significant evidence of active debate
in the North Vietnamese officer corps about military strategy and tactics. During the mid-to-
late 1960s, for example, Giap thought efforts to fight the United States directly were
wasteful and that Hanoi should return to a slow and protracted guerrilla war, even if it took
15-20 years to win. Some officers published articles agreeing with Giap, while the
commander in the south at the time, General Nguyen Chi Thanh, continued to defend a
much more aggressive offensive strategy. 252 The key point is that this was the sort of debate
that did not regularly occur within the South Vietnamese officer corps.2-5
Also consistent with best practices in information management, North Vietnamese
political leaders seem to have regularly gathered information about battlefield events. Their
history notes the existence of a reporting system by which commanders informed the
CMPC, and in turn the Central Committee and the Politburo, of battlefield events.254
Furthermore, there are repeated references to Ho Chi Minh receiving a steady stream of
candid information about the war. The Communist history claims that Ho "regularly
monitored the activities of our units on the battlefields"2s and that "every day Uncle Ho
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received a briefing, either in person or by telephone, from the Combat Operations
Department on the combat situation in both North and South Vietnam."256
Information also seems to have flowed in the other direction. From the beginning,
high-level officer training in the PAVN involved reading directly from Politburo resolutions
on the army. 257 COSVN leaders also annually "attended a Politburo meeting in Hanoi to
consult with Party leaders and receive directions for future strategy in the South."258 Again,
while not especially detailed, these facts are at least consistent with best practices in
information management, posing a stark contrast to the constriction of information seen in
South Vietnam.
Predictions If the Political Intervention Explanation Is Right: Confirming Evidence
* PAVN and PLAF units should have performed very well, consistently displaying good
cohesion, tactical proficiency, and the ability to conduct complex operations, due to the
adoption of best practices in political intervention.
Predictions If the Political Intervention Explanation Is Wrong: Disconfirming Evidence
- PAVN and PLAF units that demonstrated poor unit cohesion, a lack of tactical
proficiency, and/or an inability to conduct complex operations would cast doubt on the
intervention theory, because they would constitute instances of poor battlefield
performance even in the face of best practices.
Predictions If the Alternative Explanations Are Right: Additional Disconfirming Evidence
- There should have been very little cross-national variation between the performance of
PAVN/PLAF units and those of South Vietnam, if political intervention is irrelevant to
battlefield performance.
IV. Conclusion: Summary and Initial Implications
This chapter has contrasted the nature of political intervention in the militaries of
North and South Vietnam in order to generate predictions about how the two states should
have performed in battle. The general argument is that despite the fact that North and South
Vietnam shared many common characteristics said to matter for military performance,
political leaders in the two states adopted radically different forms of political intervention in
the armed forces.
In both states, political leaders frequently intervened in military activities related to
promotion patterns, training regimens, command arrangements, and information
management. These activities were unquestionably "politicized." But the forms of this
politicization and intervention varied dramatically between the two regimes, and even varied
considerably across different units of the South Vietnamese military. North Vietnamese
leaders generally adopted best practices in their forms of intervention, while South
Vietnamese leaders adopted worst practices toward most units, with the exception of the
ARVN 1" Division.
2'5 Military I History Institute, V ictogy in I Vietnamli, p. 187.
Military History Institute, Victor' in Vlietnam, p. 25.
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As a result, the intervention theory predicts that there should have been substantial
cross-national variation in the military performance of North and South Vietnam, as well as
observable variation across different units of the South Vietnamese military. Specifically, the
PAVN and PLAF should have performed much better on the battlefield than most ARVN
units, except for the ARVN 1" Division. Evidence of poor PAVN or PLAF performance, or
of good ARVN performance outside the 1 Division, would cast significant doubt on the
intervention theory, as would a general lack of cross-national variation between North
Vietnamese and South Vietnamese battlefield performance.
That said, even the evidence presented thus far should induce significant skepticism
about the structural variables emphasized in existing theories of military effectiveness. The
contrast between North and South Vietnam suggests that very different forms of political
intervention in the armed forces can arise even in states that share many common structural
traits, such as wealth, population size, regime type, external threat levels, culture, and society.
Indeed, it shows that even in environments of low military autonomy, "politicization" of the
military can take very different forms. The evidence of cross-units variation in the South
Vietnamese case, in particular, shows that these policies are much more agile than often
assumed.
All of this suggests that autocracy and "bad" political-military relations are not
necessarily synonymous. It also suggests that significant external threats do not automatically
induce "good" political-military relations. None of this proves that structural variables are
irrelevant in explaining military performance, of course. Nor does it prove that differences in
political intervention actually matter for battlefield effectiveness. But it should make us quite
curious about the material covered the next chapter: a series of battles between North and
South Vietnam during the period 1962-1975, which will make it possible to adjudicate
amongst the predictions derived from the intervention theory and its competitors.
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CHAPTER 3
Battlefield Effectiveness in North and South Vietnam
The previous chapter contrasted the nature of political intervention in the militaries
of North and South Vietnam. Whereas North Vietnam was found to have adopted best
practices in political intervention, South Vietnam was found generally to have adopted worst
practices. The major exception to this rule was the ARVN l" Division, particularly the Hac
Bao company. Nevertheless, if the theory in Chapter 1 is correct, the ARVN generally
should have demonstrated almost no battlefield effectiveness-very little unit cohesion,
virtually no tactical proficiency, and no ability to conduct complex operations. The 1"
Division should have demonstrated at least cohesion and tactical proficiency, but this
performance should have been an outlier. North Vietnam's PLAF and PAVN forces, on the
other hand, should have been highly effective on the battlefield-cohesive, very tactically
proficient, and consistently capable of conducting complex operations. As discussed earlier,
the competing theories would predict very little within-country or cross-national variation at
all.
To test the validity of these divergent predictions, this chapter examines the
battlefield evidence from the war in Vietnam, with a particular focus on events from 1962 to
1975. Specifically, the chapter focuses on the following six major campaigns or battles: the
battle of Ap Bac in 1963; the battle of Binh Gia in 1964-5; the battle for the Citadel at Hue
during the Tet offensive of 1968; the South Vietnamese invasion of Laos in 1971, known as
Lam Son 719; the Easter offensive and the response to it in 1972; and the final battles in
1975.
Out of all the conflict that occurred in Vietnam during this period, the chapter
examines these battles for three main reasons. First, these were all battles in which the
United States did not participate or in which its role was very circumscribed. So, for
example, the chapter does not focus on ARVN operations during the period 1965-1968,
because U.S. combat forces heavily dominated virtually all ARVN conventional activities
during this period.' This does not necessarily mean that the ARVN's performance during
this time contradicts the predictions of the intervention theory, only that the extensive U.S.
combat role during this period makes it difficult to isolate the effects of the variables of
interest. Instead the chapter focuses on battles in which U.S. firepower, resources, or
advisory leadership were much more minimal, thereby controlling for an important potential
confounding variable in the assessment of both North and South Vietnam's fighting
effectiveness.
Second, the analysis focuses on what were substantively the important major
engagements during the war. To be sure, the war was incredibly complex, encompassing a
bewildering degree and variety of conflict, so an almost infinite number of additional tests is
possible, and the judgment of which battles were crucial is subjective at the margins.
Nevertheless, as a group, these battles constitute the core series of events that must be
explained bv any account of the battlefield effectiveness of the two sides. Trying to discuss
the Vietnam War without reference to them is about is about as satisfying as discussing the
U.S. post-war role in Europe without reference to the Marshall Plan or NATO. One can
debate whether this discussion is sufficient for a complete analysis, but it is certainly
necessary.
I Lt. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong, RI N AF and U.S. Operational Cooperation and Coordination (Washington, DC: U.S.
Army Center of Military History, 1980), p. 165.
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Third, this series of battles captures both offensive and defensive operations for
both the North and the South and for different units within the South Vietnamese military,
providing an additional series of controls across a full range of values of the independent
variable. This group of battles enables examination of the validity of all of Chapter 2's
predictions for the PAVN and the PLAF, the ARVN general forces, and the ARVN 1
Division, even accounting for the fact that these forces were trying to do different things at
different times.
SELECTION OF BATTLES AND CAMPAGINS FOR EXAMINATION
On the tactical offense On the tactical defense
ARVN general * Ap Bac, 1963 e Hue, 1968
forces e Binh Gia, 1964-5 Easter Offensive, 1972
* Invasion of Laos, 1971 * Final offensives, 1975
ARVN 1st Invasion of Laos, 1971 * Hue, 1968
Division - Response to Easter Offensive, 1972 * Invasion of Laos, 1971
Final offensives, 1975
PAVN and Hue, 1968 Ap Bac, 1963
PLAF e Easter Offensive, 1972 * Binh Gia, 1964-5
* Final offensives, 1975
After providing some general background, the chapter examines each of these battles
or campaigns in turn. Each section first presents the context, the forces involved on the two
sides, and the key battlefield events. Then it reviews each side's performance according to
the questions established in Chapter 1, enabling a coding of the value of the dependent
variable for the actor of interest and thereby an evaluation of the validity of competing
predictions. It is important to note that each battle or campaign offers the opportunity to
observe multiple readings of the dependent variable, because each battle involves units from
both the PLAF/PAVN and the ARVN, and in some instances from different units within
the ARVN.
After performing this analysis on the six major campaigns or battles of interest and
finding general support for the intervention theory, the chapter concludes by briefly
examining evidence that might undermine this support. Specifically, I sought out supposed
instances of effectiveness in the general ARVN units (not in the 1 " Division), or instances of
poor PAVN performance. As a result, the final section of the chapter examines the failed
PLAF raid at Phuoc Chao in 1962, the battle of Dan Tien in 1962, and the South
Vietnamese incursion into Cambodia in 1970. Nevertheless, the chapter concludes that these
outliers cast only very limited doubt on the intervention theory.
I. Background: the Vietnam War, 1962-1975
The battlefield events discussed in this chapter occurred against the backdrop of a
long and multi-faceted war, which this analysis does not seek to describe in its entirety.
Nevertheless, it is useful to bear in mind the war's major contours during the period 1962-
1975. Through 1965, the war was primarily a Vietnamese affair, with the U.S. role significant
but still advisory. The PLAF led much of the fighting against Saigon, although the PAVN
role was growing. As the 1960s wore on, the war became increasingly conventional, in the
sense that the two sides generated regular, uniformed units of company- or battalion-size or
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larger to fight for and hold territory, as evidenced in the battles at Phuoc Chao (1962), Dan
Tien (1962), Ap Bac (1963), and Binh Gia (1964-5), all examined below. This is not to say
that the PLAF were not also conducting an insurgency, only that their combat repertoire
included much more than hit-and-run terrorist attacks and clearly sought to gain control of
actual real estate in South Vietnam.
The period 1965-1969 saw the introduction of U.S. combat troops and a dramatic
escalation in violence against the North Vietnamese. The PAVN came to play a more
prominent role than the PLAF in most large battles, with many of the PLAF forces wiped
out entirely during the series of 1968 attacks known as the Tet Offensive. The battle for the
Citadel at Hue, examined below, occurred during this larger campaign. Although Tet was a
military disaster for the North Vietnamese, it did succeed in draining U.S. domestic support
for the war.
After the adoption of the Nixon Doctrine in June 1969, the U.S. ground presence in
Vietnam began to contract substantially, as primary combat responsibilities shifted back to
the South Vietnamese. The war took on a strongly conventional character, with clashes
between ARVN and PAVN at the brigade or even division level not unusual. Thieu's
government focused in particular on breaking up North Vietnamese supply lines in both
Cambodia (1970) and Laos (1971), two campaigns examined below.
Hanoi now knew that a large-scale conventional offensive would be needed to win
the war, and it launched the series of attacks known as the Easter Offensive (1972) with that
goal in mind. The offensive occurred along similar lines as the attacks in 1968, and, like the
Tet Offensive, the Easter Offensive was premised on the notion that a quick succession of
North Vietnamese military victories would give way to popular uprisings that would finish
the job of overthrowing the Thieu regime. In fact, the Easter Offensive nearly succeeded
militarily, but heavy U.S. airpower assisted the South Vietnamese in driving it back. The
campaign is discussed in detail below.
In 1973, the United States signed the 1973 Paris Peace Accords, officially ending the
U.S. combat role and soon leaving only a bare-bones infrastructure for continued support to
South Vietnam. From 1973 on, the war became entirely a Vietnamese affair again, with the
North launching a final series of offensives in 1975, along the same lines as those in 1972
and 1968. Bereft of U.S. help, the South Vietnamese crumpled, and the Hanoi achieved the
victory that it had sought for more than 30 years. These final battles are also discussed in
detail below.
II. The Battle of Ap Bac, 1963
The battle known as Ap Bac presents one of the first opportunities in the Vietnam
War, prior to extensive U.S. combat involvement, to observe the ARVN and PLAF in a
relatively conventional fight for control over territory. In this battle, the PLAF was
essentially trying to draw the ARVN into an ambush, while the ARVN was attempting to
conduct a three-pronged armor-infantry assault on the PLAF's prepared defensive position.
As such, the battle enables a close evaluation of both sides' unit cohesion and tactical
proficiency. The battle also saw South Vietnam attempt to conduct complex operations on
the offense, trying to integrate several different battalion-sized units in combined-arms
maneuver, and it saw the PLAF attempt to engage in some minimal complex operations on
the defense, trying to integrate three companies' use of light arms along a thinly covered
front.
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As will be discussed below, the battle provides some initial confirmation for the
intervention theory. Despite having a 4:1 advantage in manpower and massively greater
firepower, the ARVN forces demonstrated unit cohesion that was uneven at best.
Furthermore, their tactical proficiency and attempts to conduct complex operations were
very poor, and for reasons directly attributable to the nature of political intervention in the
military. By contrast, the PLAF demonstrated remarkable unit cohesion, tactical proficiency,
and a solid ability to conduct some minimal complex operations on the defense. The PLAF
took significant casualties, but they also inflicted significant casualties. The table below
provides a brief summary of the battle, which is then discussed in more detail.2
THE BATTLE OF AP BAC, 1963
North Vietnam South Vietnam
Battle summary
Tactical orientation Defensive Offensive
Plan Ambush ARVN forces Three-pronged armor-infantry
assault on PLAF position
Weapons 12 Browning automatic rifles, 5 13 M-1 13 armored personnel
machine guns, 2-3 rifle carriers, helicopters, artillery
grenades, 60-mm mortar
Manpower ~350 -1200
Losses ~100 KIA ~63 KIA, 109 WIA
Effectiveness summay
Unit cohesion? Yes Uneven
Tactical proficiency? Yes No
Complex operations? Yes, minimally No
Confirms theory? Yes Yes
The Forces on Each Side
The battle began before dawn on January 2, 1963, in Dinh Tuong province, about 65
miles southwest of Saigon, deep in the Mekong Delta. ARVN intelligence had indicated that
an enemy radio station was located near the hamlet of Tan Thoi, about 1500 meters
northwest of the hamlet of Bac (see map 3). Reports further suggested that a reinforced
company of Viet Cong, about 120 men plus perhaps another 30 or so locals, guarded the
radio.3 Both hamlets were surrounded by knee-deep rice paddies bordered by a series of
connecting streams and canals, covered with tree lines on both banks.4 The second half of
1962 had seen a series of ambushes by the Viet Cong of ARVN forces areas just like this, so
the ARVN was eager to go on the offense. The supposed radio station at Tan Thoi seemed
I report whatever casualty figures are available for this and the other battles. The information is not
standardized, because some battle accounts report KIA, others KIA and WIA, and others just "losses." I do
not rely on these numbers as a measure of effectiveness (see Appendix A in Chapter 1 for a full discussion of
why). Although of varying reliability and relevance, these numbers provide an additional piece of information
for the reader to evaluate, in the context of all the other information about the battle and with a recognition
that the source of the information may be biased.
3 Lt. Col. John P. Vann, "After Action Report on Dinh Tuong," January 9, 1963, Historian's Files and WXorking
Papers, Center of Military History, Washington, DC, p. 4. This background also appears in David M. Toczek,
The Battle olAp Bac. They Did Everything But Learnfom It (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001), p. 71; and
General Donn A. Starry, Armoured Coibat in 'ietnam, (Dorset, UK: Blandford Press, 1981), p. 25.
4 Vann, "After Action Report," p. 4.
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to offer the perfect opportunity, especially as the expected victory would coincide with
President Diem's birthday on January 3.
The ARVN battle plan envisioned trapping the PLAF company at Tan Thoi from
three directions. First, the 7 th Division would land an infantry battalion of approximately 330
men to the north of the village by helicopter, who would then press southward. At the same
time that this battalion (known as the 2"d Battalion, 1 1 ,h Infantry Regiment, or the 2-11 IN)
brought pressure from the north, a battalion of Civil Guard units divided into two task
forces (A and B) were to attack from the south, preventing escape.5 From the southwest, just
along the flank of the guerrillas, a company of thirteen M-1 13 armored personnel carriers
(APCs) with mounted infantry were also to attack. These amphibious tracked vehicles,
drawn from the 2"' Armored Cavalry Regiment (2" ' ACR), would be able to pivot and close
with the guerillas once they began to break under the pressure from the infantry and Civil
Guard units.6
Although no preplanned air sorties were to occur, artillery as well as fighter-bombers
would be on call to provide additional firepower for any of the units.7 There were also two
additional reserve infantry companies at the nearby base of Tan Hiep; they could be lifted by
helicopter to the battlefield if needed.8 Additionally, the 3 5 2nd Ranger Company would be
stationed about 1200 meters northeast of the 2/11, providing a blocking force to prevent
another possible avenue of PLAF escape. 9 In short, the plan envisioned throwing about
1,200 ARVN soldiers, thirteen APCs, and several varieties of direct and indirect firepower
from three directions at about 150 lightly armed guerillas believed to be hiding out at Tan
Thoi."'
Four South Vietnamese commanders were at the center of the battle that would
unfold. First, Colonel Bui Dinh Dam commanded the 7t" Division, in whose area of
operations the battle occurred and from which the infantry units were drawn. It was Dam
who devised the battle plan with U.S. advisors and who was supposed to oversee its
execution. Nevertheless, Dam's background was in administration, not combat; he had
previously been chief of staff of the 7 "h division, and this was his first time in command."
Dam answered to the second major ARVN figure of the battle, General Huynh Van
Cao, the recently promoted commander of the newly created IV Corps, whom Dam had
replaced." The third figure was Major Lam Quang Tho, who commanded both the M-1 13
company from the 2 "" ACR and the Civil Guard task forces. Tho, however, was also the
chief of Dinh Tuong province, meaning that his chain of command ran through the
Department of the Interior, rather than the ARVN and the Department of Defense-even
though both the 2 "" ACR and the Civil Guard were Defense assets." In other words,
-This is merely a summary of the overall plan. For an extremely thorough account of the entire battle, see
Toczek, Battle o'Ap Bac.
6 Neil Sheehan, /A Bright Shinin lie: John Pa/i V1'ann and Ametiea In I letnamv (New York: Random Hlouse, 1988),
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8 Sheehan, Bight Shinii I Lie, p. 205.
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" Toczek, Battle olAp Bac, p. 71.
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although Dam's plan depended on Tho's units, Tho did not answer to Dam or to Cao.
Fourth, under Tho was Captain Ba, who commanded the M-1 13 company, usually known as
the 4-2 because it was the 4 th mechanized Rifle Squadron of the 2 "d Armored Cavalry. Ba had
been noted as aggressive and capable.4
ARVN COMMANDERS AND THEIR FORCES AT AP BAC
Commander Forces Additional Information
Cao IV Corps Recently promoted from command of 7 th
Division
Dam 7th Division, including the First battle as commander of 7th Division;
2/11 IN (2 nd Infantry previous positions were administrative
Battalion, 11t" Regiment)
Tho 2nd ACR, including the 4-2 Also the province chief; did not answer to
(M- 113 company); Civil Cao or Dam, but rather to Department of
Guard Task Forces A and B Interior
Ba The 4-2 (M-1 13 company) Noted as aggressive and capable
For their part, the PLAF forces in the area went well beyond the single company
reported by ARVN intelligence. The PLAF actually had three Main Force companies
totaling about 320 men, with about 30 additional locals assisting them.15 This figure still gave
the ARVN about a 4:1 advantage in manpower but certainly presented a greater challenge.
The PLAF forces included the 1s Company of the 5 14 h Regional Battalion, known as the
C1/514, which had executed a very successful ambush on the ARVN just a few miles
northwest of Tan Thoi in 1962.16 It now guarded the area just east of Tan Thoi. Also present
was the 1 " Company of the 261S Regional Battalion, known as the Cl /261, guarding the area
just east of Bac.1
The PLAF forces were lightly but sufficient armed. Their small arms were mostly of
American manufacture, including 12 Browning Automatic Rifles (BARs) and four .30 calibre
machine guns. They also had "two or three locally produced rifle grenades, one 60 mm
mortar with three rounds, ... and at least one heavy machine gun."18
More importantly, the PLAF had carefully prepared the terrain to maximize the use
of these weapons. Well aware that an attack was coming, the PLAF had established Bac and
Tan Thoi as mutually supporting positions, digging carefully camouflaged foxholes behind
the canal lines that jutted out at odd angles into the rice paddies.19 The PLAF also positioned
its machine guns so as to create interlocking fields of fire along the various dikes.21 Indeed,
these positions were so well hidden in the surrounding vegetation that even the famed
American advisor Lt. Col. John Paul Vann was totally unable to spot any evidence of them
when circling overhead at a few hundred feet during the battle.21 The PLAF's positions also
14 Sheehan, Brig'h SVhining i'e, p. 231; and Toczek, Battle o/Ap Bac, p. 73.
- Sheehan, Bright Shining IJe, p. 206. Similar figures are reported in General Cao Van Vien, 1eadeshwip,
Indochina Monograph (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military -lHistory, 1981), p. 55.
'6 Sheehan, Bight .Shininu Iie, p. 207.
, Toczek, Battle of Ap Bac, p. 85.
I" Toczek, Battle ofAp Bac, p. 70.
"9 Sheehan, Bright Shining Je, p. 209.
Sheehan, Bright Shining Lie, p. 210; and Starry, Armowed Comlibat, p. 25.
1 Sheehan, Br*ght Shining Ie, p. 210.
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were slightly elevated, providing an excellent downward view of the paddies through which
the ARVN would have to approach.22
Additionally, as historian David Toczek relates, "To maximize the effectiveness of
their weapons, the PLAF soldiers set about aiming stakes for the automatic weapons, which
were small posts marked with white tape that designated each weapon's sector of fire. With
their positions along the canals, the guerillas also did not have to worry about resupplying
themselves during the coming battle. Since the water level in the canals was well below the
tops of the dikes because of the dry season, the insurgents could safely use sampans
[wooden boats] to move supplies without exposing themselves to enemy fire."2 3 In short,
although the PLAF forces were outnumbered and outgunned, their careful use of the terrain
appeared to offer the possibility of a strong defense of Tan Thoi and Bac-certainly a much
more vigorous defense than the ARVN was expecting.
The Battle
Before dawn, the ARVN units moved into place, with the Civil Guard task forces
coming into position in the south and the 4/2 moving its APCs into place toward the
southwest. Dam also directed the airlifting of the 2/11 IN to the northwest of Tan Thoi. But
fog enveloped the area, preventing the insertion of the second and third companies of the
battalion. As a result, the Rangers moved southwest to reinforce the components of the
2/11 IN that had made it to the landing site, although after moving this short distance, the
Rangers ceased to move for the rest of the battle.24
All the noise from these initial movements was enough to alert the PLAF units, and
they quickly moved into their prepared positions as the Civil Guard and 4-2 commenced
their attack.25 Knowing the limited range of its own weapons, the PLAF let the Civil Guard
get within thirty yards of its positions before opening fire.26 Then the PLAF suddenly let
loose, wounding the Civil Guard's commanding officer and killing the executive officer
almost immediately.2 The ARVN task forces quickly became disorganized and paralyzed,
unable even to move to safety.18
As the advisor to the Task Force A reported, "I attempted to get the TF
Commander to maneuver through the tree line to the right, using it for cover and
concealment. He informed me that the Sector Chief had ordered him to occupy a blocking
position at this location. If the TF had moved, it would have forced the VC into the same
position that we were in earlier. The TF Commander either could not, or would not get
permission to make the move."29 Instead, the advisor related in his after-action report,
"Some [ARVN] soldiers cowered behind the paddie [sic] dyke and would not return fire,
others held weapons above the dyke and fired without aiming."3" Artillery fire was no help.
22 Sheehan, Brigvht .Shining I Le, p. 209.
13 Toczek, Battle o/fAp Bac, p. 70.
- Toczek, Batt/e olAp Bac, p. 78.
5 Col. James N. Winterbottom, "Translation of VC Document on Ap Bac Battle 2.jan 63," April 20, 1963,
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Sheehan, BqIghtShinin Le, p. 2 15.
1 Lt. Arthur L. Bloch, "Field Advisor Narrative Analysis: Task Force A, 2 January 1963," january 6, 1963,
Historian's Files and Working Papers, Center of Military History, Washington, DC, p. 1. These events are also
described in Palmer, Swmmons, p. 34.
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Although it was "timely," according to the advisor, it was wildly insufficient and inaccurate,
with the forward observer failing to adjusting the volume or aim.31
Task Force B also refused to budge at this point, with its advisor later reporting that
it added "nothing to the friendly cause."32 Some of its soldiers "were observed by US
Advisory personnel to abandon many of their weapons while cowering in the bottom of a
ditch. The District Chief took no corrective action even though he was present at the time of
this occurrence."33 According to the advisor, however, not all of the paralysis was the direct
fault of the commanders on the scene: "The Commander of Task Force B requested
permission to attack the main objective on at least three occasions during the afternoon but
was denied permission on each occasion by the Sector Commander," that is, by Major Tho,
who apparently feared losing the provincial forces on which he relied for governance.34 Like
Task Force A, Task Force B also had serious problems calling in artillery to suppress PLAF
fire, as Task Force B had departed its base without its forward observer personnel, "who
were considered 'unnecessary'," according to the advisor.35
Meanwhile, by 9:30am the fog had lifted, and the other two companies of the 2/11
IN were able to land in the north. Aware of the disaster with the Civil Guard, however, Dam
now wanted to bring in a reserve infantry company from Tan Hiep by helicopter. Vann, who
served as Dam's division advisor, circled over head in his observation plane to find a spot
for the insertion. Still unable to detect the well-concealed PLAF positions in the treeline,
Vann recommended inserting the reserve forces only 300 meters away, just to the west of
Ap Bac.31
The resulting attempt at insertion turned the battle from bad to worse for the
ARVN. Up until that point, despite the problems that the Civil Guard had encountered, the
PLAF were still basically pinned in from three directions, with two of those prongs not
having suffered much enemy contact at all. But bringing in the infantry reserve meant relying
on helicopters, and the PLAF was ready for them.
Of the ten H-21 s bringing in these troops or escorting them, one was downed
almost immediately. The H-21 that went to rescue the first one was then shot down too.
Another went down in an attempt to rescue the first two. Meanwhile, a fourth H-21 had
been forced to crash land about a mile away. As Neil Patrick Sheehan put it, "In
approximately five minutes of shooting they had brought down four helicopters.... The
guerillas had hit every helicopter out of the fifteen except for one...."3 The PLAF also
immediately pinned down the reserve soldiers that disembarked from the helicopters.38 It
was now fairly clear that the reserve was more in need of help than the Civil Guard it had
come to assist.
31 Bloch, "Field Advisor Narrative," p. 2.
32 Macslarrow, "Field Advisor Analysis," p. 2. See also Letter from Ma'. Jack A. Nlacslarrow to Major Tho,
January 3, 1963, Historian's Files and Working Papers, Center of Military History, Washington, DC, pp. 1-2,
and 5.
33 Macslarroxv, "Field Advisor Analysis," p. 4.
34 Macslarrow, "Field Advisor Analysis," p. 2. See also Letter Mlacslarrow to Tho, pp. 1-2; and M\ajor William J.
Hart, "Field Advisor Narrative Analysis, Task Force B: 2 january 1963," January 7, 1963, Historian's Files and
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36 Toczek, Battle oflAp Bac, p. 80.
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Realizing the gravity of the situation, Vann turned to Ba's mechanized company to
salvage the situation. Ba had a good reputation, and Vann knew that if the 4/2 could just
cross the canal, its firepower and mobility could be brought to bear against the PLAF hidden
away in the treeline. But Captain Ba had suddenly become timid, resisting Vann's
suggestions to cross the canal. Repeatedly, Ba refused. Only after Vann ordered the
American advisor to shoot Ba-an order the advisor clearly did not intend to follow but
which Ba could hear loud and clear on the radio-did Ba relent and attempt to find a
suitable place to allow the M-113s to cross the canal.3 Even then he continued to
deliberately delay the crossing."0
Meanwhile, the C1 /514 turned its attention to the 2/11 IN, which was now trying to
press down on Ap Tan Thoi as originally planned from the north. Again, however, ARVN
units walked right into well-prepared defensive positions. "Waiting until the lead company of
the 2/11 IN had closed to within 20 meters of its positions," Toczek writes, "C1/514
opened fire, catching the 2nd Company almost completely by surprise."4' But the situation
quickly became stalemated as the C1/514 sent another platoon to help pin down the 2/11
IN.42 Neither the 2/11 IN nor the PLAF company was able to move.
PLAF leaders were worried at this point. According to Toczek, "It appeared that the
7 '" Division was slowly massing a coordinated assault. The 2/11 IN, although not making
much progress against C1 /514, was pressing firmly enough to keep the northern PLAF
company fixed in place. South of Ap Bac, the two CG task forces stood a short distance
away from completely enveloping C1 /261. Worse, the mechanized company was crossing its
last obstacle and would soon close with the insurgents who were dug into the sides of the
dikes."43 Now would have been a good time to retreat, and, in fact, the commander of
C1 /261 hoped he would be told to withdraw, but the PLAF battalion commander told him
to stand firm.44
Meanwhile, the ARVN continued to fire artillery, although it was falling well wide of
the defenders' positions. Task Force A could have used this moment to attack, as the PLAF
worried it would, but decided not to. 45 Indeed, the Civil Guard soldiers decided it was time
for lunch and began to build cooking fires. "Not taking fire, [they] casually sat or stood
around, presenting an idyllic scene for the soldiers of 4/2 ACR to the north."46
But the 4/2's own situation quickly turned ugly. When Ba's APCs finally did cross
the canal and move toward the PLAF, their movements were so poorly coordinated that the
PLAF were able to pick off the vehicles one bv one; the gunners were especially vulnerable.47
The APCs also did not coordinate their movement with the dismounted infantry, who were
quickly mowed down because the vehicle gunners were not suppressing the enemy fire from
the tree lines. Having waited until the APCs came in very close range, the PLAF now
unleashed its carefully prepared interlocking fields of fire to devastating effect.
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The ensuing chaos actually caused some of the M-1 13 drivers to back up,
abandoning or even injuring their own wounded comrades in the process. 48 One advisor
later reported that the gunner near him became so panicked that he "ducked down and was
blindly firing his machine, mostly in the air.... The M-1 13 next to me started to back up,
leaving one of their men who had just been hit."9 Other M-1 13s sought to hide behind the
downed helicopters rather than attack.5o Even the sole M1 13 with a flamethrower (instead of
the normal .50 calibre machine gun) did not have much effect because "the crew had not
mixed enough of the jelling agent with the gasoline to keep the jet of flame burning
properly."5' The ball of flame that should have burned the guerillas out of their positions
wound up having "the force and effect of a Zippo lighter."52
Despite all of these problems, Ba's APC made it through and was attempting to
attack. Ba was still leading from the front. But then, in a freak accident, Ba suffered a
concussion inside his APC and was knocked unconscious. The entire attack ground to a halt
for twenty minutes as Ba struggled to regain consciousness. ' Eventually he did, but the
momentum of the attack was gone. Ba remained "too stunned to even realize that he ought
to force the four or five carriers hanging back at the canal to come forward and bolster his
attack. He could not think beyond making the frontal assault that he had been taught most
often to do."54
Ba continued to advance. Just as his carrier and one or two others were about to
close with the PLAF by crawling up the dikes leading to the foxholes, a PLAF squad leader
climbed out of his foxhole and threw a grenade right onto the M-1 13 at a range of only 15-
20 yards. Emboldened, other PLAF fighters quickly copied him. After that it was all over for
the 4-2. Still stunned from his head injury, "Ba allowed the driver of his carrier to back up,
and the one or two vehicles persevering with him followed. The assault had failed."35
At this point Vann realized some other major intervention was required. He
suggested that Dam call in a mobile reserve unit, the 8" Airborne Battalion, for a drop east
of Ap Bac, to close the cordon on the PLAF as the three prongs of the initial attack had
failed to do. "If the ARVN forces could not take Ap Bac, Vann reasoned, they could at least
hold the PLAF in position until they could mass enough forces and firepower to close with
the enemy and destroy the insurgents the following morning."56 But time was of the essence,
as daylight was waning.
Dam replied that the drop would be made, but only to the west of Ap Bac rather
than the east.57 Vann also wanted the drop to occur as soon as possible so that there would
be time to close with the defenders before dark. Instead, the drop happened just before
dusk, and it missed its target by more than half a mile. Many of the Airborne actually "landed
in front of the Viet Cong positions on the west and northwest sides of Tan Thoi, instead of
safelv behind the Civil Guards and M-1 13s at Bac as Cao had planned."58 As a result, "they
4' Starry, Armoured Comlbat, p. 27.
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were unable to do more than launch piecemeal attacks in small units before darkness put an
end to the fighting. The PLAF made short work of them and inflicted substantial casualties.
Nineteen of the paratroopers were killed and thirty-three wounded, including the two
American advisors to the battalion, a captain and a sergeant."59
After night fell, the PLAF slipped away to the east in a very orderly, organized,
careful withdrawal, without detection by the ARVN (see map 4).60 The next morning the
ARVN entered the village, but as one advisor summed it up, "No VC were found, no
weapons were found."61 The battle had ended.
Assessing the Battlefield Effectiveness of South Vietnam
The ARVN units involved in the battle of Ap Bac were drawn from parts of the
South Vietnamese military subject to worst practices in political intervention. These included
the 7 *h Division, a standard infantry division; an APC company, a Ranger company, and an
Airborne battalion, all supposedly "elite" units who actual purpose was protection of
President Diem against coups; and Civil Guard task forces, commanded by officers whose
primary task was provincial government. The ARVN 1 " Division, which Chapter 2 showed
was subject to better practices in political intervention, had no involvement in the battle.
As a result, the intervention theory would predict that the units involved at Ap Bac
should have demonstrated minimal effectiveness at best, showing no ability to conduct
complex operations, virtually no tactical proficiency, and no unit cohesion unless soldiers
were coerced into remaining on the battlefield, a practice not generally followed in the
ARVN. In fact, the evidence from the battle is consistent with these predictions and suggests
initial support for the theory. Moreover, close examination of the battle reveals not only that
the ARVN performed as predicted but that the reasons for its poor performance were
closely tied to the nature of political intervention in the South Vietnamese military.
First, as predicted, unit cohesion was poor. Soldiers displayed little confidence in or
obedience to their leaders, in part because they knew that most had not been well trained or
selected on the basis of merit.62 As one of the advisors noted immediately after the battle,
"there is still too much political interference in the Vietnamese army and... promotion too
often depends on political loyalty rather than military ability."O The result was "a complete
lack of discipline in battle that permitt[ed] commanders at all levels, and even private
soldiers, to refuse to obey any orders they personally Ifound] distasteful."64 Indeed, none of
the commanders higher than Captain Ba even appeared on the battlefield to lead their
forces.i
Moreover, it was not just U.S. advisors who thought that the ARVN had poor
cohesion. The PLAF made the same observation in its after-action report, noting the
"panic" that frequently engulfed ARVN units under stress.66 "The demoralization of the
enemy officers and troops is very serious. They did not dare to fight," the PLAF report
stated, "and their formation would be dispersed upon confronting friendly firepower."
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Although the ARVN units did not literally break and run from the battlefield, it is
important to remember that no one was chasing them; they were on the offense. At multiple
points in the battle, individual ARVN soldiers chose to simply hide or wait out the fighting,
suggesting that underlying unit cohesion was very weak. In the opening phase of the battle,
for example, ARVN soldiers in the Civil Guard abandoned their weapons and hid in ditches.
Others continued firing but made no effort to aim. They essentially tried to maintain the
appearance of fighting while knowing that their actions could not possibly harm the
adversary.
For its part, the 4-2 showed good cohesion initially, but all discipline disintegrated
once it came under fire after crossing the canals. This is not surprising, because most of the
APC crews' "training" had come in the form of presidential parades.68 Meanwhile, the 2/11
IN did hold together in the north, but it faced only a very short period of fire before the
tactical situation there devolved into a stalemate. In sum, ARVN cohesion would have to be
described as uneven at best.
Second, ARVN tactical proficiency was poor, reflecting the lack of training described
in Chapter 2. At multiple points in the battle, units proved unable to conduct basic activities
central to their assigned functions. The APCs failed to mass for their attack, for example,
allowing themselves to be picked off vehicle by vehicle in the order in which they crossed
the canal. The 4-2 also proved unable to aim its .50 calibre mounts accurately or to operate
its prized flamethrower. The Airborne troops proved unable to conduct a timely and
accurate jump, and were unable to defend themselves quickly upon landing, even though,
again, these are the central sorts of activities for which an army supposedly acquires such
forces. Throughout the battle, ARVN artillery fires also were repeatedly observed to be
insufficient in volume to suppress the relatively light fires from the PLAF, suggesting very
basic problems in efficient operation. In sum, the ARVN forces showed a basic lack of key
tactical skills-a simple inability to use their weapons.
Finally, the battle also revealed the ARVN to be utterly incapable of aggregating
basic tactical actions into larger complex operations. For example, units repeatedly failed to
perform even relatively self-contained combined arms operations. The M-1 13 drivers
exhibited a deadly inability to coordinate their movement and fire with dismounted infantry,
even though such coordination is the entire reason to have armored personnel carriers. The
Civil Guard units had not bothered to bring along their artillery forward observers, resulting
in a lack of effective suppressive fire when they were trying to advance on the well-defended
PLAF positions. And even though everyone could see that the artillery was falling wide of
the PLAF positions, the problem was never corrected.
Perhaps more importantly, the ARVN repeatedly failed to integrate low-level
initiative and high-level coordination. At several points in the battle, commanders could have
pushed forward their attack in keeping with the overall known goals of the operation,
pressing in on the defenders from all three sides with overwhelming numbers and superior
firepower. But this sort of low-level action in support of a higher-level coordinated plan
never happened. For example, the Rangers and the 2/11 IN could have moved more
aggressively south to press down on Tan Thoi, before the C1/514 had a chance to reinforce
and react. But the Rangers stopped moving at the first opportunity, and the 2/11 IN moved
slowly, giving the C1/514 time to turn to neutralize them. The Civil Guard task forces in the
south also essentially stopped moving after taking their first losses in the opening moments
of the battle. Ba's company, too, was extremely slow to cross the canals and never regrouped
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after its initial assault failed. Then the Airborne waited until very late in the day to make its
jump, giving the PLAF an opportunity to escape under the cover of darkness. In short,
whenever ARVN commanders had the opportunity to choose between acting and not
acting, it appeared they almost always chose the latter.
It is clear that much of their hesitation-and the fundamental problem in executing
the battle plan-stemmed directly from the nature of political intervention in the military, in
particular the centralization and fracturing of command. Even where commanders knew
what to do and wanted to do it, they lacked authority to follow through, because that
authority was either concentrated at higher echelons or divided among multiple lower-level
commanders.
For example, on three separate occasions, Col. Dam ordered Major Tho's Civil
Guard units to advance. Dam outranked Tho, but because Tho was not in Dam's chain of
command, the order was not followed.69 Why were there two chains of command, one might
ask? Because, as discussed in Chapter 2, President Diem wanted to divide his military forces
and weaken the chances of a coup. Similarly, why was Tho so unmoved by Dam's pleas to
advance? Because Tho needed his Civil Guard units to survive the battle with few casualties
and return to their duties helping in the governance of Dinh Tuong province.71
Tho also "owned" Ba's APC units-another arrangement imposed by Diem to
ensure that no division commander could command valuable armored units that might
attempt a coup. The problem, of course, was that when Dam (and Vann) told Ba to move,
he had to wait for approval from Tho.71 It was for this reason that Ba was "intolerably slow"
and apparently showed "a lack of aggressiveness and willingness to fight," even though Ba
had previously been characterized by American advisors as just the opposite sort of officer.
Similarly, the poor employment of the Airborne also stemmed from the highly
centralized nature of command. Dam wanted the drop made sooner and to the east, but he
was overruled by his corps commander, General Cao, who had specifically been told by
Diem not to incur too many casualties.72 As discussed in Chapter 2, Diem believed (falsely)
that earlier battle casualties had been the cause of previous coup attempts against him. He
also no doubt wanted to preserve his Airborne forces, a mobile unit that he believed could
protect him in the future if other parts of the army turned against him or if domestic
dissidents engaged in an uprising. Hence he restricted Dam's ability to actually employ the
Airborne in a way that could have salvaged the battle.
In short, the battle of Ap Bac revealed an ARVN unable to maintain unit cohesion,
perform basic tactics, or conduct complex operations. And according to at least one U.S.
advisor on the ground, the battle was no fluke: "Time after time I have seen the same
Vietnamese officers and troops make the same mistakes in virtually the same rice paddy," he
said. "The only difference was that usually they get away with it without getting hurt because
the Communists simply slip away. This time the Communists fought, and our people were
torn up." '
Most importantly, the ARVN's deficits were not simply the result of idiosyncratic
factors. The morning's fog, the scant protection that the M-1 13 provided its gunners, Vann's
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poor choice of a landing zone for the helicopters, Ba's concussion-all conspired to make
the ARVN's ambitious battle plan more difficult to execute. 75 But close examination of the
battle shows that the ARVN's effectiveness problems ran deeper than bad luck. They
stemmed fundamentally from the forms of political intervention that Diem adopted toward
his army.
Assessing the Battlefield Effectiveness of North Vietnam
Chapter 2 argued that North Vietnam's political leaders generally adopted best
practices with regard to intervention in their military. As a result, the theory would predict
that the PLAF units at Ap Bac should have demonstrated strong cohesion, sound tactics,
and an ability to conduct offensive operations. In fact, the evidence from the battle is
consistent with these predictions, providing some initial support for the theory, at least
regarding PLAF performance on the defense.
First, the PLAF units demonstrated very solid cohesion despite being outnumbered
and outgunned. PLAF troops had a clear route of escape to the east, but there were no
instances of desertion during the battle.76 Soldiers waited until nightfall when they were given
orders to withdraw, rather than breaking and running. They appear to have believed their
officers' exhortation that "it is better to die at one's post."7 Moreover, the PLAF's own
after-action report noted that "in general our troops had good morale,"78 and the Americans
also noted that it was nearly impossible to break the PLAF's willingness to fight. One
reported afterwards in astonishment, "My God, we got a fix on one machine gun position
and made 15 aerial runs at it, and every time we thought we had him, and every time that
gunner came right back up firing."79
There was one exception to this pattern. A handful of new recruits who had never
seen Airborne troops before became frightened at the sight and jumped into their ditches,
jamming their weapons. 80 This event was minor, however; the PLAF still killed 19 of the
jumpers and wounded 33 more. In general, unit cohesion was very solid.
Second, the PLAF's tactical proficiency was excellent; soldiers demonstrated very
strong basic skills. For example, all observers of the battle agreed that the PLAF made
superb use of the terrain to conceal its positions.81 "Their well sited, camouflaged, and deep
fighting positions permitted them to withstand the direct fire of the M1 13s, as [well as] much
of the artillery, and almost all of the air effort," according to one report.82 Additionally, the
PLAF's own after-action report noted, "Accurate firepower was also one of our important
strengths."83 The Americans agreed: "The marksmanship of the VC riflemen was excellent.
Most of the ARVN 50 calibre gunners died of head wounds within the opening minutes of
the fight."84
Mark Moyar, Tiumitph Forraken: the V1ietiamv I[ar, 1954-1965 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006),
p. 195-6. Moyar gives these factors significant weight in his account.
6 Sheehan, Brtbr Shining Lie, p. 239.
77 Winterbottom, "Translation of VC Document," p. 17.
_8 Winterbottom, "Translation of VC Document," p. 9.
7 Advisor quoted in David Halberstam, "Vietnamese Reds Wins Major Clash," New 'ork Times, January 4,
1963, p. 2.
8"" Winterbottom, "Translation of VC Document," p. 21.
81 Winterbottom, "Translation of VC Document," p. 36.
82 Lieutenant Colonel Andrew P. O'Meara, "Recollections of Ap Bac," undated, historians' files on South
Vietnam, Center of Military History, Washington, DC, p. B-2 and B-3.
83 Winterbottom, "Translation of VC Document," p. 36.
84 O'Meara, "Recollections of Ap Bac," pp. B-2 and B-3.
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The PLAF also displayed superb fire discipline, reflecting knowledge of the exact
range of its weapons and the moment at which they would be effective. Repeatedly, the
PLAF refrained from firing at the ARVN attackers until they were close enough to be
trapped and hit. Their after-action assessment emphasized that they had developed very
detailed and deliberate tactics for confronting APCs, helicopters, and airborne troops. They
knew the vulnerabilities of each and fired accordingly.85
Third, the PLAF successfully demonstrated the ability to conduct relatively complex
operations. Although it was only lightly armed, it successfully established interlocking fields
of fire with its machine guns, maximizing the benefit of its defensive positions. It had few
arms to combine but managed to integrate the weapons that it did possess. Perhaps most
important to remember is that the PLAF was outnumbered 4:1, meaning that its
commanders frequently had to shift small groups of soldiers from one part of the defensive
front to another. PLAF commanders reacted quickly to the different prongs of the ARVN
attacks, fighting them off in turn.86 Indeed, the PLAF itself considered this a key
accomplishment, noting that it had maintained "a combined command of 3 different types
of Troops [sic] in a counter mopping up operation."87
The strategic implications of the battle are debatable, of course. The North saw it as
a "great victory."88 An internal MACV report took the opposite view, claiming that "the 2
January operation in the south is an example of what must be accomplished.... The 2
January operation in the south achieved a desirable confrontation of forces in which the Viet
Cong came off second best."89 Casualty data from the battle does little to resolve these
interpretations, with the PLAF estimated to have lost 100 men killed in action, and the
ARVN 63, with an addition 109 wounded.9 Whatever the broader strategic interpretation of
the day's events, the PLAF clearly demonstrated superior battlefield effectiveness-a direct
reflection of the forms of political intervention its leaders adopted regarding military
promotions, training, command, and information management.
III. The Battle of Binh Gia, 1964-5
Like the Battle of Ap Bac, the engagements known as the Battle of Binh Gia offer an
opportunity relatively early in the war, prior to extensive U.S. involvement, to observe both
North and South Vietnam engaged in a conventional fight for control over territory. As
such, it enables a clear evaluation of both sides' unit cohesion and tactical proficiency.
Additionally, the battle saw South Vietnam attempt to conduct complex operations on the
offense, trying to integrate several different battalion-sized units in combined-arms
operations. The battle also saw the North Vietnamese Main Force units (simply referred to
as "Viet Cong" in most accounts of the battle, but probably a mix of PLAF and PAVN
W interbottom, "Translation of VC Document," pp. 42-4.
8' Toczek, Batt/e ofxl1p Bac, p. 124.
Winterbottom, "Translation of VC Document," p. 29.
88 Winterbottom, "Translation of VC Document," p. 29.
8( "The Use of U.S. I lelicopters in Support of Vietnamese Operations on 2 january 1963," memo to Major
General Fred C. Weyand, subject: Information Regarding U.S. Military Operations in Vietnam for Chair,
Hlouse Armed Services Committee, January 30, 1963, available in the Historian's Files and.\Working Papers,
Center of Military History, Washington, DC, p. 5.
These estimates appear in WN.B. Rosson, "Foreword," in Toczek, Battle of/1p Bac, p. xv. One South
Vietnamese general claimed the ARVN casualties were much higher, around 400 men. Vien, Leaders/p, p. 55.
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forces given the location and year) attempt to engage in much more extensive complex
operations on the tactical defense than at Ap Bac.91 Here it sought to integrate the activities
of a division-size force composed of several different arms and to combine low-level
initiative with high-level coordination. As such, the engagement against offers a good
opportunity to test the predictions of the intervention theory.
The battle does confirm theory. Despite having much heavier weapons, the ARVN
forces acquitted themselves poorly. Their unit cohesion that was uneven at best.
Furthermore, their tactical proficiency and attempts to conduct complex operations were
very poor, and for reasons directly attributable to their leaders' forms of political
intervention in the military. By contrast, the North Vietnamese demonstrated remarkable
unit cohesion, tactical proficiency, and a solid ability to conduct some minimal complex
operations, this time on the offense. The North Vietnamese did outnumber the ARVN in
this series of engagements, but they also inflicted about four times the number of casualties
that they took. The table below provides a brief summary.
THE BATTLE OF BINH GIA, 1964-5
North Vietnam South Vietnam
Battle summary
Tactical orientation Offensive Offensive, then defensive
Plan Draw ARVN forces into a Drive North Vietnamese forces
series of ambushes out of hamlet
Weapons New heavy machine guns, M-1 13 armored personnel
recoilless rifles, submachine carriers, M-24 light tanks
guns, and hand grenades;
artillery
Manpower ~8,79002 ~5,83193
Losses 132 KIA 461 casualties
E ffectiveness summary
Unit cohesion? Yes No, except Marines
Tactical proficiency? Yes No
Complex operations? Yes, minimally No
Confirms theory? Yes Yes
The Forces on Each Side
The Battle of Binh Gia took place from December 1964 through early January 1965
and bore a striking resemblance to Ap Bac: Main Force units with the North's blessing took
(I The PAVN's own account of the battle strongly suggests a mix of local and Northern forces, referring to all
as "Main Force." The Military History Institute of Vietnam, IVictory in Vietnam: the Official History ofhe People'
Army ofT ietnam, 1954-1975, trans. Merle L. Pribbenow (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2002), pp. 138-
141.
(p As discussed below, total Northern forces at Binh Gia roughly equaled a division, and the average PAVN
division had about 8,700 men. Military History Institute, V, ictory in I Vietnam, p. 29.
9 This rough estimate is based on the fact that an average ARVN division had 12 battalions and about 10,000
men, yielding a rough estimate of about 833 men in an average battalion. The seven different battalions and 1
M-113 company engaged at Binh Gia therefore would have constituted a bit more than half a division, or about
5,831 men. Data on force structure taken from Cantwell, "The Army of...," p. 153, and James Lawton Collins,
Jr., The Developient and Training of the South IVietnamese Armiy, 1950 1972 (Washington, DC: Department of the
Army, 1975), p. 10.
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control of a hamlet relatively close to Saigon and then skillfully ambushed the clumsy
piecemeal relief forces that they knew the ARVN would send to re-take the area. Although
there were important differences between the two battles, the similarities suggest that the
debacle of January 1963 was not an isolated or fluke event. Again, supposedly "elite" ARVN
units demonstrated significant problems in maintaining cohesion and demonstrating tactical
proficiency, even when simply trying to defend themselves in the midst of a supposedly
offensive operation. Although the documentary record surrounding Binh Gia is not as rich
as that covering Ap Bac, it is nevertheless clear that the two sides' performances there were
consistent with the predictions from Chapter 1.
The battle involved a mix of units of different types from both sides. As mentioned,
the North brought to the fight two Main Force regiments, the 1" and the 2 nd, although it is
unclear whether these were PAVN or PLAF. Also present was a regimental-sized artillery
unit designated Q-563 by the North and designated as the 80"h Artillery Group by U.S.
forces.9 The North also called upon local forces in the form of one infantry battalion, a
number of heavy weapons companies, and the 4 4 5t infantry company.9 5 All told, according
to Mark Moyar, "the Viet Cong fielded a force that was equal in size to a full division, larger
than anything the Viet Cong had ever put onto a field of battle. These forces were
extraordinarily well equipped because of the exertions of the North Vietnamese Navy, which
had secretly delivered an astounding 500 tons of weapons to the attack force shortly before
the battle."9"
Meanwhile, ARVN forces involved in the battle eventually included three Ranger
battalions (the 3 0 h 3 3 rd, and 3 8 h), a Marine battalion (the 4 "), an APC company of the same
type that operated at Ap Bac, and three Airborne battalions. Crucially, however, these forces
were committed piecemeal and were never all present at the same time, giving a significant
numerical advantage to the North in any given engagement.
The Battle
The Battle of Binh Gia was the culmination of a much larger North Vietnamese
effort to bait and bleed ARVN forces in Phuoc Tuy, a coastal province about 40 km east of
Saigon, in the 111 Corps Tactical Zone. Throughout November 1964 the North Vietnamese
had conducted a harassment campaign and small raids in Phuoc Tuv, attacking Binh Gia
only on December 4-5. Binh Gia was a hamlet of about 6,000 residents, most of them
Catholic refugees from the North.98 As a North Vietnamese history of the battle notes, "The
Binh Gia Campaign was designed to draw in enemy regular units so that we could annihilate
them.""('
94 This unit was apparently under the control of the Central Office for South Vietnam, or COSVN. Moyar,
Tinmph Forsakeii, p. 336.
)5 Nguyen Viet Ta et al, The Resistance W1'ar /n Eastern Cochin China (1945-1975), 'ol. II (Hanoi: People's Army
Publishing House, 1993), p. 173, translated and available in the Historian's Working Files and Papers at the
Center of Military History, Fort MicNair, W\ashington, DC.
Movar, Tri1umph Forsaken, p. 3 3 6 .
"Analysis of Situation in Phuoc Tuv, RVN," message traffic from COMUSMACV to Department of
Defense National Military Command Center, Januarv 8, 1965, p. 2-5, available in the Historian's Working Files
and Papers at the Center of Military History, Fort McNair, Washington, DC.
Nguyen Viet Ta et al, The Resistance I far in Eastern Cochin China (1945-1975), V'ol II (Hanoi: People's Army
Publishing House, 1993), p. 173, translated and available in the Historian's Working Files and Papers at the
Center of Military History, Fort McNair, Washington, DC.
( Ta et al, Resistance IVar, p. 173.
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In the initial attack, the 4 4 5 h raided the hamlet, while the 1" Regiment
simultaneously surrounded and shelled the Duc Thanh district military headquarters, located
four kilometers to the west (see map 5). The locals defended their hamlet, but the 4 4 5 h and
elements of the 1 " Regiment were still able to set up a frontal defensive position in the
hamlet looking straight out toward the military headquarters. When the ARVN then sent in
the 3 8 h Ranger Battalion to Duc Thanh in an attempt to regain control of their own
headquarters, the battalion was torn up by the mutually supporting enemy positions. The
38th suffered very heavy casualties.""
Two days later, on December 7, North Vietnamese forces launched more attacks: in
addition to an assault on another district military headquarters known as Dat Do, and
renewed attacks on Binh Gia, they raided the Xuyen Moc military headquarters, about 15
kilometers southeast of Binh Gia, and the Duc Thanh district military headquarters, about 2
km to the west, as well as the Van Kiep Commando Training Center, also in the area.""
In response, the ARVN sent a troop of M-113s to clear the highway between Binh
Gia and Duc Thanh. But the North had anticipated this move, and the 2 nd Regiment rushed
to the scene, arriving just as the M-1 13s showed up. According to the PAVN history of the
battle, there was no time to dig positions, but the North's forces "ran out to the road and
laid down such heavy fire that the enemy armored convoy was forced to halt. Other
elements of the regiments maneuvered through a hail of enemy fire from the machine gun
mounts on top of the armored vehicles and from enemy aircraft overhead. The entire
regiment surged forward and cut the enemy formation in two.... Our soldiers used hand-
held charges, hand grenades, and infantry weapons to fight the enemy.... Some soldiers leapt
up onto the sides of the vehicles and threw hand grenades inside the crew compartments."12
The North Vietnamese account of the engagement claimed to have destroyed 13 M-1 13s.
The American reports on the engagement did not confirm this figure, but no one considered
the incident a success for the ARVN armored forces, which withdrew.""
Throughout the rest of December, the North kept up its attacks in Phuoc Tuy,
culminating on December 28 with an attack once again on Binh Gia. This time the 4 4 5 "' and
the 1" battalion of the 1 t Regiment dug in to await the inevitable ARVN reaction. When it
came, in the form of the 30th Ranger battalion, the Rangers were annihilated, suffering very
heavy losses and failing to retake the hamlet. 104 The ARVN then sent in a third Ranger
battalion, the 33"", which was also "completely destroyed." "1
Finally, having lost three Ranger battalions in quick succession, South Vietnam sent
in the Marines, landing the 4"' Battalion by helicopter on December 30. The battalion linked
up with what was left of 3 0 " and the 33r" and cleared the hamlet. But the North's forces had
already withdrawn, waiting for a better moment to resume the attack. That time came the
following morning when the Marine battalion's 2"" company moved out to an area near a
" Ta et al, Resistanice Var, pp. 175.
IM Earle G. Wheeler, "Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundv, Subject: Binh Gia Engagements, 28 December
- 4January," January 5, 1965, p. 5, available in the Historian's Working Files and Papers at the Center of
Military History, Fort McNair, Washington, DC; and Ta ct al, Resirtance lWar, pp. 175.
HC Ta et al, Resistance lVar, pp. 176-7.
'"3 "Analysis of Situation," p. 2.
'"4 Ta et al, Resirtance lWar, pp. 179.
'"- Ta et al, Resistance lWar, pp. 180.
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rubber plantation about one kilometer south of Binh Gia, searching for a helicopter that had
been shot down the day before.""6
Suddenly the North's forces pounced from three directions."1 According to the
North Vietnamese history of the battle, the ARVN Marines put up a "ferocious resistance,"
but it was not enough.108 "The Marine battalion commander and battalion surgeon were shot
dead in the opening moments of the fighting, and the battalion executive officer suffered a
mortal wound. The Marines called for air strikes, only to be told that no air assets were
currently available."'1 Indeed, the Marine commander at the scene did not even bother to
call actual ARVN air assets, he explained, because "if I ask through Vietnamese channels, I'll
get aircraft one month from now."") Artillery was also unavailable."'
Even with this lack of firepower, "two of the Marine companies fought their way
northward out of the plantation and, despite heavy Viet Cong infantry and artillery attacks
along the gravel road, made it back to Binh Gia in an orderly manner."m') According to
historian Mark Moyar, "Of the two Marine companies that remained in the rubber
plantation, one was eventually overrun and decimated, with all but a dozen or so of its men
perishing. The other clung desperately to a hilltop inside the plantation, its ranks depleted
but not broken by numerous Viet Cong artillery barrages and large infantry assaults. At
sundown, the company moved off the hilltop and daringly slipped through the Viet Cong
lines to safety."m By the next day, the 530-man Marine battalion had been reduced to 232
men,"4 although the Marines reported that enemy casualties in the rubber plantation
engagement had also been high.m1
At this point, South Vietnam decided to commit its Airborne battalions, inserting
three into Binh Gia on the first day of 1965. Unsurprisingly, they made no contact, as their
opponents had again withdrawn.,16 On January 3, the PLAF managed to ambush elements of
the 3 5th Ranger battalion, an M-1 13 troop, and 1 M-24 platoon as they made their way south
down the highway out of Binh Gia. But for all intents and purposes, the struggle for control
of the area was over. North Vietnam claimed to have killed or wounded 1755 enemy
soldiers, while the South reported its casualties at 461 and VC casualties at only 132 killed."
Either way, the North had again challenged the South to a stand-up fight and managed to
hold territory for an extended period of time while bleeding the ARVN.
Assessing the Battlefield E/ffectveness of South Vietnam
The ARVN units involved in this battle were drawn primarily from parts of the
military identified in Chapter 2 as being subject to worst practices in political intervention:
the Rangers, the Armor units, the Marines, and the Airborne. The intervention theory would
1"0 Kenneth Sams, "The Battle of Binh Gia, 27 December 1965," CHECO Southeast Asia Report, 1965, p. 4 ,
available in the Historian's Working Files and Papers at the Center of Military I listory, Fort McNair,
Washington, DC.
W" oyar, ( Ti111ph Foreraken, p. 339.
'" Ioyar, Trinm111ph oI r01raken, p. 338.
'ioyar, riumiph Forsaken, p. 339.
10 Quoted in Sams, "Battle of Binh Gia," p. 2.
I "Analysis of Situation," p. 8.
12 Moyar, Triumph 'orren, p. 339.
3 M Ioyar, TJriulmph Forraken, p. 339; see also "Analysis Of Situation," p. 3.
14 Quoted in Sams, "Battle of Binh Gia," p. 6.
"1 "Analysis of Situation," p. 3.
11 , "Analysis of Situation," p. 3; and Sams, "Battle of Binh Gia," p. 6.
1 Ta et al, Resistance IFar, p. 182.
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predict that these forces should have demonstrated virtually no battlefield effectiveness,
especially given the absence of coercive measures to keep soldiers on the battlefield. In
short, their performance here should have looked very similar to that at Ap Bac.
In fact, these predictions are largely borne out by the evidence from Binh Gia. While
we do not have detailed reports on the nature of cohesion in the Ranger and Armor units,
and there are no reports that these units simply broke and ran, we do know that their
engagements were extremely short, suggesting that they did not remain intact as fighting
units for very long. The North's losses were minimal when they engaged the Rangers or
Armor units, and there are no reports that these ARVN units were able to extract themselves
once under attack. For its part, the Airborne never actually encountered the enemy.
The 4 th Marine battalion is the only force in either side's account of the battle to be
described as making an effort to resist when attacked. What accounts for this variation is not
clear, but, whatever the reason, the Marines' apparently better cohesion and proficiency was
not enough to enable the ARVN as a whole to conduct the sort of complex operations that
could have produced a real victory for South Vietnam in Phuoc Tuy. For example, the
Marines clearly could have benefited from combined arms help in the form of air strikes or
artillery during their battle, but they never got it. Command was so highly centralized that
the major on the scene knew not even to ask.
More generally, it seems obvious that the ARVN could have performed better had it
committed its units all at once after the initial attack on Binh Gia in early December, rather
than inserting them piecemeal. Indeed, according to General William Westmoreland, the
commander of MACV at the time, "Had this entire force between brought to bear
simultaneously in accordance with a well coordinated plan, the situation would have been
considerably different."118 But again, ARVN commanders were subject to such strict
centralized command procedures that they did not even ask for a larger force or attempt
anything resembling a complex operation. They knew that political leaders would be
extremely reluctant to commit troops to battle that might be needed to defend the regime."
Indeed, officers trying to fight at Binh Gia were well aware that December 1964 was
a perilous time for General Khanh, the ruling officer at the time."" Khanh was deeply
distracted by a political struggle with his rival, General Duong Van Minh (known as "Big
Minh"), and both Khanh and the commander of III Corps were far too wrapped up in this
internal tug of war to release all of their mobile forces to defend Phuoc Tuy. As
Westmoreland explained shortly after the battle, "Despite the efforts of III Corps Seniors
Advisor, a major operation did not materialize prior to the VC occupation of Binh Gia on 28
December.... A specific problem according to III Corps Senior Advisor was the reluctance
of the Corps Commanders (General Vien) to ask for Airborne battalions from the General
Reserve, since he was convinced that these units would not be made available and he would
thus lose face."121 Indeed, General Khanh apparently completely ignored the events in Phuoc
Tuy until December 31, when it became apparent that his prized Airborne would need to be
involved. 122
In Westmoreland's view, "the deficiencies in the Government of Vietnam's
responses from 28 December forward may be attributed, in considerable measure, to
"8 "AnalyTsis of Situation," p. 5.
119 "Analysis of Situation," p. 5.
2 Nguyen Cao Ky, How fl le Lost the I ietnam lar (New York: Cooper Square Press, 2002), p. 48.
"Analysis of Situation," p. 5.
"Analysis of Situation," p. 5.
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distracting influences" resulting from the power struggle between Khanh and Minh. He
reported, "III Corps commander was immersed in Armed Forces Council matters and until
30 December had scant time for tactical operations. His boss, General Khanh, made himself
unavailable to GHQ and to field commanders by holing up in Vung Tau," a coastal town.
"So preoccupied with non-military matters was the CINC that, though Binh Gia and Vung
Tau are in the same province, Khanh appeared oblivious to the severity and implication of
the continuing action, at least until 31 December." 2 3 Of course, by then it was too late, and
the ARVN units had been mowed down one by one. Again, the nature of political
intervention in the South Vietnamese military had directly hindered its ability to conduct
complex operations.
Assessing the Battlefield Effectiveness of North Vietnam
Chapter 2 argued that North Vietnam's political leaders generally adopted best
practices. As a result, the intervention theory would predict that their units at Binh Gia
should have demonstrated strong cohesion, sound tactics, and an ability to conduct complex
operations. In fact, the evidence from the battle is consistent with these predictions.
First, the North's unit cohesion appears to have been excellent. Despite being at the
end of a nearly two-month excursion deep into South Vietnam, one which had already
involved considerable combat, the forces at Binh Gia continued to demonstrate a strong will
to fight, with individual soldiers motivated to stay in the battle and no reports of desertions
or collapsing units. 124American assessments echoed this point, citing the "excellent" morale
of enemy units. 125Westmoreland's report also commented on the "strong determination"
and "unusual confidence" of the VC forces.12(
Second, the North Vietnamese forces demonstrated tactical proficiency, reflecting
their political leaders' emphasis on merit-based promotions and rigorous, realistic training.
Indeed, the North's own history of the battle notes that "each unit... was given additional
tactical and technical training" prior to the start of the campaign.12 The Politburo also
ensured that "many high-level cadre with experience in building up main force units and in
leading and directing massed combat operations were sent south with Comrade Nguyen Chi
Thanh," the commander of the Binh Gia campaign.'12 Similarly, Westmoreland's report
noted that the North's effort "was clearly well planned, directed, and executed. Forces were
well uniformed, equipped, and trained."2 Although their weapons were fairly basic-heavy
machine guns, recoilless rifles, submachine guns, and hand grenades-the soldiers knew how
to use them.
Repeatedly, North Vietnamese forces also managed to use terrain to their advantage,
concealing their defensive positions when conducting ambushes, as at the rubber plantation.
They also demonstrated these skills when they managed to use what territory they did gain at
Binh Gia on the night of December 4-5 to establish a base for firing onto the Duc Thanh
military headquarters where they (correctly) believed the ARVN would respond first.
2 "Analysis of Situation," p. 8.
' Militan History Institute, Vicoy in Vietnam, pp. 140-1.
"Binh Gia Action Report," Defense Intelligence Bulletin,Januarv 4, 1965, p. S-2, available in the Historian's
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Finally, the Binh Gia campaign provides at least some evidence of North Vietnam's
ability to conduct complex operations. The campaign involved only some basic very basic
combined arms activities, integrating artillery and infantry, although it should be noted that
the ARVN failed to integrate even these two arms at both Ap Bac and Binh Gia. What Binh
Gia most clearly demonstrated was the North's superior ability to engage in operations that
combined both low-level initiative and high-level coordination. The Central Military Party
Committee had made a decision in October 1964 to conduct a winter campaign deep in the
South, and the military proved able to integrate the activities of several different kinds of
units in pursuit of this larger goal. The North Vietnamese Navy, Main Force regiments, a
COSVN artillery unit, and local forces such as the 4 4 5 h all managed to work together in the
battle, notably in the three-pronged attack on the Marines near the rubber plantation. The
North proved flexible in its employment of a mobile division-sized force, moving it among
several different locations and quickly setting up new ambushes in response to reports of
ARVN's insertion of new units. While one could certainly imagine operations of greater
complexity, the contrast between the North and South even with respect to this sort of basic
integration is noticeable and seems attributable at least in part to the far more decentralized
North Vietnamese command structure, better officers, better training, and better
information management.
IV. The Battle for the Citadel at Hue During the Tet Offensive of 1968
The battle for the Citadel offers an opportunity to examine a large-scale, extended
engagement involving the ARVN forces identified as being subject to better practices in
political intervention, the 1" Division and the Hac Bao company. Evidence from the battle
demonstrates where ARVN units were subject to forms of political intervention more
similar to those implemented in North Vietnam, their battlefield effectiveness was much
better. Both the PLAF/PAVN and the ARVN units at Hue demonstrated strong unit
cohesion, tactical proficiency, and the ability to conduct both offensive and defensive
complex operations-but the ARVN's fighting prowess in the battle was particularly notable
given that it was outnumbered and trying to re-take territory for most of the battle. As such,
the fight for the Citadel at Hue provides an especially convincing confirmation of the
predictions in favor of the intervention theory generated in Chapter 2.
The battle took place during the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive of 1968. This
offensive involved coordinated, near-simultaneous attacks during late January and early
February 1968 by both PAVN regulars and Main Force PLAF units in 36 of South
Vietnam's 44 provincial capitals, five of its 6 major cities, 64 of its 242 district capitals, and
more than 50 hamlets (see map 6).1" The North Vietnamese had spent months planning
these attacks, stealthily infiltrating men and supplies in order to take advantage of the truce
typically observed by both sides in honor of Tet, the year's biggest holiday. This offensive
represented North Vietnam's first true attempt to take the fight to the cities, with the
expectation that the people of the South would rise up and join them in the overthrowing
the American-backed Thieu regime.1"
" James H. Wilibanks, The Te/ O/shve: a Concise f Iistory (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. xvi.
1I For background, see ArthurJ. Dommen, Thec 1/idochillese Expeiece of/the rench and the 1mericans: Nationalis
aiid Commnisilm in Cambodia, Laos, and I 'et/iam (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), pp. 661-664, 668-
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In that respect the offensive was a colossal miscalculation, and indeed, the venture
decimated the PLAF, which was essentially never again able to field Main Force units.132
Again, South Vietnam's educated urban elite proved themselves hostile toward
communism-unsurprising given their likely fate under such a regime.m33 In many of the
population centers targeted during Tet, it was the citizens themselves who helped expel the
invaders, curbing the offensive in a matter of hours or days. ARVN commanders also
distinguished themselves in repelling attacks on Da Nang, Ban Me Thuot, and Dalat,
although in many areas of the country, particularly the Delta, the Americans had to come to
the rescue.3 4 In most of the country, the offensive ended almost as quickly as it began, by
the first week in February.
Intense, sustained fighting occurred at three locations, however: Khe Sahn, Saigon,
and Hue. Khe Sahn was a U.S. base in the far northwest corner of South Vietnam, and
therefore its defense was almost entirely an American matter. In Saigon the ARVN forces
played a much larger role, but the American commander there had sensed an attack was
coming and had pulled his combat forces back from the border to defend the city. As a
result, fifty-three U.S. maneuver battalions, along with a hefty dose of American airpower,
were available to help defend the city.13
It was in the fight for Hue, the ancient capital of Vietnam, that the ARVN faced the
most sustained, intense test of its battlefield effectiveness against PAVN forces during the
Tet offensive, mainly because of the very minimal involvement there by the Americans.
Indeed, there were fewer than 200 American soldiers normally stationed in Hue, and the
nearest U.S. combat base, Phu Bai, was eight kilometers to the southeast. Additionally, the
North Vietnamese had correctly predicted that the country's northeast monsoon would
impede aerial re-supply and close air support operations in Hue, further limiting the United
States' ability to aid the ARVN in defending the city. Finally, once the battle for Hue began,
the U.S. forces that were there chose to divide the battlefield with their ARVN counterparts,
creating a sector for which the ARVN forces were independently responsible.13
For all of these reasons, the battle for Hue offers the best opportunity during the
years of extensive U.S. combat involvement in Vietnam to examine ARVN and PAVN
battlefield effectiveness. In particular, the fighting at Hue affords a clear opportunity to
evaluate both sides' unit cohesion, tactical proficiency, and performance of complex
operations, both offensivelv and defensively. As such, the battle against offers a good
opportunity to test the predictions of the intervention theory.
[SEE NEXT PAGE]
\illbanks, Tet Q0//nsiVe, p. 81.
m These fears were borne out after 1975, when many were killed, imprisoned, or "re-educated."
14 \Villbanks, Tet 0#ensiVe, p. 40-1. Unfortunately, information on many of these engagements in sparse. It is
unclear wvhy some of these units seem to have performed better than others. More will be known after the
publication of Erik Villard's forthcoming book on the Tet offensive, which will enable further testing of my
hypotheses.
m Willbanks, Tet Q0ensive, pp. 3 1-39.
H \Villbanks, Tet Qgensi'e, pp. 44-4 9 .
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THE BATTLE FOR THE CITADEL AT HUE, 1968
North Vietnam South Vietnam
Battle summary
Tactical orientation Offensive, then defensive Defensive, then offensive
Plan Take and hold the Citadel at Defend and then re-capture the
Hue as part of the larger Tet Citadel from PAVN and PLAF
Offensive
Weapons Mortars, machine guns Light anti-tank weapons,
machine guns, M-16 rifles
Manpower 8,000 initially, then increasing to A few hundred initially, then
probably double thatm3 rising to12,500138
Losses 1,042 KIA, several times that 384 KIA, 1800 WIA
number WIA
Effectiveness summary
Unit cohesion? Yes Yes, in 1" division
Tactical proficiency? Yes Yes, in 1" division
Complex operations? Yes Yes, in 1" division
Confirms theory? Yes Yes
The Forces on Each Side
The Perfume River slices the city of Hue into two parts: an ancient northern half
protected by an imperial fortress known as the Citadel, and a southern half known as the
New City that is largely residential. The Citadel is a square whose corners face north, south,
east, and west, covering three square miles in area, with outer walls thirty feet high and forty
feet thick. (See map 7.) Its southeast wall borders the river, while the other three walls are
bordered by a deep moat. At the time of the battle, the inside of the Citadel housed a great
many shops and homes, while its outer walls held numerous bunkers and tunnels built by the
Japanese during World War II.m1 Inside the Citadel, key landmarks included Tay Loc Airfield
in the western corner and the old Imperial Palace on the southeastern wall, above which flew
the Republic of Vietnam flag.
The headquarters of the 1" Infantry Division sat in the Citadel's northern corner,
where the division was commanded by General Ngo Quang Truong, a highly respected
officer who "had won his position through ability and combat leadership."14 Most of the 1"t
Division's combat units were actually outside the city, however, guarding the routes of
advance. Only its Hac Bao (Black Panther) unit was actually stationed in the Citadel. The
Hac Bao was commanded by 1" Lt. Tran Ngoc Hue, a prot g6 of Truong's recognized as a
rising star in the ARVN. He, too, had earned his position based on merit rather than political
3 This is a very rough estimate inferred from Willbanks, Tet 0/ensiue, p. 45.
1 This is a rough estimate based on the presence of the 11 Division and the insertion of 3 Airborne battalions.
ARVN typical divisions had about 10,000 men, and an average battalion had about 833 soldiers, so ARVN
forces probably totaled no more than 12,500. This estimate is very generous because it assumes that all of the
1t Division made it back inside the Citadel intact and does not reflect that the Airborne forces arrived at the
battle late and left early.
131 Smith, Sieue, p. 8.
"4' Willbanks, Tet OJfnsive, p. 46; and Smith, Siee, p. 13-14.
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connections, and as such, he was a rare exception to the normal rules governing military
promotion in South Vietnam.141
For their part, the North Vietnamese initially committed an estimated 8,000 troops
to the battle at Hue, out of roughly 80,000 committed to the offensive overall. 142The forces
at Hue included two PAVN regiments and 6 PLAF Main Force battalions. As the battle
wore on, however, "the total Communist force in and around the city would grow to twenty
battalions when three additional infantry regiments were dispatched to the Hue area from
the Khe Sahn battlefield."14
The Battlefor Hue
The battle for Hue swung like a giant pendulum, first in one direction, then back in
the other: its first phase involved a North Vietnamese attack that overran all but the tiny 1'
Division headquarters in the northern corner of the Citadel, but then its second phase saw
the ARVN, led by the 1" Division and particularly its Hac Bao company, launch counter-
attacks from this outpost, gradually regaining the lost ground. They were helped in the final
days by the U.S. Marines, although for most of the battle the U.S. and ARVN forces
operated separately, with the ARVN handling areas to the north of the river and the Marines
to the south.14
On the first morning of the Tet offensive, General Truong grew suspicious upon
hearing reports of enemy attacks elsewhere in the country. After reviewing recent
intelligence reports from I Corps, Truong issued alert orders to confine all troops to their
barracks. Although some had already gone on leave for the holiday, many stayed in place and
began defensive preparations. Truong also sent out his 36-man Reconnaissance team to
protect the western approaches to the city.'4
The six platoons of the Hac Bao, numbering about 200 men and stationed in the
western corner of the Citadel near Tay Loc Airfield, were sent to guard various avenues of
advance. Lieutenant Hue sent three of his platoons south of the river to act as security at the
provincial headquarters, a power station, and a prison. Two more were split up and
dispatched to guard the gates entering the Citadel, leaving only one platoon and the
headquarters staff, about 50 men in total, to thwart any attack inside the Citadel itself.46
The events of Januarv 31, 1968 would prove Truong's suspicions correct. In the wee
hours of the morning, PAVN and PLAF troops launched a massive attack on the Citadel. It
followed a pattern similar to that seen in other cities targeted in the Tet offensive.14 The
North Vietnamese 6" Regiment, consisting of the 80 0 "' and 802"" Battalions, and reinforced
with local PLAF troops, gathered along the western edge of the Citadel. Cued by a rocket
barrage on the city from the mountains to the west, they attacked in the middle of the night,
overrunning the ARVN forces guarding the western entrances. They soon "fanned out to
begin a coordinated attack from west to east."148 Meanwhile, separate PAVN units also
1-11 Smith, Siee, p. 23.
142 Willbanks, Tet Q/ensile, p. 39.
- Willbanks, Tet O/i/ensiv, p. 45.
I14 W\'illbanks, Tel //isive, p. 49.
N Col. Hloang Ngoc Lung, The Genera1/ p//ies of1968-69 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military
Hlistory, 1981), p. 78; and Smith, NiXee, p. 125.
141 Smith, YSige, p. 2 0.
F Willbanks, Tet (/Ysive, p. 31.
Smith, Sieue, p. 23.
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overran the MACV compound south of the river and took control of the residential areas in
Hue outside the Citadel, where they began rounding up supposed counter-revolutionaries.
Lt. Hue led the first organized resistance to the attack inside the Citadel. His Hac
Bao soldiers fired back on the North Vietnamese with light anti-tank weapons (LAWs),
machine guns, and M-16 fire. Fortunately, Hue had held several special training sessions for
his unit on the use of the new LAWs, which proved quite effective in fending off the
attackers.14 Also coming to the initial defense of the Citadel was a platoon from the ARVN
1t Ordnance Company that happened to be in the area near the airfield.
According to George Smith, an American advisor in Hue during the offensive, "The
unexpected heavy volley stopped the NVA [North Vietnamese Army, another name for the
PAVN] attack cold and further disoriented the NVA troops. The enemy then tried a flanking
movement to the right to skirt the fire coming from the ordnance compound and ran
straight into the Hac Bao platoon. Hue's troops... inflicted heavy casualties. The action
forced the 8 0 0 th Battalion to veer to the south and held up the 802"d, which was trying to
push its way toward the ARVN 1" Division HQ along the northwestern wall."150
With the PAVN attack temporarily delayed, Truong ordered the Hac Bao and
ordinance units to withdraw into the division headquarters in the northern corner of the
Citadel. This key decision saved both the valuable Hac Bao unit from being destroyed
piecemeal and also maintained a crucial foothold in the Citadel from which to launch
ARVN's eventual counteroffensive. Meanwhile, PAVN forces continued to move west,
taking control of the lightly defended Imperial Palace, also inside the Citadel.s5
Because he had managed to save his headquarters, General Truong was able to radio
immediately for reinforcement. He ordered the four battalions of his 3rd Regiment, as well as
1" Division's 4 "h Battalion, 2"" Regiment, and the 3'd Troop, 7 "h Armored Cavalry, to return to
the Citadel from their various locations outside Hue. He also requested that Saigon airlift
three Airborne battalions, the 2"', 7 ', and 9,h, into Hue.
Unfortunately, none of these units could arrive immediately, so for the time being
the headquarters would be defended only by the Hac Bao, the tiny Reconnaissance
Company, and the non-combat 1" Infantry support personnel caught up in the fighting.
Truong's men had no heavy weapons, just a few jeep-mounted light machine guns and a few
LAWs. They also had no artillery or air support, due both to the inclement weather and to
the priority afforded U.S. forces struggling to defend the MACV compound in the southern
half of Hue.-2
As the day wore on, the North attacked the ARVN headquarters three more times,
but each time Truong's men managed to repel the invaders. According to Smith, "Each
attack became weaker as the enemy had to divert some of its resources to deal with ARVN
reinforcements coming down Route I from the north. There would be one more attack on
the 1't Division compound the night of 31 January, but it proved to be the last one. The
enemy pulled back from the division CP [command post] and strengthened its defenses at
the airfield. Other enemy troops set up a headquarters in the Imperial Palace compound,
while others moved to the southeast to put pressure on Truong's garrison from the
south."]53
1 Smith, Siege, p. 24.
150 Smith, Siege, p. 24.
151 Smith, Siege, p. 25-6.
152 Smith, Siege, p. 27.
153 Smith, S/ege, p. 28.
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By February 2, some of Truong's requested reinforcements, including the Airborne
battalions, had made their way to the Citadel by boat and helicopter. 54 According to a South
Vietnamese history of the battle, "With these additional forces, the 1" Division finally retook
the Tay Loc airfield inside the old citadel after two days of heavy fighting during which the
enemy lost in excess of 200 killed."155 Shortly thereafter, other elements of the l' Division
"fought their way to the An Hoa Gate, liberating most of the northwestern wall of the
Citadel and resulting in an astounding additional 693 enemy killed in action (KIA). ARVN
forces now controlled the more open areas of the northern sector of the Citadel and were
poised to launch attacks throughout the remainder of the city."156
Despite this progress, Truong could see by now that he was literally fighting a losing
battle-the North Vietnamese continued to receive fresh supplies and troops, while his own
forces were suffering more and more attrition and had no relief in sight. Unfortunately, U.S.
and ARVN forces had never closed off the western resupply and infiltration routes to
Hue. 5 7 As a result, "enemy forces were well dug in, and, from all appearances, willing to
fight it out to the end."ss Worst of all, the ARVN still lacked heavy weapons, a particular
disadvantage when trying to retake well-defended positions nestled in the thick walls of the
Citadel.159
This is not to say that the ARVN did not keep trying. According to Smith, "The rest
of General Truong's 3" Regiment, the 2"n, 3ri, and 4 t' Battalions, arrived on 7 February....
Each unit had been trying to assault the Citadel from the south after breaking free of enemy
pressure at the outset of the battle. The 2"nd and 3"d Battalions, which had been bypassed by
the enemy invasion a week earlier, had slowly moved eastward along the northern shore of
the Perfume River to the base of the Citadel, which they were unable to enter...." Even the
Airborne performed surprisingly well.1)
But as Airborne casualties rose, Thieu soon wanted the units to return to Saigon.161
When Truong protested, he was eventually told that three battalions of Vietnamese Marines
would replace the departing Airborne. '2 Not reassured by this promise, Truong finally asked
the Americans for help. In response, the United States sent in sent in three mechanized U.S.
Marine companies.13
The U.S. Marines soon got a sense of what Truong's men had been up against. The
Citadel's walls were sturdy and its streets narrow, making tanks necessary yet cumbersome to
employ. "The NVA forces had had a couple of weeks to prepare their defensive positions in
the Citadel," Smith explains. "Firing positions were cleverly concealed not only in buildings
and on rooftops but in spider holes at street level."164 Despite heavy pounding by naval guns
and U.S. airpower, including high-explosive bombs, napalm, and tear gas, the North
Vietnamese kept firing, demonstrating "fortitude and resilience." 6
154 Smith, Siege, p. 64.
15 Lung, Genera/ Ogensies, p. 80.
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After several delays, the South Vietnamese Marines also finally arrived at the Citadel.
The Hac Bao, which had also just helped the 3 'd Regiment break out of an encirclement
toward the southern corner of the Citadel, quickly moved to guide the Vietnamese Marines
into position and then helped them push the North's force back along the northwestern
wall.166 Meanwhile, the unit that the Hac Bao had just helped break free of the encirclement,
the 2 nd Battalion, 3 rd Regiment (2/3), turned to the task of guarding the U.S. Marines' right
flank as the armored companies moved through the city.167
The U.S. Marines did not have an easy go. Although the ARVN Airborne had fought
well, its withdrawal by Saigon had been premature, ceding several key defensive positions to
the PAVN and PLAF, who now used them to fire on the advancing U.S. Marines.168 In fact,
it was this error that lay at the root of many later Marine accounts disparaging ARVN
performance in Hue.169 Fighting was hand-to-hand at times, and U.S. Marine casualties were
high.170 Nevertheless, the U.S. Marines did have the benefit of organic heavy weapons,
particularly recoilless rifles. Additionally, the weather had cleared, enabling the use of
supporting airpower.17, Truong's men had enjoyed neither of these advantages.
Indeed, the ARVN 2/3 on the Marines' flank continued to face a very tough fight.
According to historian Andrew Wiest, "The NVA set up mutually supporting defensive
positions in buildings that flanked the winding roads, with snipers firing from upper floors
and numerous defenders in lower windows or doorways creating a deadly crossfire that
converted the streets into kill zones. Lacking heavy-weapons support, 2/3 attempted to deal
with such defenses by having elements of the battalion lay down covering fire while others
dashed forward."172 Eventually, the Hac Bao went back in to help both the Marines and the
2/3 "in the final push toward the southeastern wall of the Citadel."l73
Meanwhile, elements of the U.S. 1" Cavalry helped seal the western routes of entry
that had been providing fresh troops and supplies to the North Vietnamese throughout the
battle.'" By February 22, the PAVN and PLAF began to withdraw, ceding the Citadel piece
by piece to the Marines and the 2/3.' Finally, "on the night of February 23-24, an ARVN
battalion launched a surprise attack westward along the wall in the southeastern section of
the Citadel. A savage battle ensued, but the South Vietnamese pressed the attack. The
PAVN, suffering from a lack of ammunition and supplies, fell back. Allied forces overran
some of the last positions; VC and PAVN troops abandoned the others as they withdrew
westward to sanctuaries in Laos."' 1'Members of the 2/3 soon took down the NLF flag and
raised the South Vietnamese banner over the Citadel, while the Hac Bao retook the Imperial
Palace.
The battle officially ended on March 2.' In 26 days of fighting, the ARVN had lost
384 killed and 1,800 wounded, while Allied forces claimed to have killed over 5,000 North
66 Smith , Siege, p. 145.
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Vietnamese soldiers.178 Later a captured North Vietnamese document revealed that losses in
Hue had been significantly lower, about 1,042 killed and several times that number
wounded. Among the dead were 1 regimental commander, 8 battalion and 24 company
commanders, and 72 platoon leaders.m7
Assessing the Battlefield Effectiveness of South Vietnam
Chapter 2 argued that because patterns of training and promotion were different for
the ARVN 1" Division, particularly the Hac Bao company, its performance should have
been markedly better than that of other ARVN units. In fact, the fighting at Hue bears out
this prediction, showing that where political intervention varied in the ARVN, so did
battlefield effectiveness. Compared to the earlier battles examined, ARVN soldiers at Hue
performed far more cohesively and skillfully, even showing the ability to perform some
complex operations. In fact, they demonstrated effectiveness comparable to that of North
Vietnamese forces.
First, ARVN cohesion at Hue was, in general, excellent. Unlike other units in other
battles, the ARVN stood and fought in the Citadel over a long period of time in extremely
difficult conditions. Yet there are no reports of unit collapse, and the battle is replete with
incidents in which units called to fight aggressively moved to do so. For example, Truong's
outlying battalions all showed up to fight in Hue, even though they could have fled, and
even though they all encountered resistance on their approach. One South Vietnamese
history of the battle notes this fighting spirit explicitly, praising "the laudably high morale of
our troops. After being forced into a defensive posture, ARVN units had fought gallantly
and continued to fight well despite persuasive enemy appeals to surrender."18( Moreover,
most accounts of the battle tie the 1t Infantry and Hac Bao cohesion directly back to the
merit of these units' leaders, suggesting that promotion policies governing these units had a
clear impact on their performance.18
Second, the ARVN units in the Citadel repeatedly demonstrated strong tactical
proficiency. Although severely handicapped by a lack of heavy weapons, the ARVN proved
skillful in the use of the weapons they did have, notably the LAWs, as well as machine guns
and rifles. The fact that they could continue to repulse the multiple attacks on their
headquarters on the first night of the offensive and then even manage to retake areas like the
airfield later in February further testifies to their tactical abilities. Again, it contrasts sharply
with the performance of other units in the ARVN who seemed to display basic problems
following orders and using their weapons. Where ARVN units were trained regularly and
realistically, their skills clearly improved.
Third, the ARVN in the Citadel consistently demonstrated the ability to engage in
large-scale coordinated operations that conformed to an overall plan yet nevertheless
required substantial initiative on the part of individual soldiers and lower-level commanders.
The mere fact that Truong began the battle with hardly any of his troops actually in the
Citadel, yet was able to draw them all in to fight in a coordinated fashion at multiple
different locations, testifies to the fact that the 1t Division was capable of more than basic
tactical proficiency.
8 Willbanks, Tet (Jensiie, p. 54.
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Similarly, the Hac Bao unit not only managed to stay intact and perform adequately
in individual engagements despite its platoons' dispersal at the start of the battle, but it also
repeatedly moved to different areas across the battlefield in response to the needs of the
various battalions in the 1" Division and the actions of the enemy. On the initial night of the
battle it even proved able to conduct a fighting withdrawal from the airfield to the
headquarters. This behavior suggests that at least some parts of the ARVN were capable of
complex operations that aggregated tactical skills into larger-scale, more difficult activities.
Along these same lines, the 2/3 displayed particularly strong abilities to conduct
complex operations as it cleared the city while operating on the U.S. Marines' right flank. It
carefully coordinated its movement with the firepower that it did have. It also engaged in the
carefully planned surprise attack that finally ended the battle. This success and the others
show clearly the benefits of a unified, decentralized command structure, compared to the
centralized, fragmented arrangements seen in earlier battles.
To be sure, the battle for the Citadel at Hue was won not only by the ARVN, but
also by the U.S. Marines. Indeed, some histories of the battle have referred derisively to the
ARVN as mere "spectators" in the fight for the Citadel, which they claim was won solely by
the Marines.182 On this subject, a few facts about the Marines' role are worth bearing in
mind.
First, the U.S. Marines did not enter the battle until late February, after significant
evidence of the ARVN's independent battlefield effectiveness in the Citadel was evident.
This takes nothing away from the U.S. Marines' fighting prowess but merely suggests that
whatever their role in concluding the battle, the ARVN's capabilities can still clearly be
evaluated in the long period of battle prior to Marine involvement. Second, although there is
no doubt of the U.S. Marines' crucial contribution to the battle's outcome, they enjoyed
several enormous advantages that the ARVN did not possess for most of the battle: organic
heavy weapons, air and artillery support, aerial resupply, and clear weather. 8
Additionally, perhaps by sheer bad luck, the ARVN were responsible for the
toughest sectors of North Vietnamese resistance even after the Marines' entry into the battle.
As Smith later reflected, "Having witnessed fighting on both sides of the Perfume River, I
believe that the enemy resistance was strongest in the Citadel, particularly in the west and
southwest sectors where ARVN troops were deployed. That area of operations was the
closest point to the enemy's command and resupply headquarters. The ARVN units, lacking
the marines' heavy weapons capability, particularly tanks and 106mm recoilless rifles, faced
fresh troops almost daily for three weeks."184 Their performance is all the more remarkable
in this light. Indeed, the Marines' fight would have been even more difficult had Truong not
maintained the initial foothold in his headquarters, recaptured Tay Loc airfield, and then
attached the 2/3 to the Marines' right flank as a guide through the city.185
Finally, many U.S. Marine accounts of the battle mistakenly conflate ARVN
performance outside the Citadel in the southern half of Hue-the area of operations where
most U.S. Marines were engaged-with that of the 1" Division inside the Citadel. ARVN
units south of the Perfume River did in fact perform poorly and also engaged in significant
looting from their own citizens after the U.S. Marines had cleared neighborhoods.'86
182 Keith Nolan, Battlef/or Hue: Tet, 1968 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1983), p. 172.
183 Smith, Siege, p. 141.
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However, these units were not from the 1" Division or Hac Bao, and their behavior should
not take detract from the credit due the ARVN inside the Citadel.187 If anything, U.S. Marine
accounts of poor ARVN effectiveness in the southern half of the city merely confirm the
general predictions of the intervention theory, that most ARVN units did not fight
cohesively or proficiently and that the 1't Division and Hac Bao were exceptions to the rule,
along with some instances of Airborne troops fighting well during the limited time that
Saigon allowed their deployment.
Assessing the Battlefield Effectiveness of North Vietnam
Chapter 2 argued that North Vietnam's political leaders generally adopted best
practices with regarding to intervention in the military. As a result, the intervention theory
would predict that during the Tet offensive the PAVN and PLAF units should have
demonstrated strong cohesion, sound tactics, and an ability to conduct complex operations.
In fact, the evidence from Hue is consistent with these predictions.
First, the cohesion of the North Vietnamese forces was again remarkable. They
persisted in their hold of the city for nearly a month, despite having to subsist in defensive
positions that in most cases were less than hospitable. Although the PAVN and PLAF
clearly had an evacuation route out of the city to the west, there is little evidence that any of
their forces used it to flee the battlefield. Moreover, the North Vietnamese engaged in
repeated attacks when trying to take their objectives in the Citadel, for example, their three
attacks on the headquarters compound on the first night of the offensive. This sort of
offensive activity suggests that their commitment to succeeding in their mission was more
than perfunctory and that cohesion was high. Indeed, the PAVN history of the battle praises
the "high resolve" of its fighters at Hue.188 (Of course, this version of history also claims that
"the population of Hue city rose up in insurrection," which did not occur.) 189
Second, the North Vietnamese demonstrated excellent tactical proficiency, as the all
accounts of the battle reflect. Although they lacked anything heavier than mortars and
machine guns inside the city, the PAVN and PLAF troops knew how to use their weapons
and were described as "skillful" and as having clearly "rehearsed their attacks beforehand."""
Just as important, they also knew how to use the urban terrain of Hue for cover and
concealment while trying to take or defend territory, another area in which they had received
special training.
Third, the North Vietnamese attack on the Citadel clearly showed their ability to
aggregate tactical abilities into complex operations. The North Vietnamese repeatedly
combined their arms and coordinated the activities of multiple different types of units to
produce maximum effect, both offensively and defensively. In the attack's initial phase, for
example, the infantry of the 6t" Regiment coordinated its movement with the rocket barrage
from the mountains to the west. Then the battalions of the 6th, the 800', and 802"" overran
Hue from west to east in a synchronized attack. As the PAVN history proudly notes,
"Because our plan was detailed and the organization and command of our approach march
was properly handled (in spite of the fact that we had a large number of forces and had to
divide the approach march into many columns, cross many rivers and streams, and bypass
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many enemy outposts), all units reached their positions securely and on time.""' As the
battle progressed, the PAVN also successfully established blocking positions to attempt to
interdict Truong's reinforcements converging on the city.
Additionally, once they had taken over most of the Citadel, North Vietnamese forces
proved themselves able to conduct impressive defensive operations that again combined
arms and coordinated activities across different types of units. Both the ARVN and
American histories note that the North Vietnamese skillfully established complex defensive
positions with interlocking fields of fire.m9 Indeed, had these positions not been established,
the United States' heavy firepower never would have been needed.
All of this is not to say that the North Vietnamese performance was flawless. Indeed,
in broader military terms the Tet offensive was a disaster, as it enabled the destruction of
most of the PLAF Main Force units and also galvanized further South Vietnamese
resistance. Additionally, even at the tactical-operational level, the North Vietnamese clearly
did not achieve their objectives in Hue: for example, they failed to ever overrun Truong's
headquarters. 94Nevertheless, the sheer length of the battle testifies to their battlefield
effectiveness-as well as to that of the ARVN units responsible for defense of the Citadel.
V. The Invasion of Laos, 1971
The invasion of Laos offers an opportunity to gauge the battlefield effectiveness of
both North and South Vietnam after more than five years of direct U.S. combat
involvement in the war, including intensified attempts at training the South Vietnamese. By
this time, three full years after the Tet Offensive, the threat to the South had become
undeniably clear, which should have produced strong pressures for improved ARVN
performance. Indeed, as the United States' own after-action report noted of the invasion of
Laos, "Operation Lam Son 719 was a real test of the effectiveness of the RVNAF and the
Vietnamization program."9, This was mainly because U.S. combat forces and advisors were
not authorized to cross the border into Laos, making the fighting a much clearer reflection
of the actual capabilities of the ARVN and the PAVN.96 The United States did provide fire
support from bases inside South Vietnam, although poor weather greatly circumscribed the
contribution that airpower could make.',
Furthermore, the campaign in Laos involved attempts by both North and South
Vietnam to engage in full-scale conventional warfare, offering a clear opportunity to examine
the two sides' unit cohesion and tactical proficiency, as well as their abilities to conduct
complex operations. Additionally, both sides conducted both offensive and defensive
operations involving multiple divisions--including, on the South Vietnamese side, regular
92 Military History Institute, Victor-y / 1 1)/enam, p. 218.
19 Wiest, Vlietalll/'s Foigotten Iny, p. 110.
14 Smith, Siege, p. 55.
"LAMSON 719 After Action Report," Department of the Army, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, May 14, 1971,
p. 99, available in the I listorian's Working Files and Papers at the Center of Military History, Fort McNair,
Washington, DC.
196 Because of the Cooper-Church Amendment passed after the invasion of Cambodia, no U.S. advisors or
combat forces could cross the border into Laos, although U.S. airpower and fire power from support bases
inside South Vietnam did play a role in the battle. James H. Willbanks, A bandonig VietnaI: iHow Almerica Lef
and South V ietnam Lost Its lfar (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2004), p. 98.
07 Willbanks, A bandoning Ienam, p. 102; Maj. Gen. Nguyen Duy Hinh, Lam Son 719, Indochina Monograph
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1977), p. 64.
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divisions and the ARVN 1" Division. As such, the invasion of Laos provides an ideal
opportunity to test the predictions of the intervention theory.
The evidence strongly confirms that theory. During the battle, ARVN units generally
proved themselves incapable of unit cohesion, tactical proficiency, or complex operations,
whether on the offense or the defense. The one clear exception to this pattern was the
ARVN 1St Division, as the theory would predict. The 1" Division fought well across all three
components of the dependent variable. All of the PAVN units also consistently
demonstrated unit cohesion, tactical proficiency, and the ability to conduct complex
operations, on both the defense and offense. Again, these outcomes are consistent with the
predictions of the intervention theory about how military units should fight when they are
subject to better forms of political intervention.
THE INVASION OF LAOS, 1971
North Vietnam South Vietnam
Battle summary
Tactical orientation Defensive, then offensive Offensive, then defensive
Plan Ambush ARVN forces, overrun Raid Northern stronghold in
ARVN firebases, drive ARVN Laos by establishing a chain of
out of Laos firebases, then withdraw
Weapons Tanks, artillery, rifles, machine APCs, tanks, other vehicles,
guns, mortars, rocket launchers light anti-tank weapons,
artillery, U.S. helicopters
Manpower At least 30,000 17,000
Losses -20,000 7,000+ KIA
Effectiveness sammary
Unit cohesion? Yes No, except 1" Division and to a
lesser extent the Marines
Tactical proficiency? Yes No, except 1" Division
Complex operations? Yes No, except 1" Division
Confirms theory? Yes Yes, except for Marine
cohesion
The Forces on Each Side
The South Vietnamese invasion of Laos, known as Lam Son 719, began on January
30, 1971. It aimed to attack crucial nodes in the Ho Chi Minh trail, particularly two major
supply areas known as Base Area 604 and Base Area 611.198 These were located near a
deserted village known as Tchepone, about 60 km inside Laos. The sole route of approach
to Tchepone was an old French-built highway called Route 9, bordered to the south by the
Xepon river, which flowed under triple canopy vegetation all the way to the village (see map
8).19" Also to the south of Route 9, just adjacent to the Laotian border, was the Co Roc
highland, a four-km mountain range that provided excellent observation of both Route 9 to
10 Lam Son was the birthplace of a famous Vietnamese patriot, Le Loi, who defeated an invading Chinese
army in 1427 A.D. The operation's numerical designation came from combining the year, 1971, with the main
highway to be used, Route 9.
'9 Keith William Nolan, Into Laos: the Sty of Deny Canyon I/ Law Son 719; Vlietnam, 1971 (Novato, CA:
Presidio Press, 1986), p. 14.
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the west and Khe Sahn to the east. Farther west into Laos, south of Route 9 and the river,
was a high escarpment that overlooked both. To the north of Route 9 was hilly terrain with
heavy vegetation.200
To conduct Lam Son 719, the ARVN marshaled the 1" Division, as well as elements
of the 1t Armor brigade, 3 Ranger battalions from I Corps, the Airborne division, and two
Marine brigades. In total it committed about 17,000 troops to the operation.201 The 1"
Division was commanded by Brigadier General Phu, a man with extensive combat
experience who was described as "competent and hard-working."2o2 Unfortunately, the other
ARVN commanders in the operation did not have similarly sterling reputations. The I Corps
commander, in charge of the overall operation, was Lt. Gen. Hoang Xuan Lam, a man with
little combat experience of his own who had already acquired the nickname "Bloody Hands"
because of his fatally poor attention to operational issues.203 His primary interests were
military administration and his daily game of tennis.204
Lt. Gen. Du Quoc Dong, equal in rank to Lam, commanded both the Airborne and
Armor forces involved in the battle. A close political ally of Thieu, he too had little
command experience and had already shown himself to lack initiative during an incursion
into Cambodia the previous year. The Marine commander, Lt. Gen. Le Nguyen Khang, was
not much better. An ally of Ky, he remained in Saigon throughout the operation and
delegated most actual command decisions to Col. Bui The Lan, who was considered more
competent.205
ARVN COMMANDERS AND THEIR FORCES IN LAM SON 719
Commander Forces Notes
Phu 1s Division Combat veteran described as "competent"
and "hard-working"
Lam I Corps Nicknamed "Bloody Hands"; no experience
with a major campaign
Dong Armor, Airborne, Rangers Equal in rank to Lam; ally of Thieu
Khang Marines Equal in rank to Lam; ally of Ky; mostly
delegated command to Col. Lan
The ARVN plan envisioned the Armor units moving directly down Route 9 while
the other forces established a series of firebases along the sides of the narrow path to protect
the advance (see map 9). Specifically, the 1" Division was to secure the Co Roc and the
escarpment south of Route 9, while the 1" Airborne battalion and 1" Ranger battalion were
to be dropped into the hilly terrain north of Route 9. The northern flanking forces would
then to converge on Tchepone and Base Area 604, while the southern flanking forces were
to converge in and clear out Base Area 611. Meanwhile, the Vietnamese Marines were to
serve as reserve forces in the Khe Sahn area.'"" ln many ways, the operation was intended to
2"" Hinh, Lam Son 719, pp. 26-8.
21 Hinh, La/ Son 719, p. 127.
2"2 Nolan, Into L aos, p. 105
2"W Nolan, Into Laos, p. 104.
2)4 Wiest, V ietnam's Fo/7otten A ry, p. 209.
2"5 Nolan, Into Laos, p. 105.
2"' Nolan, Into Laos, p. 103-4.
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be a replay of the previous year's successful (and largely unopposed) incursion into
Cambodia.207
However, precisely because that operation had decimated supply routes through
Cambodia, the North Vietnamese now recognized the importance of defending their base
areas in Laos. According to the PAVN's official history, in late 1970 North Vietnam formed
the 7 0 ,h Corps-Sized Group, consisting of the 3 0 4 h, 3 0 8t', and 3 2 0 "h Divisions, plus a
number of specialty branch regiments and battalions, to counter any potential South
Vietnamese invasion into Laos.28 By early 1971 North Vietnam forces in the area had,
according to PAVN's later history, "grown to 60,000 troops, consisting of five divisions
(3 0 8 "h, 304", 3 2 0 h, 3 2 4th, and 2"nd), two separate infantry regiments (2 7t' and 2 7 8 h), eight
artillery regiments, three engineer regiments, three tank battalions, six anti-aircraft regiments,
and eight sapper battalions, plus rear service and transportation units."09 South Vietnamese
estimates put enemy combat strength at more like 30,000, but either way, it is clear that
North Vietnam had a large concentration of men in the area.210
Sent to the front as the representative of the Central Military Party Committee and
the High Command was Colonel General Van Tien Dung, and in command was Major
General Le Trong Tun, Deputy Commander of the General Staff. The PAVN history adds
that "many senior cadre from the general departments and specialty branches were sent to
reinforce the front's staff agencies. This was a strong command structure with sufficient
ability and authority to command all forces participating in the campaign and to coordinate
operations."211 With these forces in place, the battle began on January 30, 1971.
The Battle
The initial phases of the invasion went well for South Vietnam. The ARVN Armor
column advanced approximately 20 km along Route 9 and linked up with the Airborne. Five
firebases were established along the way, with Airborne and Ranger units guarding the
northern flank of the westward advance and the I" Division guarding the southern flank. By
the end of the first week, however, the forward advance of the Armor and Airborne had
slowed, so "a decision was made to step up the operation by having the 1" Infantry Division
quickly occupy the higher mountain tops south of the Xepon River and establish fire
support bases there to support the Airborne Division's push toward Tchepone."12
Although the Pt Division succeeded in this task, pushing south and successfully
engaging the enemy at several points, ARVN Armor progress remained very slow.
According to one account, "On 11 February, the attack ground to a halt.... The ARVN
force just stopped attacking...."m1 Lacking orders urging them forward, "the South
Vietnamese forces in Laos sat where they were.""' Meanwhile, the initial sluggishness of the
Armor advance had given the PAVN time to reinforce the area, activating what was soon
revealed to be a dense network of defenses. The PAVN began to lay siege to stalled ARVN
'") This operation is discussed in more detail at the end of the chapter.
Military I listory Institute, Victog in V ietnam, p. 272.
T" Military History Institute, IVictog in VI ietnam, p. 274.
Hinh, Ia ll Son 719, p. 131.
Military I listory Institute, Victog in Vietnamv, pp. 274.
Hihn, Lam Non 719, p. 74.
m1 Willbanks, dIbandoning Ilietnam, p. 105.
''4 \Villbanks, I bandoing.4 Vietnam, p. 105.
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units isolated along Route 9, massing infantry, armor, and artillery to confront them
piecemeal.21S
Soon the PAVN overran the Rangers' firebase, leaving the remaining two firebases
guarded by the Airborne even more exposed. The first of these was soon overrun in a
combined armor-infantry attack that the Airborne failed to repel, despite having significant
quantities of light anti-tank weapons. U.S. airpower was of little use in defending these bases,
because the PAVN intentionally hugged the South Vietnamese positions closely.216
Seeing the Airborne's losses, Thieu became anxious that the division would be
destroyed, so he suggested that it be removed from battle and replaced with the Marines.
Lam had the sense to see the infeasibility of this suggestion: "such a relief under the combat
conditions on that battlefield would be very hazardous."217 Flying to Saigon to meet with
Thieu, Lam instead proposed that the Airborne simply drop back to protect Route 9 from
the north, while allowing the 1" Infantry alone to continue west. It would now be the 1"'
Division that would make a heliborne assault on Tchepone, with the 1" Marine brigade
following behind it and the 3" Marine brigade remaining in reserve.218
Thieu accepted this plan and then adjusted the overall objective of the operation as
well: the goal was now simply to reach Tchepone, rather than to destroy Base Areas 604 and
611. Reaching the town "had become more of a political and psychological symbol than an
objective of practical military value. There was nothing of military importance in the ruined
town; enemy supplies and war materiel were all stored in caches in the forests and
mountains."219 But the ARVN had to press on in service of this new directive.
The Airborne soon lost its remaining firebase under the pressure of continuing heavy
infantry-armor attacks from the PAVN.22 Meanwhile, the 1' ARVN successfully executed
helibourne assaults to the west, establishing three bases in the face of heavy resistance.221 The
1" Division "fought aggressively, repeatedly engaged the enemy, and defeated him
everywhere," getting to Tchepone in just three days.2 The next day the 1" Division's rapid
reaction force, the Hac Bao, also successfully landed near Tchepone and extracted the crew
of a U.S. aircraft that had gone down as it supported the final attack. According to a South
Vietnamese general whose memoirs are otherwise quite critical of ARVN performance in the
operation, "The Black Panthers scored a major combat exploit by rescuing all the Americans
and subsequently made contact with the enemy, sustaining light casualties but killing more
than 60 Northern troops. During this violent action, they also seized 30 NVA automatic
rifles, destroyed an anti-aircraft gun position, and found another 40 NVA soldiers killed by
airstrikes."2
Inside Tchepone, the 1' Division found modest amounts of rice, weapons, and
enemy dead, but the North Vietnamese had already moved most of their supplies farther
west2 mNevertheless, with some ability to claim victory, President Thieu made the decision
to end the operation right away, on March 15. The extremely difficult task of returning to
H ihn, Laml Soni 719, pp. 76, 86.
21' Hinh, Law, Son 719, pp. 84, 145.
Hihn, Law, Son 719, p. 89.
1 Hihn, Law,, Son 719, p. 89.
Hihn, La,, Son 719, p. 90.
1Hinh, La, Son 719, p. 96.
Willbanks, A bandoning I 'ietnamn, p. 108-9.
I Hihn, Lam, Son 719, p. 98.
Hihn, Lam Son 719, p. 98.
Hihn, Lam,, Son 719, p. 127.
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South Vietnam along Route 9 now fell to the 1st Division. Instead of this road having been
secured by Armor and Airborne units as originally planned, the PAVN could now pounce
on it from all directions: the 3 0 8 th Division from the North; elements of the 3 2 0 ,h and 3 0 4th
Divisions from the east; the 2 "d Division directly in the path of the ARVN 1 "; and the 3 2 4th
Division near the Co Roc, where the Marines had tried to enter the battle as reinforcements.
A South Vietnamese general likened the PAVN to a hunter about to kill his prey by "locking
its head and gripping its tail."225
The 1" Division suffered extensive casualties as it fought its way back to positions
from which it could be airlifted to South Vietnam.226 As the rear guard element, the 4 "
battalion of the 1" infantry regiment suffered particularly high losses in a day-long battle that
left only thirty-two survivors. Nevertheless, the battalion did not break. It "had
accomplished well its rear guard mission and in the process, had sacrificed nearly every
man," while inflicting much larger casualties on the North Vietnamese units on the attack.227
By contrast, the Armor and Airborne units did return, but their "withdrawal along Route
No. 9 surely did not proceed as planned in an orderly and controlled manner."228 The
Marines also chose to make a hasty withdrawal rather than waiting for orders from General
Lam.229
Total ARVN casualties were 9,065. The PAVN's were estimated to be above 20,000,
although this total includes numerous men killed by U.S. air strikes and artillery.23() Both sides
claimed victory.
Assessing the Battlefield Effectiveness of Siouth Vietnam
Lam Son 719 was a nearly unmitigated disaster for the ARVN, which other than the
1" Division demonstrated virtually no battlefield effectiveness. Certainly, the North
Vietnamese had known an attack was coming, and their defenses were prepared along the
ARVN's inevitable axes of advance. The simple geography of the area made the ARVN's
movements predictable, while the terrain, particularly the poor condition of Route 9, slowed
the advance, as did bad weather at times.
Nevertheless, ARVN forces showed serious deficits in unit cohesion, tactical
proficiency, and above all in the ability to conduct complex operations-deficits that were
clearly linked to the nature of political intervention in the South Vietnamese military. Indeed,
the only unit to have performed with adequate effectiveness during the invasion was the 1"
Division, which was subject to different forms of intervention.
First, overall unit cohesion in the ARVN was poor. In particular, the Airborne and
Rangers were not steadfast in their attempts to hold the firebases. As a South Vietnamese
history put it, "When a FSB was threatened with being overrun, the only course of action
our unit commanders took was to destroy the artillery, abandon the base, and extricate their
troops by helilift."23I Lt. General James Sutherland, the American Corps commander
involved in the operation, echoed these concerns, warning General Abrams, "1 am very
concerned about the discipline and morale of the airborne division," because healthy,
t Hihn, I am Von 719, p. 113.
N MIlitary I istory Institute, V ictorr in V ietna, p. 277; HIn h, I all Son 719, p. 153; and WilIbanks, A bandoning
Vietnam, p. 112.
Hihn, Laml Son 719, p. 108.
2H H inh, I al Son 719, p. 118, 163.
Hihn, ILam Son 719, P. 154.
23") Hihn, ILam Son 719, pp. 127-132.
l1 Hinh, Iam Son 719,p. 162.
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unwounded troopers were attempting to leave the battle aboard supply helicopters. "The
airborne infantry commander was among those who managed to get aboard the choppers,"
reported General Sutherland. "I suspect that before this night is finished, the airborne troops
may walk off."232
The Armor units also shrank from the fight, abandoning two-thirds of their vehicles
on Route 9, even though many were still in working order.233 These included 21 tanks, 26
armored personnel carriers, 13 bulldozers, two graders, and 51 other vehicles that had to be
destroyed by U.S. airpower and artillery the next day to prevent them from falling into
enemy hands.234 Again, many of these so-called elite troops did not live up to their
reputations, fleeing the field as soon as they had the opportunity.
To be fair, the Marine units were described as "retaining unit integrity and
cohesiveness," which may in part have been attributable to their competent field
commander, Col. Lan. But however good individual Marines might have been, their overall
commander General Khang still ordered them to withdraw in defiance of orders from
General Lam, "apparently to avoid a difficult battle," making whatever cohesion they did
have ultimately irrelevant to the battle's final phases. It was only the 1" Division and the Hac
Bao that actually received high praise for discipline and cohesion.235
Second, where they did stand and fight, most ARVN forces continued to display
severe problems with basic tactical proficiency. For example, while there is no doubt that the
Airborne troops faced difficult odds in defending their firebases, they were in fact armed
with light anti-tank weapons that could have significantly impeded the PAVN's armor-
infantry attacks (and, in turn, protected the 1 " Division's eventual withdrawal down Route
9). But the Airborne troops repeatedly fired the weapons inside the minimum range needed
to arm the projectile, rendering the weapons virtually useless. The Airborne troops
apparently believed, or at least later reported, that the weapons were defective, though re-
testing revealed that the weapons were in perfect order.2 3The problem was not with the
hardware, but with the ARVN's lack of basic tactical skills-deficit that is not surprising in
light of the intervention theory.237
Similar problems plagued the Armor units, where "gunners proved to be confused
and hasty, firing from too far away and often too soon, thereby frequently causing
deflections."238 Additionally, armored vehicles were used primarily for transportation, not for
maneuver or even firepower. As one ARVN general later lamented, "We had 300 armored
vehicles but they could barely control 12 miles of road."230
Meanwhile, none of these sorts of basic tactical problems were reported with regard
to the 1" Division.241 It was instead described as "topping the honor roll," "well led," and
"the number one ARVN combat unit."24, The 1" Infantry was also the only element that
23 Quoted in Willbanks, Abandonin fietiam, p. 108.
233 Starry, A rmoured Combat, p. 197; and Hinh, Lam Son 719, p. 155.
'34 Hinh, La, Son 719, p. 119.
235 Hinh, Lawl on 719, pp. 153-4.
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'38 Hihn, Lall Von 719, p. 88.
'39 Hinh, La, Son 719, p. 169.
24" Nolan, 1nto Laos, p. 259.
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showed the ability to maneuver on foot rather than relying solely on motorized or airborne
transport across the battlefield.242
Third, beyond basic tactics, Lam Son 719 was a damning indictment of the ARVN's
ability to conduct complex operations. Repeatedly ARVN forces displayed an inability to
combine arms. For example, more than eight years after Ap Bac, the ARVN still
demonstrated an inability to coordinate movement with artillery or air support. 43 Indeed,
this shortcoming as described in the Laos operation was virtually identical to that noted by
American advisors during the early 1960s.244
More importantly, the fracturing of the ARVN command structure profoundly
hindered the application of low-level initiative in support of a higher-level plan, the real key
to complex operations. For example, even if the Armor, Airborne, and Ranger units had
been more cohesive or tactically proficient, it is not clear that these improvements would
have translated in much greater fighting effectiveness, because the commanders of these
units had the ability to refuse to participate in the joint campaign plan devised by Lam.
According to a South Vietnamese officer's account, Lam
was virtually ignored by the two commanders of the Airborne and Marine
divisions, lieutenant generals themselves who were more accustomed, as
commanders of national strategic reserve forces, to answering directly to
Saigon rather than responding to a corps commander. They contested
Lam's orders and directives at every opportunity. Although Lam appealed
to President Thieu for support, Thieu refused to reprimand Lam's
subordinate commanders, even when their actions bordered on
insubordination during the heat of the battle.245
For example, it was Dong who ordered the Armored units to stop moving forward in their
advance early in the operation, and Khang who ordered his Marines to withdraw early.24(
Why did Thieu refuse to rebuke, or better yet fire, Dong and Khang? Not because he
lacked information about how his command arrangements were affecting the course of the
battle14 Rather, Thieu did not intervene because Thieu believed Dong's Airborne was the
best safeguard against a coup, and because Khang's Marines secured the power of Thieu's
rival, Ky, whom he did not wish to provoke.24, Thieu needed Dong's loyalty and Khang's
continued neutrality. As one general put it, "the most important problem... was
insubordination on the part of general reserve unit commanders who like many other
generals considered themselves," correctly, "the pillars of the regime."249
At the same time that this sort of fracturing presented one set of problems, the
centralization of ARVN command posed another. While Thieu allowed a paralyzing division
of authority to persist among his generals, he used what authority he did retain to try to
control the movement of units from Saigon, rather than devolving this power to Lam.
Thieu's personal intervention in the course of the battle explains why the initial advance
slowed, why the Airborne was replaced by the Marines midway through the operation, and
241 Hinh, Law Son 719, p. 161.
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why the goals of the campaign were scaled back in a manner that made withdrawal far more
difficult. Ultimately, the same elite forces tasked with conducting the invasion played vital
roles in securing Thieu in power domestically, so his political intervention in the battle was
focused on preserving these units.250
Only the 1" Division had a unified, decentralized command structure: it was directly
controlled by Phu, who did not have to share authority with other generals or take tactical
and operational orders from Saigon. Only the 1" Division, which was not responsible for
backing any of the Republic's political leaders, actually followed Lam's orders and
demonstrated some ability to conduct complex operations.21 The result of these differing
patterns of political intervention was clear. As the Deputy Senior Advisor to I Corps
commented in his after-action report that despite the many ARVN shortcomings on display
during Lam Son 719, "The l" Division demonstrated the ability to conduct a large scale
airmobile operation against a well trained, locally superior force. Many problems arose
during the operation but most were solved on the spot."252
None of this is to suggest that Lam himself was a particularly worthy general,
however. Even during this campaign, in which more than 7,000 ARVN soldiers would
eventually lose their lives, Lam took breaks everyday to play tennis.253 Thieu had promoted
him primarily based on political loyalty, and as the battle wore on Thieu eventually realized
the gravity of this error. On February 23 he actually tried to replace Lam with General Do
Cao Tri, the III Corps commander who had proven himself competent during the incursion
into Cambodia the previous year.25 4 Unfortunately, Tri was killed in a helicopter crash on his
way to take command, leaving Lam in charge.255 It is little wonder, then, that the larger
ARVN force never proved able to conduct complex operations either offensively or
defensively.
Assessing the Battlefield Effectiveness of North Vietnam
Although Lam Son 719 inflicted heavy losses on the North Vietnamese and probably
delayed the Easter Offensive of 1972, the battles in Laos reflected well on the PAVN's
actual battlefield effectiveness. North Vietnamese leaders had adopted best practices in
political intervention, which resulted in units that were highly cohesive and tactically
proficient, consistent with the predictions of the theory. Most importantly, these units also
demonstrated the ability to conduct complex operations.
First, regarding unit cohesion, the accounts of the battle actually offer very little
comment on this subject except for a brief moment in the PAVN history that notes the
"steadfast resolve" of its soldiers. In this case, though, absence of evidence may not be
evidence of absence: neither the North's nor the South's record of the battle contains any
accounts of PAVN surrender, PAVN withdrawals, or PAVN abandonment of positions.
This stands in stark contrast to how both sides record the ARVN's performance. Another
25" Hihn, Into Laos, p. 158.
251 Nolan, Into Laos, p. 105
252 Tern L. Florence, "Final Combat Operation After Action Feeder Report, Lam Son 719," memo to
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254 General Tri's record in Cambodia is discussed later in the chapter.
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indicator of strong PAVN cohesion is that out of the tens of thousands of soldiers it had in
theater, only 57 were taken prisoner.256
Second, and more concretely, the record of the battle is full of examples of the
PAVN's clearly demonstrated tactical proficiency, which would be hard to execute in the
absence of cohesion. For example, the PAVN units consistently made excellent use of the
terrain surrounding Route 9 to conceal their positions, as well as to establish observation
points for accurate fire.257 According to the U.S. after-action report, PAVN forces
"registered mortar, artillery, and rocket fires on most potential landing or pick up zones in
the area.... Consequently, nearly every landing and pick up zone came under indirect fire
attack soon after any allied airmobile operation began."258 The PAVN also used the terrain to
create "mutually supporting, well dug-in, crescent-shape, covered trench segments," called
horseshoe blocks, which greatly slowed the ARVN advance.259
Additionally, the PAVN demonstrated great tactical proficiency in the area of air
defense. The U.S. after-action report from Laos notes, "The NVA skillfully deployed
throughout the Lam Son 719 operational area an extensive, sophisticated, well-integrated,
highly mobile air defense system. Large numbers of anti-aircraft weapons of several calibers
were strategically positioned, well-camouflaged, and effectively dug-in."260 It seems clear that
PAVN soldiers possessed basic tactical skills and applied them more consistently than did
the ARVN.
Third, and most importantly, the PAVN demonstrated the ability to aggregate basic
tactical skills into complex operations at both the small- and large-unit levels. For example,
even in very small units of ten to twelve members, the PAVN soldiers were capable of
effectively combining arms such as small weapons, machine guns, mortars, and rocket
launchers, to devastating effect and with excellent consistency.26I According to an ARVN
officer, "The enemy effectively coordinated all his capabilities, to include antiaircraft,
artillery, mortars, and massive infantry formations."262 Indeed, infantry and anti-aircraft
gunners coordinated their movements especially closely so as to "hug" ARVN positions and
prevent the application of American air support.263 Again, this coordination bespeaks an
operational sophistication missing in most of the ARVN. Additionally, the PAVN proved
able to coordinate the movement of a multi-division force, another task that the ARVN's
convoluted command structure rendered impossible. In short, the battles of Lam Son 719
provide strong confirmation of the political intervention theory.
VII. The Easter Offensive, 1972
Coming only a year after the confrontation in Laos, the Easter Offensive of 1972
offers an opportunity to probe what, if anything, the two sides learned from that campaign.
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Indeed, 1972 saw the most widespread conventional fighting of the entire war, with major
battles occurring in all four military zones of South Vietnam. Both sides attempted to
conduct multi-division operations on both the offense and defense. Furthermore, U.S.
ground forces had dwindled substantially by 1972 under the policy of Vietnamization.264
As will be argued below, though, the Easter Offensive is not as clean of a test of
each side's battlefield effectiveness as one would like. It is true that the U.S. Army and
Marines had a much more limited presence in Vietnam by 1972. Nevertheless, American
advisors were still heavily involved in coordinating South Vietnamese military operations-
and unlike in Lam Son 719, these advisors were actually at the scene of all the major battles,
greatly enhancing their contribution to ARVN fighting effectiveness, especially in the
attempt to conduct complex operations.
Most importantly, however, U.S. airpower, and to a lesser extent U.S. artillery and
naval gun fire, played an overwhelmingly prominent role on the battlefield during the Easter
Offensive (see chart below). Sources from North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and the United
States all agree: more than merely "supporting" ARVN forces or "tying down" PAVN
forces, U.S. firepower repeatedly proved to be the decisive element that determined who
won and lost particular engagements.26 5
U.S. FIXED-WING STRIKE SORTIES IN SOUTH VIETNAM, 1972266
March April May June Totals by type
USAF tactical air 247 3,032 7,516 5,310 16,105
USAF gunships 24 407 491 325 1,247
USAF B-52s 689 1,608 2,223 2,207 6,727
U.S. Navy 128 4,683 3,247 2,040 10,098
U.S. Marine Corps - 537 1,381 1,937 3,855
Totals by month 1,088 10,267 14,858 11,819
Although it is important not to fixate on battle outcomes per se, U.S. firepower
remains an extremely powerful confounding variable in any attempt to gauge South and
North Vietnamese effectiveness in the Easter Offensive. The signal to noise ratio is simply
much lower here than for the other battles and campaigns examined in the chapter.
Nevertheless, the analysis seeks to isolate these signals as much as possible, and it
finds that, where discernable, they lend some support to the intervention theory. In general,
the Easter Offensive revealed PAVN forces to have very impressive unit cohesion and
tactical proficiency, as well as the ability to conduct complex operations. By contrast, the
ARVN generally continued to demonstrate serious deficits in basic cohesion and proficiency,
and virtually no ability to conduct complex operations. Again, these deficits were directly
attributable to the nature of political intervention in the South Vietnamese military.
264 At the end of 1971, the United States had 158,120 soldiers in South Vietnam, but by the end of 1972, only
24,000 remained. Dale Andrad6, America's I ,ast Vietnam Battle: Haltinlg Hanloi's 1972 Easter Ofr nsive (Lawrence,
KS: University Press of Kansas, 2001), p. 7.
265For a South Vietnamese perspective, see Lt. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong, The Easter /6nsie of 1972
(Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980), especially p. 172. For a U.S. perspective, see
Capt. David K. Mann, The N FA 1972 Intasion ofMiliary Region I: Fal/ oflQuang Ti and De/pnse of Hue, Project
CHECO Report,January 22, 1973, available in the Historian's Working Files and Papers at the Center of
Military History, Fort McNair, Washington, DC.
266 All data taken from James Willbanks, The Battle oJAn Loc (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2005),
p. 158.
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And again, the exceptions to this pattern proved the rule. The ARVN 1St Division,
where political intervention was much closer to best practices, continued to perform
considerably better than the other ARVN units in the Easter Offensive. Additionally, other
ARVN units involved in the fighting, notably the 2 3rd Division and I Corps, each at least
improved their performance somewhat after changes in the nature of political intervention in
these units occurred during the Easter Offensive itself. All of this additional variation in
performance within the ARVN again suggests the importance of the political intervention
variable.
THE EASTER OFFENSIVE, 1972
North Vietnam South Vietnam
Battle summary
Tactical orientation Offensive, then defensive Defensive, then offensive
Plan Three-prong, multi-division Defend and then re-take areas
attack to take and hold territory captared by PAVN forces
throughout South Vietnam
Weapons T-54 tanks, 130-mm guns, 160- M-41 tanks, TOW missiles,
mm mortars, rockets, Sagger artillery; plus U.S. airpower,
anti-tank missiles, anti-aircraft artillery, and naval gunfire
guns and missiles, including the
SA-7
Manpower 14 divisions, 26 independent 14 divisions, 2 independent
regiments, and supporting regiments, supporting armor
armor and artillery units and artillery units, plus local
Territorial Forces
Losses -100,000+ casualties -8,000 KIA, -24,000 WIA
Ef ectiveness summar
Unit cohesion? Yes No, except 14 Division
Tactical proficiency? Yes No, except 1" Division
Complex operations? Yes No, except 1" Division
Confirms theory? Yes Yes
Finally, it is also important to preemptively acknowledge the sheer scale of the
fighting in 1972. The Easter Offensive and the response to it raged across huge swaths of
South Vietnam and prompted operations of all sizes and kinds by both sides. The only major
scholarly work to examine even close to all of the fighting runs more than 500 pages, and
even it has to pick and choose what to cover."- Data remain sparse on some parts of the
campaign, particularly in the Delta.
Because the goal here is not to provide a thorough historical rendition of the entire
campaign, the analysis focuses only on the battles within the Easter Offensive that offer the
best tests of the theory-instances about which information is available, instances in which
the United States was least involved, and, crucially, instances in which the nature of political
intervention in the ARVN shifted during the campaign, which should have produced shifts
in battlefield effectiveness. As such, this section deals primarily with the battles in the north
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26- Andrad6, America's Last Vietnam, Battle.
for Quang Tri and Hue, which occurred in two major phases, and the battles in Central
Vietnam for Tan Canh and Kontum.
In both of these cases, there is sufficient information to gauge what happened; there
was at least some fighting that occurred without major U.S. involvement; and there were
shifts in the nature of political intervention in the ARVN during the offensive, which should
have caused shifts in ARVN battlefield effectiveness as well. While far from a complete
examination of the battles of 1972, these fights were central to the course and overall
outcome of the Easter Offensive. The section below also briefly addresses the fighting near
Saigon for Tay Ninh and An Loc, although only in enough depth to determine whether it
provides disconfirming evidence, as it does not constitute a particularly useful test of the
theory.
The Forces on Each Side
The Easter Offensive involved a massive PAVN conventional assault along three
main avenues of advance into South Vietnam. First, on March 30, 1972, three North
Vietnamese infantry divisions attacked into Quang Tri province across the DMZ and from
sanctuaries in Laos to the west. Total PAVN forces in this area of operations included three
additional infantry regiments, two anti-aircraft divisions, nine field artillery regiments, two
tank and armored regiments, two engineer regiments, and 16 battalions of sapper, signal and
transportation troops.268
Facing the PAVN in Military Region 1 (also known as MR-1 or the I Corps Tactical
Zone) was the ARVN I Corps, commanded by General Hoang Xuan Lam-still in charge
despite his disastrous performance in Lam Son 719 the previous year.26 9 Directly defending
the DMZ was the ARVN 3(" Division, under the command of General Vu Van Giai,
considered to be a very good officer.2- In addition to this newly established division, formed
to replace the departing U.S. Marines, I Corps included the 1" Division, still under the
command of Major General Pham Van Phu, as well as the 2"' Division, the 51" Infantry
Regiment, the 1" Ranger Group, and the 14 Armor Brigade.f
[SEE ON NEXT PAGE]
6 Military History Institute, Victory in V 'ietiam, p. 289.
*' Truong, Easter O/Jensie, p. 1.
2" Andrad6, Amierica's Last V ietiam Battle, p. 34.
I Truong, Easter O//ensiv'e, p. 16.
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Military Region I
Gen. Hoang Xuan I Corps Same Corps commander responsible for
Lam Lam Son 719 disaster
Gen. Vu Van Giai 3 'd Division Considered a good officer, but lacked
command authority
Maj. Gen. Pham Van 1t Division Combat veteran described as "competent"
Phu and "hard-working"; same commander as in
Lam Son 719
Miitagy Region II____________________
Lt. Gen. Ngo Dzu II Corps Little command experience, malleable, meek,
considered to be one of the worst leaders in
the ARVN272
Colonel Le Duc Dat 22nd Division Well known for corruption; considered one
of the worst commanders in the army
Colonel Ly Tong Ba 2 3'" Division The same young captain who commanded
M-1 13 unit at Ap Bac; owed his low rank
(given his age and experience) to lack of
corruption; considered highly competent
The second major front of the offensive occurred in Military Region 2, where the
PAVN attacked both Kontum and Binh Dinh provinces during April 1972. Here the PAVN
forces included two infantry divisions; four separate infantry regiments; five artillery,
engineer, and sapper regiments; six anti-aircraft battalions; and one tank battalion.23
Facing them were the ARVN 22"" and 23"' Infantry Divisions, as well as one
independent infantry regiment. The 22"" was commanded by Colonel Le Duc Dat, well
known for his corruption, while the ARVN 23" was commanded by Colonel Ly Tong Ba,
the man who had commanded the M-113 unit at Ap Bac as a young captain in 1963. Not a
general officer despite commanding a division, Ba owed his low rank "to his unrepentant
opposition to the corruption and incompetence that riddled both the Thieu regime and the
South Vietnamese military."2 4 Unsurprisingly, the Americans considered him "one of the
best commanders in the army."275
Overall command of 11 Corps lay with Lieutenant General Ngo Dzu, headquartered
in Pleiku city and better known for his "malleability and meekness than for his command
experience. "-6 Indeed, General Dzu had held few combat command positions, was not
comfortable in such a large operational command, and was considered to be one of the
worst leaders in the ARVN at the time.27
272 Andrad6, America's Last V ietnamll Battle, p. 207.
273 Military History Institute, Victory in Vietnam, p. 289.
274 Andrad6, America's Last Vietnam, Battle, p. 253.
2?7 Andrade, America's Last IVietnamiy Battle, p. 253.
276 Truong, Easter /frnsive, p. 80; and Andradd, A merica's L ast Vietnamll Battle, p. 207.
2- Andrad6, America's Last V1ietnam Battle, p. 207.
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Commander IForces INotes
Also in April, the PAVN opened a third front in Military Region 3, where three more
divisions crossed the border from Cambodia and attacked Tay Ninh and Binh Long
provinces, eventually converging on the town of An Loc, 60 miles north of Saigon.278 Also in
the area were three separate PAVN infantry regiments, and four regiments of other specialty
troops including artillery and tank units.279 The ARVN 5 ", 18t', and 2 5 th Divisions were
responsible for defending MR-3, along with three Ranger groups. 21
Additional attacks occurred in the Delta, known as Military Region 4, although not
on the scale of those in the three northernmost regions of the country. Data on these battles
are more sparse, and much of the fighting was done by the Territorial Forces rather than the
regular ARVN units, so the analysis here does not focus on the Delta in depth.281
In all, North Vietnam committed virtually its entire combat force to the offensive: 14
divisions, 26 separate regiments, and supporting armor and artillery units.2s2 These forces
fielded T-54 tanks, 130-mm guns, 160-mm mortars, and a range of anti-aircraft guns and
missiles, notably the new SA-7.283 Against this stood virtually the entire combat force of
South Vietnam: 11 ARVN infantry divisions, plus 2 independent infantry regiments; 3
ARVN special reserve divisions-the Marines, the Rangers, and the Airborne; additional
ARVN supporting armor and artillery units; plus the Territorial Forces responsible for local
defense.284
It is hard to say which side had an overall numerical advantage. North and South
Vietnam fielded the same number of combat divisions. The PAVN had many more
independent infantry regiments, but the ARVN had the increasingly competent territorial
forces, as well as U.S. advisory and air support. More importantly, the local balances of
forces in particular campaigns and battles within the offensive varied greatly, as will be
discussed below.
The Initial Battles in teNo:the Fal ofQuang T Province
The initial North Vietnamese attack caught the ARVN off-guard. Both American
and South Vietnamese observers had suspected the North would mount an offensive
sometime in 1972, but intelligence generally indicated that the PAVN would attack from the
west rather than across the DMZ. Additionally, by sheer misfortune, the 3" Division
guarding this area was in the middle of rotating troops among firebases on March 30, leading
to lapses in the normal patrols and look-outs."-s
Amid this ARVN transition, the PAVN suddenly unleashed well-planned and highly
accurate 130-mm artillery fire on the 3 " Division's firebases, following the barrage with well-
coordinated armor-infantry attacks from the north across the DMZ, as well as from the west
through Khe Sahn.286 According to a South Vietnamese history, "Enemy forces conducting
these initial attacks included elements of the NVA 304"' and 308"' Divisions, three separate
1 Truong, Easter O/fr nsiVe, p. 1.
1 Military History Institute, Victog in letiam, p. 289.
2"' Truong, Easter Ogensife, p. 108.
'81 Andrad6, Almerica's Last Vietnami 3att/e, p. 471.
28' Truong, Easter O/1nsiVe, p. 1.
'83 Truong, Laster O(fensile, p. 8.
184 These figures are amended from Cantwell, "The Army of...," p. 153-5.
'8' Truong, Laster O/iensire, p. 24.
288 Truong, Easter O/ensi ye, p. 25; and Military History Institute, Vl'ictor' iI I Jetiam, p. 290-1.
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infantry regiments of the B-5 Front, two armor regiments, five artillery regiments, and at
least one sapper battalion."27
Over the next several days, the PAVN quickly overran the 3rd Division's firebases,
the network of small outposts specifically intended to prevent the quick capture of the
province. As the PAVN history of the campaign relates, "After the artillery's destructive
barrages, combined-arms forces launched assaults in the main sectors.... We also launched
coordinated operations to encircle enemy forces, make deep penetrations to the east, cut
supply routes, and isolate the campaign area from the south. During the first two days of
combat our troops overran one entire group of strong points... [and] shattered the enemy's
strong outer defensive perimeter."288 Indeed, panic engulfed a number of ARVN units as
they observed large refugee flows fleeing the areas of PAVN attack, and fire support
coordination to these outlying areas was poor.289
The ARVN was soon forced to contract to a much tighter defensive perimeter
around the obvious target of the attack: the provincial capital, Quang Tri City (see map
10).290 As an ARVN history notes, "Both ARVN regular and territorial forces seemed to hold
extremely well along this new line. To their credit, they had stopped the NVA invasion-for
the time being. They had performed their task well, not through reliance on U.S. air support
but with their own combat support."291
This last claim is somewhat true, in the sense that bad weather did prevent close air
support to most units during this initial phase.292 Lack of air support was also somewhat the
ARVN's own fault, however, as its disorderly retreat made it difficult to know the location
of friendlies. But the ARVN did still benefit from immense U.S. naval gunfire and B-52
strikes.23 As one history notes, "Before April 1972, U.S. air activities in MR-1 were at a low
level. Any 24-hour period with more than 10 tactical air sorties was considered a busy
day."294 This all changed after March 30, with U.S. air sorties rising to 300 or more per day,
everyday. It was common to see more than 30 B-52 missions in a single 24-hour period.2s
Furthermore, ARVN troops were subject to no such aerial attacks, as the PAVN did
not bring an air force to the fight. It is exactly this sort of imbalance that makes it hard to
know how much credit to give the ARVN for re-consolidating its position, especially since it
clearly suffered basic problems in cohesion during the initial attempt at defense.
In any event, General Lam was not especially concerned with bolstering that defense
or working to establish a defense-in-depth. Without having visited the front to actually
inspect the 3' Division's line, Lam ordered a counterattack to the west on April 14, although
he was careful to check his horoscope so he would know when to time the attack. "> Despite
clear weather that enabled a significant surge in U.S. air support, the ARVN units defending
187 Truong, Laster (ensie, p. 25.
288 Military History Institute, Victoy in i etnani, p. 291.
2'( Truong, Easter O/onsii'e, p. 29. This account is also echoed in the North's history, Military History Institute,
I lictory) in Vietlam!, p. 29 1.
2(" Truong, Iaster QO/enslVe, p. 25.
29' Truong, Laster Oens/re, p. 31.
Capt. David K. Mann, The NI V'A 1972 Invasion of M.Ailitary Region I:1 all of'Quiang TI and De/nse of le, Project
CHECC) Report, January 22, 1973, Chapter III, available in the Historian's Working Files and Papers at the
Center of Militarv I Iistory, Fort McNair, Washington, DC.
N3 Truong, Easter (//ens/ue, p. 31.
294 Truong, Easter O/onsihe, p. 75.
2" Truong, Easter Ol/ens/re, p. 75.
'9> Andrad6, Ameica's I ast Vietnam! Battle, p. 102.
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the line refused to attack as ordered.297 "The troops still clung to their trenches and made no
significant effort to move forward," according to a South Vietnamese history.298 "By the end
of the first week of the operation, no unit had advanced more than 500 meters from the line
of departure."299
Part of the problem was morale: "It seemed that the subordinate commanders knew
that their units lacked the strength to break through the NVA formations facing them, that
the enemy's artillery would surely catch them in the open and destroy them, and that the
coordinated fire and logistical support they would need to carry the attack was beyond the
capability of the 3 rd Division or I Corps to provide."300
But these doubts stemmed from more than shell shock and were directly related to
broader problems with General Giai's command, which bore a strong resemblance to the
difficulties seen the previous year at Lam Son 719. Although Giai was technically responsible
for all of the forces holding the line against the PAVN, he actually had authority only over
his own division, not over the Marines, Armor units, or Rangers in the area. This might have
been just as well given that, as a division commander, he lacked the headquarters needed to
truly control such a large group of forces.301
The problem, however, was that the Marines and Rangers also were not controlled
by I Corps. Instead the Rangers remained under their separate command out of Da Nang,
while the Marines continued to be led from their headquarters in Hue. As one ARVN officer
later speculated, "Perhaps General Lam did not feel certain he could handle the Marine
Division commander who, during Lam Son 719, had failed to comply with his orders but
still came out unscathed."302 After all, the Marine commander, General Khang, was a close
political ally of President Thieu's rival Ky, and reprimanding or threatening him risked
upsetting the delicate political balance that underlay the regime's stability. But the result-
again-was a chain of command that wasn't much like a chain at all, but instead like a series
of scattered links, each perhaps solid on its own but not connected together to forge
anything stronger. Soldiers on the ground could see the disastrous consequences and
(understandably) refused to move.33
Lam did directly control the Armor units in I Corps, although this centralization
posed its own set of problems, as he gave orders to these units without telling Giai.3"4
Indeed, "Lam let Giai take responsibility for the battle, but he did not grant him any real
authority. From Danang, Lam personally interceded at all levels, sometimes going so far as
to personally issue orders by radio to individual brigade commanders without notifying the
division operations center. Both Giai and his division advisers often learned of new orders
only as they were being carried out."31'
Predictably, Giai now found "that the orders he gave to his attached units had no
effect until the subordinate commander had checked and received guidance from his parent
headquarters. This was especially true if the orders required a difficult operation," such as
29 Andrad6, A1eica's Last Vietnaml Battle, p. 103.
298 Truong, Easter O/ensive, p. 39.
2")() Truong, Easter O/eiue, p. 38.
3"" Truong, E1aster O/fensie, p. 38.
31 Andrad6, Almenica' Last V1ietnaml Batt/e, p. 2.
3"2 Truong, Easte Ofenie, p. 33.
303 Andrad6, Ameica's Last f-ietinall Battle,, p. 64.
3'4 Truong, Easter Ofenive, p. 38.
3 Andrad6, Ameica's Last V ietnamll Batt/e, p. 105.
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the attempted counteroffensive." 6 In light of these sorts of delays, it is not hard to
understand why the 3 rd Division was less than enthused about participating in a difficult
attempt to re-take territory. Even though their own commander was competent, Giai's
soldiers may have known he lacked the authority to lead all the forces required to make the
operation successful.
With the ARVN having failed to launch this initial counteroffensive, a week later the
commander of the 1" Armor Brigade decided of his own accord to pull some of his units
south in order to clear elements in his rear. Again, Giai was out of the loop, this time with
dire consequences. As soon as the other ARVN forces saw the Armor Brigade's tanks
moving south, they were "gripped with panic, broke ranks, and streamed along."307 Before
Giai even realized what had happened, many of his troops abandoned their positions, and
the line of defense collapsed-not because of PAVN attacks but because of the internal
command problem within the ARVN. Once Giai realized the problem, he again managed to
re-establish defenses, but this time in an even tighter circle around Quang Tri City.308
As April wore on, Giai's lines continued to move closer and closer to Quang Tri.
Unit discipline began to collapse as the 3 d Division became increasingly isolated.309 Then on
April 27, the North Vietnamese launched a new assault. The 3 0 8 th 3 0 4 th, and 3 2 4 h divisions,
combined with artillery and tank support units, overran the remaining defenders outside the
city in a series of well-coordinated attacks.310
By April 30, Giai realized the city would fall, and he generated a plan for withdrawal.
But at the last minute, on the morning of May 1, General Lam called Giai to tell him not to
withdraw after all: "all units were to remain where they were and hold their positions 'at all
costs'." Lam added that "no withdrawal of any unit would be permitted unless he personally
gave the authorization" after receiving it from President Thieu, who was apparently now
directing events from Saigon."1 Of course, Lam had not shared with Thieu and the Joint
General Staff the true scale of the threat, downplaying PAVN advances and overstating
ARVN capabilities because he was afraid to share the bad news.32
In a disturbing echo of what had happened in Laos, and a disturbing preview of what
would happen in 1975, this sudden change in orders from an uninformed Thieu was a
disaster, resulting in neither a robust defense of the city nor a clean withdrawal. "And so
within the space of four hours," as an ARVN general later put it, "the ARVN dispositions
for defense crumbled completely.""m Or as the North Vietnamese later put it: "Surrounded
and isolated, the enemy troops... broke and ran. Our troops clung to and pursued them.
Accurate fire from our long-range artillery positions created added terror among the enemy
troops. Abandoning their vehicles and artillery pieces, enemy troops fled on foot."3'4 The
ARVN abandoned the city, with General Giai attempting unsuccessfully in the final
'"6 Truong, Eas/er s/cI, p. 33.
" Truong, E"aster Q/eis/', p. 39-40.
" Truong, Laster Qgen/re p. 39-40.
3"9 Truong, lEaster Qens/re, p. 41.
Military History Institute, Victory In V ietnaim, p. 292.
Truong, Easter Qensf/e, p. 44. A nearly identical account of these events appears in Mann, The NIT 1972
Invasion.
''1 Andrade, lmcca's L ast it//letna Batt/e, p. 143.
13 Truong, Laster Q/cnsie, p. 45.
1'4 Military History Institute, Vlictory in V ietnam,,, p. 292.
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moments to catch up with his own fleeing troops in a commandeered armored vehicle.315
Thieu had him arrested in Da Nang on May 5.316
The Second Set of Battles in the North: the Defense of Hue and the Re-taking ofQuang Tr Province
All of Quang Tri was now in the North's hands, the first time in the war that the
DRV had gained control of an entire province. This conquest opened the door to Hue, the
imperial capital only about 40 miles away that the PAVN had tried so hard to capture in
1968. The 3 0 4 "h and 308h Divisions had already been attacking it since March, with the 1"
Division again holding them off in a series of battles in the foothills to the west of the city.3'
The 1"t Division also had conducted a major counter-attack into the A Shau Valley
on March 5, successfully airlifting into six landing zones and coordinating movement with
ARVN artillery and U.S. airpower in attempt to drive back the North Vietnamese. The 3"ri
Regiment of the 1" Division temporarily retook territory at the mouth of the valley, holding
it long enough to kill more than 200 PAVN soldiers who stood and fought for it viciously.
Massively outnumbered, the ARVN regiment eventually had to withdraw on March 16, but
the operation had clearly upset the PAVN's offensive timetable for Hue and was further
testament to the combat effectiveness of at least some parts of the South Vietnamese
military.318
The PAVN gradually moved closer to the city throughout March, until Hue itself
seemed on the verge of being attacked.319 This reality, combined with the loss of Quang Tri
province, and the panic engulfing civilians in the area, led Thieu to implement a long-
overdue command shakeup. First, Thieu removed General Le Nguyen Khang from
command of the Marine Division, replacing him with Colonel Bui The Lan, the more
competent field commander from the Laos operation in 1971. Second, Thieu removed
General Lam from command of 1 Corps, replacing him with the highly able General Truong,
the former commander of the 1" Division and by now the commander of IV Corps.32
Finally, after the loss of an entire province, the nature of Thieu's intervention had
changed: he was still personally involved in promotion decisions, but now he was following
best practices instead of worst, by firing the two officers who had been responsible for
disasters in 1971 and 1972 and putting competent, proven combat leaders in their stead. As
discussed below, these changes caused some significant, though not sufficient,
improvements in South Vietnam's battlefield effectiveness during the remainder of the
Easter Offensive, consistent with the predictions of the intervention theory.
In his memoir, Truong recounted of the command shake-up, "I flew to Hue that
very afternoon with a few staff officers of my own whose abilities and dedication had earned
my respect."321 Truong quickly established a new forward headquarters for 1 Corps at Hue,
he recalled:
It was staffed by senior officers who had solid military backgrounds, both
in the field and in staff work, a rare assemblage of talents from all three
services and service branches. I had wanted to make sure that they knew
Truong, Laster Q/ensie, p. 45.
'1' Truong, Easter (ensire, p. 62.
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m Truong, Laster Q0ensilv, p. 48.
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how to use sensibly and coordinate effectively all corps combat
components and supporting units in a conventional warfare environment.
I placed particular emphasis on developing an efficient Fire Support
Coordination Center (FSCC).322
The elevation of Truong, the formation of his hand-picked leadership team, and the
renewed attention to the developing a unified command structure buoyed I Corps, bringing
about "a restoration of confidence among combat units. They all felt reassured that from
now on they would be directed, supported, and cared for in a correct manner."323
Unfortunately, the only functioning units left in the area were the 1" Division and the
Marine Division. Nevertheless, Truong began to organize a defense-in-depth of Hue-the
type that should have been established in the first place by the 3"' Division around Quang
Tri City-and the Americans initiated a massive barrage of naval gunfire, artillery, and aerial
bombing against PAVN forces to the west. 324
During May and June, both the 1t Division and the Marines launched limited but
effective counterattacks from their forward positions. In the face of the Marine attack, the
NVA units were surprised, "resisted weakly and incurred extremely heavy losses."325 The 1"t
Infantry also retook two of the westernmost firebases that had been lost earlier, conducting
another round of carefully coordinated airborne operations to seize them. The Marines also
fought off PAVN armor-infantry attacks to the northeast, and Colonel Lan was promoted to
general.326
Again, however, it bears noting that U.S. firepower continued to play a crucial role.
In the month of May alone, for example, the United States flew more than 6,000 air support
sorties in I Corps. South Vietnam's own Air Force played only a very limited role.3-7 U.S.
naval gunfire was also massive, with as many as 38 destroyers and 3 cruisers committed to
the effort along the Vietnamese coast during the month of June. On a light day, these ships
might fire 1,000 rounds of support, while on heavy days the expenditure rose to as many as
7,000 rounds.328 To be sure, General Truong deserves great credit for improving the fire
support coordination procedures, including the emplacement of forward observer teams to
call in naval gunfire, which enabled the effective use of these U.S. assets. Nevertheless, the
fact remains that the ARVN were highly dependent on these sources of non-organic
firepower for their very survival, a fact that the PAVN history is quick to mention.329
Throughout May and June, Truong also oversaw an aggressive refitting and
retraining effort in I Corps.331 As he explained, "A two-week quick recovery training program
was conducted at each unit by ARVN and U.S. mobile training teams, usually at battalion
level with all officers and NCOs attending. This program included both the theory and
practice of marksmanship, the handling of individual and crew-served weapons,
reconnaissance and tactics."u Instructors also emphasized the proper use of the new TOW
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(tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided) anti-tank missile.332 Artillery units underwent
counter-battery fire training, another crucial deficit that had been evident at least since Lam
Son 719.333 The 3 rd Division was also reconstituted, undergoing a complete retraining
program. Many of the soldiers who had abandoned it returned when it was placed under the
leadership of Brigadier General Nguyen Duy Hinh.334
Having made these preparations, Truong launched Operation Lam Son 72 to re-take
Quang Tri province on June 28. In this two-pronged counter-offensive, the Marines and the
Airborne (who had been called in from Saigon) were to attack north, while the 14' Division
continued to pin down enemy forces southwest of Hue so that they could not join the
offensive.335 Unfortunately, the Airborne and Marine spearheads moved "slower than
expected," and enemy resistance became heavy.336 The PAVN defenders proved "ferocious,"
repeatedly interdicting the counteroffensives with infantry and armor attacks.m3 As General
Truong later recalled, it became clear that the North planned to hold Quang Tri City "to the
last man.... The enemy continued reinforcing; he was determined to go all out for the
defense of this city. The ARVN drive was completely stalled."338
Indeed, as had happened in Lam Son 719, the slowness of the ARVN offensive (or
in this case, counteroffensive) had given the PAVN time to reinforce. By September, the
North Vietnamese had flooded the area with their forces, which now included six infantry
divisions: the 304th, 308th, 324B, 325th, 320B, and 312'. For its part, South Vietnam had only
three divisions in I Corps and no additional reserves available.m39
As South Vietnamese officers readily admit, these forces soon became heavily reliant
on U.S. firepower to break up the building concentrations of PAVN forces. It was only after
two months of heavy B-52 strikes and U.S. artillery bombardments that the Vietnamese
Marines finally retook Quang Tri City on September 15. The Airborne also retook two of
the firebases remaining in enemy hands, while the 1" Division continued to defend Hue and
eventually retook several of the firebases to the west of Hue, albeit again with very heavy
U.S. air support.34
By October, MR-1 was stabilized. While the ARVN certainly deserves credit for this
eventual outcome, and in particular for changes in promotion, command, and training
processes, it also seems clear that these efforts would have been moot without U.S. support.
ARVN forces would not have lived to make these changes, nor been able to reap the
benefits of them, absent the United States. As the PAVN history notes, "Eighty percent of
our casualties were caused by U.S. air attacks and U.S. naval gunfire support."34'
The Battles in Central Vietnam: Tan Canh and Kontum
In many ways the fighting in the Central Highlands of MR-2 paralleled the course of
events in MR-1. The PAVN enjoyed initial successes, striking with deadly effect to overrun
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ARVN firebases and capture significant territory. This catastrophe, which threatened to slice
South Vietnam in half, prompted a better-late-than-never series of shifts away from worst
practices in political intervention, as had the catastrophe in MR-1. Again, political
intervention in the military never went away, but its form changed significantly. Combined
with a horrific onslaught of U.S. firepower, these changes proved just enough to drive back
the skilled and determined North Vietnamese. As such, the battle for Central Vietnam
provides some support for the theory by demonstrating that improvements in political
intervention practices in South Vietnam did result in improvements in battlefield
performance.
As in MR-1, the United States had retained little combat presence in MR-2 by the
spring of 1972. The ARVN 22"" Division, commanded by Colonel Le Duc Dat, had primary
responsibility for the northern areas of the region, notably Kontum and Binh Dinh
provinces. In early March, in response to evidence of an impending attack, Saigon also
dispatched an Airborne brigade and the tactical command post of the Airborne Division to
Kontum to shore up forces there.342
The ARVN 23"' Division held responsibility for the large expanses comprising the
rest of MR-2, including Pleiku province. In command of the 23"' was Colonel Ly Tong Ba,
the man who had commanded the M-1 13 unit at Ap Bac as a young captain in 1963. The
advisor who had overseen the battle of Ap Bac, John Paul Vann, was also still on the scene
in MR-2, although now as a civilian. As mentioned, overall command of II Corps lay with
Lieutenant General Ngo Dzu, headquartered in Pleiku. 3
The PAVN attack in MR-2 built gradually with attacks on outlying firebases in
Kontum province, defended mostly by Airborne forces (see map 11). On April 14, the first
of these was overrun in a well-planned infantry attack utilizing artillery, rifles, mortars, and
rockets. A week later, PAVN armor, infantry, and artillery overran a second firebase, also
defended by the Airborne. Much as had happened to the 3" Division as it tried to defend
Quang Tri City, the 22"" Division quickly fell back to a tighter and tighter circle around its
base at Tan Canh, to the northeast of Kontum city. To make matters worse, Colonel Dat
had neglected to hold the ridgelines to the north and east of the base, which made the
ARVN's position especially vulnerable. The PAVN soon detected this weakness and fired at
least 1,000 highly accurate rounds per day into the base during the last two weeks of April.44
On April 23, the PAVN 2"" Division, along with B-3 Front units, sappers, and tanks,
began to converge on Tan Canh itself. According to an ARVN history, "The enemy made
extensive use of the wire-guided 'Sagger' missile which disabled our tanks and destroyed our
bunkers with deadly accuracy. This was the first time our forces were exposed to this
weapon and its use caught them and their U.S. advisors unprepared. One by the one, the M-
41 tanks positioned in defense of the division CP [command post] were hit and disabled
along with several bunkers. Then the division tactical operations center took a direct
blast." 4
With this stroke of bad luck, all command and control of the 22"" was lost, and the
division's cohesion rapidly disintegrated. Colonel Dat refused to leave the destroyed
command post and was never heard from again. Aside from some ARVN artillery, only U.S.
airpower remained to stave off the PAVN attack. By the next day, PAVN tanks had
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surrounded the base at Tan Canh. The remaining forces of the 2 2nd "fought in utter disorder,
then broke ranks and fled through the defense perimeter."346 Vann himself barely made it
out by helicopter.
Overrunning Tan Canh was no small achievement, as the PAVN history notes: "For
the first time in the history of the Central Highlands, our forces had destroyed an enemy
divisional base camp located behind a fortified line of defenses."347 PAVN forces soon
consolidated their control of surrounding areas and continued pushing east toward Binh
Dinh province on the coast. Within days, the PAVN 3rd Division also had captured the three
northernmost districts of Binh Dinh, nearly cutting South Vietnam in half from its western
border to the sea. Meanwhile, the PAVN 3 2 0 "h Division continued its pressure on the
remaining firebases protecting Kontum city. They were soon abandoned, "while U.S. tactical
air endeavored to destroy the positions and equipment they had left behind."348
The situation was now dire, with General Dzu believing that Kontum could not
hold. Thieu decided to replace Dzu with Major General Nguyen Van Toan, the ARVN
Armor commander who was also serving in I Corps at the time. But events were moving too
rapidly to turn around the entire II Corps effort. Colonel Ba, the commander of the 2 3 'd,
attempted to take control of the situation by moving his division headquarters to Kontum.
He left all of southern MR-2, the area for which his division was normally responsible, to the
territorial forces. His new plan was to rely on Ranger battalions to defend the avenues of
approach to the city, while the 23" would defend the city itself.
Although this plan was essentially sound, a familiar problem of command and
control quickly emerged: Ba had no actual authority over the Rangers and Airborne, which
maintained separate chains of command, and even in his own division he had actually been
given control over only one regiment, the 53 "'. As a result, "Colonel Ba's predicament was
not unlike what General Giai of the 3rd ARVN Division had faced in MR-I ."3 It also was
not unlike the predicament Ba himself had faced at Ap Bac almost a decade earlier.
Fortunately, the situation improved somewhat when the Rangers were replaced by the other
two regiments of the 23"' Division, the 44"' and 45"', both of which now fell squarely within
Ba's chain of command.
Meanwhile, PAVN forces continued to conduct infantry-armor assaults on the
outskirts of Kontum City, pressing forward despite massive B-52 strikes.35" By the second
week of May, Ba had organized the defense of Kontum, sending the infantry and armor
forces of the 23"r to guard the northern and northwestern approaches to the city and relying
on territorial forces to guard the southern and southeastern approaches.35' An ARVN history
notes that morale was high:
The division commander [Ba] seemed to make a big difference. He
personally inspected the defense perimeter with his staff, encouraged and
provided guidance for his troops on tactical detail and shoxved great care
for them. The defense, fire support, and counterattack plans were
coordinated and rehearsed daily, drawing on the painful lessons learned at
Tan Canh. All units were given the opportunity to practice-fire the LAW
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antitank rocket until their troops became confident that enemy tanks were
not as formidable as they had thought.352
On May 14, the PAVN armor columns attacked Kontum with five regiments drawn
from the 3 2 0 th, the B-3 Front, and the 2 "d Division. The ARVN managed to break up the
initial attacks using artillery and anti-tank weapons, although the new U.S. Cobra gunships
swooping in from Pleiku probably didn't hurt either.353 In general, the 23"rd fought
considerably better than had its sister division, the 22"', at Tan Canh.
During the night, however, a PAVN battalion managed to slip through a gap in the
ARVN line between the 4 4 th and 5 3rd Regiments. "This situation became critical when this
enemy unit enlarged the gap and exploited its gains with successive waves of mass
assaults."354 It soon became obvious that Kontum would be overrun, and ARVN soldiers
prepared for the worst. But then, with perfect timing, two massive B-52 strikes suddenly
landed on the PAVN forces, breaking their attack.355
Ba was able to capitalize on this stroke of good fortune, tightening his defensive
perimeter to close the gaps yet again. He proved especially good at directing ARVN armor in
this endeavor, as he was an armor officer himself. Having stabilized his defenses, Colonel Ba
set about regaining some measure of initiative. With the support of U.S. tactical air and
gunships, he launched several limited offensive operations in the areas north and northwest
of the city within the range of ARVN artillery."356
On May 25, the PAVN resumed its attack with a large and accurate artillery barrage,
which included the use of some of ARVN's own artillery captured at Tan Canh. The ARVN
again managed to counter the attack, but again only with an extremely heavy reliance on
airpower. Indeed, "the situation became so bleak that a tactical emergency was declared in
order to divert all available tactical air and gunships to the area for the day"-this despite the
ongoing attacks in the rest of the country.357 An ARVN history reports, "Despite all the
efforts of ARVN troops and the firepower of U.S. tactical air and gunships, and even the
commitment of ARVN tanks held in reserve, it was difficult to dislodge the enemy from his
positions. He seemed determined to dig in and exploit his foothold in the city."3ss In
response, Col. Ba further tightened the perimeter, giving the B-52s more room to operate,
but the PAVN still fought for Kontum house by house.
Fventually, "the attrition caused by airstrikes and gunships finally allowed ARVN
forces to counterattack and regain the initiative. To dislodge the enemy, they had to fight
from bunker-to-bunker [sic], using hand grenades.3-9 But by May 30 they had dislodged the
NVA from their positions into the city."3," Ba got a star, and the ARVN controlled most of
MR-2 again by May 31. With a unified, more decentralized command structure finally
empowering a more competent leader, the ARVN, along with a massive dose of U.S.
firepower, had scored a victory.
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The Battles Near Saigon: Tay Ninh andAn Loc
Although not a major focus of the analysis here, the third major front of the Easter
Offensive was in MR-3. Here the PAVN attacked the city of Tay Ninh on the morning of
April 2, 1972, eventually converging on the town of An Loc in Binh Long, 60 miles north of
Saigon. The PAVN laid siege to the town, hoping to make it the capital of a new provisional
revolutionary government in South Vietnam. In the face of ARVN resistance, the attackers
eventually retreated from An Loc three months later, a victory claimed at the time as a great
success for Vietnamization.361
In fact, however, most analysts of the battle conclude that ARVN forces did not
acquit themselves very well at An Loc and prevailed only because of the United States-an
outcome consistent with the predictions of the intervention theory, given that most of the
units in MR-3 were subject to worst practices. As historian James Willbanks, a witness to the
events, has noted, "The performance of the South Vietnamese during the demanding battle
for An Loc [was] uneven at best," with looting a serious problem and many units collapsing
during the fight.32 He continued, "ARVN forces were not prepared for what happened at
An Loc. They were plagued by the same kinds of problems that had bothered them for the
entire Vietnam War: politicized commanders, inept leadership, and tactical incompetence at
the higher levels of command. The ARVN were victorious at An Loc because the American
advisers and U.S. airpower had negated the debilitating effects of these long-standing
maladies."363
Indeed, the U.S. role at An Loc was even greater than in the northern and central
sectors of the Easter Offensive, which is one of the reasons to be skeptical about how much
light it can shed on the question of ARVN or PAVN effectiveness. U.S. ordnance unleashed
on the PAVN here was simply horrendous-the PAVN's static concentrations of men and
materiel around the city provided ideal fixed targets.364 From April to June 1972, for
example, the United States flew 887 B-52 strikes in MR-3, which is equal to about half the
total number of B-52 sorties the United States later conduced in the entire 1991 Gulf War.365
Counting Navy, Air Force, and Marines Corps operations, there were 4,206 fixed-wing
strikes in total in MR-3 during this period.36 This was in addition to massive Army aviation
operations, which were also without precedent, and to all the other indirect fire provided by
the United States.36 Although both ARVN and American sources have criticized the
PAVN's ability to coordinate armor, artillery, and infantry during the attacks in MR-3, one
has to wonder how well any army lacking an air force could be expected to fight under such
devastating conditions.368
It is also important to note that U.S. advisors also were responsible for coordinating
all of this firepower. American observers and American forward air controllers were the ones
calling in fire support, aerial interdiction strikes, and re-supply flights.369 Moreover, their
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presence artificially altered the nature of ARVN performance, accounting for much of the
cohesion that did exist in ARVN units. As Willbanks argues, "These strikes inflicted
horrendous damage on the NVA, but maybe just as importantly they pumped up the morale
of the beleaguered defenders, who were heartened time and again by the devastation the
giant bombers inflicted on the NVA. Often, the big bombers were the only margin between
hanging on and being overrun."370
Not only was U.S. firepower vital in defending the city, but U.S. advisors also
virtually commanded some ARVN units in An Loc.371 Numerous advisors reported that
ARVN leaders simply lacked the ability to coordinate their own firepower and movement,
requiring U.S. officers to take charge.372 Moreover, Willbanks reports, "This situation was so
bad at several points during the siege that some advisers felt that the city would probably
have fallen if the NVA had left the road open to the south so the ARVN troops could have
escaped. In many cases, troops who did not wish to be there had no choice but to fight in
order to survive"-hardly a ringing endorsement of ARVN cohesion.373
It is important to note that this view is not merely an American one. A South
Vietnamese general came to a similar conclusion. While praising "the sheer physical
endurance of ARVN defenders," he readily admits that "the enemy's back had been broken
and An Loc saved only because of timely B-52 strikes."37 For all of these reasons, the
fighting in MR-3 does not offer a particularly good test of the intervention argument,
although the evidence from the battle there does not cast doubt on the theory.
Ultimately, the ARVN suffered more than 8,000 killed in the Easter Offensive as a
whole, and probably three times that number wounded, although the PAVN claimed to have
inflicted many more deaths. PAVN casualties probably topped 100,000. Both sides suffered
enormous losses of equipment, including in the North Vietnamese case probably half of
their artillery and tanks.m
Assessing the Battlelield Effictiveness of South Vlietnam
The Easter Offensive is often hailed as an ARVN triumph because the North
Vietnamese ultimately failed to take Quang Tri, Kontum, and An Loc (as well as the Delta).
But a close look at the evidence suggests that this "victory" occurred despite rather than
because of ARVN battlefield effectiveness, and because the PAVN were severely
overmatched by U.S. firepower. Most of the ARVN units actually displayed serious deficits
in cohesion and basic proficiency, as well as in the ability to conduct complex operations.
Furthermore, these problems were directly attributable to the imposition of worst practices.
First, overall unit cohesion in the ARVN continued to be rather poor. All three
sectors examined here-MR-1, MR-2, and MR-3-displayed numerous instances in which
the PAVN were able to overrun firebases because ARVN troops simply stopped fighting.
Indeed, this was generally the pattern by which the North Vietnamese achieved their initial
territorial gains. In other instances, ARVN troops used withdrawals or the chaos of large
battles as an opportunity to flee their units and abandon their equipment. At An Loc, ARVN
soldiers actually looted the homes of their countrymen. Indeed, many attribute what unit
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cohesion there was at An Loc to U.S. leadership and the lack of a physical exit from the city.
While there were clearly individual ARVN soldiers who proved brave and courageous, it is
impossible to avoid noting the serious disciplinary problems and deficits in basic cohesion
present in most units.
In both I Corps and the 23 rd Division, changes in command seemed to improve unit
discipline, convincing soldiers that their cause was not entirely hopeless. And in the 1"
Division, which had had good leadership and adequate preparation for battle all along due to
the differing forms of political intervention applied to it, cohesion was actually quite good.
Unfortunately for the ARVN, however, these were exceptions to the rule. Most soldiers in
the ARVN seemed to suspect that their leaders were incompetent, their training inadequate,
and their side unlikely to prevail, and they saw little reason to lose their lives in order to find
out for sure.
Second, where they did stand and fight, most ARVN forces exhibited significant
problems with basic tactical proficiency. The best evidence of this problem is actually
indirect: the fact that in both MR-1 and MR-2, when better officers assumed command after
the initial disasters, they immediately initiated not just refitting efforts but retraining
programs. For example, when Truong took over I Corps, he did not simply reorganize the
command structure and fix broken equipment; he initiated marksmanship training and basic
instruction in handling individual and crew-served weapons. With three PAVN divisions
breathing down his back and the imperial capital of Vietnam at stake, it is hard to believe
that Truong would have invested the time and effort in these endeavors if ARVN troops had
exhibited basic tactical proficiency during the opening stages of the battle. If he had to re-
teach soldiers how to fire their rifles and instruct artillery units to learn about counter-battery
calculations, it is reasonable to infer that he had detected very basic tactical problems in I
Corps during the initial phase of the offensive. Only the 1" Division is recorded to have
been tactically proficient throughout the battle.
One could draw similar inferences from Ba's preparations for the defense of
Kontum in MR-2 after the initial PAVN victories. His focused not only on improving the
command structure but also on more basic tactical activities like firing LAW rockets and
forming defensive lines. Again, the implication is that Ba had observed these areas to be
deficient during the ARVN's initial defense of MR-2.
Third, beyond basic tactics, the Easter Offensive presented a damning indictment of
the ARVN's ability to conduct complex operations. Repeatedly, ARVN forces displayed an
inability to combine arms, whether on the offense or the defense. The extensive need for
U.S. airpower was both a symptom and a cause of this problem. As one commander noted,
"Since U.S. air support was so effective and always available, ARVN tactical commanders
tended to disregard their own supporting weapons which were seldom used properly.
Eventually the tendency to rely on B-52s or tactical air in the place of organic fires and
maneuver became so commonplace that it inhibited initiative and often caused delays in
conducting attacks."'
More importantly, the fractured, overly centralized ARVN command structure
profoundly hindered the application of low-level initiative in support of a higher-level plan,
the real key to complex operations. In both MR-I and MR-2, the few good officers that did
exist repeatedly found that they had responsibility without authority. Command over their
forces had to be shared with less competent colleagues, or units received (poor) tactical
direction from Saigon.
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Ultimately, even when ARVN soldiers had been re-trained, they showed an inability
to actually aggregate their skills into larger operations. For example, Truong had difficulty
getting his troops to actually go on the offensive in re-taking Quang Tri, and Kontum nearly
fell because ARVN troops defending it allowed a large gap to open in their lines. Again, only
the 1" Division seemed able to conduct well-coordinated offensive and defensive operations.
This is not surprising, as it was still the only major unit subject to political intervention that
embodied best practices.
Assessing the Battlefield Effectiveness of North Vietnam
Although the Easter Offensive inflicted heavy losses on the North Vietnamese and
was a strategic failure, most of the fighting reflected well on the PAVN's actual battlefield
effectiveness. North Vietnamese political leaders certainly intervened in their military, but in
ways that improved cohesion and tactical proficiency. Most importantly, PAVN units also
repeatedly demonstrated the ability to conduct complex operations.
First, regarding unit cohesion, there were virtually no reports of PAVN units fleeing
the battlefield or abandoning their positions. Indeed, most accounts of the Easter Offensive
reflect the surprising tenacity of the PAVN soldiers, even in the face of tremendous U.S.
airpower. For example, they were still conducting human wave attacks against An Loc well
into the third month of the siege there.
Second, and more concretely, the record of the Easter Offensive is full of examples
of the PAVN's clearly demonstrated tactical proficiency. Reports from all sources describe
PAVN artillery barrages as highly accurate, its marksmanship as excellent, its anti-aircraft fire
as effective, its tank movement as generally adequate, and its anti-tank fires especially
impressive. All of this evidence reflects units that had engaged in rigorous and realistic
training processes, producing skilled soldiers capable of using their weapons.
Third, and most importantly, the PAVN demonstrated the ability to aggregate basic
tactical skills into complex operations at both the small- and large-unit levels. The PAVN
were generally able to conduct combined arms operations. For example, they repeatedly
proved successful in integrating artillery fires with infantry movement. Although the PAVN
did not demonstrate total mastery of armored warfare, displaying some problems integrating
the use of tanks with dismounted infantry, it is unclear how much these problems were a
function of actual deficiencies in the PAVN and how much was a result of the disorientation
and disruption caused by U.S. firepower. Either way, the PAVN's ability to conduct
combined arms operations was far superior to that of the ARVN.
Additionally, the PAVN proved able to coordinate the movement of a multi-division
force, another task that the ARVN had so far never executed successfully. North Vietnam's
sheer ability to get 14 divisions into the field and have them execute three separate corps-
level attacks on multiple avenues of advance-all while taking a massive pounding from the
air-reflects a unified, decentralized command structure. Moreover, in numerous instances
these formations proved able to react appropriately to both opportunities and setbacks on
the battlefield, reflecting an important integration of low-level initiative with a higher overall
plan. For example, PAVN troops quickly exploited the gaps that they found in ARVN
defensive lines around both Quang Tri City and Kontum. All in all, while the PAVN
performance was not perfect, it certainly reflected a superior ability to conduct complex
operations.
VI. The Final Battles, 1975
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Despite their devastating losses in the Easter Offensive and the restrictions imposed
by the Paris Peace Accords, the North Vietnamese retained an estimated 170,000 regular
troops and 30,000 other soldiers inside South Vietnam after the 1973 withdrawal of U.S.
combat forces.377 With the United States finally out of the picture, North Vietnam renewed
its drive to conquer the South, culminating in the final series of battles in 1975.
The overall contours of this drive mimicked those of 1972 and even 1968, with many
of the same units locking horns over the same real estate. But what is remarkable about these
battles is how rapidly Saigon fell and how little actual fighting occurred. Instead of devolving
into a stalemate or showcasing another dynamic series of attacks and counterattacks, the
battles of 1975 highlighted significant improvements in performance by the North
Vietnamese and exposed just how heavily dependent on the United States most of the
ARVN truly had been. Stripped of U.S. firepower and command structures, ARVN's
poisonous political-military relations exerted their full force, even on units that had
previously been exempt, such as the 1"t Division. The ARVN did not so much lose the final
battles as self-destruct, barely demonstrating itself capable of basic defensive operations and
frequently losing all semblance of cohesion.
The PAVN, by contrast, showed that it not only retained its impressive cohesion and
proficiency from 1972 but that it had fixed some of the deficits in complex offensive
operations that had been evident in the Easter Offensive. Although some accounts of the
final battles emphasize the North's numerical superiority or the South's shortages of
ammunition and equipment, close examination of the actual course of events suggests that
these factors were at best of secondary importance.r8 The nature of political intervention in
the militaries of the two societies continued to exert a powerful and very direct influence
over the course of events. And while it was not the only factor that mattered, it is impossible
to explain what happened in 1975 without close attention to it. Indeed, it is important to
remember that the fall of Saigon was in no way preordained and came as a surprise to those
on the ground. As late as 1974 the United States' own assessment indicated that the ARVN
was "strong and resilient," and Hanoi was only slightly more optimistic, predicting that it
could not conquer the South until 1976 at the earliest.m 9
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THE FINAL OFFENSIVES, 1975
North Vietnam South Vietnam
Battle summary
Tactical orientation Offensive Defensive
Plan Initial probe into MR-3, Defend attacked areas; then
followed by major attacks in execute strategic withdrawal
MR-1 and MR-2, culminating in from MR-1 and then MR-2;
final attack on Saigon defend Saigon
Weapons Armor, artillery, air defense Armor, artillery
Manpower 200,000, formed into 16 combat 300,000, but only 14 combat
divisions, plus numerous divisions and 2 independent
independent regiments regiments
Losses -16,135 KIA380 ~13,847 casualties381
Effectiveness summary
Unit cohesion? Yes No
Tactical proficiency? Yes No
Complex operations? Yes No
Confirms theory? Yes Yes
The Forces on Each Side
As mentioned, the North Vietnamese retained about 200,000 soldiers in the South
after 1973, up against about 300,000 ARVN combat soldiers (out of a total ARVN force of
about 1.1 million). Although these numbers would seem to have given the advantage to the
South Vietnamese, especially because they were on the defensive, it is important to
remember that these troops were spread out over a large amount of territory, offering a
variety of targets against which the North Vietnamese could mass forces and strike.382
Furthermore, the PAVN had built more actual combat divisions out of their manpower. The
ARVN had 14 divisions in total (the 1", 2"", 3 "' 2 2nd, 23"d, 5, 18th, 2 5t*, 7 h, 9 h , 21 ", Airborne,
Rangers, and Marines), plus several independent regiments and numerous specialty units,
while the PAVN fielded sixteen total divisions plus a larger array of additional independent
and specialty forces.383
The final battles in 1975 went through three major phases. First, the North
Vietnamese probed a lightly defended province in MR-3, known as Phuoc Long, in January
1975. Then they initiated full-scale attacks on MR-1 and MR-2 during March. Finally, they
returned their focus to MR-3, converging on Saigon by the end of April. Each of these three
phrases will be discussed in more detail below, with particular emphasis on events in MR-1
and MR-2, as these were the sites of the most intense action.
On both sides, the forces and commanders were familiar, with many characters
reprising roles from the earlier battles. General Truong continued to command the ARVN I
Corps (where the Marines and Airborne were now stationed), in addition to the 1", 2"', and
3"" Divisions, one armored brigade, and four Ranger groups. Despite this impressive show of
38" These figures are calculated based on Michael Clodfelter, fla/are andArmed Conflicts: a Statistical Re/Irence to
Casua/ty and Other F'nres, 1500-2000 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2001), p. 743.
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force, the ARVN were outnumbered in MR-1, as the PAVN had seven divisions there by
early March 1975, as well as several additional PAVN reserve divisions just north of the
DMZ.384 PAVN divisions inside MR-1 included the 208h, 312th, and 320B Divisions, as well
as the 3 0 4 h, the 3 2 5 5 and the 3 2 4 .
More importantly, the North Vietnamese had vastly improved their road networks in
MR-1 (and indeed, throughout South Vietnam), creating new lines of transportation referred
to in the ARVN as "Ho Chi Minh east." These routes essentially gave the PAVN internal
lines within South Vietnam, greatly shortening the distances across which the North
Vietnamese had to maneuver in order to get within striking distance of key cities, and
substantially increasing the speed of re-supply efforts.385
II Corps had new leadership, as General Phu, the former commander of the 14
Division, had been moved to command there. Despite his strong reputation as a combat
commander, Phu admitted that he felt unready for this new position, as he had little
experience as a "headquarters man." Moreover, his predecessor, General Nguyen Van Toan,
had not left II Corps in good shape. A close friend of Thieu, Toan "had turned the
command into a petty fiefdom, parceling out provincial posts and other assignments on the
basis of various personal gratuities.... Phu had been left with the vestiges of Toan's style of
command-an inept staff with almost no feeling for the troops."386
Phu's troops included the 22"d and 2 3r' divisions, as well as several Ranger groups. 387
The 2 3 " now had new leadership-Ba was no longer in command, having been replaced by
Brigadier General Tuong, about which little appears to be known. Arrayed against these
ARVN forces in MR-3 were five PAVN divisions: the NT3, F10, 320,h, 968th, and 316t', plus
fifteen independent regiments specializing in armor, artillery, antiaircraft fire, and
engineering, for a total of more than 75,000 soldiers.388
PAVN forces were led again by General Van Tien Dung, who as a colonel had led
forces in Laos during Lam Son 719.389 A prot6g6 of Giap, Dung was a beneficiary of the
legendary commander's belief that professional merit was more important than party status
in determining promotions." Following the Politburo's direction to assess the lessons of the
Easter Offensive, Dung had overseen a massive review and re-training effort within the
PAVN since 1973, with significant emphasis on improving tactical skills from the individual
soldier up to large-unit formations.Y As the PAVN history of the period reports:
The General Staff directed our units to make use of this time of peace in
North Vietnam to conduct a series of training sessions, each session being
three or six months long. The mid-level and high-level Military Study
Institutes doubled the length of training for their students; basic cadre
training was increased from one year to two years; and supplemental
training was extended from six months to one year. The infantry divisions
implemented a two-phase training plan: basic training for subordinate
units in offensive and defensive tactics, and combined training, exercising
114 Hosmer et al, 7The Fa/, p. 102.
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in various types of coordinated operations from company up to
regimental level. 392
Under Dung's leadership, the North Vietnamese also had held a variety of realistic
exercises emphasizing the use of combined arms warfare at multiple levels of warfare. "In
1974," according to the PAVN history, "units held many staff and command-level exercises
at the corps and division level to practice our different combat tactics."393 These included
special exercises by the PAVN 1" Corps "involving an offensive campaign operation aimed
at liberating a large city and attacking enemy forces mounting counterattacks on the outskirts
of the city. Command and staff cadre at three levels, corps, division, and regiment,
participated in the exercise."34 Clearly, while the nature of political intervention in the South
Vietnamese military had remained pathological, in North Vietnam the opposite
circumstances prevailed; political intervention in and oversight of the military followed best
practices, particularly with regard to promotions and training.
The Initial Probe in MR-3
In late 1974 the Politburo developed its plan for the conquest of South Vietnam
during 1975-6. A key question for North Vietnamese leaders (not to mention for their
Southern counterparts) was whether the United States would intervene militarily to rescue
South Vietnam in the event of imminent conquest. The North Vietnamese had seen in 1968
and 1972 that the United States could tip the balance against them, and they sought to probe
what the United States would do in the event of a violation of the 1973 agreements.
This experiment began in early January 1975, when two PAVN divisions attacked
Phuoc Long province with armor, artillery and infantry. The North Vietnamese had
purposely chosen one of the most "weakly defended" areas of the Republic, just outside of
MR-2 and very close to their own sanctuaries in Cambodia.' As predicted, the ARVN
forces in the area, part of III Corps, "offered little resistance to the overwhelming
Communist forces" and were quickly overrun as they proved unable to mount a coordinated
defense. Beyond serving as another "telling manifestation of the GVN's [government of
South Vietnam's] inability to carry out combined operations," the lack of U.S. and South
Vietnamese response to the loss of this province convinced Hanoi that the time for a
broader offensive had arrived. The stage was now set for the real attacks in I and 11 Corps."
The Battles in II Corps
On March 10, the North Vietnamese launched a multi-division attack on Ban Me
Thuot, the provincial capital of Darlac, at the very heart of the Central Highlands. Il Corps
forces were responsible for this area but were widely dispersed, with only one regiment of
the 23" Division actually defending the capital.3 Dung had built up a substantial local
superiority in numbers.398 Following a powerful artillery barrage, two divisions of PAVN
infantry and armor directly attacked the city from three directions, overrunning almost all of
3"2 Military I liston Institute, /'i/ctog, in I 'ietunam, p. 351.
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its defensive positions by the end of the day and bypassing what pockets of resistance
remained in order to attack targets in the heart of the city.
The South Vietnamese air force also did the PAVN a favor by accidentally bombing
the 2 3 rd Division's command post, severing the defenders' communications and disrupting
much hope of organized resistance. One Ranger group made it to Ban Me Thuot to try to
rescue the 2 3rd, but no sooner had it arrived than the Division Commander, Tuong, diverted
it from fighting to secure a landing zone for the evacuation his own wife and children.319 By
the time the Rangers had completed this task, the battle was over, and Ban Me Thuot was in
North Vietnamese hands.
Observing this disaster, President Thieu ordered General Phu, the commander of II
Corps, to re-take the city by airlifting another regiment of the 2 3 d into nearby Phuoc An.
But this process took much longer than either Thieu or Phu expected. "Even more
disastrous," according to the recollections of ARVN generals after the war, was that the
troops lifted into the area "'were not ready to fight' and began to desert in order to take care
of their families" as soon as they arrived. Instead of trying to retake Ban Me Thuot, soldiers
from the 23"' took off their uniforms and abandoned their weapons, hoping to blend in with
the civilian population and escape.41
Phu, who had previously had an excellent reputation as a commander of the 1"
Division, expressed grave reservations about the operation to those around him,
complaining that he had done it only because of Thieu's order and that he remained deeply
"pessimistic about the chances of reoccupying the province capital."u By March 14, Thieu
must have agreed, because his decision-making soon swung in the opposite direction: instead
of trying to save Ban Me Thuot, he told Phu that the remaining forces of the 23"' were to
abandon the two large provinces to the north, Pleiku and Kontum, and move to the coast,
from which they would supposedly later be in a position to retake Ban Me Thuot. Not only
was the 23"' to make this withdrawal immediately, but it was to execute it in secret, leaving
behind the civilians in these areas, including the dependents of the 23"'s own soldiers, as
well as the RF/PF forces. Moreover, the 23"I was to accomplish the withdrawal using an old
back road, Route 7B, that was heavily mined and had been in disrepair for some time.412
Thieu's orders were so bizarre, and so obviously infeasible, that even years after the
war many ARVN officers and high-ranking officials had a difficult time explaining them.
South Vietnam's Speaker of the House of Representatives later went so far as to suggest that
the decision to abandon the highlands might have been purely instrumental, aimed at
"creating a state of emergency in the country which would consequently muzzle the
mounting opposition" to Thieu's rule and possibly provoke the United States to finally
intervene. 43 Certainly, this policy-announced at a meeting of top officials at Cam Ranh Bay
and therefore known as the Cam Ranh decision-stood in stark contrast to Thieu's long-
stand policy known as the "four no's": no negotiations with the North Vietnamese, no
North Vietnamese, political activities south of the DMZ, no coalition government with the
North Vietnamese,, and no surrender of territory to them.
So entrenched was the four-no's policy that Phu's officers did not believe him when
he relayed the orders, and many expressed their preference to stay in Kontum and Pleiku
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and fight. Perhaps seeing their reactions, or experiencing the same sense of shock himself, or
fearing that he would be captured by the North as he had been after Dien Bien Phu, Phu
appears to have all but abdicated his command. In an unforgivable stroke of irresponsibility,
he took his key staff officers and simply left for Nha Trang on the coast, leaving behind a
colonel to execute the withdrawal of 165,000 men, with "no staff, no planning, and no
guidance from the JGS staff in Saigon, who themselves were at first unaware of Thieu's
redeployment order."414 When the troops heard the order and realized their dependents were
to be left behind and that their leaders had abandoned them, they lost all discipline. Local
forces began to riot, and the colonel who had been left in charge had to use his personal
pistol just to keep order at the airfield in Pleiku."5
Despite attempts to rapidly repair route 7B during the next several days, the
withdrawal quickly bottlenecked on the old road, alerting the population to their
abandonment and causing an avalanche of refugees to join the withdrawing column (see map
12). The PAVN quickly noticed this inviting target and began to attack it, civilians and all.
Years later, military officials present at the scene recalled the disaster and the trauma:
"Jammed with civilians and military alike, the road from Pleiku rapidly became a nightmare.
Unit integrity completely disintegrated as did all semblance of control."*6
Because the withdrawal had occurred so hastily, even the soldiers had little food to
bring with them, leading them to literally rape and pillage their way through the countryside.
To make matters worse, an ARVN armored unit trying to clear an alternate route was hit by
South Vietnam's own pilots, crushing any remaining morale in the withdrawing column. In
some cases, soldiers actually began killing their officers and readily surrendering to the
PAVN. "The despair was so great that at one point two or three guerrillas arriving at the
scene could make prisoners of a hundred Rangers," according to witnesses after the war.* 7
Ultimately, "only about 20,000 of the 60,000 troops that had started out from Pleiku
and Kontum finally got down to Tuy Hoa [on the coast], and these were no longer fit for
combat.... Of the some 400,000 civilians who had attempted to flee..., only an estimated
100,000 got through," and they were still trickling down by April 1.41I RVN officials later
called this withdrawal "the greatest disaster in the history of ARVN" and lamented that it
"must rank as one of the worst planned and the worst executed withdrawal operations in the
annals of military histor."419 The PAVN had certainly out-fought the ARVN at Ban Me
Thuot, but with his extreme centralization of command, President Thieu's interventions
managed to turn the defeat of a single regiment into what would soon become the collapse
of an entire corps.
Indeed, the quick pace of events surprised even Hanoi, where the Politburo soon
issued new orders to proceed with taking all of South Vietnam in 1975.4" With the 2 3 "
Division demolished, the PAVN forces were able to attack the 22"", situated in the
northernmost part of II Corps. Soon the 22"" was trapped from both the north and south,
fleeing almost literally into the sea by mid-March.4"1
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Meanwhile, the other provinces of II Corps quickly collapsed despite strong
resistance from the RF/PF forces remaining behind the ARVN. There was a total
breakdown in command and control of units in these areas, with several observers later
defining the basic problem as a case of "no one was in charge."412 Phu himself never
recovered from Thieu's initial orders to withdraw from the Central Highlands. After his
initial abandonment of his Corps, Phu later simply walked out of his headquarters, got in a
helicopter, and flew to Saigon. The other senior commanders in central Vietnam soon
followed him. North Vietnam controlled almost all of the highlands and the coastal areas of
II Corps by early April.413
The Battles in I Corps
Simultaneous with their attacks in II Corps, the North Vietnamese also launched an
enormous offensive in MR-1 during early March, led by the 3 24 "h Division. Under General
Truong's command, the ARVN did a decent job fighting off initial attacks both near Hue
and farther south in Quang Tin province, holding the face of the PAVN onslaught. But on
March 10, Thieu apparently grew nervous about the possibility of a coup in Saigon and
ordered the Airborne to return immediately from southern I Corps to protect him.414
Apparently, General Truong had become a little too effective for his own good-
ever since his success in retaking Quang Tri in 1972, Truong had enjoyed growing national
stature, and now Thieu was suspicious that he was a rival for national power. As it later
turned out, Thieu's fears were not entirely unfounded: "Ky, by his own admission, had
begun to approach other senior officers about removing Thieu after the loss of Ban Me
Thuot," and it is possible that Truong was among them.41 In any event, Thieu did not want
five divisions within Truong's orbit, despite the four-plus PAVN divisions threatening MR-
1.
Truong, shocked by the military implications of Thieu's recall of the Airborne, coped
as best he could with the sudden change. He moved two of the three Marine brigades in
Quang Tri down to Quang Nam to defend the area formerly secured by the Airborne. But
all of these rapid and unusual troop movements alarmed the population, causing them to
initiate a massive refugee flow south, similar to what had just occurred in II Corps. Indeed,
as news of the defeat at Ban Me Thuot and the abandonment of Kontum and Pleiku spread
throughout the population of I Corps, the panic worsened. Many near the DMZ believed a
secret deal had been struck to partition Vietnam anew, ceding the northern regions to
Hanoi.4'
By March 13, these fears proved half-founded as Thieu informed Truong that "he
had to give up most of I Corps," keeping only the city and port of Danang and the
immediate surrounding areas. Thieu described the new strategy as "light at the top, heavy at
the bottom": the ARVN would give up much of I and 11 Corps, withdrawing to fight from
the coasts and the areas surrounding Saigon.4m Soon, however, even this strategy proved
futile, as 2 million refugees flooded into Danang, a coastal city of only 300,000 people,
clogging the major roads in I Corps.
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On March 19, Truong tried to convince Thieu to reconsider his decision to withdraw
all the way to Danang, explaining that such a withdrawal was infeasible due to the refugee
situation and that it was better "to stay in Hue and fight" because he had established "good
defensive positions around Hue."418 Thieu eventually agreed to Truong's suggestion and
reassured him that the Marine Division would remain in I Corps as well, a critical point on
which Truong sought information for planning purposes. "After hearing this new decision,
General Truong reported he 'felt good'," like he could still sustain the defense of his region
for some time.419 Immediately after the meeting, however, the Prime Minister privately
informed Truong that "there were indeed plans under way to bring back the Marines."
Truong was "crushed" and filled with despair.420
Matters only worsened the next day when Truong returned to Danang, and the Joint
General Staff relayed a new and confusing set of additional instructions. In what remains a
matter of historical controversy, Truong interpreted these new instructions as telling him to
abandon Hue.421 According to JGS officers interviewed after the war, the message was
intended only to warn Truong that Saigon had a limited ability to support forces in I Corps
and that he had permission to withdraw from Hue to Danang when he felt it necessary. To
Truong, however, the ambiguous message came across as meaning Saigon would not
support the defense of Hue in the first place and that he must go ahead and withdraw to
Danang-an important distinction.
As several high-ranking RVN officials noted after the war:
This misunderstanding was but one manifestation of the serious problems
in communication and coordination that existed between the I Corps and
Saigon staffs. The JGS did not appear to comprehend the gravity of the
situation in I Corps, which it felt was being "exaggerated" by local
commanders there. One JGS officer complained of "inadequate" and
"inaccurate" reporting from I Corps, while General Truong, on the other
hand, faulted the "weak" planning support and command from Saigon.
He commented that when the Americans had been in Vietnam, I Corps
could rely on U.S. channels. However, with the departure of U.S. forces,
coordination was no longer "appropriate" to deal with the situation. 422
This debacle became somewhat moot by the next day. On March 20, two PAVN
divisions, the 324"' and 3 2 5 "', cut the road between Hue and Danang, "despite intensive
close air support and a determined counterattack by a Marine battalion rushed to the area."423
The PAVN also put pressure on ARVN forces north of Hue, threatening a total
envelopment of the city. In the face of these developments, "the cohesion of the South
Vietnamese forces began to give way. The I Corps Chief of Staff stated that 'everything was
out of control' and that the commanders 'reported back that they could not control their
troops, that the troops deserted, that they did not have enough supplies and that they could
not control the situation. They reported that they had to abandon Hue'."424
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As had been the case in the withdrawals already attempted, this move away from
Hue was a disaster for the South Vietnamese, and the PAVN history notes that "under the
pressure of our attacks, enemy troops in Hue collapsed into disorder."425 The Navy and
Marines that were supposed to provide evacuation for ARVN forces by sea failed to arrive at
the right locations on time. Many 1" Division soldiers were drowned in rising tides in the
areas where they were supposed to await evacuation, while others were killed by PAVN
forces because the Marines had not secured the rendezvous points as planned.
"Furthermore, command over the withdrawing troops was inadequate and, in the words of
General Truong, there was 'not good discipline'."426
All told, "less than half of the troops scheduled for evacuation... arrived in Danang,
and those that did make their way there were completely disorganized. Upon arriving in
Danang, the 1" Infantry remnants dispersed in an effort to find their dependents and were
no longer of fighting value."427 Amazingly, despite the JGS message of the previous day,
"Hue's abandonment apparently came as a surprise to President Thieu."428
Meanwhile, the battle was not over in the southern part of I Corps. There the PAVN
overcame the 2"' Division's defenses and cut all routes to Danang, splitting the Corps area in
half. The 2 "' Division was totally surrounded and had to be evacuated by sea. Only about
2,000 of this Division's troops ever made it to Saigon.429
With the 1V and 2 "d Divisions utterly dismantled, the PAVN's five divisions in I
Corps could now turn their combined might on the remaining 3 d Division, two Marine
brigades, and various RF/PF units in and around Danang. Not only were these forces
outnumbered, but the city behind them was out of control with refugees, looting, lack of
sufficient food and water, and nowhere near enough police. "Realizing the situation was
becoming unmanageable, and unwilling to stop the flow of refugees for humanitarian
reasons, General Truong urgently requested assistance from Saigon, both for transportation
to move the refugees out of Danang and for food and other vital provisions. However,
except for a few transport flights, no help was forthcoming."43,
Desertions by both officers and enlisted men increased rapidly as it became a
situation of every man for himself and his family.431 The North Vietnamese history of the
battle claims that all of the Marine units in Danang simply abandoned their defensive
positions.-1 Not mentioned in this history is that the PAVN also began shelling Danang,
including areas teeming with civilians. Observing the carnage, Truong asked Thieu for
permission to withdraw, but Thieu again equivocated and refused to make a decision. After
PAVN artillery cut communications with Saigon, "General Truong made the decision on his
own to withdraw."43
In one of the many great ironies of 1975, the Marines, whose recall to Saigon had
prompted much of Truong's despair, were virtually destroyed as a fighting force in the
withdrawal. Less than half the division made it out by sea. Similarly, out of the 12,000-man
3"" Division, only about 5,000 men made it to the evacuation point, and of them only a
42 Military I Istory Institute, Victory in / / etnia//, p. 383.
42 Hosmer et al, T/e I all, p. 109.
- Hosmer et al, T/e Fa/, p. 109.
428 Hosmer ct al, T/e Fa/, p. 110.
429 Hosmer et al, T/e Fal/, p. 110.
43") Hosmer et al, T/le Fal, p. 110.
431 Hosmer et al, TIe Fa/, p. 111.
432 Mii tary, History Institute, 'ic/oiy in Vietnal;,, p. 391.
m3 Hosmer et al, TIhe Fall, p. 111.
168
thousand could board the single ship that arrived. In an odd contrast to the many previous
years of high casualties, total South Vietnamese combat losses in I Corps in March are
estimated to have been only 1,000-2,000 soldiers. As the ARVN chief of staff observed after
the war, "I have to say there was no big battle. Only small engagements so the losses were
not much. Maybe a thousand, maybe two thousand. But not much because no big battles."434
The Battles in and around Saigon
With the rapid collapse of I and II Corps in March, the PAVN was able to turn its
full force against the remaining ARVN forces in and around Saigon. So much of the ARVN
had self-destructed that the North Vietnamese advantage in numbers was by now
overwhelming. As a RAND history put it:
Except for the two Airborne brigades previously withdrawn from I Corps
and the few units that could be reconstituted from the estimated 18,000
or so demoralized troops who had been successfully extracted from the
northern Corps areas, the defense of South Vietnam now rested with the
six divisions and two armored brigades and the various Ranger groups,
Regional Forces, and Popular Forces organic to III and IV Corps.
However, most of these indigenous units were themselves already hard
pressed and tied down by local Communist forces and could not be
disengaged to form reserves to meet the fresh enemy divisions moving
down from the north.45
As a result, PAVN forces were able to quickly converge on the capital, which had
only about two divisions' worth of troops defending it-a hodgepodge of Airborne,
Rangers, Marines, RF/PF, and stragglers from I and II Corps. But in addition to being
poorly organized, these forces were demoralized, ill-disciplined, and "no longer wanted to
fight."43 6 They stood in stark contrast to the PAVN divisions, most of which had vet to see
hard fighting and "were up to strength, fresh, and obviously buoyed by their enormous
successes in the north." Indeed, the collapse in the north had happened almost too fast for
the PAVN to fully exploit it.47
By the end of April, after overcoming some final ARVN resistance in Ninh Thuan
and Long Khanh provinces, the PAVN had assembled thirteen divisions on the outskirts of
Saigon, plus four more in reserve.4w On April 21, Thieu resigned in favor of the vice
president, Tran Van Huong. A week later, on April 28, General Duong Van Minh, known as
"Big Minh," replaced Huong, as he was said to be the only leader acceptable to the North.
Minh attempted to negotiate a ceasefire, to which North Vietnam responded by strafing the
presidential palace with captured South Vietnamese aircraft. With its overwhelming
numbers, perhaps as great as 4:1, the PAVN overran Saigon quickly in a mechanized attack
from five directions, targeting key government sites and facing almost no organized ARVN
resistance .43 On April 30, Minh unconditionally surrendered. The war was over.'"
Assessing the Battlefield Eifctiv'eness ofSouth ietnani
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As mentioned, what is so striking about the South Vietnamese performance in 1975
was how little fighting actually occurred. The ARVN essentially self-destructed, with such a
collapse of cohesion as to make considerations of tactical proficiency and the ability to
conduct complex operations almost irrelevant to evaluation of the campaign. In both MR-1
and MR-2-the two key arenas in which the ARVN had at least a fighting chance to resist
the North Vietnamese-ARVN soldiers repeatedly chose to stop fighting, take off their
uniforms, drop their weapons, and blend in with the fleeing civilian population. Although
even the best armies sometimes need to withdraw from engagements in which they are
outnumbered, the ARVN's retreats were so disorderly that most of the forces were never
reconstituted as combat units.
Furthermore, in both MR-1 and MR-2, the mass exodus began after the intervention
of President Theiu, overruling his field commanders and giving them unrealistic orders to
execute. This extreme centralization of command obviated the influence of the good
commanders who did exist in the ARVN and the preparations that they had made to fight,
particularly in I Corps. For example, Thieu's order to withdraw the Airborne and Marines
from MR-1 due to coup fears crippled the ability even of the very good corps commander,
General Truong, to keep his units intact and to fight from prepared defensive positions.441
Likewise, Thieu's absurd order to withdraw immediately from the Central Highlands
essentially caused his corps commander General Phu to give up. Phu had clearly
demonstrated himself to be capable in the past as a division commander. Although some
South Vietnamese officials interviewed after the war condemned Phu's behavior in 1975,
most officials believed the real blame lay with Thieu. In their view, "the withdrawal
operations should never have been left in Phu's hands in the first place." It was not
reasonable to think "that II Corps could withdraw forces already under enemy pressure and
preserve their morale and combat effectiveness, much less retake Ban Me Thuot."442
Furthermore, in both MR-1 and MR-2, the negative impact of Thieu's unrealistic
orders was further compounded by the subsequent lack of clear procedures for
communicating those orders from the President to the JGS to field commanders, and for
sending information about the battlefield back up the chain.43 Especially in MR-1, the corps
commander remained confused about when and where the President planned to withdraw
various forces, particularly With regard to Hue and Danang. South Vietnam's worst practices
in information management-a weakness that the Americans had been able to paper over in
previous battles-crippled whatever fighting power the ARVN had now that it was on its
own.
While one can speculate about what would have happened in 1975 absent these
worst practices-whether and for how long the ARVN might have been able to hold out
against the PAVN, and what sorts of costs it might have imposed on the PAVN in the
process-such conjectures remain just that. The nature of Thieu's political interventions
obviated the impact of any good practices he had previously exercised, leading to a force that
was fundamentally not cohesive and unable to resist the PAVN advance.444 As soon as
troops in the field saw their leaders abandoning them and realized the lack of competent
planning for their resistance, they gave up. The collapse in MR-1 and MR-2 made the actual
441 Hosmer et al, The Fal/, p. 112. The same conclusion is reached in Smith, The Siege, p. 175.
442 Hosmer et al, The Fall, p. 96.
443 Hosmer et al, The Fal/, p. 96.
44 Hosmer et al, The Fal/, p. 79.
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conquest of Saigon a foregone conclusion, allowing the PAVN to achieve an overwhelming
superiority in numbers which alone would have guaranteed that the capital eventually fell.
Assessing the Battlefield Effectiveness of North Vietnam
The final offensives illuminated an even greater contrast in North and South
Vietnamese capabilities than had appeared during the earlier years of the Vietnam War, when
the United States had been able to compensate for what turned out to be critical flaws in the
ARVN's battlefield capabilities and to keep heavy pressure on the PAVN. The PAVN
continued to demonstrate strong cohesion in 1975 and actually improved its tactical
proficiency and ability to conduct complex operations compared to earlier battles.
First, regarding unit cohesion, there are again virtually no reports of PAVN units
abandoning their positions, fleeing the battlefield, or demonstrating poor discipline.
Granted, the battles of 1975 did not offer the greatest test of North Vietnamese cohesion,
because the PAVN usually had local superiority in numbers and was essentially winning
from the beginning-a fact of which its soldiers were well aware and which buoyed morale.
Nevertheless, soldiers also had "high resolve" because they knew that they were led and well
trained by competent officers asAs the PAVN's own history described it, "All units
participating in the campaign had been well prepared and their morale was high."46
Second, tactical proficiency in the PAVN was as good as it had ever been, which is
to say, excellent. The results of Dung's intensive training program were evident, with
virtually all ARVN officials agreeing after the war that the enemy "had greatly improved his
proficiency in using his equipment, especially armor."47 Another example of just how well
honed PAVN tactics were came in the area of air defense, where North Vietnamese soldiers
displayed extraordinary fire discipline, reflecting very careful and specialized attention to
tactics. Reports the PAVN history of the campaign: "Our anti-aircraft artillery troops waited
until enemy aircraft dove down to a low level before opening fire," which made such fire
particularly effective.448
Most importantly, however, the PAVN proved itself able to aggregate cohesion and
tactical competence into very difficult combined-arms operations. The PAVN had mastered
the art of using tanks for maneuver, repeatedly demonstrating the ability to bypass obstacles
on the outskirts of major South Vietnamese cities and move directly to key targets inside, all
the while closely coordinating armor movement with infantry. Indeed, the PAVN history
notes, "Our infantry stuck close to and support our tanks while they overran enemy pockets
of resistance."4" They also repeatedly demonstrated the ability to coordinate artillery with
infantry and armor. 45"
Moreover, the PAVN demonstrated the ability to combine low-level initiative with a
higher-level coordinated plan. Although the Politburo had set the overall goals of the
campaign for 1975-76, the PAVN repeatedly showed the ability to react in response to
events, such as the quick collapse in MR-1 and MR-2. Although the PAVN leaders had
planned to fight large battles for some of the cities in these areas, they showed the ability to
adjust when ARVN units began withdrawing, and the PAVN soldiers instead pursued the
45 Military History Institute, Victory i/I Vietnam, p. 393.
46 Military History Institute, V ictory in Vietnam, p. 364.
44 Hosmer et al, The Fall, p. 65.
48 Military History Institute, V1ictory in V1ietnam,, p. 372.
44 Military I History Institute, IVictoy in Vietnamn, p. 372.
45" Military History Institute, Victory in Vietnamn, p. 371.
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retreating ARVN columns and disrupted their ability to evacuate by sea. As the PAVN's
own history put it, there was "unanimity of thought from the top to the bottom regarding
the opportunity we faced and the tactics to be employed," but significant room for
commanders to execute their plans within the framework of the overall attack.451 Indeed, the
PAVN history emphasizes that in 1975 its soldiers truly demonstrated "their ability to
conduct combined-arms combat within the context of large-scale campaigns"-the goal that
had been set after 1972.452
VIII. Potential Disconfirming Evidence: Instances of Unexpectedly Good South
Vietnamese Performance and/or Poor North Vietnamese Performance
Although the battles already discussed provide substantial support for the theory,
what about disconfirming evidence? In order to test the theory as rigorously as possible
against the empirical record, the research strategy deliberately sought out instances in which
the ARVN performed unexpectedly well or the PAVN performed especially poorly. While
this sort of evidence would not necessarily support alternative explanations, it would still cast
doubt on the intervention theory. This section therefore analyzes the four biggest potential
outliers in the empirical record: the North Vietnamese raid at Phuoc Chao in 1962; the
ARVN Operation Dan Tien, also in 1962; the ARVN incursion into Cambodia in 1970; and
the resistance by the ARVN 18t' Division at Xuan Loc during the final battles of 1975. The
analysis generally finds that these exceptions cast only limited doubt on the theory.
Phuoc Chao, 1962
Phuoc Chao offers an instance in which ARVN forces successfully repelled an
attempted raid on an outpost 25 miles south of Quang Nam, in I Corps, despite being
outnumbered. Guarding the outpost were barely one hundred South Vietnamese soldiers-
one regular infantry company, one platoon of the Civil Guard, and one platoon of Self-
Defense Corps.45 They were armed with rifles, submachine guns, heavy machine guns, one
60-mm mortar, and one 81-mm mortar. Fortunately they also had the support of 105-mm
and 155-mm artillery from two friendly posts nearby.454 The men at Phuoc Chao had wisely
constructed a defense of their post, building a triangular-shaped bunker connected by
trenches surrounded with barbed wire and "taking full advantage of the terrain" (see map
13).455
Still, on the day of the raid, November 25, 1962, the North Vietnamese massively
outnumbered and outgunned the defenders at Phuoc Chao.456 The attacking force consisted
of two PLAF regular units, the 6 0 "h and 7 0 "' Battalions, as well as nine units of regional
troops and militia, one intelligence platoon, and one demolition platoon. These troops were
45 Military History Institute, f-ictory in V ie/in, p. 393.
452 Military History Institute, Victory in V ietiam, p. 395.
453 Pham Chung, "Analysis of the Long Range Military, Economic, and Social Impact of the Strategic Ilamlet
Program," unpublished study for the Defense Advanced Research Projects AgencN, 1964, p. 77, available in the
Historian's \Working Files and Papers at the Center of Military History, Fort McNair, Washington, DC.
454 Chung, "Analysis of Long Range...," p. 77.
Lt. Nguyen Kim Tuan, "Phuoc-Chau: the Viet Cong Paid a Very Expensive Price for Their Unrealistic
Estimate," In/anh, vol. 54, no. 4, July-August 1964, p. 29; and Col. Bryce F. Denno, "The Viet Cong Defeat at
Phuoc Chao," Marine Cops Gaette, vol. 49, no. 3 (March 1965), p. 36.
456 Tuan, "Phuoc-Chau," p. 30.
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armed with rifles, submachine guns, light machine guns, 57-mm recoilless rifles, three 60-
mm mortars, three 81-mm mortars, and three heavy machine guns.4 57
According to documents captured after the battle, "The Viet Cong attack plan, as
usual, was carefully prepared. They knew all the details concerning the terrain of the post,
gun positions and defense constructions, the system of trenches, the strength, weapons, and
equipment of the defenders, the reinforcement route, and the capacity of the artillery
support of nearby friendly posts."458 The attackers envisioned a two-pronged attack with a
reserve unit blocking a third area that could have served as an escape point for the
defenders.
Nevertheless, the ARVN skillfully defended Phuoc Chao, driving back the PLAF
assault. First, the commander of the post, 2" Lt. Quang Trinh, correctly guessed that an
attack was imminent due to the odd behavior of local villagers right before the attack, as well
as the fact that the village dogs were barking all night.459 Then the ARVN received a stroke
of luck: in the early morning hours as the attack was just beginning, one of the PLAF
soldiers accidentally stepped on a mine, giving away the exact direction of the coming attack.
As a result, the North Vietnamese were suddenly "compelled to make the attack even
though necessary avenues of approach had not been cleared," nor had they emplaced their
heavy weaponry to protect the infantry's approach."
The Phuoc Chao defenders unleashed their fire, repelling the attack using their
organic weapons as well as artillery called in from the other two posts. 461 According to an
ARVN analysis:
Thanks to pre-selected fire positions, all BARs [Browning Automatic
Rifles] and machineguns effectively covered all essential avenues of
approach. The troops in the post moved along communicating trenches
and rapidly concentrated at the side which faced the strongest enemy
pressure. Simultaneously, upon request of the post commander, the 105
mm and 155 howitzers delivered heavy fire on enemy assaults waves and
reserve elements. Several artillery salvos were adjusted accurately and
exploded on targets located 40 to 50 meters outside the post.... All the
105mm and 155mm artillery fires had been prepared and adjusted
beforehand. Moreover, at the moment of the attack, the post commander
calmly made radio contact with the artillery and adjusted the 105mm
rtilry fire on the Viet Cong assault waves. The artillery fires broke up all
Viet Cong assault efforts.4 62
Indeed, the PLAF forces seemed to collapse once their initial plan went awry. The
ARVN analysis notes that the "attack forces were not properly coordinated. When his main
effort was brought to a standstill by our small arms and artillery, the VC commanders could
not reorganize their troops.... The VC commanders were in a state of chaos. No further
efforts were made to change the direction of the main attack or to commit the reserve with a
view to maintaining the momentum of the attack."' PLAF fire support was also described
as inaccurate and poorly coordinated, contributing to very high casualties and a disorderly
45~ (hung, "Analysis of L ong Range...," p. 77-8.
l58 Chung, "Analysis of Long Range...," p. 80.
459 Tuan, "Phuoc-Chau," p. 30.
'6' Tuan, "Phuoc-Chau," p. 30; and Denno, "Viet Cong Defeat," p. 39.
461 Chung, "Analysis of Long Range...," p. p. 78 .
46' Tuan, "Phuoc-Chau," p. 31.
463 Tuan, "Phuoc-Chau," p. 33.
173
withdrawal.4 Meanwhile, ARVN small arms marksmanship and artillery accuracy was said
to be excellent, with Lt. Trinh engaging in careful adjustment of the latter.46s
Clearly, this engagement demonstrates that the North Vietnamese did not always
perform flawlessly, nor was the ARVN always a force of bumbling incompetents, even in the
regular infantry divisions and Territorial Forces. The PLAF proved unable to recover from
the extraordinary stroke of bad luck they experienced with the early detonation of the land
mine, and the tactical leadership of Lt. Trinh was no doubt excellent, producing a very
cohesive and proficient defense of Phuoc Chao.
Indeed, the U.S. after-action report praised "the willingness and aggressiveness of the
individual Vietnamese soldier" at Phuoc Chao, as reflected by his high volume of fire, and
spirit throughout the defense." The ARVN had exemplified a "well coordinated and
integrated close defense plan" that received attention not only in official channels but in U.S.
and South Vietnamese military journals of the time.466
The very prominence of the events at Phuoc Chao, however, raises questions about
how representative it was of the overall fighting effectiveness of the ARVN. Why were the
actions of a mere one hundred men in a strategically insignificant outpost still being written
up and circulated throughout the army several years later? Perhaps because the battle was
such an outlier. The events at Phuoc Chao certainly show that there were exceptions to the
pattern of ineffectiveness displayed in the rest of the ARVN. Trinh's unit did display
cohesion, tactical proficiency, and the ability to conduct a combined arms operation on the
defense, despite being subject presumably to the same forms of political intervention as the
rest of the army. Nevertheless, the events at Phuoc Chao seem to have been rare and Trinh's
approach to command not repeated elsewhere.
Operation Dan Tien 44, 1962
Operation Dan Tien 44 represents another instance in which the ARVN conducted
itself fairly well and North Vietnamese forces seem to have disintegrated. The engagement
occurred in an area about 100 km southwest of Saigon on September 18, 1962. Reports had
indicated that two enemy companies were in the area, so the 7 "' Division Headquarters (the
same division later involved at Ap Bac in January 1963) sent two infantry battalions, seven
Civil Guard companies, a Ranger Company, part of a mechanized infantry company, and
several swimmer-support boats "to drive the VC into a killing zone by attacking from all
sides" in an area surrounded by canals.46 The ARVN also had support from fixed wing
aircraft, nine helicopters, and two artillery platoons (see map 14).
With this overwhelming concentration of firepower, the ARVN did manage to
intercept the North Vietnamese, killing at least 100 as they tried to escape. The three M-113s
appear to have inflicted most of the damage, with the other units in blocking positions.
Some of the North Vietnamese forces still "stood and fought as best they could with
machine guns, automatic rifles, and individual weapons" in the face of the attack.46s
"4 Tuan, "Phuoc-Chau," p. 34.
41 Tuan, "Phuoc-Chau," p. 35.
46 Capt. Graham D. Vernon, "After Action Report," November 26, 1962, p. 4, available in the Historian's
Working Files and Papers at the Center of Military History, Fort McNair, Washington, DC.
46- Memo, Senior Advisor (Lt. Col. John Paul Vann), 71 Infantry Division for Chief, U.S. Army Section,
MAAG, Vietnam, September 24, 1962, sub: After Action Report (Dan Tien 44), p. 1, available in the
Historian's Working Files and Papers at the Center of Nilitary Histoy, Fort cNair, Washington, DC.
46 "After Action Report (Dan Tien 44)," p. 1.
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Nevertheless, their resistance was largely futile, and the ARVN suffered only 3 wounded in
action while taking dozens of POWs.469
This engagement was clearly a success for the ARVN and demonstrates that its
infantry and armor units-even those that would later perform so poorly at Ap Bac-could
remain coherent and execute basic tactics under certain circumstances. But it is important to
consider what those circumstances were. First, the ARVN benefited here from a massive
advantage in both numbers and firepower. Second, the North Vietnamese were clearly
caught by surprise and were attempting only to escape; they were not trying to hold territory
as they later would at Ap Bac.
These two factors appear to have made the situation so favorable for the ARVN that
they were able to perform with cohesion and some tactical proficiency. Meanwhile, the
North Vietnamese still displayed unit cohesion but had serious problems in executing
proficient tactics. This outcome suggests that although political intervention remains an
important variable in explaining effectiveness, it is not the only one that matters. Extreme
values of other relevant variables, such as firepower, numbers, and operational objectives,
clearly overwhelmed the importance of politics in this engagement.
The Incursion into Cambodia, 1970
The ARVN incursion into Cambodia is often cited as an instance of successful
ARVN performance, one which could potentially confound the predictions of the
intervention theory.4' Close examination of the operation, however, reveals that claims of
ARVN effectiveness here are significantly overstated.
First, for the most part Hanoi chose not to contest the incursion, making ARVN's
performance look better than it was because it faced little resistance. Second, where the
North Vietnamese did resist, the ARVN relied heavily on U.S. fire support to respond.
Indeed, much of the actual operation was conducted by U.S. forces, making it a poor test of
the ARVN's independent capabilities. Finally, to the extent that some ARVN units did
perform well in Cambodia, independently and competently countering actual North
Vietnamese resistance, this seems attributable to different political intervention practices
governing those particular units-arrangements that bypassed many of the worst practices
seen in the rest of the ARVN. As a result, to the extent that the operation in Cambodia is a
valid test of the theory, it actually lends some support to the intervention theory.
The incursion into Cambodia during April-June 1970 had one overarching goal: to
end the North Vietnamese use of Cambodia as a base for attacks into South Vietnam.
Although both the United States and South Vietnam had itched to deal with this part of the
Ho Chi Minh trail for years, the situation came to a head in March 1970.4 That month
Cambodian General Lon Nol ousted his country's ruler, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who
had previously turned a blind eye to North Vietnam's activities on Cambodian territory. Lon
Nol now closed the port of Sihanoukville, through which the North Vietnamese had
regularly infiltrated men and materiel to the South, and demanded the removal of all North
Vietnamese forces from Cambodia. In response, the PAVN launched attacks on Cambodia
469 "After Action Report (Dan Tien 44)," p. 1 and subsequent unnumbered pages.
4" Brig. Gen. Tran Dinh Tho, The Cambodian icrsion, Indochina Monograph (\ashington, D.C.: U.S. Army
Center of Military History, 1978), p. 169-70.
4- This trail had existed since the French-Viet Minh War, beginning as a system of jungle trails and mountain
paths running from North Vietnam into Laos and then further south into Cambodia. Since 1959, the trail had
been greatly expanded, with approximately 50,000 troops devoted to running supplies along it and another
100,000 laborers contributing to its construction and maintenance. Tho, Cambodian Iicion, p. 18.
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itself, creating the prospect that North Vietnam might gain control over the entire country,
providing an even greater sanctuary from which to launch attacks on South Vietnam.472
Between this immediate risk and the long-standing threat from the Ho Chi Minh
trail, the imperatives for intervention grew. In particular, U.S. and South Vietnamese
planners concentrated on two areas that they believed had to be targeted in any cross-border
attack. The first was known as the Fishhook, a Cambodian salient that jutted into South
Vietnam about 50 miles northwest of Saigon and was believed to be contain enemy bases,
supply points, and the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN). The second area of
attention were known as the Angel's Wing and the Parrot's Beak, also located west of
Saigon. The North Vietnamese had launched their 1968 attacks on Saigon from the
permanent bases and training centers located here (see map 15).473
Initially U.S. forces lacked authorization to operate in Cambodia, so the first two
spearheads of the incursion involved only ARVN forces. The attack began on April 14,
when two ARVN infantry-armor task forces from III Corps raided the Angel's Wing area in
an operation known as Toan Thang 41. These task forces almost immediately encountered
resistance, which they repelled with the help of South Vietnamese artillery and tactical air.474
Finding large stocks of North Vietnamese supplies as they moved farther into Cambodia
over the next several days, the task forces occasionally encountered the enemy and
apparently managed to inflict considerable casualties while taking few of their own. On April
20, the ARVN IV Corps launched a second raid farther south, also encountering some
resistance and uncovering larger stocks of ammunition.475
Nevertheless, it was clear that for the most part, "the enemy had deliberately avoided
engagement" in response to these two initial thrusts.47 The North Vietnamese were picking
their battles, choosing to expend their combat power deeper in Cambodia against Lon Nol's
regime, rather than near the border defending their caches and bases. Their main objective in
encounters with the ARVN task forces was to escape. In fact, most ARVN casualties during
the incursion came from mines and booby traps, not from direct encounters with PLAF or
PAVN units.4- As a result, it is hard to draw particularly reliable inferences about ARVN
battlefield effectiveness from these two initial thrusts. Almost any offensive operation would
appear effective in the absence of a defender.
After April 30, President Nixon authorized U.S. forces to operate across the border,
resulting in three additional attacks into Cambodia. These included 1) an additional series of
operations by 111 Corps and the U.S. Field Force 11 out of MR-3; 2) additional operations by
IV Corps and the Delta Military Assistance Command out of MR-4; and 3) a series of
operations by II Corps and the U.S. Field Force I farther north out of MR-2.4 But these
operations, too, encountered minimal resistance.4u
ARVN operations from this period forward also were essentially joint, meaning at a
minimum that U.S. advisors were on the ground with ARVN units up to 30 km inside
Tho, Camlbodianl 1iculrrion, pp. 30-34.
Tho, Cambodian Incurrion, p. 40.
4 Tho, Cambodian 1ncuri:sion, p. 46.
Tho, Cambodian Incursion, p. 49.
Tho, Cambodian 1ncursion, p. 47.
4 Tho, Cambodian Incursion, p. 174.
4-8 Tho, Cambodian Incursion, p. 51.
John M. Shaw, The Cambodian Campa'i: the 1970 OQ/esive a)d Americas Ietnam [ar (Lawrence, KS:
University Press of Kansas, 2005), p. 79; and Tho, Cambodian IcurrU/on, pp. 75, 100.
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Cambodia and that ARVN units were heavily backed with U.S. firepower.4811 In fact, between
April 30 and June 30, "U.S. tactical air flew a total of 6,017 combat support missions, or an
average of 210 missions per day."481 This amounts to a flight taking off in support of the
operation about every 7 minutes, 24 hours per day, for nearly a month, suggesting that U.S.
airpower was more than a merely peripheral feature of the battlefield. All of this makes it
questionable whether one can discern much about ARVN's own effectiveness in these
operations.
Moreover, tactical air power was not the only source of U.S. firepower on the
battlefield. U.S. artillery and helicopter gunships were in near-constant use, and both South
Vietnamese and U.S. accounts make it clear that U.S. advisors were crucial to conducting the
actual fire support coordination.42 "ARVN's reliance on U.S. fire support coordination
meant it appeared better at such essential skills than it actually was," according to one
historian of the incursion.483
That said, even with extensive U.S. support, the ARVN did not prove especially
effective, displaying many of the same battlefield deficiencies as in the other battles already
examined. For example, one Vietnamese officer later wrote that the ARVN's tactics had
been "generally sound; however, problems developed in combined arms coordination,
employment of mechanized and armored forces, use of supporting artillery and other fire
support means, and first and second echelon maintenance.... U.S. advisors contributed
significantly to increased effectiveness of ARVN tactical units...."484
Indeed, many of the specific ARVN deficiencies during the incursion were nearly
identical to the problems on display at Ap Bac more than seven years earlier. For example,
the ARVN experienced significant problems integrating the use of M-113 APCs and
dismounted infantry, including Ranger units, resulting in situations where the APCs could
not fire without hitting their own soldiers.485 Airborne units were criticized as displaying poor
coordination and a lack of aggressiveness.486 ARVN infantry units did not demonstrate the
ability to correctly call in the appropriate types of fire support to attack different types of
targets most effectively while avoiding friendly casualties.41
Interestingly, the one ARVN commander who receives consistent praise in both
South Vietnamese and American accounts of the incursion is General Do Cao Tri, the I1
Corps commander. He was considered "very able."48, Tri receives credit for the cohesion
and tactical proficiency the ARVN sometimes displayed when North Vietnamese forces did
resist, particularly in the city of Kampong (ham, deep inside Cambodia and beyond the
reach of U.S. advisors.481
4'( Tho, Cambodiai lnmrsion, p. 57.
41 Tho, Cambodian Incmrion, p. 173.
42 Tho, Cambodian Inaurion, p. 179; and Shaw, (amlbodian Campaign, p. 56.
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But what was the key to Tri's apparent effectiveness? "Bypassing the much
politicized division commanders and their staffs, who played almost no role."49( Tni
deliberately formed his task forces in such a way as to evade the damaging political
intervention that the ARVN normally faced; each was led "by a handpicked and experienced
colonel," not by the divisional commanders and staffs promoted on the basis of political
loyalty as described in Chapter 2.491 While the evidence from the incursion overall must be
taken with a heaping mound of salt, the evidence from III Corps certainly suggests that
ARVN commanders themselves believed that their leaders' typical forms of political
intervention damaged battlefield performance.
In any event, despite the ARVN's uneven performance and the incursion's deep
unpopularity in the United States, the operation achieved its overall military objectives. It
devastated a major hub of North Vietnamese combat power, resulting in astounding losses
for Hanoi: 11,393 men killed, 22,916 individual weapons captured, 2,509 crew-served
weapons captured, 11,700 bunkers or other structures destroyed, and 7,023 tons of rice lost.
The ARVN and U.S. forces also captured enough rocket-propelled grenades to supply 144
full-strength PLAF/PAVN battalions; as well as more than six times the average number of
rockets fired monthly into South Vietnam; and the equivalent of seven months' expenditure
of PLAF/PAVN small arms ammunition.492
Many observers credit these staggering losses with delaying the Easter Offensive, and
indeed, defenders of the operation are quick to note that "the Communists were unable to
launch any significant operations from the Fishhook and Parrot's Beak for the next two
years."43 More broadly, the incursion probably also hurt enemy morale and helped shore up
the Lon Nol regime in Cambodia, for a time at least.44 Nevertheless, it was not the shining
moment of ARVN battlefield effectiveness often claimed, and in fact lends some support to
the notion that the nature of political intervention in the South Vietnamese military
remained a key constraint on performance.
Xuan Loc, 1975
The ARVN 18" Division's defense of the town of Xuan hoc northeast of Saigon
during April 1975 does constitute an outlier that the intervention theory has difficulty
explaining. While Thieu's extreme centralization of command caused the rest of the
ARVN-even very good units, like the 1" Division-to self-destruct during the final battles
of the war, the defenders at An Loc displayed a surprising ability to remain cohesive,
proficient, and capable of complex defensive and offensive operations. It is no exaggeration
to say that if the rest of the ARVN had fought as well as the 18"' Division did at An Loc, the
war might have ended differently. It certainly would have ended later.
For 11 days in 1975, a single ARVN division and a group of provincial forces at
Xuan Loc, in the province of Long Khanh, managed to hold off a series of massive
combined-arms attacks by an entire corps of PAVN infantry, armor, and artillery, inflicting
many more casualties than they took.4" The commander of the PAVN 4 t" Corps, a man who
"" Willbanks, Abandoning V-ietiamu, p. 88.
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had fought both the French and Americans, later described it as "the fiercest battle of his
thirty-year military career."46
Knowing that Xuan Loc was a vital corridor to Saigon, the commander of the
ARVN 1 8 th Brigadier General Le Minh Dao, closely studied the terrain before battle,
correctly guessing that the North Vietnamese were likely to use the same routes of advance
upon which they had relied in 1968. Dao created what he called "the meat grinder" in
response-essentially a series of interlocking fields of artillery fire through which the
invaders would have to pass. His artillery chief, Colonel Ngo Van Hung, was meticulous in
establishing these fields, ordering a bulldozer "to dig revetments to protect the guns and
bunkers to pull back into after they fired. He personally registered all of the howitzers."497
Additionally, "Dao expanded the existing system of bunkers and trenches not only
for his artillery, but for the city defenders as well. He wanted to render the NVA
counterbattery fire ineffective. His efforts ultimately were very successful, and he later
remarked, 'Their artillery could never find us."'498 Dao also stockpiled as much ammunition
as possible and "was not passive in the face of the increased communist patrolling" prior to
the attack. He used his own reconnaissance platoons to sweep the areas around Xuan Loc
and made a special point of flushing them from nearby hills that could have been used as
observation posts over the city.499
The battle began on the morning of April 9, when the PAVN opened fire with a
massive bombardment of artillery shells, mortar, and rockets. But the PAVN actually missed
most of the ARVN defensive positions, which were well hidden in their bunkers and
trenches.500 One history relates:
Believing the South Vietnamese troops would run as soon as the artillery
barrage lifted, the North Vietnamese soldiers confidently pressed forward.
Instead, the men of the 18th ARVN held fast. The eastern side of the
town was fairly open ground, and Dao had prepared for a combined tank
and infantry attack by constructing strong defensive works. The assault
elements of the 7t" would have to move uphill across open fields,
penetrate eight barbed wire barriers, navigate several minefields, and scale
an earthen berm before finally reaching the ARVN trench lines."'I
The ARVN successfully impeded the PAVN armor advance with coordinated use of
rockets, anti-tank mines, and even air strikes.502 As a PAVN account later noted, "None of
the assault waves... were successful. Our troops struggled with the enemy for control of
each section of trench, every house, every city block."33 Although some PAVN troops
eventually penetrated the city, the ARVN inflicted heavy losses on them for doing so. By the
afternoon of the first day, "the PAVN had suffered close to seven hundred dead and
wounded, the ARVN no less than fifty. The 1 8 " continued to firmly hold its positions. For
the first time in five weeks the ARVN had not buckled, but instead had fought back with a
tenacity that surprised even Western military observers.5"4
496 Veith and Pribbenow, " 'Fighting Is an Art'," p. 165.
49 Veith and Pribbenow, " 'Fighting Is an Art'," pp. 183-5.
49' Veith and Pribbenow, " 'Fighting Is an Art'," pp. 183-5.
499 Veith and Pribbenow, " 'Fighting Is an Art'," pp. 183-5.
5"" Veith and Pribbenow, J"Fighting Is an Art'," p. 187.
3"1 Veith and Pribbenow, " 'Fighting Is an Art'," p. 188.
'"2 Veith and Pribbenow, " 'Fighting Is an Art'," p. 188.
5"3 Veith and Pribbenow, " 'Fighting Is an Art'," p. 189.
5"4 Veith and Pribbenow, " 'Fighting Is an Art'," p. 191.
179
Dao then initiated several counterattacks, again pounding PAVN armor and infantry
with air strikes and artillery. The ARVN even managed to retake much of the city by April
10. These events repeated themselves several times, as the PAVN proved willing and capable
of continuing the attacks, while the ARVN proved adroit at continuing to defend and
counterattack.sos PAVN loses eventually grew to more than two thousand dead in four days
of fighting, while ARVN casualties were in the low hundreds.506
Dao eventually realized the need to withdraw, but he executed even this move very
carefully, ordering a deception operation by an Airborne brigade so that most of his forces
could escape without being detected. "Despite the dangers, the retreat by Dao and the 1 '
ARVN was masterful," according to one history of the battle. "Dao's personal leadership
again made the difference. Walking up and down the column all night long, General Dao
encouraged his tired troops to keep moving and to protect the civilians that were retreating
with them."07 They eventually made a successful retreat.
Clearly, the performance of the 18t' ARVN division at Xuan Loc in April 1975
testifies to how much costlier the final battles could have been for the North Vietnamese.
There was nothing inherently inferior about the South Vietnamese soldiers-at Xuan Loc
they displayed remarkable cohesion despite being outnumbered; impressive tactical
proficiency in operating their weapons; and surprisingly effective combined arms operations,
including the integration of air support and a very difficult fighting withdrawal.
The question, of course, is why this division suddenly fought so well, after not
having an outstanding record in previous years of the war and at the same time that the rest
of the ARVN was self-destructing. One notable difference is that, perhaps because of the
chaos occurring in the rest of the country at the time, President Thieu stayed out of the way
of the division commander at Xuan Loc. He did not suddenly withdraw forces from the
commander's control or order unrealistic withdrawals. Dao presided over a unified
command that had actually devolved to him the authority he needed to do his job. As has
been shown, the generals in the rest of the ARVN, particularly MR-1 (General Truong) and
MR-2 (General Phu) did not enjoy this arrangement in 1975.
Just as importantly, however, Dao himself was clearly a competent leader, one who
paid close personal attention to building bonds between his officers and his soldiers, to
tactical preparations, and to the execution of difficult operations.5"8 But while it is obvious
that "his strong leadership was one of the primary reasons his troops fought so well,"3)9 it
unclear why Dao was in a position of authority. Was it a fluke, simply the result of a random
assignment in the otherwise warped ARVN promotion system? After all, even a broken
watch tells time correctly twice a day. Or was Dao promoted on merit, suggesting that his
power was the result of improved practices in political intervention? In other words, it is
clear that Dao's traits as a commander were key to ARVN performance at Xuan Loc, but it
is unclear if Dao was promoted because of those traits or in spite of them. There simply is
very little information about the actual nature of political intervention in the 18" Division.
As a result, it is hard to know whether the defense of Xuan Loc constitutes evidence for or
against the intervention explanation, although it is clearly an outlier in the overall record of
the war.
Veith and Pribbenow, " 'Fighting Is an Art'," p. 193.
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IX. Other Explanations of North and South Vietnamese Effectiveness
What else might have accounted for the variation in battlefield effectiveness between
North and South Vietnam? Several alternative explanations seem possible, besides those
extrapolated from the theoretical literature on military effectiveness. Some focus on possible
additional reasons for poor ARVN performance, stressing the role of ARVN doctrine; the
problem of more general ARVN dependence on the United States (also known as moral
hazard); and the disadvantages South Vietnam faced in fighting on its home turf. Other
explanations focus on potential alternative reasons for superior PLAF and PAVN
performance, such as the power of communist ideology. Lastly, some explanations focus on
the possibility of more general contrasts between the two states, such as the degree of
nationalism, the role of differing organizational legacies, or the role of regional cultures.
Here I address each of these alternatives in turn, concluding that while some aspects of them
do have merit, they still do not necessarily provide a more powerful explanation than the
political intervention theory.
The Role ofA RTN Doctrine
Some scholars suggest that the fundamental problem with South Vietnamese military
effectiveness was the doctrine the United States imparted to it, which supposedly
emphasized large-unit conventional fighting on the model of Korea, rather than the small-
unit counterinsurgency force actually needed to win the conflict in Vietnam.51 Putting aside
the very considerable resources the United States devoted to building counterinsurgency (or
"pacification") capabilities among South Vietnam's Regional Forces/Provincial Forces, this
argument mistakenly presumes that the state of South Vietnam's conventional capabilities
was somehow irrelevant to the course and outcome of the war. Indeed, this narrative tends
to imply that South Vietnam was reasonably effective at conventional warfare, and it lost the
war simply because North Vietnam refused to engage in stand-up battles and instead won
the hearts and minds of the South Vietnamese population.
As the analysis of battles here has tried to show, the war actually took on a
remarkably conventional character after 1968, precisely because the North Vietnamese were
unable to win over the South's population through political means. By 1971, MACV rated 97
percent of villages and hamlets in South Vietnam as either totally or relatively secure.5I
While the reasons for this supposed pacification success remain debatable, it does point to
the fact that North Vietnam was basically unable to win the war politically or through
irregular conflict at the village level." From a relatively early point, the war involved large
force-on-force engagements in which regular units fought for control of territory.
In other words, if the problem for South Vietnam were simply that it had borrowed
an initially inappropriate conventional doctrine from the United States, that doctrine should
have served it well, especially after 1968. Going back to the 1950s, South Vietnamese
officials had consistently chosen to emphasize the ARVN's role as a bulwark against external
51" Cantwell, "The Army of...,".
V illbanks, 2 bandoning [i/etna, p. 122. For a discussion of some of the pitfalls of these statistics, see Wiest,
V'ietnam's ForgottenArmy, p. 179.
5 I Anthony James Joes, The [Var/or .Vouth I /etnal// (New York: Praeger, 1 990), p. 154.
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aggression rather than as a counterinsurgency force.13 While this choice might explain why
South Vietnam fared poorly in the war before 1968, it makes the South's performance after
that time all the more puzzling.
Ultimately, the problem for South Vietnam was not a mismatch between its doctrine
and the nature of the war, but rather that it was unable to implement its doctrine
competently in the first place. Many units suffered basic deficits in cohesion and tactical
proficiency due to the nature of political intervention in the South Vietnamese military. This
reality suggests that the source of South Vietnam's battlefield problems went much deeper
than its doctrine alone.
The Role ofA RTN Dependence on the United States
Other explanations focus on the more general legacy of South Vietnamese
dependence on the United States.-' Here the United States faced a classic dilemma: if it
offered too much assistance, it risked enfeebling its ally in the long term; but if it offered too
little, the ally would not survive in the short term. The result was that although the U.S.
escalation in Vietnam initially prevented a collapse of the regime in the South, the U.S.
presence itself eventually came to constitute a major obstacle to ARVN effectiveness.
Repeatedly, U.S. combat power shielded the South Vietnamese from the
consequences of their own mistakes, denying Saigon feedback that perhaps could have led to
needed reforms sooner. As late as the spring of 1975, South Vietnamese leaders continued to
believe that the United States would never let their government fall to the North, and,
indeed, even the North doubted that the United States would stand aside. The United States
also had a more general habit, noticeable in the joint operations discussed in this chapter, of
taking over the very tasks that were so essential to complex operations, such as
communication and fire support coordination. This tendency certainly did the ARVN more
harm than good after the precipitous U.S. withdrawal.
Still, it is important not overstate the legacy of dependence. Chapter 2 showed that
the detrimental patterns of South Vietnamese political intervention in the military were well
established before a large U.S. presence arrived on the scene. Indeed, it was the battlefield
results of these damaging practices that prompted U.S. escalation in the first place. The U.S.
presence may then have provided an impediment to needed changes in those practices, but it
is hard to argue that moral hazard alone explains South Vietnam's military deficits. Also, the
1 " Division had no less involvement With the United States than other divisions, but it still
performed much better in battle, suggesting again that poor ARVN effectiveness was not
necessarily the inevitable result of the U.S. presence. For all of these reasons, the political
intervention variable is still important in understanding the effectiveness of the two
militaries.
The Role of Honie Turf Disadvantage
Others might argue that South Vietnam faced an extra disadvantage in the war
because it fought on its home territory. In other words, the comparison between North and
South may not be a fair one, because the South had to fight on the same territory it was
supposed to be governing.
51 Ronald Spector, Adice and Support: the Ear/y Year:, 1941-1960 (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific,
2005), p. 263. This question is discussed further in chapter 18, especially p. 353.
5 4 Marc Gilbert, "The Cost of Losing the 'Other War' in Vietnam" in Wlhy the North Won the V ietnan 1ar, ed.
Marc Jason Gilbert (New York: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 153-199.
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The analysis above shows that one of the motives for South Vietnamese leaders'
worst practices was indeed their reliance on the military as a governing agent at the
provincial and local levels; after all, this is part of the argument about how worst practices
can arise, noted in Chapter 1. But one could just as easily argue that fighting on its home turf
should have made South Vietnam's military tasks significantly easier. South Vietnam had the
benefit of much shorter supply lines and internal routes of movement, while Hanoi had to
divert enormous resources to the Ho Chi Minh trail just to keep its forces fed and armed.
Moreover, history is replete with examples of armies that successfully repelled invaders from
their home territory. While one can speculate as to the reasons South Vietnam failed to do
this, it is hard to convincingly point to sort of inherent "home field disadvantage" as the
reason.
One can certainly imagine that had the ARVN been fighting a completely
expeditionary war, its ability to be distracted by domestic governance and its potential to
pose a coup threat to the regime in Saigon would have been substantially less. In this sense,
South Vietnamese "incumbency" may have constituted a sort of precondition to the
adoption of worst practices in this particular case. At the same time, however, even if the
PAVN had been fighting the war on its home turf, it seems doubtful it would have suddenly
adopted worst practices in political intervention. In fact, it is important to remember that the
PAVN did have to defend its homeland against massive U.S. bombing campaigns at the
same it was fighting in the south, and indeed, it had large military forces stationed in the
north. Yet it still never adopted worst practices. As a result, it is important not to overstate
the role of any "home field disadvantage" as a deterministic cause of either worst practices
or ineffectiveness more broadly.
The Role of Communist Ideology
Other studies emphasize the role of communist ideology in motivating PAVN and
PLAF soldiers and also in winning over the population of South Vietnam.'15 According to
this argument, the primary driver of PLAF and PAVN effectiveness was the regime's
ideological apparatus, which instilled incredible loyalty and inspired immense sacrifice.
Certainly, the North Vietnamese themselves must have believed that their ideology
had power, because they invested considerable time in dispensing it to their civilian
population and their soldiers. Nevertheless, as Chapter 2 demonstrated, the PLAF and
PAVN devoted considerably less time to political indoctrination of soldiers than often
assumed, and, when push came to shove, ideology and party credentials almost always to a
backseat to rigorous military training.
Furthermore, while communist ideology might help explain soldier motivation and,
in turn, some aspects of unit cohesion, an army cannot propagandize its way to competence
in basic tactics and complex operations. The development of these skills requires training,
good officers, appropriate command structures, and solid information management-all of
which Hanoi repeatedly prioritized. Even Douglas Pike, one of the foremost historians of
Vietnam and not one to readily dismiss the overall importance of communism in the war,
notes the tautology and illogic of explanations that over-emphasize these variables in
explaining the fighting prowess of North Vietnam. Pike is worth quoting at length on this
pont:
\'illiam Duiker, Sacred War: Nationa/ism and Rero/ntion, in a Dilided Vietniam (New York: McGraw Hill, 1995),
especially chapter 7.
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Americans and others often assumed that the NLF army members were
fanatics. Because they performed well in combat, it was argued, they were
highly motivated, which meant dedication to an ideological cause. Thus
the search was for the essence of this belief. It proved elusive, largely
because it did not exist. The best of the military units-the Main Force
units-were highly effective because they were composed of
professionals. These were not young green Vietnamese farmers, only
recently introduced to the rifle, but experienced guerillas who had been
fighting most of their adult lives. What impelled them was not ideology so
much as professional competence, much like the United States Marine of
the French Foreign Legionnaire. The men in the best of these units were
very good; their discipline was superb; they know how to use camouflage
well, a requirement for survival; they were well skilled in small-unit tactics,
especially the ambush in its many variations; they trained hard, rehearsed,
and practiced attacks until letter perfect, and then they fought hard. Their
mystique should be attributed chiefly to a unit esprit de corps that stemmed
from the consensus that each man in the unit was a superior and vastly
experienced professional. 56
Additionally, the evidence from South Vietnam shows that when Saigon adopted
best practices toward particular units like the 1" Division, those units fought much better,
too, despite lacking communist indoctrination. While this does not prove that ideology was
irrelevant to North Vietnamese fighting power, it again suggests that more mundane
variables may have been doing much of the heavy causal lifting.
Finally, the notion that the government of South Vietnam fell because its people
were ultimately won over by communism is simply wrong. First, although many South
Vietnamese may not have felt a deep affinity for their own government, many were still
deeply anti-communist, as the repeated refugee flows in the face of all of the major North
Vietnamese advances demonstrated. Despite the many desertions that plagued the South
Vietnamese military, for example, virtually none of them resulted in actual defections to the
North, and surveys repeatedly demonstrated that public support for communism was low.sc
While some aspects of the communist program, such as social justice and the demotion of
landed elites, clearly appealed to the peasantry, the fact remains that Hanoi had to rely on
highly coercive tactics to get many peasants to support the insurgency.58 Meanwhile, Hanoi
was never able to spark urban uprisings against the South Vietnamese government either-
not in 1968, not in 1972, not even in1975.51> While one cannot dismiss the role of
communism, it is worth noting that North Vietnam had to win the war militarily through a
conventional assault precisely because it was unable to use the power of ideology alone to
achieve its goals.
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The Role of Nationalism
Nationalism is another factor often cited in explanations of the varying fighting
power of North and South Vietnam. According to this perspective on the war, the North
fought better because only Hanoi was able to claim the nationalist mantle of independence,
while South Vietnam appeared to be a puppet regime tainted by its association with the
United States.
Nationalism was an undeniable advantage for North Vietnam, one that Ho and his
followers carefully cultivated throughout their decades of revolutionary struggle. The key
question, of course, is how did nationalism impact events on the battlefield? It probably
helped guarantee North Vietnam a steady supply of manpower, but, as we have seen, a
shortage of manpower was not the primary driver of South Vietnam's effectiveness
problems during the war.
More importantly, perhaps, nationalism may have helped North Vietnamese society
deliver more motivated soldiers to the PLAF and PAVN, potentially bolstering unit
cohesion. By changing the way that soldiers conceived their interests, nationalism also could
have made these soldiers more willing to conduct dangerous tactics or more able to perform
difficult operations away from direct supervision by their officers.20
No doubt PAVN soldiers exhibited an unusually strong sense of their normative
obligations to perform military service. But we have seen that South Vietnam was also able
to generate very motivated soldiers capable of fighting cohesively and skillfully when the
nature of political intervention in those units were more like that in North Vietnam. Indeed,
even in many cases where cohesion disintegrated, as in 1975, this problem seemed more
attributable to the highly pathological ARVN command structure and the officers who ran it
than to the political views of the average soldier. This does not mean that nationalism did
not provide a boost to the North Vietnamese side, but it does suggest that nationalism is not
necessarily always required for battlefield effectiveness.
Still, nationalism may have conferred its biggest advantage on Hanoi indirectly, by
convincing the North Vietnamese that their regime was internally secure and that worst
practices in political intervention were unnecessary. Likewise, perhaps if South Vietnam's
leaders believed their national project had been more successful, they would have been more
likely to treat all of the ARVN the way they treated the 1" Division. These are reasonable
inferences, but because they involve the personal perceptions and judgments of leaders, it is
hard to know whether they are correct. Nationalism or leaders' perceptions of nationalism
may have mattered, but at the end of the day one of the primary mechanisms through which
differences in nationalism manifested themselves may have been in the nature of political
intervention in the militaries of the two states. This possibility merits additional attention in
further research.
The Role of/Organizational Legacies
Beyond specific arguments about communism or nationalism, one could also
generally posit that the entire course of the war was determined long before armed struggle
began, because of organizational legacies dating to the pre-war period. In other words, the
very processes by which North and South Vietnam came into being arguably exerted
powerful effects on their subsequent abilities to build and sustain effective military
organizations.
This gencral logic d -raws on john Lynn, The Bayonets of the Republic: Alotivationi and Tactics in the A rmy of
Re'o/nltionary Flance, 1791-94 (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1984).
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After all, the French had killed off most credible, non-communist nationalists who
struggled for revolution, leaving the Vietnamese with only two choices by the 1950s. On one
side were the communists, the only revolutionary group that had evaded French repression
and gained experience and credibility in the process. On the other side were the privileged
Vietnamese elite forming the nucleus of the Saigon regime, most of whom had either
actively collaborated with the French or sat on the sidelines in the struggle for
independence.s52 One can certainly imagine why many Vietnamese would have preferred the
former over the latter, especially since Hanoi deliberately avoided emphasizing its
communist ambitions, stressing themes of independence and unification instead.
Similarly, the revolutionary struggle had endowed Hanoi with a vast and
sophisticated political network through both South and North Vietnam, providing ready-
made infrastructure for its later armed struggle.22 The regime in Saigon could draw on no
such base. The units that went on to form the PAVN also had gained significant combat
experience fighting the French.523 It is important to remember, for example, that the famous
French defeat Dien Bien Phu occurred in the north, not the south.
All of these facts suggest that the past significantly influenced the fighting power that
the two states later generated. At the same time, however, it can be misleading to tell a "just
so" story with the benefit of hindsight. North Vietnam was not born with a ready-made
fighting organization. Recently uncovered historical evidence emphasizes just how difficult
the late 1950s actually were for Hanoi, precisely because of the ways in which it had
conducted the revolutionary struggle against the French. Its united front strategy had created
such a broad movement that the result was "organizational anarchy" that Hanoi spent years
trying to overcome through massive purges in the late 1950s. The leadership in Hanoi was
also wracked with internal divisions about how to build socialism in Vietnam and whether to
prioritize reforms at home or the struggle for unification with the south.-52 North Vietnam
was not a ready-made "organizational weapon" as sometimes depicted.25
At the same time, Diem was highly effective in decimating Hanoi's infrastructure in
the South in the mid-1950s, arresting and executing many with only the loosest connection
to communism.26 Although these sweeps ultimately created more problems than they solved
for Saigon, they also illustrate that North Vietnam's supposed organizational advantages
from the war against the French did not go unchallenged on southern territory. Indeed, party
leaders fretted that their organization had been nearly destroyed in the south during this
period.52
In short, it is hard to look at the scene in the late 1950s and believe that victory was
inevitable for the North, especially in light of the infusion of American aid flowing to Saigon
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at the time. One could imagine the story turning out very differently had South Vietnamese
leaders made different choices, including choices about intervention in the military-choices
that they did, in fact, make with respect to the 1 t Division. This is not to say that the past
did not matter in shaping their choices, only that events in the late 1950s were still
contingent and subject to agency on both sides. As such, the theory of political intervention
still seems relevant in explaining the course of subsequent events.
The Role of Regional Culture
Lastly, one might suppose to some sort of other North-South cultural difference
could explain the variation in military performance between the two sides. For example, is it
possible that the ARVN did not train realistically because of some sort of regional norm
against public humiliation or failure? Or that the PLAF and PAVN benefited from a
northern culture that lacked these concerns and was therefore better able to embrace
communist practices such as the self-criticism session?
While not beyond the realm of possibility, the research here uncovered little evidence
of this sort of divide. Many of Hanoi's leaders had actually been born and raised in the
south. It is true that Ho Chi Minh and General Giap were northerners, for example, but
other influential figures, such as Ho's successor Le Duan, and General Nguyen Chi Thanh,
had been born in the south. 528As such, Hanoi was far from immune to any "southern"
influences; quite the contrary. Likewise, the south was far from immune to "northern"
influences, as nearly a million residents from the north had fled south in 1954. In short, by
the 1950s there had been substantial mixing of whatever regional cultures might have
existed, suggesting that such norms were unlikely to have exerted systematic influence on the
military performance of either side by the 1960s and 1970s.
X. Conclusions and Summary
This chapter sought to test the validity of the predictions generated in Chapter 2
from the theory of political intervention outlined in Chapter 1. First, the evidence from the
battles showed that there was, in general, significant cross-national variation in effectiveness
between North and South Vietnam, in addition to significant variation within the ARVN
itself. The PLAF and PAVN demonstrated unit cohesion, tactical proficiency, and an ability
to conduct complex operations much more consistently than did the ARVN. These facts
alone suggest that the existing explanations of military effectiveness focused on the roles of
wealth, regime type, culture and society, and civilian control cannot adequately account for
all the observed variation. North and South Vietnam were very closely matched along these
broad, static dimensions, making them implausible candidates to explain the divergence the
two states displayed on the battlefield.
Second, the battlefield evidence generally provided strong support to the predictions
needed to affirmatively confirm the theory of political intervention. Regular ARVN units,
including infantry divisions, the airborne, the Rangers, the Marines, and the armor
squadrons, usually performed poorly, often demonstrating virtually no effectiveness. This
trend appeared clearly in the battles at Ap Bac, at Binh Gia, during the Tet Offensive, in
Laos, during the Easter Offensive, and in the final offensives. Moreover, the reasons for
these units' poor performance were clearly tied to the way that South Vietnamese political
2 Brigham, "WVhy the South," in 11hy the North, ed. Gilbert, [Why the North, pp. 101, 108.
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leaders intervened in them with respect to promotions, training, command, and information
management.
By contrast, where the nature of political intervention varied within the ARVN, so
did battlefield effectiveness. Evidence from the battle for the Citadel at Hue in 1968, the
invasion of Laos in 1971, and the response to the Easter Offensive in 1972 all showed that
the ARVN 1" Division, including the Hac Bao Company, displayed excellent effectiveness.
Frankly, it would have been very difficult for an outside observer to tell which forces were
North Vietnamese and which were South Vietnamese based on the 1" Division's
performance in these battles. The 1" Division's effectiveness shows that there was nothing
inherently inferior about ARVN forces. Using essentially the same human and material
resources as the rest of the South Vietnamese military-and facing the same set of
disadvantages as well-the 14 Division generated significantly more fighting power because
it was subject to best rather than worst practices in political intervention.
Scattered evidence from other units is also suggestive in this regard. For example,
changes in leadership, aggressive re-training, and shifts in command led to at least some
observable improvements in the performance of I Corps as a whole, as well as the 23"
Division, after the initial losses in the Easter Offensive. While these units did not radically
transform over night, they did fight better than before. In combination with the evidence
from the 1" Division, the improvements again show that there was nothing inevitable about
South Vietnam's battlefield deficits. Where political intervention began to move in the right
direction, there were commensurate improvements in effectiveness. These speak to how
differently the whole war might have turned out, had South Vietnamese leaders believed that
they could or should different forms of political intervention.
Meanwhile, PAVN and PLAF units consistently performed very well in all of the
battles examined, displaying good cohesion, tactical proficiency, and a steadily improving
ability to conduct complex operations. This is not to say that North Vietnam had no military
shortcomings. Particularly in the war with the Americans, Hanoi showed a willingness to
accept that casualties that was often counterproductive. Nevertheless, what successes the
North did enjoy were, again, clearly tied at least in part to the very different political
intervention practices adopted in North Vietnam. Furthermore, they speak to just how
different non-democratic regimes can be, even when they have similar post-colonial legacies,
similar cultures, similar levels of economic development, and militaries that are subject to
frequent political intervention.
Lastly, close examination of the battles detected minimal disconfirming evidence.
There were virtually no cases of ineffectiveness in the PLAF/PAVN units. Conversely, in
only a handful of instances did other ARVN units besides the I" Division demonstrate even
minimal effectiveness. For example, the Marines did show some surprising cohesion in Laos
in 1971, and the 18 ,h Division demonstrated surprising ferocity and competence at Xuan Loc
in 1975. But beyond these exceptions, most seemingly surprising instances of ARVN
effectiveness turned out not to be very surprising at all-in every case it turned out that they
resulted from the avoidance, either deliberately or by chance, of the political intervention
practices typical in the ARVN. Probably the strongest evidence to cast doubt on the theory
is that the 1 t Division did not fight better in 1975.
Still, overall, the evidence from Vietnam suggests that the political intervention
theory has substantial explanatory power. Although imperfect, it does a much better job than
the existing theories explaining both the cross-national and within-countrv variation
observed in the North and South Vietnamese cases. lndeed, the differences in political
intervention in the militaries of North and South Vietnam go a long way toward explaining
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variation in the fighting power each army was able to generate from its national resources.
As such, the theory of political intervention merits further testing-a task addressed in
Chapters 4 and 5.
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CHAPTER 4
Political Intervention in the Militaries of Iraq and Iran
During the period 1980-1988, Iran and Iraq fought one of the largest and bloodiest
land wars of the twentieth century, a war that ended with hundreds of thousands of people
dead and nearly a million more wounded, with hundreds of billions of dollars diverted from
the economies of both sides. Despite producing virtually no change in the territorial holdings
of either belligerent, the war, by its sheer persistence and scale, fundamentally reshaped the
politics of the Middle East and lead to profound shifts in U.S. foreign policy.'
To name just a few of its consequences, the war helped solidify the Iranian
revolution while deepening Iran's diplomatic isolation, producing a conundrum that the
international community has struggled ever since to resolve. The war provided a firm
rationale for the already growing U.S. conventional military presence in the region-the
embryo of what became U.S. Central Command. The war made possible the 1986 Iran-
Contra scandal, which so damaged U.S. credibility with its Gulf allies that the United States
felt pressure to expand its naval protection of their shipping in 1987, protection that has
subsequently proven very difficult to withdraw.2
Perhaps most important, the war built the military of Saddam Hussein, drawing in
vast arms and providing a rationale for a level of Iraqi conscription never before seen. The
resulting military then had the capability to invade Kuwait only a few short years later. The
Iran-Iraq War also furnished a reason for Iraq to invade Kuwait, because the long struggle
against Iran had led Iraq to accumulate debts to Kuwait that it then seemed to believe could
be resolved through conquest. Absent the 1990-1 conflict, one can draw a whole series of
fairly uncontroversial conclusions about just how different the region, U.S. foreign policy,
and the U.S. position in the world might be, even today.
Crucially, however, it was the merciless persistence and ever-escalating scale of the
Iran-Iraq War-almost eight entire years of multi-division battles along a 1300-km border,
eventually involving the use of chemical weapons, missile attacks on urban areas, and a
campaign against tanker traffic in the Gulf-that produced most of these regional and
international consequences. Had either Iran or Iraq been able to bring the war to a swifter
conclusion, many of these effects never would have come to pass. Not only would the
human and economic costs of the war have been far lower, but the entire architecture of the
region and the U.S. role there likely would have assumed a very different form.
The puzzle for observers of the war is why this did not happen. Why did the war last
so long, despite some initial Iranian battlefield successes that suggested it might end quickly?
Why was neither side able to decisively end the conflict on the battlefield prior to 1988, the
year that a quick series of Iraq counteroffensives finally did so? Why was neither side able to
consistently capitalize on the resources and advantages it possessed in order to sustain an
effective fighting apparatus? And what explains the surprising shift in the performance of
key Iraqi units at the eleventh hour?
As we will see, the existing explanations of military effectiveness are unsatisfactory in
explaining both the generally poor performance of Iran and Iraq, compared to what one
might expect given their national resources and characteristics, as well as the limited early
successes of Iranians and the late triumphs of the Iraqis. In this chapter and the one that
I Gary Sick, "Trial By Error: Reflcctions on the Iran-Iraq War," Middle EastfJournal, vol. 43, no. 2 (spring 1989),
p. 230.
' Sick, "Trial By Error," p. 240.
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follows, I argue that only by understanding the nature of political intervention in the two
militaries is it possible to resolve the puzzle of the two countries' battlefield performances,
and in particular to explain the within-country, over-time variation seen in particular units of
both militaries, particularly on the Iraqi side.
In the Iraqi case, the country entered the war with an almost ideal-typical set of
worst practices with respect to political intervention in the military. Saddam Hussein
oriented the military toward protecting him from various internal threats, including Kurdish
uprisings, Shia conspiracies, and coups. Only around 1986 did Saddam shift to a system of
mixed practices that prioritized external combat effectiveness over the performance of these
internal tasks, producing enough of an improvement in battlefield effectiveness among his
expanded Republican Guard units to end the conflict.3
Iran's leaders also generally adopted worst practices with respect to political
intervention in the military, orienting their armed forces toward domestic tasks that included
revolutionary consolidation, the suppression of ethnic rebellions, and coup protection.
Although the details of many of these policies differed from those in Iraq, their overall
contour was surprisingly similar not only to the early Iraqi policies but also to those of the
Shah.
That said, in the early years of the war Iran did benefit from the slightly better
practices in political intervention that the Shah had employed, not all of which Iran's
revolutionary leaders had yet been able to dismantle. In particular, Iranian units drawn from
the pre-revolutionary regular army, which had received American training during the 1970s,
displayed noticeably better tactical proficiency in the initial battles than the revolutionary
masses roused by Shia clerics to become martyrs.
Unfortunately for Iran, however, its leaders never successfully integrated pre-
revolutionary and revolutionary armed forces, and in fact mistakenly credited the
revolutionary forces rather than the legacy regular units with stopping and turning back the
initial Iraqi invasion. As a result, Iran's leaders actually solidified their imposition of worst
practices as the war went on, decimating whatever battlefield effectiveness lingered from the
Shah's era. Iran's military strategy instead relied on revolutionary soldiers who were
ideologically motivated to be cohesive but who lacked any ability to convert that cohesion
into tactical proficiency or complex operations, due to the imposition of worst practices.
Iran was thus very vulnerable to the improvement in Iraqi practices that finally occurred late
in the war.
It is important not to overdraw these contrasts, of course, especially in the Iranian
case where the movement of the political intervention variable was certainly more subtle
than in the dramatic shift seen in Iraq. Indeed, the shift in the Iranian case was probably
more subtle than the theory presented in Chapter 1 can fully capture. Iranian practices both
under the Shah and after him were clearly very bad, but there were at least a few shreds of
adequate training before the revolution that exerted their effects early in the war. Overall,
however, the evidence from both Iran and Iraq strongly suggests the importance of the
political intervention variable in explaining battlefield effectiveness.
This chapter proceeds in three main parts. The first section provides background,
discussing the origins and basic course of the Iran-Iraq War and sharpening the puzzle
presented by the two sides' battlefield performances. The second section establishes the
values of the independent variable with respect to Iraq, relying on the series of coding
questions presented in Chapter 1. After providing a brief overview of the history and
3 F1ollowing convention, the chapters use "Saddam" as shorthand for "Saddarn Hussein," instead of "I lussein."
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structure of the country's military, the section marshals evidence about the nature of political
intervention in the four key sets of military activities in Iraq: promotion patterns, training
regimens, command arrangements, and information management. The section then
generates predictions about how different units of the Iraqi military should have performed
over time according to the different theories presented in the first chapter, including my
own. The third section of the chapter repeats this procedure with respect to political
intervention in the military of Iran.
Chapter 5 then turns to the empirical evidence needed to adjudicate amongst these
predictions, examining a series of battles between Iraq and Iran during the period 1980-1988.
Both Chapters 4 and 5 draw for their evidence on recently declassified and translated
documents and audio tapes from the regime of Saddam Hussein, made available at the
Conflict Records Research Center of National Defense University; on archival material made
available through the National Security Archive and Digital National Security Archive,
including transcripts of FBI interviews with Saddam Hussein and intelligence and military
documents pertaining to U.S. foreign policy in the region; and on secondary literature on
both Iraq and Iran, including already published interviews with ex-officers from both
countries.
I. Background: The Iran-Iraq War
The Ongins of the War
In order to have some context in which to assess political intervention in the
militaries of Iraq and Iran, it is necessary to establish a bit of background about the two
states' relationship in the period leading up to the outbreak of war in September 1980. In
some sense, the cause of the war was quite narrow and immediate: a border skirmish. But it
is hard to see how this dispute could have escalated into the war it became absent some
broader differences between the two regimes. Chief among these, Iraq was a staunchly
secular regime run by Sunni Arabs, while Iran was a theocracy run by Shia Persians.
In the narrow sense, the war arose from a territorial dispute over the waters of the
Shatt al-Arab, where the Tigris and Euphrates meet and separate the two countries in the
south (see maps 16 and 17). A 1937 border treaty had given Iraq control of the Shatt up to
the river bank on the Iranian side, except for an 8-km stretch in which Iraqi control
extended only to the center of the channel. Starting in 1969, the year after the Ba'th came to
power in Iraq, "Iran unilaterally renounced the 1937 treaty and systematically began to
challenge Iraqi control of the Shatt al-Arab by not flying the Iraqi flag on its ships and by
refusing Iraqi pilots."4
In 1975, the two countries resolved these disagreements with the Algiers Accord,
negotiated on the Iraqi side by the country's second-in-command at the time, Saddam
Hussein. This accord adopted the center line as the boundary along the entire river, but in
return for this contraction of Iraqi territory, which essentially internationalized the Shatt,
Iran agreed to end all support for the Iraqi Kurds, who had been conducting an ongoing
insurrection against Baghdad during this period.- The agreement held until 1979, at which
4 Sick, "Trial By Error," p. 230.
5 "The Implications of the Iran-Iraq Agreement," paper produced by the Central Intelligence Agency, State
Department, and Defense Intelligence Agency, May 1, 1975, available at
\vww.gvwu.edu/ nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB 167/01.pdf.
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time Iran still occupied some small stretches that were to have gone to Iraq according to the
1975 terms. Although the new regime in Tehran did not formally renounce the Algiers
Accord, "neither did it offer assurances that the treaty would be observed. On the contrary,
revolutionary leaders almost casually let it be known that they did not consider themselves
bound by any of the Shah's agreements."'
Accounts vary as to the precise series of events that then led to the outbreak of war.
Iraq claimed that its invasion in September 1980 was a response to 69 violations of its
airspace by Iranian aircraft between April and September 1980, culminating in Iranian
artillery fire at three points along the border that were to have been returned to Iraq under
the Algiers Accord. After retaking these disputed areas by September, Saddam declared that
Iraq would no longer adhere to the Algiers Accord. But Iraq soon reported additional
incidents near Basra, Iraq's second largest city, apparently leading to the all-out Iraqi attack
on September 22.7 Other accounts trace the invasion to skirmishes farther north. Regardless,
it soon became evident that Iraq had been preparing its invasion for some time, casting
doubt on the notion of any single border incident as the sole catalyst for the war.8
Indeed, in a broader sense, Iraq's preparations were not surprising given escalating
bilateral tensions during 1979-1980. To put it simply, both regimes were engaged in efforts
to shore up their own power, but the very methods by which each chose to do so almost
inherently threatened the other. For his part, Saddam had just replaced General Ahmed
Hassan al-Bakr as the country's top leader (a series of events that will be discussed in more
detail below). Circumstantial evidence suggests that Saddam's timing stemmed in part from
Bakr's pending move to join Iraq in a Ba'thist alliance with Syria, which would have made
Hafez al-Assad the clear successor to Sadat as leader of the Arab world after the Camp
David Accords. It appears that Saddam wanted to claim this mantle as his own, a stance
which put him into a somewhat inevitable opposition to non-Arab Iran.9
Saddam's status as a secular Ba'thist and as a Sunni ruling over a majority Shia
population also gave him good reason to fear the example of the Iranian revolution. Tehran
did nothing to quell this fear when it initiated a propaganda campaign calling for the removal
of the "non-Muslim" Ba'thist regime in Baghdad." Tehran radio during this period also
proclaimed a leading Iraqi Shi'ite cleric in Najaf, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, the
"Khomeini of Iraq." A wave of anti-government bombings swept the country, apparently
with Iranian blessing, and the major anti-government Shia party, al Dawa, began to organize
active opposition to the Ba'th regime." Anti-government riots broke out in the Shia holy
cities of Najaf and Karbala, resulting in the execution of 79 Iraqi dissidents, some of them
military officers, in March 1979.12 Indeed, there is some evidence that Bakr's hesitation to
execute these officers was the final disagreement with Saddam that prompted Bakr's ouster
(discussed in more detail below)."
Sick, "Trial By Error," p. 231-2.
Sick, "Trial By Error," p. 233.
8 \nthony Cordesman and Abraham Wagner, The I essons o/ Moderm Itar, V'o. 11: the rni-lraq i~ar (Boulder:
\Westview Press, 1990), pp. 30-31.
( Said K. Aburish, "low Saddam I lussein Came to Power," in The addam I Ins.ein Reader, ed. Turi Munthe
(New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 2002), pp. 48; and Adeed Dawisha, Iraq: A Po/itical History /fom Independence
to Otcpatfion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), p. 214.
" Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, Saddam, Husein: a Plo/itca/ BIography (New York: the Free Press, 1991), p. 138.
Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, p. 25.
2 Cordesman and Wagner, ILessons, p. 26.
' Dilip H iro, The Longest War: the 1rani-raq MI/itary Con//ic (New York: Routledge, 1991), pp. 28-9.
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By 1980, Iran was also providing guerilla training to Iraqi Shias and sending them
back to Iraq. 4 In April a new wave of bombings swept across the country, culminating in
assassination attempts against two high-ranking Iraqi officials. Baghdad responded by
arresting and then executing al-Sadr and his sister, a move that so outraged the Shia
community that even twenty-six years later, guards present at Saddam Hussein's execution
were heard yelling, "Long live Mohammed Baqir Sadr!"15
As Gary Sick has noted, "In retrospect, it is evident that the events of April 1980
represented the crucial turning point that eventually led to war."I Just as the very nature of
the Iranian regime in this period seemed to threaten Iraq, so too did many aspects of the
Iraqi regime appear threatening to leaders in Tehran. And just as Khomeini stoked Saddam's
fears, Saddam stoked Khomeini's.17 Iraq gave safe harbor-and radio stations-to numerous
officials from the Shah's regime, including former prime minister Shapour Bakhtiar and the
former commander of Iranian ground forces, General Gholam-'Ali Oveisi, allowing them to
broadcast anti-revolutionary messages back into Iran.18
Interestingly, there is some evidence that these exiles in fact "filled Saddam's head
with visions of a weak fundamentalist regime that would collapse if given a shove but that
otherwise would subvert Iraq's oppressed Shi'ah population if not stopped immediately."'9 It
was an odd logic: the Iranian regime was so strong that it had the potential to unseat
Saddam's regime simply through ideological appeal, but so weak that it could be toppled by a
quick military incursion that would leave Iran's major cities, including the capital, untouched.
Saddam apparently believed he could undo the Iranian revolution by appealing to the Iranian
Arabs who lived near the southern sector of the border, just as Iran's leaders apparently
believed that they could spread their revolution easily to their co-religionists in southern
Iraq.2
Against the backdrop of these fresh tensions and misperceptions, festering for
almost two years, the border clashes of September 1980 proved to be one skirmish too
many. Both sides were soon engaged in a full-scale war that was to last eight years.
An Overview of the War Between Iran and Iraq
Most of the war took the form of ground combat along the border, which comprised
three main sectors, each with different terrain: a northern sector roughly adjacent to Iraq's
Kurdish areas consisting of steep mountain ridges with minimal vegetation; a central sector
where the border curves inward toward Iraq and the Zagros mountains rise up on the
Iranian side, roughly parallel to Baghdad; and an oil-rich southern sector containing
extensive marshes and several major rivers.21 Although fighting occurred in all three sectors,
most of the decisive ground combat occurred in the central and especially the southern
sectors, as these were the areas that protected Iraq's capital and its very limited access to the
14 Hiro, Liongest [Far, pp. 35.
1 "More Arrests Expected from Hussein Execution Video, CNN.com,January 3, 2007, available at
http://vvw.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/01 /03/saddan.execution/index.html.
H Sick, "Trial By Error," p. 232.
Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, 1ian and Iraq a/ [Far (London: L B. Tauris, 1988), chapter 1.
IS Hiro, L iongest fFar, pp. 36.
1 Kenneth Pollack, Arabs at lWar: Ailita, E/#ctiveness, 1948-1991 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002),
p. 183.
2" Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, p. 24.
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Gulf. Furthermore, the southern sector was home to Iraqi Shia and Iranian Arabs, the two
populations to which Tehran and Baghdad, respectively, believed they could appeal.
Though complex and multi-faceted, the Iran-Iraq War (or the Imposed War, as it is
known in Iran) consisted of three major phases.22 The first began with the Iraqi invasion of
Iran in 1980 and continued into early 1981, at which time Iran initiated a series of
counteroffensives to regain lost territory. This phase of the war was fought almost entirely
on Iranian territory and lasted into the early summer of 1982. During this time, the war aims
of the two sides seemed to escalate. For example, Iraq's deputy prime minister and future
foreign minister, Tariq Aziz, publicly declared in April 1981, "Now we don't care if Iran is
dismembered." Around the same time, Iran's chairman of parliament and future president,
Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, declared that "removal of Saddam Hussein's regime is our
strategic goal on which we will not compromise."23
By mid-1982, Iran had regained most of the land Iraq had conquered. A second
phase of the war then began when Iran rejected Iraq's attempts at a ceasefire and invaded in
July. For the next five years the war took place almost entirely on Iraqi territory and saw
numerous Iranian attempts to conquer various parcels of Iraq. Though the Iranians scored
some victories in this phase, notably the conquest of the Faw peninsula in 1986, for the most
part the fighting devolved into a war of attrition. The Iraqis defended their territory at great
cost but were unable to decisively drive out the Iranians, who also suffered extremely high
losses in their repeated assaults on Iraqi positions.
In an attempt to break the stalemate, the Iraqis began using chemical weapons as
early as 1983, and by 1984 the war had also spilled into the Gulf, with each side attempting
to interdict the other's access to oil and shipping. In 1985, Iraq initiated large-scale missile
strikes against Iranian cities.24 Such attacks were one of Iraq's only ways to compensate for
Iran's immense strategic depth: Tehran was always more than 800 km from the scene of the
ground battles, while Baghdad was often little more than 100 km away.2
Finally, in late 1987, the short but crucial third phase of the war began, in which the
Iraqis conducted five counteroffensives in quick succession. During the first half of 1988,
Iraq regained virtually all the territory it had lost in the previous five years, drove the Iranians
back across the border, and called for a ceasefire, which Iran accepted in August. The terms
of this ceasefire were essentially the same as those Iraq had offered in 1982 and secured for
Iraq virtually no gains over its position at the outset in 1980.1
The war had been a disaster for the participants in almost every sense-social,
economic, political, strategic. Iran's total losses were estimated at 200,000-220,000 battlefield
deaths and 350,000 to 400,000 wounded, plus approximately 16,000 civilian deaths.2 Iraq's
losses amounted to at least 105,000 killed and 400,000 wounded.18 By some calculations, the
22 I borrow this periodization from Gregorv Gause, The Intenationa/ Relations o/the Perrian Gn//f(New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 57-8. The war is also known as the Qaddisiyat Saddam in Iraq, a
reference to the famed battle of al-Qadissiya in 637 AD, in wibch the Arabs expelled the Persians from Iraq.
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total cost of the war reached over $1,190 billion.29 This figure included more than $41.94
billion worth of weapons imported by Iraq and $11.26 billion imported by Iran.
Additionally, neither side realized its major goals. The Iraqi invasion consolidated
rather than upended the Iranian revolutionary regime, damaged rather than strengthened
Iraqi standing in the region, and alienated rather than "liberated" the Arabs of Khuzestan.
Similarly, the Iranian invasion in 1982 was also counterproductive: it rallied even Shia Iraqis
around Saddam and terrified the rest of the region and the superpowers into much greater
support of the Iraqi war effort. 31
Indeed, international reaction to the war tended to reflect Henry Kissinger's rumored
remark, "Too bad they can't both lose."32 Many countries, including the United States,
initially declared themselves neutral, but as time went on and it appeared Iran might prevail,
they tilted toward Iraq.3 Egypt, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia all became open supporters,
providing various forms of aid, including loans, outright grants, weapons, transit rights for
the shipment of weapons, and assistance in getting Iraqi oil to market. Meanwhile, Iran still
was able to buy weapons and/or spare parts from North Korea, China, Vietnam, Britain,
and numerous European companies.34
U.S. policy continued to be more ambiguous, following the lines suggested in a
policy memo from the period that "our interests are best served by a military stalemate."35
As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, the United States provided some tactical
intelligence to the Iraqis and publicly engaged in Operation Staunch to stem the flow of
weapons to Iran, but it also secretly funneled arms to the Iranians through Israel in what
became known as the Iran Contra affair. 36Remarkably, despite a great deal of indirect
external intervention, little changed on the front lines until the abrupt turn of events in 1988.
The Puz-Zle of Battlefield Effectiveness in Iraq and Iran
The Iran-Iraq War remains puzzling for scholars of military effectiveness. Why did
the war last so long, with neither side able to bring it to a decisive end despite some initial
Iranian successes? Why did each side seem unable to capitalize on the particular national
assets it possessed-Iraq's tremendous access to international arms, for example, or Iran's
greater strategic depth and larger population? And why did the situation then change so
dramatically in 1988, with the Iraqis able to conduct counteroffensives so effectively that
Iran suddenly accepted terms it had been rejecting for six years?
Existing theories do not provide a satisfactory answer, for several reasons. First,
along many of the dimensions said to matter for the generation of military power, such as
regime type and external threats, Iraq and Iran were fairly evenly matched. For example,
H iro, Longest IVar, p. 1.
3" Hiro, Liiongst IVar, p. 250.
3 Sick, "Trial By Error," pp. 233-6.
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Iraq War," mid-1982, available at the National Security Archive, the George Washington Univsitd
Washington, DC.
34 Vietnam was an ideal supplier because many of Iran's weapons were Amcrican-made, and I Lanoi had
captured significant quantities of U.S. spare parts when it conquered South Vietnam. Hiro, Longest lVar, p. 72.
Britain reportedly provided large quantities of spare parts for Iran's Chieftain tanks, including engines.
Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, p. 120-1.
Discussion Paper, Origin Unknown, "Discussion Paper for SIG...".
3 Hiro, Liiongest IVar, chapter 5; and Bryan R. Gibson, Covert Relationship: Americn Foreign Policy, Inte//igence, and the
Ian-Iraq l1ar, 1980-1988 (Denver, CO: Praeger, 2010), pp. 71-2.
196
neither regime was democratic.37 Certainly one can argue that their brands of
authoritarianism differed, but neither state should have benefited in its battlefield
performance from any of the supposed advantages of democratic strategic assessment or
liberal political culture. If anything, Iraq should have performed worse given that its
POLITY score was consistently more negative than Iran's, yet this was not the case.
Additionally, both states should have experienced strong external pressures to
improve their military performance, given the intense human and economic costs of the war.
This was not some great game played in distant lands, but a border conflict in populated
areas. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, there is some evidence that each side
did do better when forced onto the strategic defensive. But it remains unclear whether these
slight improvements were due to nationalism or simply the fact that defensive operations are
often less militarily challenging then offensive ones.
What is clear is that despite many years of feedback telling both states that their
military strategies were failing to deliver their battlefield objectives, neither side
demonstrated much improvement until the Iraqi changes in 1986-7. Indeed, the evidence
shows that the Iranians drew the wrong lessons from the initial successes they did have in
turning back the Iraqi invasion. Overall, this pattern is quite puzzling for realist theories,
which would expect a major land war to produce strong incentives for military
improvement, especially as war aims escalated and losses mounted.
Along other dimensions said to matter for military power, such as wealth,
demography, and culture, the two countries were not evenly matched, but their differences
deepen rather than resolve the puzzle surrounding their battlefield performance. For
example, Iran was the wealthier of the two states, in terms of GDP, its cash reserves, and the
ability to export oil.38 With an estimated 45 million citizens, Iran also had a population
roughly three times that of Iraq. 3 Its demographic advantages were even more pronounced
with respect to the two countries' male and militarily fit populations (see chart below). Yet
these advantages never translated into sustained Iranian battlefield effectiveness.
Iranian and Iraqi Military Manpower4"
(in millions)
1980 1988
Iran Iraq Iran Iraq
Total population 39.1 13.6 50.4 17.0
Males aged 15-49 8.6 3.0 11.5 3.8
Militarily fit 5.1 1.7 6.8 2.2
Iran and Iraq also clearly had different national cultures, with Iran reflecting its
Persian roots and Iraq its Arab ones. Yet contrary to some theories emphasizing the
3 POLITY scores reinforce this notion. These scores code states based on the presence of institutions and
procedures that allow citizens to express preferences about policies and leaders; the existence of
institutionalized constraints on the executive; and the guarantee of civil liberties. A score of 10 indicates a
completely institutionalized democracy, while a score of -10 indicates a completely institutionalized autocracy.
According to POLITY, Iran became more authoritarian as the war went on, with its score dropping from -2
(1980) to -6 (1982-on). It had scored -10 during the time of the Shah. Iraq's score was -9 throughout. Monty G.
Marshall and Keith Jaggers, POLITY IV Dataset, 2009 version.
3 Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, p. 41.
3 Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, pp. 13, 54.
4" Cordesman and Wagner, Iessons, p. 54, based on CIA data.
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detrimental effects of Arab culture on military performance, the Iraqis ultimately
outperformed the Iranians in the war.4' These sorts of over-time improvements in particular
Iraqi units should not have occurred if a large structural variable such as Arab culture was
the systematic driver of performance. Also puzzling for cultural explanations is the fact that
for most of the war the Iraqis and Iranians had many of the same tactical problems on the
battlefield, suggesting that some underlying similarity, rather than national cultural
difference, was important in explaining the course of the war.
Furthermore, civil-military relations in Iran and Iraq were broadly similar, which
makes the sub-national variation seen in both states especially puzzling. Both states had long
histories of political intervention into the armed forces and military intervention into
politics.42 Some histories have indeed diagnosed much of the Iranian and Iraqi problems on
the battlefield as the result of "civil leaders interfer[ing] directly and constantly in all levels of
military activity."43
Had there been no early Iranian successes on the battlefield and no improvement in
Iraqi performance in the final phase of the war, conflictual civil-military relations, as
conceived in existing theories and histories, might be a satisfactory explanation for the
battlefield performance of both states. But the decline in Iranian effectiveness and the
improvement in Iraqi effectiveness-despite a low level of military autonomy in both states
throughout-suggest that something besides civil-military conflict or the mere level of
civilian control of the military drove the two sides' performances.
Ultimately, as argued below, what mattered were the actual forms of political
intervention in the militaries of the two states. Whatever their other differences and
similarities, both militaries performed poorly when uniformly subject to worst practices: in
the Iranian case, after about 1982, and in the Iraqi case, before about 1986. By contrast, in
the period before these practices were fully imposed on the regular military in Iran and in the
period after these practices were lifted on the Republican Guard units in Iraq, military
performance by those forces was noticeably better compared both to the opponent's military
and to other units drawn from the same state. The contrast was especially dramatic in the
Iraqi case.
II. Political Intervention in the Iraqi Military and Its Predicted Impact on Battlefield
Effectiveness
What policies did Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein adopt regarding the military's
promotion patterns, training regimens, command arrangements, and information
management? What kinds of outcomes should these policies have produced in terms of
battlefield effectiveness, if the theory presented in Chapter 1 is correct? How do these
predicted results differ from what we would expect to see if forms of political intervention
were irrelevant to explaining battlefield effectiveness, or if other variables were more
important?
By and large, Saddam adopted what were identified in the first chapter as worst
practices in political intervention, orienting his military toward protection against internal,
4 Ken Pollack, "The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness," Ph.D. dissertation,
Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1996.
4'Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, p. 25.
4 Cordesman and Wagner, ILessons, p. 413.
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non-state threats, rather than potential external dangers. Saddam promoted officers within
his military primarily on the basis of political loyalty and sectarian background, and at times
actively punished battlefield competence; he severely limited military training; he heavily
centralized and deliberately fractured command arrangements; and he restricted horizontal
communication within the military and developed an intelligence apparatus directed at his
own forces. Only relatively late in the war, when Saddam apparently decided that the
Iranians posed a bigger threat to his rule than his domestic enemies, did he alter some of
these policies, adopting something close to best practices with respect to Iraqi Republican
Guard units.
As a result, overall Iraqi military performance should have been quite poor for most
of the war. Ground units should have displayed little if any cohesion and tactical proficiency,
and no capacity to conduct complex operations. Only late in the war, after selected shifts in
Saddam's forms of political intervention, should there have been improvement in the
battlefield effectiveness of Republican Guard units. These forces should have demonstrated
greater cohesion, improved tactical proficiency, and some ability to conduct complex
operations, particularly compared to their own performance earlier in the war and to the
performance of other Iraqi units facing the same sorts of military challenges.
Crucially, the theories based on variables besides political intervention in the military
predict that very little of this sort of variation should have occurred. Iraqi wealth, population,
regime type, and culture were all essentially static throughout the war. Admittedly, there was
some variation in the degree of external threat facing the Iraqis after 1982, although one
would think that if this factor alone were responsible for shifts in battlefield performance
that these shifts would have occurred much sooner in the war than they actually did.
Overall Iraqi civil-military relations were also relatively static during the war, in the
sense that Saddam maintained personal control of the armed forces and heavily curtailed
military autonomy throughout. At no time during the war was Saddam uninvolved in military
matters. As we will see, throughout the entire conflict Saddam was intimately involved in
most decisions about hiring and firing senior officers. From the very outset, he devoted a
great deal of his time to receiving and analyzing detailed updates about the war and field
reports from his commanders.44 It was not unusual to see him inquiring about activities and
personnel down to the brigade or even the platoon level.45 He also oversaw training
regimens, command arrangements, and information management, once noting, "1 always
have to be the driving force that gets the officers to move."4(, Even the changes Saddam
made late in the war did not reflect a lessening of his personal involvement in military
matters, only a shift in the content and purpose of that involvement. - As a result, even the
4 "Transcript of a meeting between Saddam Hussein and his Commanding Officers at the Armed Forces
General Command," CRRC Number SH-SHTP-D-000-856, November 1980, pp. 1-3; and "Transcript of
Saddam Hussein's 28 September 1980 meeting with the Armed Forces General Command," CRRC Number
SH -SI ITP-D-000-773, September 28, 1980, p. 3.
45 "Presidential Direction during War in 1984," CRRC Number S11-AFGC-D-000-686, February-December
1984, pp. 24, 29; and "I landvritten Transcript of a Recorded Meeting of the General Command of the Armed
Forces during the 1st Gulf War and Telephone Conversations," CRRC document number SI-AFGC D-000-
393, january 7, 1981, 145 pages; and "Audio Recorded Meeting between Saddam Hussein and Other unknown
Iraqi Military Officers regarding Various Military Activities," CRRC Number SI I-SITP-A-000-627, Date
unknown but afterJune 1982, p. 19-20.
46 "Audio Recorded Meeting," CRRC Number SF-SFITP-A-000-627, pp. 46-7.
4 Charles Tripp, "The Iran-Iraq War and Iraqi Politics," in T/e Iran-Iraq 1ar: Impact and1mp/ications (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1989), pp. 70.
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existing civil-military explanations seem to predict much less variation in Iraqi military
performance than actually occurred.
Nevertheless, merely detecting variation in Iraqi military performance does not
provide evidence in favor of an explanation based on the nature of political intervention in
the military. For example, if it were the case that instances of excellent battlefield
performance coincided with the imposition of worst practices in political intervention, or
that instances of terrible military performance coincided with best practices in political
intervention, that would constitute strong evidence against this explanation. But to detect
such disconfirming evidence, we first have to know much more about the value of the
independent variable in Iraq-about the actual policies that Saddam adopted towards its
military.
To do this, the section below briefly reviews the basic structure and history of the
Iraqi armed forces since the end of World War I. Then it examines the nature of political
intervention in the four areas of interest: promotions, training, command, and information,
using the coding questions from Chapter 1. In each of these four areas I outline the general
policies that Saddam adopted, while also exploring the exceptions to these policies with
respect to Republican Guard units, which began to occur in 1982 and accelerated greatly
after 1986. I conclude with predictions about how different parts of the military should have
performed in battle at different points in time if my theory is right or wrong, and if the other
theories are right or wrong.
Background on Iraq and Its Militay
Throughout modern Iraqi history, the country's military posed a recurring dilemma:
political leaders relied heavily on the army to protect their regimes against internal
opponents, but, simultaneously, the military itself repeatedly proved to be the greatest threat
to anyone wearing the mantle of power.4 1 Even prior to independence, during the British
occupation after World War 1, the Iraqi army had focused primarily on internal missions
rather than on combat against other states." The instability of the early years of
independence, including the formation of no fewer than 12 different cabinets during the
period 1932-1939, invited praetorianism. Iraq's military launched its first coup in 1936, and
by 1941, six more had occurred.5"
Thereafter, a period of relative stability emerged under the British-influenced
Hashemite monarchy, but this, too, ended with a coup in 1958. This time the plotters were
the Free Officers, led by nationalist General Abd al-Karim Qasim.5' Although Qasim
succeeded in finally curtailing the British hold on Iraq, he did little to end the systems of
patronage and coercion that many Iraqis despised. Also unresolved were the competing
claims to political power made by communists, the Shia Dawa party, the Sunni Muslim
Brotherhood, and the emerging Ba'th party. 2
Unsurprisingly, Prime Minister Qasim himself was soon the target of violence,
surviving an assassination attempt in 1959 at the hands of a 22 year-old Ba'thist apparatchik
named Saddam Hussein. Saddam fled the country, but in February 1963, Qasim was not so
4' Ibrahim Al-Nlarashi and Sammy Salama, Iraq's Ared]orces:AIn AnalyticalHistoi7 (New York: Routledge,
2008), p. 3; and Charles Tripp, A History ofraq (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), ch. 2.
4 Pollack, Arabs at IFar, p. 149.
5" Karsh and Rautsi, Saddan, Hissein, p. 7.
Tripp, History of/raq, chapter 4.
"Tripp, History ofiraq, chapters 4-5.
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lucky. A group of twelve Ba'thists and four Arab nationalist officers shot him dead and
declared themselves in charge of the country. Squabbles among this new ruling clique paved
the way for a follow-on coup in November 1963, this time orchestrated by General Abd al-
Salam Arif, and again with help from two Ba'thist military officers who had grown
disillusioned with their earlier collaborators. 53
For the next five years, President Arif and, after Arif's death in a helicopter accident,
his brother Abdul Rahman Arif, ruled Iraq, again relying on the military as a pillar of the
regime. They formed the Republican Guard as an elite unit to protect the palace, and Ba'th
members were purged from the officer corps. In fact, the entire party had to go
underground, where its security apparatus was now built and managed on a day-to-day basis
by Saddam.54 Saddam himself was imprisoned during part of this period for plotting with his
cousin Bakr against Arif, and he later noted that the era had a profound impact on his
political trajectory.ss "A leader is not made in a factory in Europe," he observed. "Leadership
is developed gradually. This was done underground."56
In July 1968, Bakr and Saddam finally saw their chance to regain power, again with
help from the armed forces. Collaborating with three disillusioned officers, the Ba'th plotters
overthrew President Arif in a bloodless coup. 57 Within two weeks, Saddam and Bakr also
moved to preclude a repeat of the mistakes of 1963. They orchestrated a second coup,
dumping their military allies and declaring themselves the country's sole political authority-
in Saddam's case, by personally escorting one of the ruling generals at gunpoint to a new
assignment as ambassador to Morocco.58
This move was the first in a deliberate series of steps to wrench political power away
from the armed forces and place it permanently in Ba'th hands. The most important
institutional change occurred in late 1969, when Saddam and President Bakr stacked the
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) with Ba'thist civilians, turning the country's highest
decision-making institution from a military-dominated body to a tool of the party
overnight. Under Saddam's direction, the Ba'th also purged the army of potentially disloyal
officers and arrested large numbers of communists, Nasserists, dissident Ba'thists, former
politicians, and Western-oriented businessmen, among others.61 Several prominent senior
officers died of conveniently timed heart attacks or in mysterious car accidents as well.61
Saddam summarized his objectives during this period when he noted, "The ideal
revolutionary command should effectively direct all planning and implementation. It must
not allow the growth of any other rival center of power."6e He added in an interview around
this time that "with party methods, there is no chance for anyone who disagrees with us to
jump on a couple of tanks and overthrow the government." 6 The regime later codified this
view at a 1974 party congress, where a statement noted, "From the earliest days, the Party
3 Tripp, Histol)' o/iraq, chapter 5.
Tripp, Fistory of/raq, chapter 5; Karsh and Rautsi, Saddamll Iussein, p. 24.
FBI Interview with Saddam Hussein, session 2, conducted by George Piro, Baghdad Operations Center,
Februarv 8, 2004, p. 6, available at http://ww\w-.gwu.edu/~-nsarchiv/NSALBB/NS\ H3lBB279/index.htm.
56 FBI Interview with Saddam I lussein, session 5, conducted by George Piro, Baghdad Operations Center,
February 8, 2004, pp. 7, available at http://vwx.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSA\EB3279/index.htn.
Karsh and Rautsi, Naddam Hissein, chapter 2.
Tripp, Histolj' of/raq, chapter 5; and FBI Interview, session 5, pp. 3-5.
lKarsh and Rautsi, Saddam, Hussein, p. 47.
Tripp, Histog of/raq, p. 188; and Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam, Hussein, pp. 40-1.
61 Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces, p. 113.
re Dawisha, Iraq, p. 212.
( Dawisha, Iraq, p. 212.
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urgently had to... consolidate its leadership in the armed forces; to purge them of suspect
elements...; ... to establish the ideological and military criteria which would enable the armed
forces to do their duty as well as possible and would immunize them against the deviations
which the Qassem and Aref regimes and their military aristocrats had committed in the
army's name...."64
Along these lines, in 1970 Saddam oversaw the formation of the Popular Army. The
nucleus of this paramilitary force had already played key roles in the 1963 coup and in the
initial consolidation of Ba'th power in 1968. Now Saddam sought to develop the Popular
Army as a full-fledged counterweight to the regular military, growing it to a strength of
100,000 men by 1979 and again to 250,000 by 1980. It eventually would reach a size over
half a million men during the war with Iran (see chart below) .65
IRAQI FORCE STRUCTURE66
1980 1987
Regular army 200,000 805,000
4 armored divisions 5 armored divisions
4 mechanized divisions 3 mechanized divisions
4 infantry divisions 10 infantry divisions
1 Republican Guard division 1 Republican Guard division
2 special forces divisions
Air Force 38,000 40,000
Navy 4,250 5,000
Total regular 242,250 850,000
Popular Army 250,000 500,000
Reserves 250,000 230,000
The Popular Army came in addition to the Republican Guard inherited from Arif.
This force would grow from two brigades during the early years of the war to more than two
dozen by the end of the conflict. Many accounts of the Iraqi order of battle, including the
HSS Military Balance, actually obscure this growth by counting divisions only, and they often
list Iraq as having only 1 Republican Guard division throughout the war (see chart above).68
While this may have been true as a matter of nomenclature, experts on the Iraqi
military note that the country's divisions-including those from the Republican Guard-
often had many more than the typical three brigades under their command. In some cases,
divisional commands included up to ten brigades, as is evident even from some very basic
arithmetic based on the standard Iraqi order of battle numbers listed above. For example, in
1980, Iraq is listed as having had 200,000 ground troops organized into 13 divisions,
producing a rough average division size of about 15,300. But by 1987, Iraq is listed as having
had 805,000 ground troops organized into 21 divisions, suggesting an average division size
64 Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, p. 189.
63 Chubin and Tripp, Iranl and Iraq, p. 294.
6" Data adapted from Chubin and Tripp, Inni and Iraq, p. 294.
6 Different sources provide slightly different estimates of the number of Republican Guard brigades by the
end of the war. Pollack counts 28, while Al Marashi and Salama count 25. Arabs at lWar, pp. 218-219; and Iraq's
A rmed Forces, p. 168.
68 "The Middle East and North Africa," The Ailitary Balance, vol. 80, no. 1 (1980), pp. 42-3; and "The Middle
East and North Africa," The Ailitary Balance, vol. 86, no. 1 (1986), pp. 97-8.
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of over 38,300. These calculations are not important in their details, except for the more
general point they illustrate: Saddam had increased the number of Republican Guard
brigades rather dramatically by the final years of the war, in ways that are sometimes
obscured by typical division-focused methods of force structure calculation.
Still, in the early years of Ba'th rule Saddam remained behind the scenes, with Bakr
the figurehead not only because of his age and title but also because of his continuing links
to the officer corps, still a key constituency despite Ba'thist reforms. Saddam had no military
background or standing, having failed the entrance exam to the Baghdad Military Academy,
which Bakr considered a good thing.69 As Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi explain, "As long as
the Party was in opposition, the primacy of the military faction was indispensable since the
army was the only institution which could help the Party regain power. [But] having achieved
the country's top position, Bakr no longer needed a strong military faction. On the contrary,
ambitious independent officers around him posed a permanent threat to his position.... In
these circumstances, an able and ruthless, yet loyal operator like Saddam Hussein, who was
equally determined to break the military's hold on Iraqi politics, seemed the ideal number
two man."71
As the 1970s wore on, Saddam became more prominent and took a number of steps
to place the armed forces even more directly under his personal control. With Stalin as his
role model, Saddam "uncovered" a number of anti-regime plots within the security
apparatus, although only one of these, in 1973, has ever been confirmed as real.71 Then, in
1976, Saddam had Bakr grant him an honorary military rank of Lieutenant General,
equivalent to Chief of Staff of the army. From this position, he appointed numerous
relatives from his (and Bakr's) hometown of Tikrit to key positions in the officer corps, most
notably naming a cousin as minister of defense, a position previously held by Bakr. The
cousin then used this position to further purge the officer corps of those who might be
disloyal to Saddam.
Saddam launched a major program of military expansion from 1977 to 1979.3 By the
end of that year, Iraq's ground forces were double what they had been in 1973, putting them
second in size only to Egypt's among the Arab states. The regular army now had twelve
active-duty divisions, including four armored and two mechanized infantry divisions, totaling
approximately 200,000 men. During the course of the war with Iran, the army eventually
would balloon to an astounding 40 divisions encompassing at least 700,000 active-duty
soldiers, 250,000 reservists, 4,000 tanks, 3,800 other armored vehicles, 3,500 artillery pieces,
and 600 combat aircraft.>
By 1979, Bakr-and his sway with the officer corps-had simply become
unnecessary to Saddam's hold on power.7 Under murky circumstances, the ailing Bakr
Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, p. 15. Saddarn did, however, receive an honorary degree in 1970.
Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, p. 68.
"lKarsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, p. 35.
Karsh and Rautsi, SaddaIm I Issein, pp. 41, 88; and Dawisha, Iraq, p. 211.
Karsh and Rautsi, Saddamll HJussein, p. 88.
IKarsh and Rautsi, Saddam, I Hlssein, p. 88.
Pollack, Arabs at IVar, p. 182; and "Iraq's Role in the Middle East," National Intelligence Estimate, Director
of Central Intelligence, June 21, 1979, p. D-1, available at
\Vww.g\vu.edu/ nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB167/02.pdf.
Pollack, Arabs at Ifar, p. 207.
"Iraq's Role," p. 7; and Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958:f/oIll Revoltion to Dictatorshb
(New York: I.B. Tauris, 2001), p. 206.
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abruptly resigned in July of that year, leading to Saddam's immediate ascendance as Iraq's
president. 77 He also became the chairman of the RCC, commander in chief of the armed
forces, and Field Marshal.78 Shortly thereafter Saddam announced the discovery of a Syrian
plot against him, leading to a wave of show trials and purges within the party leadership.79
These included an extraordinary meeting of the RCC and top party officials on July 18, at
which Saddam "exposed" those in the audience who had participated in the supposed plot
and called out plain-clothes security officers to arrest them.80 Saddam then gave handguns to
those remaining and compelled participation in the execution of their former colleagues.81
Afterwards Saddam distributed videotapes of the entire event to the rest of the party
membership.82
It remains unknown regarding this and other similar incidents whether Saddam's
fears were genuine or instrumental. Saddam had noted cryptically in 1978 that "the
revolution chooses its enemies," suggesting that he might see some political value in
manufacturing plots.83 On the other hand, Saddam was probably correct that some in the
party did oppose his usurpation of power from Bakr.84 Furthermore, it was reasonable for
Saddam to have been haunted by the very events that had brought him to the presidency. He
is said to have commented to a personal guest in the summer of 1979, "I know there are
scores of people plotting to kill me, and this is not difficult to understand. After all, did we
not seize power by plotting against our predecessors?"85
Saddam also reflected many years later that well into 1980, the primary job of the
military was still "countering the sabotage," that is, protecting the regime from internal
threats rather than external ones. 86 In particular, Saddam feared armed rebellion by the
Kurds or Shia. One of the only actual military duties assigned to the army prior to the war
was "hammering away at largely undefended Kurdish villages."87 In addition to the
crackdown already mentioned against perceived Shia conspiracies in 1979-80, Saddam
executed an unknown number of Kurds and communists whom he worried might have
aspirations to unseat him.88
Some observers have implied that Saddam's worries might have been mere paranoia.
For example, a 1979 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate referred agnostically to a regime
that "believes it has a host of enemies among its own people."89 Adeed Dawisha has noted
that even "at the height of his popularity" in 1980, Saddam "still could not be convinced of
- Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam T Hussein, chapters 4-5.
8 AI-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Al rmed Forces, p. 127.
7 The background to these events can be seen in "Correspondence Between the Baghdad and the General
Security Directorates requesting confirmation of miscellaneous information on an attempted coup," CRRC
Number SI--GMID-D-000-190, June 19, 1979, p. 1.
" Aburish, "How Saddam Hussein...," pp. 51-2.
E' Aburish, "How Saddam Hussein...," pp. 53-4.
8' Dawisha, Iraq, p. 214.
Quoted in Samir al-Khalil, Repub/ic ofLear the Politics ofAodern Iraq (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1989), p. 20.
"4 Aburish, "I low Saddam Hussein...," pp. 52.
85 Karsh and Rautsi, Vaddamn lassein, p. 2.
86 "A meeting, dated I May 1991, between Saddam I Hussein and the General Command of the Army regarding
the enlargement of the Army, and assessment of performance/problems in recent conflict," CRRC Number
SH-SIITP-A-000-849, May 1, 1991, pp. 1-2.
8' Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, p. 60.
18 Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, p. 28.
89 "Iraq's Role," p. 7.
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the solidity of his people's support for him and his regime."91, Yet one has to wonder if he
could not be convinced because the reality was not very convincing. In addition to the
tumultuous events of 1979-80, Saddam faced five assassination attempts in 1981, two in
1982 (including one in which the presidential motorcade was pinned down for several hours
before being rescued by the army), and another in 1987, all linked to Shia opponents of the
regime.91
Furthermore, at the same time that Saddam relied on the military to protect him
against these domestic enemies, Saddam saw the military itself as a potential threat, even
after Ba'th civilians had secured essentially all levers of political power. 92 As one of his
generals later reported Saddam to have said, "The Iraqi army was the only force capable of
conspiring against me. The only power we fear is this army will take over the party's
leadership. The army is like a pet tiger."93
1. Promotion patterns
Before and during most of the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam adopted worst practices with
respect to promotion patterns in the Iraqi military. During the 1970s, the Ba'th focused
almost solely on political loyalty as the key criterion for officer selection and advancement.
As one general noted in an interview decades later, "Whereas the saying in the early part of
the Ba'th rule had been 'better a good soldier than a good Ba'thist,' it changed to 'better a
good Ba'thist than a good soldier."' 94As this same general noted, Saddam "ordered
politicians to serve at the army level and... emphasized the principle... that as long as one
was a Ba'thist he can always be a leader, since the Ba'thist is a truly natural leader."95
In fact, the regime actively selected against military professionalism in forming its
officer corps. The government and officer corps were soon dominated not simply by Sunnis,
as had been the case in all previous administrations, but specifically by Tikritis, and in
particular those who shared clan or tribal ties with Bakr and Saddam.96 This trend only
accelerated when Saddam became president. One authoritative study notes that "the
emphasis was now on political reliability and unquestioned obedience to orders rather than
on serious military professionalism.... Once firmly in charge, Saddam acted to promote a
number of lieutenant colonels to major general, and subsequently to the command of
divisions, without requiring them to hold any of the traditional or intermediate level
command positions."')
Audio tapes of Saddam's deliberations with his advisors confirm that he paid close
personal attention to senior officer appointments and even to those of many junior
officers.98 He cared somewhat about the professional qualifications of his potential
9" Dawisha, Iraq, p. 222.
I iro, ILonaest I Uar, pp. 51, 68, and 197.
'p The details of this shift are masterfully documented in Amazia Baram, "The Ruling Political Elite in Bathi
Iraq, 1968-1986: the Changing Features of a Collective profile," Jnternationalfournal oMiddle Eas/tA dies, vol. 21,
no. 4 (November 1989), pp. 447-493.
(3 Quoted in Woods et al, Saddam's War, p. 90.
Q uoted in Woods et al, Saddaml's lfar, p. 4.
Quoted in \Woods et al, Saddam's lWar, p. 25.
Al-Narashi and Salama, ]raq's Armed Foces, pp. 114-16.
" Woods et al, Saddam's IV'ar, p. 4.
8 "Text Versions of Cassettes Recorded of 1980 Meetings Held among Saddam Hussein and Iraqi Officials
Regarding Tactics and Plotting Against the Iraqi Enemy," CRRC Number SH-SHTP-D-000-624, 28-29
December 1980, p. 112, 119; and "Written Transcripts of Audio Tapes of meetings between Saddam Hussein
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commanders but also showed notable interest in a candidate's family background, political
views, and likelihood that he would provide "support" for Ba'ath objectives."" In one
exchange on this topic in 1980, a division commander reported to Saddam that a capable
officer had been passed over promotion to brigade commander because "he is not a party
member. I am saying it frankly... there is no other reason." Although in this particular case
Saddam eventually relented and allowed the promotion of the officer, the very fact that he
and his officers had such an extensive conversation about whether the officer could be
trusted-despite the fact that all agreed "he is a good officer"-reflects the overriding
importance of officers' political credentials early in the war with Iran.'
Furthermore, Saddam repeatedly purged the officer corps of those he deemed
disloyal."" By the eve of the of war, "the high command structure had effectively become
Saddam Hussein and his political supporters, none of whom had practical military
experience and training.... Much of the high command was chosen more for loyalty than
competence."i2 The formation and rapid expansion of the Popular Army epitomized these
practices, as "low-grade Popular Army 'brigades' were rapidly created with officers whose
own real qualification was party membership and loyalty to the regime."""
There is some evidence that these promotion policies began to shift slightly in 1982,
probably the lowest point of the entire war for the Iraqis." For example, Saddam purged the
Popular Army of its worst commanders, in part to shift blame for the terrible defeats the
Iraqis had suffered.i10 Apparently he also ordered the execution of as many as 300 senior
officers for poor performance around this time.106 Saddam then "began promoting officers
who had fought well in the first two years of the war" and "began treating Ba'thist and non-
Ba'thist officers on a par when it came to promotion."1"7
Most importantly, though, Saddam simply reduced the use of the Popular Army on
the front lines and focused on enlarging and improving the leadership of the Republican
Guard. One of his generals later reported that after 1982, "Saddam began to choose
commanders from the best Iraqi armored battalions to command Republican Guard
battalions, whereas previously he had chosen only his relatives.... He started picking the best
officers, commanding officers, and junior officers within the Iraqi army and put them in the
Republican Guard, and he aimed to save this new force for the major counterattack.... This
was in line with the recommendations of the general officers to create a special armored
force that was well equipped and well trained, led by expert, high-ranking officers, with great
experience." 10
It seems, however, that this expansion and improvement in the Guard was still quite
limited during the period 1982-1986. The same general who noted some of the early changes
and Senior Military commanders discussing nominations to Ba'ath Party Leadership and Iran-Iraq War Battles,"
CRRC Number SH-SIITP-D-000-864, September 1982, pp. 123-8.
"' Written Transcripts," CRRC Number SH-SHTP-D-000-864, pp. 130-2.
"Text Versions," CRRC Number SH -SH TP-D-000-624, pp. 107- 110.
"d Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, p. 43-4.
", Cordesman and Wagner, 1Lessons, p. 59.
"3Cordesman and \Xagner, Lessons, p. 110.
14 Cordesman and W' agner, Lessons, p. 133.
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in 1982 nevertheless commented that even four years later, "a substantial number of
Republican Guard commanders were brave but professionally unprepared and often
incompetent in the positions they held." 10 Indeed, there is some evidence that Saddam felt
this way as well, as tapes from 1984 reveal him brainstorming about the possibility of
bringing generals out of retirement to lead companies, because the junior officer corps was
so inept.""
These continuing problems were no doubt also related to training, a subject
discussed below, but it is noticeable that after 1986, the merit component of promotion
standards was made much more stringent. Though still overwhelmingly Sunni and Tikriti,
the top command of the Guards was reconfigured during this year, with its highest post now
filled by an officer "known for his courage and achievements" on the battlefield.m11
Additionally, "initiative on the battlefield was rewarded over political loyalty or blood
relations to Hussein, and incompetent officers who were friends or relatives were purged."'12
Saddam then combed the rest of the army to pull out the most "outstanding and
exceptional" officers for transfer to the Guard, which expanded to over two dozen brigades
by 1988.113
No doubt it is difficult for any leader to find enough competent generals to
command a rapidly expanding army in the midst of war, but the evidence does show that
Iraq shifted from worst practices in promotion early in the war to something close to best
practices by 1986-7, at least with respect to the Republican Guard units. Interestingly, at the
same time that Saddam fully embraced these practices with respect to the Guard, he created
a new force known as the Special Republican Guard to continue to protect him in Baghdad.
Its soldiers were drawn primarily from the original membership roster of the Republican
Guard, prior to the switch in practices.14 During this time Saddam also "tightened up his
control of the state apparatus" in non-military domains, transferring or dismissing from
government service anyone outside his immediate circle of kinsmen and trusted long-time
associates." 3 Furthermore, as soon as the war was over, Saddam ousted much of the top
Guard leadership from the period 1986-88."6 "What is sad," explained one general, "is that
we had heroes who survived the war, but they were dismissed by Saddam because he
accused them of something or another."
2. Training reg.iens
Prior to and during the early years of the war, Saddam also adopted worst practices
with respect to training. The Popular Army provided only nominal training to its members."
Soldiers usually received about two months of instruction focused on the use of small arms
and low-intensity conflict, with little attention to the use of heavy weapons or combined
1") W\oods et al, Saddamv's lfar, p. 14.
" "A meeting on 18 October 1984 between Saddam Hussein and unknown officials dated in which they
discuss military operations and a large secret project," CRRC Number SH-SHTP-A-000-735, October 1984,
pp. 9-10.
11 Woods et al, Saddam's Ifar, p. 83.
" Al-Marashi and Salana, iraq's Armed F orces, p. 166.
13 Saddam's reflections on the process discussed in "A meeting," CRRC Number SH-SHTP-A-000-849, pp. 4-
5. Further details in Pollack, Arabs at Ifar, pp. 219-220.
''4 Pollack, Arabs at I1ar, pp. 219-220.
lI- Tripp, "The Iran-Iraq War," in 1rani-Iraq lFar, pp. 233.
IS Karsh and Rautsi, Vaddam Hussein, p. 185.
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arms skills.'19 As one history notes, "These People's Army units were usually led by senior
members of the Ba'th rather than professional officers. They were not properly organized,
led, or equipped for intense combat."120
This state of affairs was certainly odd, given that Saddam intended the Popular Army
to serve as a counterweight to the regular military. There is some evidence that the
Republican Guards were given better training prior to the war, although even for them, there
were limits.121 Despite an infusion of modern weapons, for example, very few Iraqi officers
received foreign military training in how to use those weapons, because of Saddam's fear
that they would bring communist ideas back with them from the Soviet Union and become
subversive.122 All of this speaks to the highly contingent nature of leaders' beliefs not only
about threats but about the very practices that lead to military effectiveness. Saddam seems
to have held the view that if Iraq simply purchased the right weapons, it could prevail in war,
almost regardless of other factors.
Perhaps the greatest indication of how little training the Iraqi military had received
prior to the war is that, once the war escalated, Saddam had numerous conversations with
his generals about how to correct training deficits.123 Only a month into the conflict, for
example, the Director of Military Movements, Staff Colonel Maysar Ibrahim al-Jayouri,
subtly warned Saddam, "Our soldier is raw material, we can accomplish miracles with him if
he is better used and guided."124 Saddam noted in another conversation, probably in the mid-
1980s, "We have formed a large army to be trained," but "our infantry training is a bit a
lagging.... We have been in war ... without training and of course all of you knew before the
war we were in need of training. If there was any blame to be placed, it would be for not
having the training done before the war started."125
Similarly, Saddam gave specific instructions for improved training of the Popular
Army.2 During this period he also decided to personally review all training manuals for the
army, again reflecting his concern that he had restricted training too much prior to the war.12
Nevertheless, as late as 1984, an Iraqi general found it necessary to publish a long defense of
the importance of training in an Iraqi military journal. He wrote,
Training and maintenance are essential, basic elements in all
circumstances. They are needed to build a qualified human and material
base superior to that of the enemy, and to maintain the momentum and
impact of that base in various stages of the conflict to achieve decisive
results and to effectively remedy shortages and losses stemming from the
length of the war. In this regard, emphasis must be placed on not
restricting training and maintenance to a certain aspect or area to the
exclusion of another."2
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While perfectly unobjectionable, the very fact that a senior officer devoted the time to write
an article explaining the importance of unrestricted training-four years into the war-
speaks volumes about the legacy of Saddam's pre-war policies.
One can draw a similar inference from another article published in the same issue, in
which the author observed, "Constant drilling in peace based on the most likely scenario
tends to produce good action in warfare. Training alone ensures gradual improvement in all
exercises.... The constant execution of realistic procedures in peacetime will make matters
proceed automatically and easily in war, which increases the chances of success in battle."129
The very banality of these statements is striking, perhaps suggesting that the Iraqi political
leadership had still failed to grasp commonsense training maxims.
Although there were efforts to improve training for particular units starting as early
as the fall of 1980, they remained sporadic at best well into 1984-5.100 In one recorded
conversation with Saddam, for example, an officer carefully approached the topic of seeking
foreign help with training, commenting, "We cannot say that the [foreign] officers are
smarter than the Iraqi ones.... On the brigade level our officers can hold their own, but in
other areas we can do better if some of those [foreign] officers can come here and train
us.... As a matter of fact we should have put more emphasis on training our troops....
Education in the military should take a larger scale and requires planning."131
As late as 1986-7, Saddam's advisors still had to work to convince him to ease
restrictions on training. In one 1986 conversation, for example, the defense minister noted,
"The process of building the warrior and building the human being, it is not a haphazard
process, it is not just giving a weapon to a person and train him for two weeks and tell him
go ahead and fight, the process of building the fighter is a very difficult one and requires
time." 132 In another conversation in 1987, a commander struggled to convince Saddam of
the need to reconsider Iraq's training methods, or lack thereof: "if these brave troops were
to be given room for training..., if they were to be given three to four months to be trained,
our position will be much better. Sir, each battalion needs a month or a month and a half to
be trained.... Can you see how it works, sir? ... If you allow me sir, everything will be
explained...."m The general gingerly concluded that, more so than the size of Iraqi forces,
the "quality, and the shortage of its training, [were] very important too."13
Finally, in late 1986 and early 1987, Saddam shifted to a system of best practices in
training for the rapidly expanding Republican Guard brigades, which were now formed into
a new command known as the Republican Guard Forces Command. According to one
recent history, "Saddam made the decision to pull the Republican Guard units out of the
front line and begin a wholesale reequipping and retraining effort from squad level all the
'2) "Security and Safety of the Unit in Peace and War, by Staff Major General Farug Umar al-Hariri," in
"Military Journal," July 1984, p. 12.
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m "Transcript of a Conversation between Saddam Hussein and High Ranking Officers during the Iraq-Iran
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way to division and corps command.... There was a greater willingness at the top to pay
serious attention to the recommendations of the more professional officers to build up the
Republican Guard's capabilities.... This effort to improve the Republican Guard involved
more extensive training at all levels to improve tactical and battlefield proficiency of officers
commanding Republican Guard units."136
For the first time, the forces actually practiced conducting both smaller-unit and
large corps-level offensive and defensive operations in highly realistic, full-size mockups of
Iranian defensive positions.137 One general recounted years later, "There was an extensive
training curriculum, day and night.... Saddam Hussein continuously followed up with us to
see how our training was coming, and the readiness of our forces.... We had several active
firing ranges and training grounds that would run 24 hours a day."138 In fact, many officers
no longer wished to serve in the Guard because of these intensive training responsibilities.139
Saddam was, of course, able to assuage some of these complaints by increasing the material
and financial benefits of service. 14 0
According to Cordesman and Wagner, Iraq also formed elite naval infantry brigades
during this period, which "sometimes trained with the Republican Guard units," and were
"aggressively trained... for the two kinds of operations [Iraq] generally had failed to conduct
successfully during the period from 1983 to 1987: aggressive infiltration and assault
operations and operations in wetlands and across water barriers."14, A few regular army units
were also given additional training: the 3rd, 6 t', and 1 0 ,h armored divisions and the 1" and 5 th
mechanized infantry divisions. 2 Cordesman and Wagner report, "Iraqi armor and infantry
were given special training in maneuver and combined-arms operations.... Iraq conducted
corps-level exercises in fluid defense and counterattack tactics.... Iraqi artillery units were
given special training in concentrating and shifting fire and in providing fire at the call of
forward air controllers in the forward area rather than prepared fire."43
Although Pollack emphasizes the heavily scripted nature of these training exercises
(and the resulting operations), he acknowledges that Iraqi generals also "began to try to
encourage junior commanders to be aggressive and innovative in combat and to react more
quickly and effectively to enemy moves."144 In short, Saddam altered the substance of his
intervention in Republican Guard training after 1986, shifting from worst practices to at least
better practices, if not best.
3. Command arrangements
Iraq began the war with worst practices in place regarding command arrangements,
evident in at least two major respects. First, Saddam adopted a highly centralized command
structure that located almost all battlefield decision-making authority in his personal hands
or those of a small inner circle in Baghdad.14s He went so far as to order that soldiers could
13\ Woods et al, Saddam6' IWar, p. 14.
Steven R. Ward, 1mmorta: a Military H-Iistory of/iani and Jts Armed Forces (Washington, DC: Georgetown
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never retreat unless they were outnumbered by particular force ratios. Several years into the
war, Saddam even created a Punishment Corps that operated in rear areas to enforce this
policy.146
Hence those on the battlefield were often afraid to take any action-offensive or
defensive-without specific authorization from higher headquarters or their unit's political
officer.147 Cordesman and Wagner note, "Every level of command tended to refer all
decisions upwards. The entire burden of command eventually rested on Saddam Hussein
and his immediate staff in Baghdad, a burden of command they lacked both the
communications and the expertise to bear effectively."48
Second, Saddam intentionally fractured command lines to different parts of the
military, ensuring that he personally controlled them but that no one part could ever gain any
command authority over the others. For example, Saddam ensured that the chain of
command for the Popular Army went outside the armed forces and the Ministry of Defense,
so that he could control it independently. 14 The Republican Guard also bypassed the normal
chain of command, reporting only to Saddam.15
According to Al-Marashi and Salama, two academic experts on the Iraqi military, the
motivation for these decisions was obvious: "if rebellious military officers were successfully
to carry out a coup, they would have to coordinate their actions with these parallel militaries
inside of the capital, increasing the chances that their plan would be uncovered. If officers of
the regular military tried to move against the leadership without the help of these anti-
armies, then they would have to fight their way into the capital, increasing the risks of such a
move."151 Additionally, Saddam engaged in the frequent shuffling of officers to prevent them
from forming personal relationships with men under their command that could then be used
to foment a coup.152
As with the policies on promotion and training, there is evidence that Saddam
shifted away from worst practices with respect to the Republican Guard late in the war. The
impetus for these changes is evident in conversations between Saddam and his generals a
few years into the war. In one such discussion, for example, Saddam explicitly voiced his
realization that "it is hard for the higher command to have a good control system when you
have a large army with many brigades and it lacks coordination between its units."153 It seems
that while tight personal control and extreme centralization of command might have been
feasible when the army's main tasks were palace protection, monitoring the Shia, or shelling
the Kurds, it proved paralyzing and dangerous for a multi-division army operating across
three major fronts in a conventional war. An Iraqi military journal around the same time
observed that "there is a limit to the number of individuals which one supervisor can
manage effectively" and that Iraqi lines of command authority needed to be clarified to
avoid conflicting orders and "duplicate leadership." 15
146 [ir, 1Lonuest War, pp. 109.
1 A taste of these sort of orders appears in "Nlecting Between Saddam...," CRRC Number SH-SFITP-A-000-
634, p. 10.
-1 Cordesman and Wagner, Iesons, p. 80.
149 Al-Marashi and Salama, lraq's Armed Forces, p. 126.
Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces, p. 156.
5 Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Arlmed For-ces, p. 125.
AI-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces, p. 145.
"Audio Recorded Meeting," CRRC Number SI-S ITP-A-000-627, p. 25.
'54 "Defense in Strong Points, by Staff Brigadier General Abd-al-Zuhrah Shikarah al-Maliki," in "Military
Journal," CRRC Number SH -MODX-D-000-853, p. 60.
211
In another conversation, a different military officer concurred with Saddam's
dawning realization that a more decentralized command structure might allow better
coordination across different branches of the Iraqi military. According to this officer, "In
other armies they make different branches of the military interact and have the same tasks.
Usually the armed forces break soldiers of different branches into working together by
forcing them to do joint tasks. As they ease into it, it becomes a routine."iss Saddam agreed
with this officer that Iraqi command arrangements needed to be restructured to "hinder any
chances that the enemy would use the lack of coordination or communication for his
advantage."s He also listened as another officer suggested that Saddam needed to halt the
destructive practice of frequently shuffling officers among different commands-an ideal
mechanism for preventing coup plots but a detrimental one for unit cohesion and tactical
proficiency in wartime.i17 Still, there is little evidence that Saddam made any actual changes
to these practices early in the war. 158
Finally, meetings between Saddam and his generals in July 1986 and March 1987
apparently led to the decisions to launch new offensives against Iran with an expanded
Republican Guard subject to new command arrangements (as well as new policies in the
other areas of interest: promotions, training, and information management). 159 These
decisions were all related: Saddam's generals convinced him that Iraq would never win the
war merely by continuing a static defense, but the Guards could never conduct anything
more complex absent a shift in command arrangements (again, in addition to shifts in
promotions, training, and information management). According to a U.S. military assessment
of what had happened, "Under the generals' strategy Saddam would be relegated to virtual
observer status. In the past, all operations had been tightly controlled from the Palace; this
could not be under the new set up. Operations had to be decentralized; from the Palace
Saddam could not direct a campaign that was expected to go on for weeks...." 0"
The result was a series of significant changes in Saddam's command arrangements.
First, he allowed a significant devolution of command authority. 161 Ward writes that starting
in mid-1986, "the Iraqi dictator limited his micromanagement of operations" and "allowed
Iraq's increasingly competent and professional commanders more control."]( Cordesman
and Wagner also report that Iraq's field commanders and fighting officers were given a
much stronger voice in directing battles and campaigns."1o Saddam recalled many of the
political officers, often called commissars, that had formerly been assigned to all Iraqi units
above battalion strength, and those who remained found their command authority
curtailed. '6'
Saddam never ended the fracturing of command, in the sense that the Guard
continued to be separate from the Popular Army, which was separate from the regular army.
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On the other hand, Saddam did not nothing to divide the Guard further, while more than
tripling its size. He also encouraged the formation of a functioning general staff system
among Guard officers, reversing some of the intra-Guard fracturing that had existed
earlier. 65Additionally, the constant rotation of officers was ended.166
In these ways, there was a real shift in the nature of the practices governing the
Guard, which was the entity actually conducting most of the externally oriented combat by
this time in the war. While perhaps still not best practices, these policies certainly were an
improvement over the worst practices in place during the early years of the conflict.
4. Information management
In general, Iraqi intelligence was more concerned with tracking political
developments inside Iraq and the loyalty of the armed forces than with gathering
information on the Iranians.167 During the 1970s Saddam had constructed a vast spy network
to report to him on the activities of military officers. Indeed, a rough but credible calculation
suggests that in 1980 "one-fifth of the active Iraqi labor force... were institutionally charged
with one form or another of violence," either in the army or in the numerous internally
directed policing and intelligence agencies. 168
Another study notes that "when the war started, political commissars, who did
nothing but report back to Saddam, were attached to all units. This system was still in place
in 1982, an indication of Saddam's continued distrust."169 In fact, in one conversation with
his generals, Saddam responded to their disagreement about part of a report by noting,
The Intelligence Officer will settle this matter, because he was
eavesdropping on you.... He was assigned to eavesdrop on the
Corps, this way we can find out whether the Corps will comply
with operation security.... Every time we have a battle going, the
Intelligence Officer instruct [sic] technical departments to ensure
that the Corps are adhering with guidelines and hear what they
are talking, whether such talk will reveal the plans, the Officer
would tell the Corps that he regard [sic] them as enemy, so he
eavesdrops on their conversations.'
Internal correspondence from the Iraqi General Military Intelligence Directorate
actually noted that after the war started, the government was facing difficulties gathering
intelligence from its own population, because Iraq's citizens were so used to an intelligence
apparatus focused on them instead of Iran. One document stressed that the government
needed to work to "convince the masses that the staff intelligence directorates were
established to watch the enemy and not our various sectors; we should end this sort of
stereotype and convince them that intelligence is part of the armed forces and not a
dominating department-with the only concern-of watching and looking for
adversaries.""
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The same writer also noted that thus far in the war, "intelligence is still not up to the
required standard due to some organizational reasons."172 Indeed, as late as 1984, an Iraqi
military journal published an article emphasizing the importance of basic tactical
information, which it described as "the vital nerve in warfare." The author added that "long
ago, it was said 'Give me information and I will give you victory.' The basis of warfare is the
collection of information before and during the war. Information is indispensable to any
commander regardless of his capability or status."179 Again, the fact that an officer had to
spell out these facts suggests continuing problems with information flow in the Iraqi
military.
Given this climate, Saddam's officers rarely reported information that they thought
he might not want to hear. As one general explained in an interview after the fall of the
regime, "Saddam put great pressure on Iraqi commanders on the ground to avoid losses,
which led them not to report failures. Withholding losses from reports and thus not
receiving reinforcements or other support left commanders in impossible combat
conditions. However, this was better than reporting their failures and suffering execution."174
Indeed, commanders often exaggerated their claims about battlefield events or chose
not to convey important developments up the chain of command.175 Iraqi officers also were
afraid to speak to one another, fearing that they might be accused of coup plotting. As
Cordesman and Wagner put it, "The command-and-control system was incapable of
transmitting the true tactical situation. Senior Iraqi officers later noted that they often got
more timely information from the media than they did from their own commanders at the
front."' 6
That said, the problem was a two-way street: political leaders also severely limited the
information that battlefield commanders received, even about events occurring directly in
their areas of operation. According to Al-Marashi and Salama, "Controlling the
dissemination of information served as a means of manipulating the military during the war,"
in other words, of preventing military units from collaborating in any potential internally
directed actions that might threaten the regime. "Tactical field commanders rarely received
timely intelligence down from the chain of command and thus never had a full picture of the
nature of the Iranian forces in their theater."'-
Starting in 1983, Saddam initiated some changes in his information management
policies. First, he fired the security chief who managed the spy network in the armed
forces.' The next year he made some attempts to gather more realistic information from his
field officers, evident in their more frequent inclusion in high-level political meetings about
the war.' Indeed, there is quite a bit of evidence that by 1984-5, Saddam was seeking a more
realistic assessment of how to win the war. A memo from Saddam to his commanders dated
7 "GMID Daily Intelligence," CRRC Number SH-GMID-D-000-883, p. 18.
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February 16, 1984, admits, "We must quietly examine our defensive measures and find out
what type of activity we could add to those measures to increase their effectiveness."180
Still, only in 1986-7 did Saddam institutionalize major changes in information
management. First, he allowed his officers to formulate an alternative strategy to be
implemented by the Republican Guards. According to Al-Marashi and Salama, Saddam also
finally accepted "the need for combined arms operations, even though in the past these had
been discouraged due to political reasons.... To conduct these combined arms tactics, the
officers had to convince Hussein to allow cooperation between the military services and
devolve command and control authority to the commanders on the field." 181 Saddam
complied, slashing "the number of bureaucratic barriers to the rapid transfer of information
to field commanders" and lifting restrictions on interservice communication.182
While probably still not ideal in terms of information management, these changes
certainly represented a shift away from the worst practices that characterized the early years
of the war, at least with respect to Republican Guard units. Combined with the other aspects
of political intervention already discussed, these policies make it possible to generate
predictions about the likely battlefield effectiveness of the Iraqi military.
Predictions If the Political Intervention Explanation Is Right: Confirming Evidence
e Iraqi units should have displayed virtually no effectiveness in the early years of the war
with Iran, especially prior to 1982. Their battlefield performance should have reflected
minimal cohesion, virtually no tactical proficiency, and no ability whatsoever to conduct
complex operations.
e The one exception should have been those units fighting under the coercion of the
Punishment Corps, which should have demonstrated improved cohesion, although
without tactical proficiency or the ability to conduct complex operations.
* After 1986, there should have been substantial improvements in the battlefield
effectiveness of Iraqi Republican Guard units. These units should have been cohesive,
tactically proficient, and capable of at least some complex operations, in contrast to
regular army and Popular Army units.
Predictions Ifthe Political Intervention Explanation Is Wrong: Disconfirming Evidence
- Iraqi units that demonstrated cohesion, tactical proficiency, and/or the ability to conduct
complex operations prior to 1986 would cast doubt on the intervention theory, because
they would show that the military was effective even under worst practices in political
intervention.
* Republican Guard units that failed to demonstrate cohesion, tactical proficiency, and the
ability to conduct at least some complex operations after 1986 would also cast doubt on
the intervention theory, because they would show that major shifts in the nature of
political intervention did not prompt corresponding changes in battlefield effectiveness.
Predictions I/the Alternative Explanations Are Right: Additional Disconfirming Evidence
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* There should have been very little variation over time or across different units of the
Iraq military.
e There should have been very little cross-national variation between the performance of
Iraqi Republican Guard units and Iranian military units after 1986.
III. Political Intervention in the Iranian Military and Its Predicted Impact on
Battlefield Effectiveness
What policies did Iran's leaders adopt regarding their military's promotion patterns,
training regimens, command arrangements, and information management? What kinds of
outcomes should these policies have produced in terms of battlefield effectiveness, if the
theory presented in Chapter 1 is correct? How do these predicted results differ from what
we would expect to see if forms of political intervention were irrelevant to explaining
battlefield effectiveness, or if other variables were more important?
Iran's revolutionary leaders relied entirely on worst practices in political intervention.
They promoted officers based on political and religious credentials; they limited training;
they established convoluted and fractured command arrangements; and they restricted
horizontal communication within the military and used their intelligence apparatus primarily
to spy on their own population and the military itself. Despite the threat of Iraqi invasion
and occupation, leaders of the Islamic Republic essentially never budged from the belief that
their greatest enemies were internal rather than external. As reflected in the slogan
"Revolution Before Victory," counter-revolution, popular uprisings, and coups all remained
bigger concerns than combating external attack.183
Indeed, in a striking example of the highly contingent relationship between leaders'
threat perceptions and their actions with respect to political intervention, even where Iranian
leaders created forces that they considered more politically reliable-such as the
Revolutionary Guards-they still never adopted best practices toward those units. This
stance sets them apart from the Iraqis and the South Vietnamese, whose leaders at least
seemed to understand that there were real tradeoffs involved in differing forms of political
intervention and who displayed some attempts, however belated or inadequate, to vary
practices across different parts of their armies.
lt is important to acknowledge that Iran under the Shah had hardly been subject to
best practices, either. The Shah intervened intensely and frequently in most major military
activities, and in ways that veered largely toward worst practices, as will be discussed below.
Although Khomeini constantly emphasized his break with the past, when it came to running
his military there were more continuities than admitted.184 That said, the evidence shows that
under the Shah there were at least better practices in place with respect to training, largely
due to the alliance with the Americans. This difference was subtle, perhaps more subtle than
the theory from Chapter 1 can fully capture, but it does suggest that there should have been
a further deterioration in Iranian militarv effectiveness as the revolution was consolidated
and the final traces of the Shah's policies dissolved.
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Indeed, if the political intervention explanation is correct, Iranian battlefield
performance should generally gave been quite poor, but especially so as the war went on and
the country's revolutionary leaders deepened their imposition of worst practices on the
regular forces and undid any lingering benefits of the training that had occurred under the
Shah. From the outset, however, newly constituted Iranian revolutionary forces should have
displayed little cohesion, no tactical proficiency, and no ability to conduct complex
operations.
Crucially, as mentioned earlier, the variables emphasized in existing theories suggest
that Iranian battlefield performance should have been essentially static throughout the war
and generally better than Iraq's. Because Iran's level of wealth, population size, regime type,
national stakes, culture, and level of military autonomy did not vary significantly, there
should not have been much of a difference between the performance of legacy units from
the Shah's army and revolutionary units formed after his overthrow. Furthermore, Iran's
superior wealth, larger population, lower degree of autocracy, and Persian culture all should
have provided significant advantages over Iraq on the battlefield.
In fact, the evidence suggests that Iranian battlefield effectiveness varied more and
was generally worse than existing theories would predict. What successes its military did have
largely reflected a lag effect from the practices used by the Shah, and once the revolution had
fully exerted its influence, the Iranian fighting power hinted at in 1981-2 vanished.
To be sure, Iran's subsequent "human wave" attacks enabled it to stalemate Iraq
during the period 1982-1986, and the revolutionary forces that executed these operations did
reflect a surprising level of ideologically motivated cohesion not predicted by the political
intervention theory. But as we will see, the Iranian experience actually underscores the
difference between cohesion and battlefield effectiveness, showing that the former is a
necessary but not sufficient condition of the latter. Despite the eagerness of Iranian troops
to fight and die, political leaders' imposition of worst practices prevented this asset from
ever evolving into consistent tactical proficiency or the ability to sustain complex operations.
To examine these claims, the section below briefly reviews the basic structure and
history of the Iranian armed forces. Then it examines the nature of political intervention in
the Iranian military in the four areas of interest, both before and after the Iranian revolution.
The questions used to code the independent variable are listed in Chapter 1. In each of the
four areas-promotions, training, command, and information-I outline the general policies
that Iranian leaders adopted, while also exploring possible exceptions to these policies. I
conclude with summary predictions about how the Iranian military should have performed
in battle if my theory is right or wrong, and if the other theories are right or wrong.
Background on Iran and Its Militay
Iranians are sometimes described as tending toward paranoia about enemies both
foreign and domestic, but the country's history reveals that these fears are grounded in a very
real experience of external interference and internal instability. The military has been a
central focus of political contestation throughout the existence of modern Iran, serving as
both a source of political power and a constant threat to it.
After being invaded by both Britain and Russia, Iran ended World War I as a British
protectorate. Fearing instability and Soviet influence after the withdrawal of British troops,
Britain supported a 1921 coup led by a young colonel, Reza Khan, who overthrew the last
ruler of the Qajar dynasty and in 1925 established Pahlavi rule. Although Reza Shah Pahlavi
wore a monarch's crown, his regime was better characterized as a military dictatorship in
which the army served as "the keystone of his authority and the focal point around which he
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planned to raise the Iranian nation."18 Seeing himself as a modernizer in the mold of Ataturk
and Mussolini, the Shah enlarged the Iranian army, now called the Artesh, in order to assert
central authority over Iran's many tribes and to undermine the power of Iranian clergy.186 At
the same time, rumors of coup plotting were frequent, and the Shah was careful to promote
only those military officers whom he personally knew to be loyal.187
During World War II, Iran's good relations with Nazi Germany and ability to
block-or provide-a potential Allied supply corridor to the Soviet Union led to a repeat of
the World War I invasions. British and Soviet forces again swept through large swaths of the
country. Seeing that the Artesh could not hold up against these foreign armies, the Shah
accepted Allied terms in August 1941 and abdicated in favor of his 22 year-old son,
Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, who took the throne in September.188
The years after the war brought turmoil to Iran. The young Shah faced growing
opposition from both the communist Tudeh party and the Nationalist Front, led by
Mohammed Mossadeq, who became the country's prime minister in 1951. Mossadeq's
growing political popularity eventually forced the Shah to give him control of the war
ministry, a position from which Mossadeq immediately began to reduce the military's size
and purge it of the Shah's supporters.189
Army officers responded by conspiring to remove Mossadeq. Given Mossadeq's
decision to nationalize Iranian oil-a threat to British profits, which themselves had been
one of the main rallying cries of the Nationalist Front-British intelligence soon joined the
plotting, as did the Central Intelligence Agency. The result was a 1953 coup in which the
army carefully orchestrated Mossadeq's ouster and restored to the Shah wide-ranging powers
more akin to those his father had enjoyed. Over the next several years, the CIA also assisted
the Shah in establishing an internal intelligence organization, eventually known as the
SAVAK, which assisted in further consolidating the Shah's rule and ridding the Iranian
armed forces of Tudeh supporters.""'
His power thus fortified against threats from the nationalist and communist camps,
the Shah spent the next 25 years building the Iranian military into the largest and best-
equipped force in the Middle East.'"" With extensive aid from the United States, the Shah
developed the military as the key pillar of his authority.192 Keenly aware that both he and his
father had come to power through coups, the Shah lavished the officer corps with pay and
perks. 193
During the 1960s and 70s, the military's role was primarily internal, focused on
implementing the Shah's reform and modernization programs and quelling opposition.114
Under the Shah, "senior officers were assigned to run provinces, important government
1-5 Ward, Imimortal, p. 134.
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ministries and large state enterprises, particularly major industrial installations." '95Even the
last major expeditionary operation mounted by the Artesh, a campaign to help the Sultan of
Oman defeat an insurgency 1973, reflected a military that had evolved to perform mostly
internal tasks related to state-building or regime protection, rather than to combat external,
state-based threats in a conventional war.196 Nevertheless, the Shah also expressed great
worries about external threats to his country, ranging from the Soviets to the Iraqi Kurds to
the Egyptians.197
By 1977, the annual Iranian defense budget had grown to nearly $9.4 billion.198 The
Artesh now consisted of three armored divisions, three infantry divisions, and four
independent brigades (one each of armor, infantry, airborne, and special forces).'"9 These
forces provided 240,000 active duty men available for combat, in addition to as many as
400,000 men in the reserve.21o Roughly 45,000 Americans also lived in Iran to provide
various types of advice and support to these forces.21I
IRANIAN FORCE STRUCTURE202
1980 1986
Regular army (Artesh) 150,000 305,000
3 armored divisions 3 mechanized divisions
3 infantry divisions 7 infantry divisions
4 independent brigades 1 special forces division
4 air defense battalions 1 airborne brigade
Add'l armor brigades
Add'l infantry brigades
12 air defense battalions
Revolutionary Guard 75,000 350,000
and militia forces 8 divisions
(Pasdaran and Basij) Add'l indep. brigades
Add'l air, naval assets
>300 Basij battalions
Air Force 70,000 35,000
Navy 20,000 14,500
Total active 240,000 704,500
Reserves 400,000 350,000
The year 1978 shattered this equilibrium, however, as a diverse series of popular
grievances with the Shah lead to violent uprisings across the country. Exiled Shiite cleric
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini skillfully capitalized on the citizenry's discontent with
enforced secularism, economic inequality, and dependence on the Americans. He also
19 Ward, Immwortal, p. 202.
96 Ward, Imlmlortal, p. 203.
'F "The Evolution of the U.S.-Iranian Relationship," State Department Report, January 29, 1980, pp. 3 7 -8, 42,
50, available through the Digital National Security Archive, item number IR03556.
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cleverly appealed to the military not to defend the Shah's regime, sparking a series of
desertions and mutinies. For his part, the Shah proved unwilling to order the sort of harsh
crackdown that might have saved his regime, and, indeed, somehow the military had never
been specifically trained to put down riots or control crowds.23 In January 1979, the Shah
fled the country.
Khomeini touched down in Tehran two weeks later, and within a matter of days
what remained of the Iranian military had returned to its barracks.204 The revolutionaries had
clearly triumphed, but the diverse anti-Shah coalition displayed little consensus on what
should replace him. Secular nationalists, liberals, leftists, communists, and various Islamists
all had different ideas about the shape of the new order.20 Between February and November
1979, Khomeini began to systematically neutralize other centers of power in post-
revolutionary Iran. As Zabih has observed, "Khomeini, who had labored strenuously to keep
them together as long as he needed their aggregate strength, now turned against them. To do
so he applied an old Persian proverb: 'if you want to smash a bunch of sticks, don't do it in
one blow. Break them one by one."'206
Khomeini started by pressuring the new prime minister, Mehdi Bazargan, into
accepting members of the clerically-dominated Islamic Republic Party (IRP) into his
administration.2 These members then lent further support to the armed groups known as
the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, or Pasdaran, springing up around the country in
support of Khomeini. During 1979 the country disintegrated into a virtual civil war as the
Guards fought against their former allies, especially the Tudeh and the Marxist movements
such as the Fedayeen e-Khalq and Mujahedeen e-Khalq (MEK).2'8 According to Ward, the
Fedayeen and MEK at the time "had between fifteen thousand and twenty thousand armed
guerrillas, while the Tudeh Party had about seven thousand armed men and women in
Tehran alone. Militant Islamic groups aided by cadres of Lebanese Shia and Palestinians had
nearly twenty thousand fighters, while another twenty thousand or more armed Iranians
were in the streets after the military's armories were looted."2 9 The Guards also put down
ethnic revolts during this period by nearly all the major non-Persian groups in Iran, including
the Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, Baluchs, and Azeris.l1
November 1979 then brought what some have called "the second Islamic
revolution" or the "clerical coup d'6tat."21 I Angered by news of a meeting between Bazargan
and U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, Iranian students-probably with
direction from the Guards-stormed the American embassy and took hostages in protest.
Bazargan resigned, and his government fell. 2 Khomeini supporters then quickly pushed
through constitutional changes granting the ayatollah "absolute power" under the concept of
2"3 Ward, Immilortal, ch. 8.
204 Ward, I1mnortal, pp. 216-224.
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guardianship, also known as clerical rule. He was now the commander-in-chief of the armed
forces and the Guards as well.213
January 1980 brought the election of a moderate, secular intellectual, Abol Hasan
Bani Sadr, as president. Having become allies during their anti-Shah days in France,
Khomeini backed Bani Sadr and also delegated to him the responsibilities of commanding
the military, including the Guards. But the Guards soon rejected Bani Sadr's authority, and,
as had been the case with Bazargan, the gulf between Bani Sadr and the radical clerics who
supported Khomeini grew too great. Bani Sadr was dismissed in June 1981.214 With this step,
the Khomeini faction was no longer just a faction; it had transformed into a juggernaut in
full control of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the state. 21 5
Khomeini had recognized early on that gaining a monopoly on the use of force
would be essential to consolidating the Islamic regime. In particular, he had shown
immediate concern in the spring of 1979 about the threat posed to the revolution by the
professional military.216 Although the Artesh's return to the barracks had been instrumental
in the Shah's demise, it was not exactly a hotbed of support for the new clerical regime.217
Schahgaldian, who interviewed dozens of exiled Iranian officers in the 1980s, notes, "From
the very beginning of the Islamic regime, the ruling clerics were intensely aware of the
potential threat that the Shah's military posed to their own political survival."218 Guard units
had been immediately stationed at the exits to Artesh garrisons, ensuring that these units did
not move without permission from Khomeini.219 These fears probably only worsened as the
regime learned of six coup plots in the first half of 1980 alone.220
Against this sort of backdrop, it is easy understand why Khomeini had ordered the
establishment of the aforementioned Revolutionary Guard in May 1979. This force grew
from 30,000 in 1980 to more than a quarter of a million during the war.22 1 The Guard also
helped over see volunteer militias of young Iranians known as the Basij, who already
numbered 75,000 during 1979-80 and would eventually swell to a size of 200,000 at the
height of the war.222 Both of these forces helped ensure that Khomeini had at his disposal a
large coercive apparatus committed to the ideals of the revolution.
Crucially, however, Khomeini formed this apparatus with the destruction of
domestic enemies in mind. Indeed, anti-regime violence continued in Iran, peaking in a
spectacular attack on iRP headquarters in June 1981, followed by the assassination of the
president and prime minister in August.-bThe regime subsequently admitted to more than
2,000 executions of opposition members between June and September. Outside experts
suggested the actual number could have been more than 50 percent higher.74
After this major crackdown, violence against the regime lessened considerably.225 By
1982, for example, the U.S. State Department described the regime as "in firm control of
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Iran with no meaningful opposition within the country."226 The Defense Intelligence Agency
made a similar assessment, noting, "Politically, the Khomeini regime has defeated most of its
immediate internal opponents and continues to consolidate control"227 Although an
additional coup plot was discovered in April 1982, and 1983-4 brought further crackdowns
on the Tudeh, in general the regime had stabilized.228
To the extent that Iran's leaders considered Iraq a threat prior to the start of the war,
this fear had meaning largely within the context of Iran's own domestic battles. For example,
while still in office Bani-Sadr wrote the UN Secretary-General that "from the very beginning
of our revolutionary victory..., Iraq has been violating the terms of the Algiers Agreement of
1975, by sending Iraqi agents and armed units across our western and southwestern borders
into the provinces of Khuzestan and Kurdestan for the purposes of committing acts of
sabotage and assisting counter-revolutionary groups.... Iraq has been a haven for the
remnants of the previous regime and other reactionary and criminal elements involved in
propagandistic and terroristic activities against the Islamic Republic of Iran."229
To be sure, these suspicions were not without merit. As mentioned, Saddam had
given refuge to the Shah's last prime minister and last army commander, who were now
broadcasting attacks on Khomeini from Iraq.23o Iraq also supported anti-Khomeini coup
efforts, including the most serious, the Nojeh plot in July 1980.231 But Iraq was perceived as a
threat not because of its conventional military capabilities but because of its potential
counter-revolutionary political activities inside Iran. Similarly, as Iran expanded the
Revolutionary Guards into a force of several hundred thousand by August 1981, it did so
primarily with the goals of providing a counterweight to the regular military and protecting
the regime from internal threats.232 It was this evolving force that faced the Iraqis on the
battlefield starting in September 1980.
1. Promotion patterns
The idea of officer promotion based on merit rather than political ties was a
relatively foreign one in Iran, even under the Shah. Although it managed to acquire an
impressive arsenal of modern weapons, the Artesh had been far from a truly professional
military in terms of how it selected and advanced its leaders. The Shah exerted his personal
control over all promotions at the level of colonel and above to ensure that the armed forces
would be good at governance and regime protection, and unlikely to foment coups or stir up
other dissent against him.233 As Ward argues, "The original sin of the Shah's armed forces
was that political considerations took first priority in managing the officer corps, even if this
meant removing capable officers or promoting mediocre ones loyal to the court."234 The
Shah did not simply hire cronies-he actively fired anyone who appeared competent enough
126 Discussion Paper, State Department, "Implications for U.S. Interests and Policy of Iranian Invasion of
Southern Iraq," July 14, 1982, available at the National Security Archive, the George Washington University,
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to threaten him. To put it bluntly, "Muhammad Reza quashed ambitious military men."235
Generals who demonstrated too much ambition or appeared to be a threat to the regime
could expect a far-away diplomatic posting, or worse.23
This was the so-called professional military that Iran's new leaders inherited in
1979-already an officer corps consisting of perhaps less than stellar human capital. Fearing
the military as a possible source of counter-revolutionary sentiment, Khomeini further
decimated the officer corps by initiating a massive wave of purges, perhaps comparable only
to those by Stalin on the eve of World War II. Schahgaldian reports that "by the end of 1979
almost all of the hardline pro-Shah officers and those who had been known for their pro-
American views were eliminated, regardless of rank, in one way or the other. These
reportedly included all of the 14 army division commanders, the eight commanders of the
independent army and army air command brigades, and all the military governors."23
Starting in 1980, the purges reached into the lower ranks, and "membership with any
political group not in favor of the newly instituted clerical regime came to be regarded as a
sufficient ground for purge." 238 According to Ward, extensive purges, even below the rank
of major, continued throughout the first half of the 1980S.239 "The Iranian officer corps may
have lost as much as 40 percent of its strength by the eve of the war with Iraq," he
estimates.20
Although Khomeini sought to strip the Artesh of its imperial taint, in a certain sense
his policies reflected continuity rather than disjuncture with the forms of political
intervention used by the Shah. The definition of political reliability shifted-from loyalty to
the Shah to loyalty to the clerical regime-yet it remained a far more important criterion
than demonstrated military competence for selection and advancement in the officer corps.
The result, as under the Shah, was a climate of distrust and anxiety in the officer corps, and a
generally poor human base for handling the challenges of war.24 1
In the new Islamic Republic, officers gained their promotions primarily through
family ties to the clergy, who were able to manipulate promotion and selection even of very
senior officers.242 In many instances captains and lieutenants were promoted to fill senior
billets recently vacated by disfavored colonels and generals: "officials chose to promote
junior officers who were not the most capable men available, but those of whose political
loyalty they were certain." 2 The result was an officer corps likely to shore up the new
regime but even more poorly situated than its predecessor to handle the challenge of a
conventional war against another state.
There is some evidence that these worst practices may have abated slightly as the war
went on. Relations between the Artesh and the Pasdaran did improve a bit, and the pace of
purges slowed somewhat after 1982.244 Many, former officers were called up to service on the
front, in some cases from prison. 15 There was also evidence that the regime came to value
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the role of competence in making some leadership decisions after 1983.24 There is no
evidence, however, of any wholesale, systematic changes in promotion practices.
Furthermore, it is important to note that restoring officers from the Shah's military hardly
constituted best practices, given the manner in which the Shah had intervened regarding the
selection and promotion of officers.
2. Training regimens
Under the Shah, military training had at least purported to prepare the armed forces
for combat, although the Shah's methods had been far from best practices. Extensive and
realistic training at the small- and large-unit levels was not common in the Shah's army, for
example. 247 The training that did occur tended to consist of set-piece exercises organized by
the United States.24 Not wishing to risk mistakes or raise suspicions," Ward writes, "unit
commanders showed a marked lack of interest in collective training or in developing their
abilities to handle larger combined forces." 249
Clearly, training under the Shah was not ideal, but it did exist. After the revolution,
even the limited military school system all but collapsed. 250 Ward argues, "The clerics were
content to allow logistical problems to fester while they focused on the military's political
reliability.... Advanced training came to nearly a complete halt." 251 The purges also caused
enormous turnover in the institutions responsible for training, such as they were, and
dramatically lowered the standards of instruction. Schahgaldian reported based on his
interviews with exiled military officers that "in general, the professional military has become
much more lenient both in admission and graduation requirements of most training
centers.... They lowered the professional competence of the officer corps." 22 Even Iraqi
intelligence noted in 1980 that many Iranian units had "not conducted any exercises since
the fall of the Shah."253
To the extent that the new regime did prepare soldiers for the battlefield, the lessons
tended to consist of ideological indoctrination rather than realistic, live-fire opportunities to
develop and hone actual military skills.254 The military academy now devoted more than a
third of all courses to an ideological and political curriculum and was designated as "the
arena where military and Islamic tenets are integrated.255 Khomeini's new Political-
Ideological Directorate (PID) assigned clerics from the joint staff down to the platoon level
to provide ideological and political education, write new training materials, hold daily
prayers, and enforce Islamic standards of behavior.256
In short, Khomeini was still more concerned that soldiers accept the ideas needed to
consolidate the revolution than that they develop the tactical and operational abilities needed
to defend against the Iraqis.2>7 To be sure, he probably considered the two to be related:
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soldiers who believed in the ideals of the revolution would also probably be more motivated
to evict the "infidel" regime of Saddam Hussein and "liberate" those Shias oppressed under
his rule. But clearly, Iran prioritized ideological indoctrination over even very basic training.
Many soldiers reportedly received only a few weeks of instruction of any type.258 This
reality appears to have been confirmed by Iraqi interrogations of Iranian prisoners of war.25 9
Basij training in particular was nominal, usually consisting only of very basic small arms
training and perhaps a few hours of exercises in penetrating defensive obstacles. 261) Iran did
not restore the training systems that had existed under the Shah and conducted little
refresher training.261
Furthermore, large segments of the Guard were focused on local policing and
enforcement of Islamic laws and regulation, the defense of the regime against
counterrevolutionary elements, the protection of government buildings and installations, the
collection of internal intelligence, the sponsoring of pro-regime rallies, publication of pro-
regime literature, and other mobilization of the population in support of the regime.262 Thus
to the extent that training did occur, its content was geared toward duties unlikely to have
prepared Iranian soldiers for fighting a conventional war against an opposing land army.
Even six years into the war, a senior Iranian minister clearly drew this distinction, noting,
"The mission of the Guards of the Revolution is to protect the Islamic revolution, which
may be from threats other than those across the frontiers."26
3. Command arrangements
Iran also adopted worst practices regarding command arrangements. Even under the
Shah, Iranian command arrangements had been highly centralized and intentionally
fractured, in order to maximize the Shah's personal control of the armed forces. As one
study notes, "The Shah ensured loyalty to himself by applying the divide-and-rule principle
among his generals, accomplished by exacerbating intense personal rivalries among his
generals and placing 'personal enemies alternately in the chain of command' to preclude the
possibility of a coup.
Additionally, the Shah "frequently shuffled commanders to ensure that they could
not form power bases or enduring alliances. Under his micromanagement, no regular chain
of command developed. Every general viewed himself as responsible to no one other than
the Shah, and the field commanders regularly bypassed the SDC [Supreme Defense Council]
and their service chiefs to contact Muhammad Reza."26 The entire system was so dependent
on the personal authority of the Shah that his direct permission was required for any general
to visit Tehran."2"
Scholars have noted that, ironically, this command structure played a role in the
revolution itself. According to Ward, "Muhammad Reza could not break his habit of using
rivalry and resentments among his senior commanders to prevent the rise of a potential
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alternative to his rule. The result was a senior command structure unable to coordinate
action to stop the revolution."267 Roberts has made a similar observation, noting that because
"the Shah insisted that the heads of the armed forces heads deal with him directly on all
matters and prohibited direct contact among service chiefs," the military was essentially
unable to coordinate effective action in the face of the revolutionaries.268 Hence although it is
true that the Iranian revolution later purged individuals loyal to the Shah, in some sense the
new regime also perpetuated the underlying command structure the Shah had developed:
overlapping chains of command reporting directly to political leaders. Now these leaders
were all clerics, but the resemblance was visible.
Certainly, centralized control broke down to a certain extent in the period
immediately surrounding the revolution; many military units acted independently with little
direction from Tehran.269 Nevertheless, Khomeini was quick to re-assert his personal
direction over the military by inserting mullahs throughout the command structures of both
the Pasdaran and the Artesh.270 According to Ward, "Clerical supervision was arranged for all
Pasdaran units down to the local level."271 During 1980-81, the revolutionary regime was so
worried that Bani-Sadr was trying to isolate the regular army from Islamic influences that the
Supreme Defense Council, dominated by clerics, insisted that religious commissars be
attached to all Artesh units. Even when Bani-Sadr fled Iran, these commissars-with the
power to override the commands of regular army military officers-remained in place.272
In essence, the mullahs had developed "their own separate chain of command
through the various religious commissars in the forces and often exercised a command
authority which overrode that of the regular commanders."27 It became common for senior
commanders "to bypass regular command chains and go directly to leading clerical figures in
order to resolve internal military problems." 24 In fact, in what must have been a somewhat
awkward observation, given Saddam's command structure, an Iraqi assessment of Iran noted
the damaging effect of these conflicting and confusing chains of command: "the units are
driven by committees consisting of three persons that are mostly clergymen. This has left a
bad effect on the psychological state of the commanders and leaders." 27
Even more striking than these moves towards centralization in lran's command
structure was Khomeini's repeated willingness to fracture the command structure, a pattern
rooted in the establishment of the Guard in May 1979.2 Y The emergence of two parallel
militaries, each with its own chain of command, created hostility and tension within the
country's armed forces, hindering coordination.2- Again, an Iraqi assessment picked up on
the rivalry, noting, "The relationship between the Guards and the Armed Forces is full of
tension. The members of the Guards feel that they are the real power of Al-Khomeini. They
behaved improperly with the members of the armed forces and degraded them. This has
built grudge Isic] and hatred towards them. The statements of Bani Sadr and the
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commanders of the guards show the size of the exploitation, the chaos that has spread
between their flanks, and the differences between their commanders."278
Furthermore, Iran's leaders wasted repeated opportunities to rectify the problem and
unify their fractured armed forces. A joint military command between the army and the
Guard was announced as early as 1982, but real integration never happened, often because
of interference from senior mullahs.279 Iran's senior leaders simply did not wish to resolve
the division between the regular army and the Guards.28o The two entities even exchanged
some officers, but tensions remained high. According to Cordesman and Wagner, "reports
of clashes between clerics, officers of the regular forces, and officers of the Revolutionary
Guards continued through 1988."281 The two organizations maintained separate budgets,
recruiting systems, and intelligence arms as well.282
While there is some evidence that the mullahs' interference in command decisions
lessened as the war went on, and that some of the tension between the regular forces and the
Guard subsided, these developments seem to have been limited.283 As a general matter,
Iranian leaders persisted in worst practices in command arrangements, requiring centralized
religious approval for most military decisions and maintaining military institutions that were
deliberately and formally separated from one another.
4. Information management
As with the other areas of military activity, the Shah had not developed good
practices in information management. Rather than optimize his officers' ability to gain,
share, and use information in wartime, the Shah had developed an elaborate, internally
directed intelligence apparatus to report to him on his own forces. According to Ward, the
Shah "used multiple organizations, including SAVAK, his own secret intelligence bureau,
and military intelligence, to watch the armed forces and each other, ensuring that officers
could not confidently make alliances with each other or regime opponents."284
The Shah also severely restricted horizontal communication among his officers.25
"For example," according to Schahgaldian, "the three service chiefs, the commanders of the
national police force and gendarmerie, and the directors of various security and intelligence
organizations all reported directly to the monarch and received orders from him and were
permitted to communicate with one another only through the Shah or his own personal
staff." 28( While these measures lessened the likelihood of a coup against the Shah, they also
all but eliminated the ability of different units within the military to communicate with one
another. Additionally, they created a political-military climate characterized by distrust,
suspicion, and hesitation on the part of the officer corps to take any action absent direct
approval from the Shah.28-
2-8 "Intelligence report," CRRC Number SH-GMID-D-000-842, pp. 42-3.
Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, p. 420.
280 Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, p. 324.
281 Cordesman and Wagner, I essons, p. 420.
28' Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, p. 431.
Schahgaldian, Iranian Ali/itay, pp. vii, 31; Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, p. 169; Zabib, Iranian Military, p.
213; and Ward, Inunortal, p. 255.
24 Ward, Imunortal, p. 209; and Zabib, Iranian Miliarr, p. 8.
285 Roberts, Khomeini's Incoiporation, p. 6.
286 Schahgaldian, 1ranian Alilitay, p. 14.
28 Roberts, Khomeini's Incoiporation, p. 6.
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Khomeini continued the spirit if not the letter of many of these policies, establishing
multiple new organizations with overlapping domestic spying responsibilities. These agencies
were intended "partly to keep watch over the regular military and potential opposition
groups and partly to keep watch over each other"288 In this way, Ward argues, the regime
was able to generate "a large number of overlapping control mechanisms" that produced
multiple independent streams of information about any potential threats in either the regular
military or Iranian society writ large.29 Military officers, NCOs, and civilian defense
employees could all expect to be monitored closely by a network of clerical spies. 29U The
same PID representatives who oversaw ideological indoctrination in every unit also "spied
on the soldiers and served as snitches."291 In general, the system was set up to manage
information about activities inside Iran-not to gather intelligence on state opponents such
as Iraq.292
Additionally, Khomeini continued the Shah's strict limits on horizontal
communication among officers.23 By and large, officers simply were not allowed to discuss
military matters, or anything else, outside politically approved channels.294 For the new
government in Tehran, the risk of counter-revolutionary plotting seemed too great.
Schahgaldian reported based on his interviews with escaped officers, "It is believed that
three or more senior or middle-level officers from different branches or units cannot meet in
a group and hope to remain unreported."295
In sum, Iran's leaders adopted worst practices with respect to information
management, echoing those they adopted with respect to promotions, training, and
command. Broadly speaking, Iran's revolutionary practices represented little departure from
the overall practices used by the Shah, with the exception of those governing training. These
policies make it possible to generate predictions about the likely battlefield effectiveness of
the Iranian military.
Predictions If the Political Intervention E xplanation Is Right: Confirming Evidence
* Iranian revolutionary units, notably the Pasdaran and Basij, should have displayed
virtually no battlefield effectiveness--poor cohesion, little tactical proficiency, and no
ability to conduct complex operations.
" Iranian regular units should have displayed comparatively better battlefield effectiveness
early in the war, reflecting the lingering influence of training practices under the Shah.
" The fighting effectiveness of Iranian regular units should have declined over the course
of the war as the revolutionary leaders' worst practices exerted their full force.
Predictions lIfthe Political Intervention Explanation Is Wrong: Disconjirming Evidence
* If Iranian revolutionary units displayed high levels of battlefield effectiveness despite the
consistent application of worst practices, this finding would cast significant doubt on the
political intervention explanation.
288 Schahgaldian, Iranian Ai/itag, p. vii.
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292 Cordesman and Wagner, Lessois, p. 59.
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- If Iranian regular units displayed increasing rather than decreasing levels of battlefield
effectiveness over the course of the war, this finding would also cast doubt on the
political intervention explanation.
Predictions If the Alternative E xplanations Are Right: Additional Disconfirming Evidence
- There should have been very little to no variation over time or across different units of
the Iranian military.
e There should have been very little cross-national variation between the performance of
Iranian regular units and Iraqi military units in the early years of the war.
IV. Conclusion: Summary and Initial Implications
This chapter has examined the nature of pre-war and intra-war political intervention
in the Iranian and Iraqi militaries. The general argument is that for most of the war, leaders
in both countries adopted what Chapter 1 identified as worst practices. Broadly speaking,
leaders in both regimes promoted officers on the basis of political loyalty and actively
selected against competence in the officer corps; they imposed severe restrictions on military
training; they adopted highly centralized yet fractured command structures; and they applied
restrictions on horizontal and vertical information sharing in the military and hindered
political-military communication.
There were, however, two important exceptions to this general trend that provide
important analytical leverage for testing the intervention theory against the alternatives. First,
the regular Iranian military units that had existed prior to the revolution had been subject to
somewhat better training practices than the units formed after the revolution. While the
overall nature of the Shah's political intervention practices was quite similar to those of
Khomeini, training did constitute a subtle but important area of difference. Under the Shah,
training did occur, largely led by Americans. This stands in contrast to the period after the
revolution, in which military training broke down almost completely and in which the
country's religious leaders began to actively restrict training by the regular forces.
As a result, the theory predicts that there should have been at least somewhat better
battlefield effectiveness by the regular forces compared to the revolutionary forces early in
the war, and that the effectiveness of the regular forces should have declined over time. In
other words, there should have been some lingering effect from the slight better practices in
this area dating to the time of the Shah, even though the theory would expect it to disappear
as the war went on and the mullahs fully imposed worst practices. Evidence that the regular
forces improved over time, that there was no difference between the regular and
revolutionary forces at all, or that there was no difference between the Iranian regular forces
and the Iraqi forces early in the war, would all cast doubt on the political intervention
explanation.
Second, on the Iraqi side, there was also variation, but in the opposite direction.
Although he entered the war with worst practices, Saddam shifted away from those forms of
intervention around 1986 with respect to his Republican Guard units. As a result, the theory
predicts that prior to 1986 Iraq should have displayed little to no cohesion, tactical
proficiency, or ability to conduct complex operations. After 1986, however, the performance
of the Iraqi Republican Guard units should have begun to improve significantly due to the
shifting forms of Saddam's intervention. These units should have demonstrated excellent
cohesion, good tactical proficiency, and even the ability to conduct complex operations,
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especially as compared to earlier Iraqi performance and to Iranian performance during the
same period. By contrast, evidence that Iraqi effectiveness did not improve after these
changes, that it improved before they happened, or that Iraqi forces did not perform better
than Iranian forces after this shift, would cast doubt on the political intervention explanation
and potentially lend weight to the alternative theories.
These predictions will be tested in the next chapter, but even the evidence presented
thus far should induce significant skepticism about the structural variables emphasized in
existing theories of military effectiveness. The evidence from the Iraqi case, for example,
suggests that even within environments of low military autonomy, there are dramatically
different ways for political leaders to shape their interventions into the armed forces. Hence
the traditional focus on the "level" or "amount" or civilian control may miss much of the
variation in political-military relations that actually matters for effectiveness.
The sketch of the Iraqi military presented here also demonstrates that even in Arab,
autocratic regimes, significant variation in the nature of political intervention in the military
is possible. Another way to put this is that Arab culture, autocracy, and "bad" civil-military
relations are not synonymous, interchangeable concepts, but rather distinct variables that can
move independently of one another. By the same token, the fact that non-Arab Iran-under
both the Shah and revolutionary leadership-adopted forms of political intervention very
similar to those used initially in Iraq also casts doubt on the role of culture in pre-
determining either civil-military relations or military performance.
Again, none of this is to suggest that structural variables are irrelevant in explaining
military performance. Nor does it prove that differences in political intervention actually
matter for battlefield effectiveness. The next chapter turns to these questions, examining a
series of battles between Iran and Iraq during the period 1980-1988 in order to adjudicate
amongst the predictions derived from the intervention theory and the competing theories.
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CHAPTER 5
Battlefield Effectiveness in Iraq and Iran
The previous chapter examined the nature of political intervention in the militaries
of Iraq and Iran. Leaders of both states were generally found to have adopted worst
practices, leading to an overall expectation of low battlefield effectiveness relative to the
resources and assets each state possessed. Chapter 4 identified two exceptions to this
pattern, though. First, regular Iranian military units had been subject to slightly better
training practices during the time of the Shah, which revolutionary leaders had not been able
to completely dismantle at the outset of the war. Second, in the final two years of the war a
dramatic improvement occurred in Saddam Hussein's forms of intervention with respect to
the Iraqi Republican Guard units.
If the theory in the first chapter is correct, then, Iranian regular forces should have
displayed at least somewhat better effectiveness in the early years of the war compared to
both Iranian revolutionary units and to Iraqi forces during that time-better unit cohesion,
better tactical proficiency, and a better ability to conduct complex operations. This
differential should have been subtle, though, as the Shah's overall forms of political
intervention were still mostly worst practices, and it should have narrowed as time went on
and Iran's revolutionary leaders solidified the complete imposition of worst practices on the
regular forces.
Meanwhile, Iraqi battlefield effectiveness should have been quite poor for most of
the first six years of the war. After 1986, however, Iraq Republican Guard units should have
demonstrated a significant improvement. Once subjected to best practices, or an
arrangement very close to it, these units should have displayed much better cohesion, far
stronger tactical proficiency, and a much more impressive ability to conduct complex
operations. As discussed earlier, the competing explanations would predict that all of this
sub-national variation over time and across different military units in Iraq and Iran should
not have occurred and, if anything, they would predict only cross-national variation in the
form of Iran out-performing Iraq.
To test the validity of these predictions, this chapter examines battlefield evidence
from the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988. Specifically, it focuses on the following eight major
battles or campaigns: the Iraqi invasion and initial battles in Iran from September-November
1980; the Iranian counteroffensives from January 1981-May 1982; the battle for Basra in July
1982 and subsequent battles in 1982-3; the battles for the Howizeh Marshes in 1984-5; the
battles for Faw and Mehran in 1986; Iran's Karbala offensives from December 1986-April
1987; the second battle for Faw in April 1988; and the Iraqi final offensives during the spring
and summer of 1988.
The chapter focuses on these battles largely for the same reasons the Vietnam battles
were chosen. First, the battles offer the best opportunity to isolate the fighting effectiveness
of the Iraqi and Iranian forces of interest, with minimal involvement by other actors.
Notably, these battles occurred in the central and southern sectors of the border, where
there was little Kurdish participation in the fighting. This is important, as Kurdish
involvement would likely confound the analysis, given that such forces were relatively
autonomous from the national governments of both states and subject to differing forms of
political intervention. This is not to say that battles in the north were unimportant or
irrelevant, only that they do not offer as much analytical leverage over the questions of
interest.
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Additionally, notwithstanding the substantial fighting in the north, the war was
decided primarily in the other two sectors, making the battles there of great substantive
significance. Lastly, this series of battles captures both offensive and defensive operations
for both Iran and Iraq involving all of the different types of military units about which the
theory generates predictions. As a whole, the group allows the cleanest examination of the
predictions in Chapter 4. It makes possible the tracking of all the relevant forces across a
complete range of comparable activities, which helps ensure that the values of the dependent
variable are not simply the products of some other exogenous factor, such as the type of
operation at hand.
On the tactical offense On the tactical defense
Iraqi General Forces * Invasion, 1980 * Counteroffensives, 1981-2
* Mehran, 1986 e Khorramshahr, 1982
* Basra and subsequent
battles, 1982-3
* Howizeh Marshes, 1984-5
* Faw I, 1986
* Karbala offensives, 1986-7
Iraqi Republican * Invasion, 1980 * Faw I, 1986
Guard * Faw II, 1988
* Final offensives, 1988
Iranian Regular Army Counteroffensives, 1981-2 0 Invasion, 1980
(Artesh) Basra and subsequent Mehran, 1986
battles, 1982-3 0 Faw 11, 1988
* Howizeh Marshes, 1984-5 0 Final offensives, 1988
* Faw I, 1986
*Karbala offensives, 1986-7
Iranian Revolutionary Counteroffensives, 1981-2 Invasion, 1980
Forces Basra and subsequent * Mehran, 1986
(Pasdaran/Guard and battles, 1982-3 * Faw II, 1988
Basij/Miitia) Hovizeh Marshes, 1984-5 * Final offensives, 1988
* Fawvl, 1986
* Karbala offensives, 1986-7
After providing some general background on the war, the chapter examines each of
these battles or campaigns in turn. As in the Vietnam comparisons, the chapter first presents
the context, the forces involved on each side, and the key events. Then it reviews each side's
performance according to the questions established in Chapter 1, enabling a coding of the
value of the dependent variable for the actor of interest and an evaluation of the validity of
competing predictions. It is important to note that each battle or campaign offers the
opportunity to observe at least two readings of the dependent variable, because each battle
involves forces from both aran and Iraq.
The analysis generally confirms the predictions of the theory: worst practices in
political intervention were a consistent barrier to full battlefield effectiveness in both
countries, while the lingering effects of slightly better practices under the Shah led to
comparatively better Iranian regular army performance early in the war, and improvements
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SELECTION OF BATTLES AND CAMPAIGNS FOR EXAMINATION
in Saddam's political intervention produced improvements in Iraqi Republican Guard
effectiveness late in the war.
That said, for much of the war Iranian units, particularly revolutionary forces, were
far more cohesive than the political intervention theory would predict. The possible reasons
for this cohesion and its theoretical implications are discussed in more depth at the end of
the chapter, along with case-specific alternative explanations for each side's battlefield
performance. It is worth noting at the outset, however, that although some alternative
ideational force was clearly driving Iranian cohesion, this cohesion never evolved into
tactical proficiency or the ability to conduct complex operations. The nature of political
intervention in the Iranian military continued to prevent full battlefield effectiveness. In fact,
Iran's "cohesion," exemplified in its suicidal human wave attacks, ultimately contributed to
the collapse of its military.
This discrepancy speaks again to the importance of distinguishing between victory
and effectiveness, and between necessary and sufficient components of effectiveness. As will
become clear in the discussion below, the outcomes of various battles and campaigns in this
war often hinged at least in part on exogenous factors: not only ideational variables, but also
weather, technology, terrain, alliances, and so on. Still, by looking closely at the three
components of the dependent variable-the tasks each side was or was not able to
perform-the influence of varying forms of political intervention is apparent. Indeed, the
evidence from the war ultimately lends strong support to the theory presented in Chapter 1.
I. Background: the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988
The battles examined in this chapter occurred in the context of a much larger war,
whose details have been covered elsewhere.' Nevertheless, a brief overview is useful for
context. As mentioned in Chapter 4, ground combat in the Iran-Iraq War comprised three
major phases. The first began with the Iraqi invasion of Iranian Khuzestan in 1980, which
encompassed battles for the Iranian cities of Dezful, Abadan, Mehran, and Khorramshahr
during September-November 1980. Despite the Iraqi advantage of surprise, the operations
generally involved surrounding and besieging outnumbered Iranian defenders. Iran began to
marshal its forces for offensive action starting in early 1981 and kicked off a major
counteroffensive by September of that year. Gradually Iran regained much of the territory it
had lost, conducting a series of offensive operations in Khuzestan into the spring of 1982,
including the very large battle of Khorramshahr in April and May.
Summer 1982 marked the beginning of the war's second major phase with the
Iranian invasion of Iraq. After nearly succeeding in taking the key southern city of Basra in a
large battle in July, the Iranians settled into a pattern of annual offensives, as exemplified in
the battles of 1983. The years 1984-5 brought a series of inconclusive struggles for control of
the strategic Howizeh Marshes, a large swampy area of the border containing significant oil
reserves. Most of the fighting during this period amounted to a grinding war of attrition,
living up to Chaim Herzog's characterization of the conflict as a "delicate balance of
Dilip H4iro, The Longest IFar: the Iran-Iraq Mli/tary Con/lict (New York: Routledge, 1991); Edgar O'Ballance, The
Gii//liar (Washington: Brassey, 1988); Gary Sick, "Trial By Error: Reflections on the Iran-Iraq War," Middle
Jastforna/, vol. 43, no. 2 (spring 1989), pp. 230-245; and Anthony Cordesman and Abraham Wagner, The
Lessons ofModern ll1ar, I 'o/. 11: the Iran-Iraq IFar (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990).
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incompetence."2 The one exception was Iran's surprising conquest of the Faw peninsula,
Iraq's gateway to the Gulf, in February 1986. After this momentary victory, though, Iran
continued to launch offensives during the rest of 1986-7 with few gains.
Nineteen eighty-eight saw the dramatic third phase of the war, as the Iraqis returned
to the strategic offensive, launching a series of operations to drive the Iranians back across
the border. In April, the Iraqis decisively regained control of Faw in a large but rapid battle.
The Iraqis followed this success with four more quick offensives during May-July of that
year, virtually collapsing the Iranian military and forcing Iran to accept a ceasefire in August
1988.
The analysis below focuses on the ground battles, as these were the arena in which
the majority of fighting took place and in which the war was decided. A focus on ground
warfare also allows for the most consistent comparison between the Iran-Iraq cases and the
Vietnam cases. Still, the war was far from a land-only affair, with both sides attempting to
use airpower strategically (for example, to bomb the other's cities or attack shipping) and
tactically (for example, to provide support to ground forces). The Iranians also deployed
significant naval forces in an attempt to strangle Iraq's access to the Gulf. For their part, the
Iraqis used chemical weapons early and often, eventually mounting them on long-range
missiles targeted at Iranian population centers. The Iranians also engaged in some missile
attacks on Iraqi cities.3
Third parties did participate in the war. In addition to the Kurdish involvement on
both sides of the conflict, the United States eventually deployed significant naval forces to
keep shipping open in the Gulf. Indeed, the war's end probably came a bit more
expeditiously because the United States trounced the Iranian navy in an apparently unrelated
skirmish the very day after the Iraqis retook Faw in 1988.4 Overall, however, most of the war
was fought on the ground by the armies of Iran and Iraq, and it is on these interactions that
the chapter focuses.
II. The Iraqi Invasion: September-November 1980
The Iraqi invasion of Iran and Iran's initial defense of its territory offer an important
opportunity to observe the battlefield effectiveness of both states in their first large-scale
interaction. In addition to providing a chance to observe both countries' cohesion and
tactical proficiency, the campaign shows the Iraqi military attempting to conduct offensive
complex operations. The Iraqi campaign plan envisioned a series of lightning strikes against
key Iranian targets across the border and was to have relied on a combined arms force of
armor, artillery, infantry, and some airpower.
As will be discussed below, the invasion and defense against it provide some initial
confirmation for the theory. Despite having a significant advantage in manpower and
catching the Iranians almost completely by surprise, the Iraqis' advance was slow, clumsy,
and very costly in terms of casualties and equipment losses. While the Iraqis were minimally
Chaim I lertzog, "A Military-Strategic Ovcrview," in The Jrai-Iraq [Far Impact and Implications (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1989), pp. 255.
3 Shahram Chubin, "Iran and the War: from Stalemate to Ceasefire," in The Guf Wlar Regional and International
Dimensions, eds. Hanns W. Maull and Otto Pick (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), p. 12; and Cordesman
and Wagner, Iessons, p. 380.
4 Kenneth Pollack, Alrabs at [ar: Alilitary E/ctiveness, 1948-1991 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002),
p. 228.
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cohesive, they displayed serious tactical shortcomings and little competence in complex
operations.
The Iranians did not perform much better. Although both regular and revolutionary
forces displayed surprising levels of cohesion, only the regular forces displayed any tactical
proficiency, and neither attempted to conduct complex operations. Close examination of
battlefield events suggests that both sides were more lucky than good, owing the gains they
made more to the mistakes of the other side than to their own performance of key tasks.
The Forces on Each Side
When the war began in September, Iraq's twelve active-duty divisions were deployed
at various points along its eastern border: five in the north, near the Kurdish areas; two in
the central front, roughly opposite Baghdad; and five in the south opposite Khuzestan, the
oil-rich, Arab-populated area of Iran that also offered excellent access to the Gulf. The Iraqi
battle plan, such as it was, envisioned an initial Israeli-style air attack followed by four
armored thrusts into Iranian territory: one each in the northern and central sectors, and two
major multi-division efforts in the southern sector (see map 18).
In addition to its substantial inventory of tanks and other armored vehicles, Iraq had
ample artillery and anti-tank guided missiles to assist in the assault.) Saddam's spending spree
in the 1970s had ensured that much of this arsenal was of high quality, too. The Iraqis
possessed advanced T-72 main battle tanks, the best Soviet export at the time; BMP-1
infantry fighting vehicles; and MiG-23 Floggers in addition to older SU-22 Fitter fighter-
bombers .6
Arrayed against this juggernaut was one Iranian infantry division in the far north, an
infantry division slightly farther south covering the threat from Iran's Kurds, an armored
division in the central sector, a brigade at Qasr-e Shirin, a brigade at Mehran, and an armored
division at Ahwaz (see map 18). Iran had one more armored division and an airborne
division in reserve, In essence, though, it had two divisions and two brigades opposite the
main lines of Iraqi attack in the south, the key sector 8 These Iranian forces were significantly
understrength, however. Most combat units stood at only 30-50 percent of their authorized
manpower due to the upheavals of the revolution and the purges described in Chapter 4.9
Available manpower consisted primarily of Pasdaran, that is, units from the Guard, not from
the Artesh, or regular military." Iran's armor was mostly Chieftain and Patton tanks.
[SEE NEXT PAGE]
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THE IRAQI INVASION OF IRAN, FALL 1980
Iraq Iran
Battle summary
Tactical orientation Offensive Defensive
Plan Air attack followed by multi- Some ambushes and
pronged invasion, including roadblocks followed by retreat
major assault on Khuzestan to more easily defended urban
areas
Weapons 2,750 tanks, 1,400 artillery 500 operational tanks, 300
pieces, 4,000 APCs, 340 fighter- artillery pieces, <100 aircraft"
bombers
Manpower In southern sector: three In southern sector: Two under-
armored and two mechanized strength divisions, two under-




Unit cohesion? No Mixed
Tactical proficiency? No Yes, among the regular forces
Complex operations? No No opportunity to observe
Confirms theory? Yes Somewhat
The Battles
The Iraqi attack on September 22, 1980, began with a series of air strikes that
attempted to mimic the pre-emptive Israeli operations in 1967. Although Iraq's strikes
inflicted negligible damage on the Iranians-in part because the Shah had hardened and
dispersed his air bases according to American standards, and in part because the Iraqis
planned and executed their attacks poorly-the Iraqis proceeded with their invasion. They
crossed the border at several points along a 700-km front even as the Iranian air force was
launching retaliatory attacks overhead on targets in Iraq.
At the northernmost points of the invasion and in the central sector, the Iraqis were
able to overrun the towns of Qasr-e Shirin and Mehran within the first day. Penetrating
Iranian territory to depths of 45 km in some places, the Iraqis faced only disorganized and
scattered resistance. They soon spread out in a 50-km front along the central sector,
guarding potential routes to Baghdad.13
It was in the southern sector that the Iraqis launched their major offensive thrust.
Deploying three armored and two mechanized infantry divisions, they quickly reached the
outskirts of two major cities, Khorramshahr and Abadan. Along the way, the Iranians had
formed some initial roadblocks and ambush attacks, but the Iraqis broke them with heavy
artillery and anti-tank missiles. Recognizing their odds, the Iranians rapidly withdrew to more
defensible urban terrain-a feat made far easier by the fact that Iraqi forces never went after
Iranian rear areas or vigorously pursued retreating Iranian forces.1
" Order of battle data taken from Pollack, Arabs at a; p. 186.
2 Loss figures from Cordesman and Wagner, Iessons, p. 108.
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The Iraqis soon found themselves facing a four-week battle in Khorramshahr, a
town of 70,000 where 3,000 Artesh soldiers and thousands of Guards had holed up,
burrowing into the classic advantages of an urban defense despite having little more than
rifles, grenades, and Motolov cocktails. Their defense was then aided by the Iraqi decision
to "soften up" the city of 70,000 with heavy artillery fire before entering. This Iraqi tactic not
only angered the local population, rousing them to their city's defense, but later made it far
more difficult for Iraqi armor to move through the city.
Indeed, Cordesman and Wagner note, "Iraq rapidly found that it could not send
tanks unescorted into the city and that it had to send in infantry support." But since Iraqi
forces had received no training in urban warfare, "they moved far too cautiously in
maneuvering through the less-defended parts of the city and repeatedly became the victims
of Iranian ambushes. Neither Iraqi armor nor infantry conducted aggressive reconnaissance,
and both tended to wait until massive firepower could be brought to bear. Iraq was forced to
slowly secure the perimeter of the city with the armored division it had initially committed to
the attack and then rush a special forces brigade and Republican Guard brigade through a
quickly improvised course in urban warfare. This process took several weeks," giving the
Iranians further time to reinforce their meager units in the city.16
Although Iraq eventually took the city with its Republican Guard brigade-which
was quickly returned to Baghdad after the fight-doing so required a street-to-street grind at
the price of 8,000 Iraqi casualties and 100 Iraqi tanks and armored vehicles.I" As Ward notes,
"The Iraqis paid a heavy price for moving into urban terrain."18 One Iraqi general similarly
recalled that "the Iranians displayed ferocious resistance during the urban fighting, to the
point where it became difficult and costly for us to occupy [Khorramshahr]. They would
always attempt to retake their last bases even after we had pushed them over the bridge.
They would hold every point to the bitter end, so they were able to inflict heavy losses on
our forces."", The Iranians suffered an estimated 7,000 killed or wounded, with some reports
indicating that the Guards shot Artesh soldiers who attempted to flee the battle.2)
In addition to halting the overall Iraqi advance, the battle for Khorramshahr diverted
Iraqi efforts to besiege another crucial city in the south, Abadan.21 An oil refining town of
300,000, the city was defended by about 10,000 Iranian fighters, including an armored
brigade with 50 tanks about 5,000 Pasdaran.2 Even though Iraq started shelling the city on
September 22, it did not attack until October 10, giving Iran ample time to organize and
reinforce its defenses. Although the initial Iraqi entry to the city required a difficult crossing
over the Karun River, demonstrating an impressive feat of combat engineering, once inside
Iraq found itself fighting street by street as in Khorramshahr. Apparently unwilling to incur
further losses, Iraq never took the entire city, and the Iranian garrison there remained.i
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In fact, September 1980 proved to be the high point of Iraq's territorial gains in the
war. After gaining control of Khorramshahr and making these inroads at Abadan, Iraq never
extended its grasp farther into Iran.24 Pollack attributes this outcome in part to the superior
skill of Iranian regular army armor crews compared to their Iraqi counterparts (and, it can be
inferred, compared to the Revolutionary Guard). "In armor duels," he notes, "small
numbers of Iranian tanks regularly outfought larger Iraqi units."" Pollack points in particular
to an instance in which an understrength Artesh tank battalion, reinforced by Revolutionary
Guard, fought off an Iraqi armored divisions' advance on the town of Dezful. Iranian armor
was better because its crews actually maneuvered and their fire was more accurate.2 6
In contrast, "the three Iraqi armored forces which originally invaded the south
remained virtually in place" during October, and "these forces did not conduct any
significant offensive operations... and only began to move forward in early November."27 By
that point, Iraq near faced parity in manpower, even though it retained a significant
advantage in heavy weapons. By the end of November, all Iraqi forward momentum had
evaporated, and the rainy season forced a pause in the fighting.28 Iraq had still failed to take
any major cities in the south besides Khorramshahr, and, crucially, it had neglected to seal
the passes of the Zagros mountains, enabling the Iranians to reinforce their positions at
will.29 On December 7, 1980, Saddam announced that Iraq would henceforth pursue only
defensive goals.30
Assessing the Battlefield Effectiveness of Iraq
Iraqi forces generally displayed poor battlefield effectiveness during the invasion of
Iran, an outcome consistent with the predictions of the theory in Chapter 4. First, Iraqi
cohesion seems to have been adequate at best. Pollack gives the Iraqis high marks for
remaining solid during the vicious house-to-house fighting in Khorramshahr, relating that
they displayed "tenacity, courage, and endurance in combat." 31 It is also true there are no
reports of Iraqi units collapsing and deserting the battlefield.
Nevertheless, the virtual halting of the invasion after only one week of minimal
Iranian resistance, the need to call in Republican Guard brigade from Baghdad, and the
decision not to fight in Abadan because of concerns about casualties all suggest that Iraq's
senior officers probably had concerns about the cohesion of their units.32 In other words,
while the battle does not provide as much observable evidence of breakdowns in cohesion as
on might expect, it does provides several instances of deliberate Iraqi choices to avoid
situations where those breakdowns likely would have occurred, casting some doubt on
whether Pollack's praise of the Iraqi units in Khorramshahr applies to the invasion as a
whole. Cordesman and Wagner argue, "The Iraqi Army lost concentration, cohesion, and
momentum as it advanced, and combat and service-support elements did not thrust forward
24Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, p. 95.
2- Pollack, Arabs at War, p. 190.
2-, Pollack, Arabs at Iar, p. 190.
2 Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, p. 95.
28 Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, p. 96.
3 Pollack, Arabs at JTar, p. 193.
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aggressively.... Some combat elements halted when they met relatively light opposition."33
All of this makes it hard to rate the Iraqi forces as broadly cohesive.
Second, Iraq demonstrated a number of very basic tactical shortcomings in the
invasion. Despite having a huge initial advantage in numbers (as much as 6:1 in some places)
and a sustained edge in technology, the Iraqis continued to display serious problems turning
these advantages into fighting power.34 In addition to the inaccurate and virtually irrelevant
air strikes conducted at the outset, Iraqi artillery units repeatedly made simple fusing errors
that limited their weapons' impact, and artillery crews remained in static positions that left
them highly vulnerable to counterbattery fire.7 Iraqi infantry did not conduct reconnaissance
patrols, and reserve units were rarely committed in an efficient manner. Tank movements
were slow and overly cautious, their fire often inaccurate. As Pollack notes, "Tank crews
could not fire on the move and had very poor marksmanship even when stopped. Iraqi tank
commanders did not use the mobility of their vehicles to maneuver against the enemy."3 All
of these behaviors suggest a fundamental lack of skills in the use of most combat arms.
Third, the Iraqis demonstrated virtually no ability to conduct complex operations.
There was little to no combined arms activity during the invasion. The Iraqi air forces and
ground forces worked in virtually total isolation from each other. Iraqi armor, infantry, and
artillery showed little ability to coordinate attacks on the cities of Khorramshahr and
Abadan. The Iraqis repeatedly missed chances to maneuver, relying on their tanks more as
big guns than as tools of offensive speed and shock.38 As Ken Pollack has observed, "Iraqi
armored and mechanized formations never used their mobility to bypass Iranian positions,
nor did they envelop Iranian defensive positions, nor did they use their shock power simply
to overrun what were usually small numbers of ill-trained Iranian infantry with little or no
antitank weaponry.... The Iraqis never tried to seize key terrain to cut off Iranian lines of
communication and retreat. Iraq did not once employ airborne or helicopter-borne troops to
conduct a vertical envelopment of Iranian positions to speed the passage of their
mechanized forces."39
In short, in what should have been an ideal environment for conducting complex
operations, the Iraqis simply did not deliver.I Their operations showed virtually no initiative
and no coordination across different units, as evidenced by the almost complete halt of
operations after the initial week of advances. A former Iraqi general noted years later, "Our
troops were just lined up on the border and told to drive into Iran. They had an objective,
but no idea how to get there or what they were doing, or how their mission fit the plan, or
who would be supporting them."41 Indeed, it turned out that the entire invasion plan was
based on an old British staff exercised organized at the Baghdad War College in 1941.4
Interestingly, combat engineering was the one bright spot in the Iraqi invasion. For
example, an entire armored division was able to cross the Karun River under cover of
darkness during the advance on Khorramshahr-an impressive feat-and Iraqi units were
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generally well supplied, reflecting a good logistics system.43 The Iraqi skills in this area
suggest that its other military deficiencies may have been less the product of large structural
factors like culture and economic development, which arguably should have impeded
capability across the board, and more the result of deliberate political choices by the regime
about which skills were and were not safe for the military to have. One can imagine that the
ability to build pontoon bridges and efficiently deliver spare parts and fuel might have been
considerably less threatening to Saddam's hold on power than the ability to conduct tank
maneuvers or coordinate air strikes.
Assessing the Battlefield Effectiveness of Iran
Iran's battlefield performance was mostly consistent with the theory, although not
entirely. Overall cohesion in the Iranian forces was better than predicted by the political
intervention theory, suggesting that other variables were driving this aspect of Iranian
effectiveness. Still, the Iranian regular forces demonstrated notably better tactical proficiency
than either the Iraqis or the Iranian revolutionary forces, a contrast that provides some
important confirmation of the predictions from Chapter 4.
First, regarding cohesion, the Iranians' general decision to retreat to the cities in the
face of the Iraqi advance was probably a wise move given the balance of forces, and it does
not appear to have been the result of soldiers deserting their units. The Iranians also did
display at least some cohesion in the defense of Khorramshahr. Clearly, the residents of the
city and at least some of the military forces put up a stiff defense, as evidenced by the street-
by-street fighting. Still, the reports that Iranian Guard units had to fire on other soldiers
attempting to flee the fighting suggests that the will to fight was uneven.
Second, Iran's tactical performance was also mixed, but in ways that conform to the
predictions from Chapter 4. Clearly, Iranians from both regular and revolutionary units had
some success in forging basic urban defenses. More importantly, though, in tank battles the
Iranian regular forces clearly showed tactical skills, conducting basic maneuvers and
exhibiting good marksmanship. In several instances, this proficiency was the key edge that
actually halted the Iraqi invasion, and it is consistent with the prediction that regular forces
should have displayed some lingering benefits from their years of training under the Shah.
However pro forma such preparation might have been, it still gave them a clear edge over
both Iraqi forces during this period and Iran's own recently constituted revolutionary forces.
Lastly, the Iranians did not really attempt perform complex operations during this
period. On the one hand, this might be considered reasonable, given the balance of forces
and the sheer surprise of the invasion (although numerous indications had suggested that a
major Iraqi attack probably was imminent)." On the other hand, it seems plausible that the
Iranian forces could have done far more to attack the Iraqis' vulnerable fixed positions.4s
While the initial battles of the invasion do not show an outright failure to conduct such
operations-the strongest possible evidence to confirm the political intervention
explanation, which would expect no ability to conduct these operations among the
revolutionary forces, and little ability to do so even among the regular forces-the lack of an
attempt at least does not disconfirm the theory.
4 Pollack, Arabs at tWar, p. 187-9.
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III. The Iranian Counteroffensives, January 1981-May 1982
As 1981 dawned, Iraq held the city of Khorramshahr, and its forces were in a
position to threaten the towns of Qasr e-Shirin, Susangerd, Dezful, Ahvaz, and Abadan.
After the initial shock of the Iraqi invasion, however, Iran launched an escalating series of
counteroffensives to regain its lost territory and prevent further incursions. This campaign
included battles at Ahvaz in January 1981, Qasr e-Shirin in March, Abadan in September,
Bostan in November-December, Dezful in March 1982, and Khorramshahr in April-May.
Although these battles varied in their details and are discussed individually below, as a group
they offer a useful opportunity to observe Iran on the offense, trying to re-take territory, and
Iraq on the defense, trying to hold territory. This campaign is also useful because it occurred
on the same terrain and with roughly the same forces and weapons as the invasion, but with
the tactical orientations of the two sides reversed.
Overall, the battles confirm the theory. The Iraqis displayed routine deficits in
cohesion and basic tactical proficiency and failed repeatedly to conduct complex defensive
operations. Over and over, their inability to maneuver, protect their flanks, conduct
reconnaissance, or engage in combined arms activities led them to cede territory to the
Iranians, often at a huge cost in terms of casualties and prisoners of war. At the same time,
Iran's territorial gains would have been possible only against an opponent such as Iraq.
Iranian human wave attacks did evince cohesion, but Iran's overall effectiveness was poor
relative to what it could have achieved. The one exception were the Iranian regular forces,
who demonstrated some solid tactical proficiency and even a minimal ability to conduct
complex operations.
The Forces on Each Side
By the end of 1980, Iran had already begun to erode Iraq's sizeable local manpower
advantage. What had been a 6:1 Iraqi superiority shrank to no more than 2:1 as Iranian
volunteers flooded into the southern sector where most of the major battles occurred." In
fact, Ward reports that "more Iranians volunteered to fight Iraq than could be absorbed by
the Guard and army, and large numbers were sent instead to eastern Iran to battle drug
smugglers.""
Over the course of 1981 and into the 1982 battles, as the campaign of Iranian
counteroffensives continued, Iran had actually gained a manpower advantage, marshalling
nearly 140,000 troops in the southern sector. About 60,000 of these were from four Artesh
divisions, while the other 80,000 were Guard and Basij forces. Against them stood about
80,000 Iraqi soldiers, mostly from the original invasion force and consisting of three infantry
divisions, two armored divisions, and one mechanized division, in addition to some
independent infantry brigadesa In general, there does not appear to have been any major
shift in the weapons employed by the two sides. The arms used in the 1981-2 campaign were
roughly the same as those used during the 1980 battles, with the exception of Iraq's
acquisition of some new Mirage fighters.-"
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THE IRANIAN COUNTEROFFENSIVES, 1981-2
Iraq Iran
Battle summary
Tactical orientation Defensive Offensive
Plan Hold territory gained during Re-take territory lost to
invasion through static invasion through human wave
positional defense of salients infantry attacks followed by
mechanized exploitation of
breakthroughs
Weapons5" Roughly the same as during the Roughly the same as during the
1980 battles, with the addition 1980 battles
of some Mirage fighters
Manpower"' In southern sector by spring In southern sector by spring
1982: 80,000 men, including 3 1982:140,000 men, including 4
infantry, 2 armored, 1 army divisions comprising
mechanized division; and 60,000 men, plus 80,000 Guard
several infantry and militia and Basij troops
brigades
Losses52 At least 54,000 KIA; 45,000 At least 70,000 KIA; 50,000
POW WIA; 5,000 POW
Effectiveness summary
Unit cohesion? No Yes
Tactical proficiency? No Yes, among regular forces
Complex operations? No Minimal, among regular forces
Confirms theory? Yes Somewhat
The Eary Battles, Januag-September 1981
As early as January 1981, Iran launched counteroffensives at various points along the
border, including near Qasr e-Shirin, Mehran, Ahvaz, and Abadan, which continued to
suffer under an Iraqi siege. In several areas the Iranians managed to push the Iraqis back by a
few kilometers, but generally speaking, these operations "were marked by hasty and
inadequate preparations" driven more by Iran's domestic political need to appear to be
responding to the invasion than by strategically sound military imperatives."
Indeed, the battle for Abadan rapidly became a disaster for the Iranian armored
forces, which had chosen to attack across a river plain not easily traversed by armor at this
time of year.54 The first brigade sent into the fight quickly bogged down in the mud and
became an easy target for the Iraqi defenders. According to Cordesman and Wagner, "If Iran
had halted at this point, its losses would have become acceptable, but Iran did not stop its
attack or attempt a different line of advance. Instead, the Iranian commander committed his
second brigade against virtually the same Iraqi defenses the next day," allowing Iraq to grind
5" Hiro, Li ongest lfar, p. 59.
Ward, I.mmorta/, p. 256.
32 Significant data on losses for both sides is missing, but these estimates are based on adding the figures
reported in the text below.
5 Ward, Immworta/, p. 253.
54 Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, pp. 112-3.
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down yet another brigade's worth of Iranian armor using infantry equipped with anti-tank
weapons, artillery, and some armor. The process was repeated a third time the next day,
virtually destroying an entire Iranian armored division.55 Iran was saved only by the fact that
the Iraqi units did not pursue their retreating opponents. 56
Unfortunately, Iran's leaders considered this disaster further evidence that Iranian
regular forces were worthless and unreliable. Accordingly to Cordesman and Wagner, after
this battle Iran's leaders actually accelerated their imposition of worst practices: "Iran ceased
giving proper emphasis to acquiring and training high technology forces and trying to build
upon its past cadre of military professionals. Priority clearly shifted to the Pasdaran.""
Indeed, the country's only major remaining secular leader, commander-in-chief Bani Sadr,
was publicly blamed for Iran's military losses and soon forced to flee the country.58
The Battle for Abadan, September 1981
Iran and Iraq had some smaller engagements over the rest of the spring and summer,
but Iran turned most of its attention to planning a major effort to relieve the besieged city of
Abadan. On September 2, Iran began with a feint, launching a 30-40,000-strong mixed force
of armor, artillery, and infantry toward Basra, a major Iraqi city in the south. This
deployment had its desired effect, convincing the Iraqis to keep their reserves around Basra
rather than using them to defend their gains on Iranian soil farther south. Iraq already had
about 50-60,000 soldiers near the cities of Abadan and Khorramshahr, and probably
considered these deployments sufficient to protect its gains. Little did the Iraqi garrison
realize that the Iranians had managed to ferry 15-20,000 soldiers down the eastern side of
the Karun River to shore up the 9,000 Artesh and 4-6,000 Guard soldiers already in Abadan.
This stealthy move soon gave the Iranians a sizeable local advantage over the five Iraqi
brigades guarding the eastern end of Abadan.
On September 26, Iranian forces inside and outside the city attacked. According to
Cordesman and Wagner, "Iraqi forces fought hard but did not receive effective
reinforcement or artillery and air support, although Iraq had some 150-200 major artillery
pieces within range." Iranian forces also managed to infiltrate behind Iraqi lines, leading to
the isolation of some units and heavy Iraqi losses. "This seems to have driven their
command into a panic, and what started as a tactical withdrawal became a rout. The Iraqi
troops abandoned their armor and heavy equipment" and rapidly retreated.9 Even a
Republican Guard armored brigade sent in to counter-attack "was easily beaten back with
the loss of over one-third of its tanks, allowing Iranian forces to capture the Iraqi bridges
over the Karun and trapping several battalions before they could flee." 6
Within three days, Iraq was forced back across the river and had lost dozens of tanks
and some 200 armored vehicles and artillery weapons, all while suffering thousands of
casualties.(" Iran is believed to have suffered about 3,000 killed in action.2 Still, lacking a
numerical advantage, and with minimal armor and almost no air support, Iran had managed
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to end the siege of Abadan.63 Unfortunately for Iran, the major commanders responsible for
this victory were killed in a plane crash on their way back to Tehran, suddenly depriving Iran
of the leaders that had successfully kluged together Pasdaran and regular forces during the
battle. The crash victims included the Minister of Defense, Chief of Staff, Army Chief of
Staff, and the regional commander of the Pasdaran.64
The Battlefor Bostan, November-December 1981
After a lull in the fighting during October and most of November, an Iranian force
of 10,000-14,000 Guard and regular soldiers now attacked the Iraqi salient near Susangerd,
south of Bostan. According to Cordesman and Wagner, "The attack was confused...
because Pasdaran attacked without waiting for either a regular army artillery barrage or
support."65 Still, the first use of the human wave attacks, involving herds of Iranian
youngsters, some no more than 12 years old, terrified the Iraqi Popular Army units stationed
in the area, which broke and ran when they saw Pasdaran units attacking over the slain
corpses of Basij who had thrown themselves on the Iraqi minefields.66
The battle was considered a victory for Iran, in the sense that it retook Bostan, but
only at the price of heavy casualties. The Iraqis suffered at least 1,000 dead and 500 taken
prisoner. In December, the Iranians also launched an attack farther north in Qasr e-Shirin,
achieving tactical surprise in a week-long battle. Due to the Iraqis' failure to react quickly and
to make use of their artillery and airpower, Iran succeeded in retaking this area as well. The
remaining Iraqi positions in the south now looked vulnerable.
The Battlefor Deful, March 1982
After a relative lull during the winter rainy season, Iran launched new attacks against
Iraqi positions in the south in the late winter and early spring, with an eye toward eventually
retaking Khorramshahr. By February 1982, Iraq had about six divisions-3 infantry, 2
armored, and I mechanized-defending its positions in the southern sector. Against this
force of approximately 80,000 men, Iran had assembled four army divisions comprising
about 60,000 soldiers, plus 200 tanks and 150 artillery pieces, in addition to 80,000 Guard
and Basij troops.i
On March 22, Iran attacked Iraqi positions in a salient near Dezful and the nearby
town of Shush, using human waves spearheaded by the Pasdaran to overwhelm Iraqi posts
manned mostly by the Popular Army. Although initially stymied, these waves eventually
achieved breakthroughs, through which regular army units then rushed to attack the Iraqi
flanks. Because Saddam had decreed that Iraqi units were not allowed to cede any ground,
the Iraqi units had a difficult time reacting to these attacks, devolving into a "disjointed and
weak" defense that induced panic in the Iraqi command. The corps commander ordered
frontal counterattacks by two Iraqi armored divisions and an armored brigade of the
Republican Guard, but these proved futile in the muddy terrain.68 Iranian forces then
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initiated a double pincer movement to trap the Iraqi forces still in the salient.69 As these Iraqi
forces were ground up over the next several days, the remaining segments of the Iraqi army
fled in disarray.711
According to Ward, "Both sides suffered heavy casualties, but Iran scored a major
victory. In addition to pushing the Iraqis out of most of northern Khuzestan, Iran inflicted
up to fifty thousand casualties, captured fifteen thousand to twenty-five thousand prisoners,
and smashed an Iraqi mechanized division, armored division, and large numbers of smaller
militia units. In addition to destroying two hundred Iraqi tanks, four hundred other armored
vehicles, and several hundred artillery pieces, the Pasdaran captured enough Iraqi equipment
and ammunition to start to organize and train its own armored units."1
The Battlefor Khorramshahr, April-May 1982
Iran's victories at Abadan, Bostan, and Dezful positioned it to make a final attack on
the last major Iraqi outpost in Khuzestan, the city of Khorramshahr. Iraqi forces in the area
were formidable, consisting of 70-90,000 soldiers dug into a well-established series of static
defenses. As at Dezful, the Iraqis guarded their positions with barbed wire and minefields.
But these proved no deterrent to the Iranians, who launched a three-pronged assault on the
night of April 30, 1982.
In the north, in the first of the three prongs, an Iranian armored division attacked an
Iraqi mechanized and armored division. From the south, another Iranian infantry division
and large numbers of Pasdaran crossed the Karun river and overran the Iraqi reserve and
Popular Army forces stationed in the area. Then, in the offensive's third prong, another
armored division and additional Pasdaran struck Iraq's eastern lines, which were being held
by several infantry brigades." As at Dezful, the Iranians generally sent waves of Pasdaran
and Basij-there were as many 40,000 massed for the re-taking of Khorramshahr-directly
into the teeth of the Iraqi defenses, persisting until the Iraqis grew exhausted or panicked.7
The waves particularly targeted Popular Army units, which broke most easily in the face of
the assaults.
Once these Iranian forces managed to rupture the Iraqi lines, regular forces with
more firepower and mobility would surge into the gap, exploiting the breakthrough to attack
the Iraqi flanks, which, again following orders from Saddam, generally remained in place
instead of conducting a fighting withdrawal or conducting any rapid counterattacks in the
numerous instances when Iranian flanks were exposed.- The Iraqis did try to conduct a
counterattack at one point with one of their armored divisions, but this effort was slow.
According to Pollack, "by the time it got moving, the Iranians had penetrated across the
front and routed most of the Iraqi frontline formations." As a result, the Iranians easily
parried the counterattack, leading Saddam to call in air strikes, which still had little effect in
stopping the Iranian surge into the city. Iraq tried again on May 6 to counterattack with two
armored divisions, but Iranian armor succeeded in stopping these forces and pushing them
back all the way to the Iran-Iraq border.
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Realizing its units were trapped, Iraq vacated all of Khuzestan except Khorramshahr
itself. Then on May 22, 80,000 Iranian troops assaulted the city, retaking it in two days of
intense street fighting.76 The Iranians captured as many as 15,000 Iraqi prisoners of war,
including many from Popular Army units who showed few signs of combat stress or battle
fatigue.77 As at Dezful, the Iranians also captured up to two hundred Iraqi tanks, some 200
artillery weapons, and enormous stockpiles of additional equipment and supplies left by the
fleeing Iraqis.78 Iran had essentially destroyed two Iraqi mechanized brigades and two
infantry brigades, although at the cost of well over 5,000 Iranian dead and at least 7,000
wounded.79
In sum, during the period March 22-May 24, 1982, Iraq gave up virtually all of the
territory it had captured in the invasion. The situation was so bleak that a CIA assessment at
the time virtually declared the war to be over, noting, "Iraq has essentially lost the war with
Iran.... There is little the Iraqis can do... to reverse the military situation.8) All told, Iraq
suffered as many as 50,000 killed and lost perhaps as many as 45,000 prisoners to the
Iranians.81 Iranian losses were estimated at 70,000 killed in action, perhaps an additional
50,000 wounded, and 5,000 prisoners of war.8 2 Saddam reacted by shooting twelve of his
generals and regrouping Iraq's defenses, while Iranian leaders appear to have credited the
Pasdaran and Basij for their victories, reaffirming the attachment to human wave attacks.83
Assessing the Battlefield Effectiveness of Iraq
Iraqi battlefield effectiveness during the Iranian counteroffensives was poor. First,
there were numerous indications of cohesion problems. At Abadan, Dezful, and
Khorramshahr in particular, the battles essentially ended with Iraqi soldiers fleeing in
disorder and leaving behind large quantities of armored vehicles, artillery, and other
equipment. The Popular Army units proved particularly likely to break, as seen at Bostan,
Dezful, and Khorramshahr. In one sense this outcome was ironic, given that these militia
members were chosen entirely for regime loyalty. But in another sense, it was entirely
predictable, given the Popular Army's lack of training and qualified leadership.84
Yet another indication of poor Iraqi cohesion, especially by the spring of 1982, was
the large number of Iraqi prisoners taken by the Iranians-often, as at Khorramshahr, with
few signs that the soldiers actually had fought and been forced to surrender. Saddam was
clearly aware of the widespread nature of this problem, as he had issued a decree in April
1981 offering a general amnesty for those who had deserted their units if they returned
within a month. Apparently unsatisfied, Saddam reversed course in the spring of 1982,
ordering the automatic execution of any soldier found to flee the battlefield.5 Both of these
Pollack, Arabs at IWar, pp. 198-9; and Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, p. 139.
Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, p. 133.
8 Ward, Immorta, p. 258; and Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, p. 133.
Cordesman and Wagner, 1Lessons, p. 133.
8" "Implications of Iran's Victory Over Iraq," Special National Intelligence Estimate 34/36.2-82, Director of
Central Intelligence, 1982, p. vii, available at
https://-ww.gwu.edu/ nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSA EBB 167/03.pdf.
SI Cordesman and Wagner, ILessons, p. 140; and Intelligence Appraisal, Defense Intelligence Agency, "Iran-Iraq:
the Second Year of War," December 8, 1982, p. 2, available at the National Security Archive, the George
Washington University, Washington, DC.
8' Intelligence Appraisal, "Iran-Iraq," p. 2; and Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, p. 142.
83 Cordesman and Wagner, L essons, p. 142.
84 Al-Nlarashi and Salama, Iraq's Arwled Forces, p. 15.
Hiro, Longest Far, pp. 61-2.
246
policies point to Iraqi troubles with the most fundamental building block of military
effectiveness, cohesion.
Second, Iraq displayed serious tactical deficits. While there is some evidence that the
Iraqis were proficient at establishing basic static defenses relying on machine gun and
artillery fire, minefields, and barbed wire, their shortcomings were pronounced. Even
Saddam, in a meeting with his officials around this time, observed Iraq's continuing basic
tactical problems. For example, he stated, "As for the artillery, it is certain that we see some
negatives in all the phases. There are negatives in the accuracy, coordination and usage. The
concentration is inaccurate and not hitting the target.... In the discipline of artillery I believe
it is one of those areas where we are still in need of someone to teach us."86 The Iraqis also
continued to be surprised by Iranian attacks because most Iraqi units failed to conduct
regular patrols, and even where they did, they did not pass on the information they learned.87
Given the continued Iraqi advantage in weaponry, one also has to question why the
human wave attacks managed to be so successful-either the Iraqis broke and ran, indicating
the aforementioned cohesion problems, or they simply did not operate their weapons
properly. Indeed, a U.S. analysis at the time pointedly noted, "Our estimate is that equipment
shortages have not been a major factor in Iraq's battlefield reverses.... Iraqi failures to date
have been due mainly to weak leadership, morale, tactics, and intelligence weaknesses."88
Furthermore, Iraq demonstrated virtually no ability to conduct complex defensive
operations. Clearly what was needed in response to the Iranian attacks was an elastic
defense-in-depth rather than a static positional defense. But Iraq's decision to dig in its
forces and forbid any retreats made these units prisoners in their positions and allowed Iran
to destroy them piecemeal in battle after battle. Over and over, Iraq displayed no ability to
conduct fighting withdrawals or to counterattack by maneuvering its reserves, even in
situations where Iranian units were exposed and vulnerable. Part of the problem, again,
appeared to be that Iraqi officers in the field lacked the authority to redeploy forward troops
or to call on reserves.8 Even in situations where the Iraqis reportedly fought hard, as at
Abadan, the lack of combined arms integration doomed their efforts to futility.
Certainly one has to question whether Iraq could ever have held such a long front
forever. But the nature of the Iraqi command system and, indeed, the commanders
themselves, made it impossible to consolidate efficiently to a more defensible set of
positions. Instead, the Iraqis' lack of cohesion, tactical proficiency, and complex operations
made their retreat enormously costly."" These forces could not be classified as effective.
_Assessing the Battlelield Efctizeness of/Iran
The period 1981-2 was the peak of Iranian battlefield effectiveness during the war.
Not only were its forces surprisingly cohesive, but the regular forces in particular displayed
tactical proficiency and, in a few instances, the ability to conduct some complex operations.
Again, these latter capabilities seem to have reflected the lingering impact of the training the
"Saddam Hussein Discusses Neighboring Countries and their Regimes," CRRC Number SH-SHTP-A-000-
626, date unknown, sometime after 1980 and before 1985, pp. 20-1.
8 Pollack, Alrabs at IFar, p. 200.
Discussion Paper, Origin Unknown, "Discussion Paper for SIG on Policy Options for Dealing with Iran-
Iraq War," mid-1982, available at the National Security Archive, the George \Washington University,
Washington, DC.
8( Cordesman and Wagner, Iessons, pp. 130-131.
9" Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, p. 140.
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regular forces received in the pre-revolutionary period, and they stand in general contrast to
the performance of the revolutionary units.
First, regarding cohesion, all Iranian forces demonstrated more cohesion than
predicted by the political intervention theory. The Guard and Basij, in particular, fought with
a great willingness to die, as evidenced in the human wave attacks.91 The ideational sources
of this motivation will be discussed in more detail at the end of the chapter, but suffice to
say that they did stem entirely from political intervention practices, even in the case of the
regular forces.
Nevertheless, it is important not to conflate cohesion alone with effectiveness. It is
clear the Iranians designed their offensives as they did precisely because they required so little
tactical proficiency, something that the poorly trained Pasdaran and Basij units clearly lacked.
Iranian "tactics," such as they were, consisted of walking into Iraqi minefields, cutting
through barbed wire, and using children as human shields again heavy weapons fire. While
perhaps "effective" in a certain way, this approach did not reflect mastery of modern military
skills such as weapons handling, careful use of terrain for cover and concealment, and so on.
Furthermore, had these tactics been used against an adversary adept in coordinating its own
movement and fire, they would have delivered far less territory to the Iranians.
Second, there was significant variation in Iranian tactical proficiency, and it occurred
largely along the lines predicted in Chapter 4. Although the first battle for Abadan was a
disaster, this was partly because the regular forces had been pressured to respond to the
invasion before they were ready. In general, the Iranian regular army units displayed
competence in the operation of their heavy weapons, notably armor. Additionally, the
Iranians deserve credit for conducting better reconnaissance than the Iraqis, as repeatedly
demonstrated in the targeting of vulnerable Popular Army units.9 While no source explicitly
identifies the regular forces as being better at this task than the revolutionary forces, one
history does single out the Pasdaran as frequently failing to do more than attack whatever
Iraqi position was directly in front of them.9" This suggests that it was probably the legacy
regular forces who were doing most of the reconnaissance and infiltration seen in the battles,
again reflecting a skill differential between the two types of units.
Third, the Iranian regular forces displayed some baseline ability to conduct complex
operations as well. Although far from consistent, the regular forces were at times clearly able
to exploit the breakthroughs created by the human wave attacks, an action that required
coordination across infantry, armor, and artillery.9 Furthermore, it was probably not a
coincidence that in one of the biggest instances of this type of success, the battle for Abadan
in September 1981, "Iranian preparation for the attack had been left largely to regular
officers believed to be fully loyal to the regime," and revolutionary forces "were
subordinated to the regular army command." , Clearly, when regular forces were in charge,
even the combat power of the revolutionary forces could be harnessed to greater effect.
It is important not to overstate these contrasts, of course. While one must give credit
to the Iranians for their gains, it is very difficult to see how the Iranian methods could have
yielded such significant results had their opponent offered even slightly more effective
resistance. In other words, it is important not mistake Iraqi errors for Iranian military
Pollack, Ararbs at War, p. 200.
Pollack, A rabs at War, p. 199.
9 Cordesnan and Wagner, Lessons, p. 131.
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prowess.96 That said, the Iranian counteroffensives show that there were some real
differences between the pre-revolutionary and revolutionary forces, in part because of the
differing nature of the Shah's earlier political intervention with respect to training.
Unfortunately for Iran, however, most of its leaders actually drew the wrong lessons
about what had happened, crediting the revolutionary rather than regular forces for Iran's
victories. The few leaders who might have told them otherwise perished in the helicopter
crash in September 1981. As we will see, these events set the stage for a decline in Iranian
effectiveness even among the regular forces in subsequent battles.
IV. The Iranian Invasion at Basra, July 1982, and Subsequent Battles, 1982-3
After regaining its lost territory, Iran invaded Iraq in July 1982, focusing its initial
efforts on Iraq's second large city, Basra. The battle of Basra therefore offers the first
opportunity to observe the Iranians on the offensive against Iraqis defending their own soil.
In what was called Operation Ramadan, Iran launched a major assault to take the city,
running directly into the teeth of Iraqi defenses. After a protracted fight, the Iraqis managed
to keep Basra. Nevertheless, the costs Iraq paid for this victory were exorbitant, and both
sides demonstrated poor battlefield effectiveness, especially in the realm of complex
operations, where the Iranian decline was clear. Because the fight for Basra established a
pattern that was to govern the ground war during the remainder of 1982 and into 1983, the
analysis below briefly discusses additional Iranian offensives that occurred after the attack on
Basra, revealing that the two sides' performances there were typical rather than anomalous.
The Forces on Each Side
Despite its devastating losses during 1981-2, Iraq retained a decisive overall
advantage in weapons going into the battle for Basra, as would remain the case for the rest
of the war.,7 In 1982, Iraq's advantage in armor and artillery was close to 3:1, and it retained
a 4:1 edge in airpower.s The two sides were more evenly matched in terms of the local
balance of manpower, with both having something on the order of 70-90,000 men near
Basra.9 Iraqi forces consisted primarily of its 3"" Corps, while Iranian forces were a mixed
force of Artesh, Pasdaran, and Basij.
Contrary to the earlier battles, however, Iraq now fought on its home turf, affording
it greater familiarity with the terrain and much shorter and more secure lines of
communication, re-supply, and reinforcement.',, Certain that they would be welcomed by
Basra's Shia populace, the Iranians had broadcast news of their impending attack.'," As a
result, Iraq had devoted considerable effort ever since its retreat from Iran to establishing
defenses along the southern sector of the front. Parallel to the main north-south roads in the
area, the Iraqis built huge berms that provided good fighting positions for tanks, machine
guns, and cannon. Opposite this line, the Iraqis established a free-fire zone filled with
9 Pollack, Arabs at IFar, p. 200.
Ward, Imimor/al, p. 259.
8 Cordesman and Wagner, Ilessons, p. 149.
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mortars, mine, and barbed wire.212 In addition, Iraq converted a small fishery east of Basra
into an enormous artificial water barrier. Known as Fish Lake, the water concealed
concertina wire, mines, and power lines that could electrocute anyone who tried to cross it
(see map 19).103
The Iranian plan reflected some awareness of these defenses. It called for two
divisions to conduct a diversionary attack across the Iraqis' northern flank, while two mixed
army-IRGC task forces would assault the Iraqis' eastern flanks. Eventually the two forces
were to link up and encircle the Iraqis between them. Meanwhile, an additional infantry
division, the 21", along with Revolutionary Guard forces, was to swing south of Fish Lake
and flank the entire Iraqi position defending the city.104
THE BATTLE OF BASRA, JULY 1982
Iraq Iran
Battle summay
Tactical orientation Defensive Offensive
Plan Layered positional defense Cut off Basra from the north,
relying on firepower to mow then engage in frontal infantry
down Iranian infantry assault with armor exploiting
any breakthroughs
Weaponsi05  >700 tanks; extensive network 200 tanks, 200 APCs, 300
of dug-in armor, artillery, artillery pieces
machine guns, mines, wire,
mortars, water barriers, tear gas
Manpoweri16 70-90,000 men: five reinforced 90,000 men: Revolutionary
divisions, plus three more Guard and Basij, plus six
armored divisions in reserve understrength army divisions
Losses'"' >3,000 KIA, 1400 POW 20-30,000 KIA and WIA
Effectiveness summary
Unit cohesion? Minimal Mixed
Tactical proficiency? No No
Complex operations? No No
Confirms theory? Yes Somewhat
The Battle
The battle for Basra began on the night of July 13-14, 1982, as the Iranians crossed
the border with relatively little immediate opposition. After penetrating about 20 kin, the
Iranians ran into the prepared Iraqi defenses. Iraqi firepower completely halted the Iranians'
diversionary attack in the north and one of their two thrusts from the east. But the second
thrust from the east broke through the Iraqi lines, causing the Iranians to call off the planned
attack by the 21" to the south of Fish Lake and instead call that unit north to reinforce the
breakthrough.
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Rather than providing momentum to the Iranian attack, this decision just created a
giant target for the Iraqis, who now attacked the Iranian penetration from three sides.-"8 The
Iranians were driven back almost to where their attack had begun and soon "lost much of
their cohesion.""'9 Iraq also may have relied on tear gas to help break up the Iranian
formations."O But Iraq, too, suffered heavy losses in all three of the divisions encircling the
Iranian penetration, primarily because the Iraqis failed to maneuver or to operate in
combined arms teams."' The retreat was devastating for Iran as well, costing it major
elements of an armored and infantry division, as well as significant amounts of artillery,
armor, and soldiers.' 2
Rather than pause, the Iranians quickly regrouped and crossed the Iraqi border again
on July 21 from a position slightly south of the original avenue of attack. Again, Iranian Basij
walked into the Iraqi defenses, clearing paths through the minefields for Pasdaran and army
forces. This effort broke through the Iraqi defenses east of Fish Lake, but again Iraqi forces
drove back the Iranian penetration with heavy fire from tanks, helicopters, and artillery. This
basic scene repeated itself during the last week of July and first days of August, as another
Iranian breakthrough was driven back by another Iraqi defensive onslaught."
All told, the Iranians took perhaps 20-30,000 casualties and lost up to a quarter of
their equipment."4 Iraqi casualties were considerably lower, somewhere around 3,000 killed
in action, but the main armored division involved, the 9", was so badly mauled that "it was
disbanded and never reformed-the only Iraqi division to suffer this fate during the war."m
Subsequent Iranian Attacks into Iraq, 1982-3
The battle at Basra set a pattern that both sides were to repeat during the remainder
of 1982 and throughout 1983. During this time, Iran launched additional attacks in the
northern sector and against Basra (late 1982), as well as five offensives spread across all three
sectors of the border (February-November 1983).'"6
Reflecting the ascendance of the revolutionary forces, the Iranian approach
continued to rely on human wave attacks. As in the initial battle for Basra, these attacks were
sometimes able to penetrate the first line of Iraqi defenses but always proved difficult to
control and direct thereafter. Iran's decreasing stocks of armor and mechanized vehicles also
made it ever more difficult to exploit the breakthroughs that did occur." Even several years
into the war, "Iran still was willing to throw thousands of Basij into combat, almost straight
from their cities and villages. It provided them with little military equipment and resupply
capability and gave its volunteers few instructions other than to advance to their primary
objective and obtain supplies from the newly liberated Iraqi Shi'ites.""8
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Ultimately, despite launching offensives involving tens of thousands of men and
suffering casualties that were often three to four times those of Iraq's, Iran's offensives in
1982-3 resulted in virtually no lasting, strategically significant territorial gains."9 Iran never
proved able to launch more than one major assault at a time. Consequently, the Iraqis always
had an opportunity to shift their forces to the various points of attack along the border.
Additionally, Iran's attacks tended to develop slowly, providing Iraq with ample time to
react."121
For its part, Iraq continued to rely on essentially the same approach that it had
employed at Basra. Iraq expanded its large fixed defenses, eventually constructing hundreds
of kilometers of closely spaced, raised sand berms that enabled the preparation of fighting
positions against human wave attacks. 121 Again reflecting the use of good combat
engineering, the Iraqi bunkers and fortifications integrated the use of mines, artillery, armor,
and various manmade obstacles, including water barriers.112 Iraq also employed chemical
weapons for the first time in 1983. 123These tactics allowed the Iraqis to stop the Iranians
through sheer attrition-firepower over skill. Rarely did the Iraqis actually rely on maneuver
or combined arms operations to surround and destroy Iranian penetrations.
The entire front devolved into trench warfare reminiscent of World War I. By 1983,
Iran had suffered about 180,000 killed in the war, with several times that number wounded,
and 8,000 taken prisoner. Iraq had suffered about 65,000 killed, with several times that
number wounded, and 50,000 taken prisoner. This meant that total battle deaths had already
reached almost a quarter of a million men, before the war's halfway mark.124
Assessing the Battlefield Efftciveness of Iraq
The battle of Basra, much like the subsequent battles during 1982-1983, was in some
sense a victory for Iraq, but one that came at a huge and disproportionate cost. Regarding
the first aspect of battlefield effectiveness, unit cohesion, there are no direct references to
Iraqi cohesion in accounts of the battle of Basra, so it is difficult to assess. Certainly, this
battle and the ones that followed did not generate reports of Iraqi units breaking and
running as had the earlier battles in Iran, although the nature of the dug-in Iraqi defensive
positions would have made this sort of surrender much less feasible than it had been
previously. 2
Second, Iraqi tactical proficiency continued to be minimal at best. It is clear that the
Iraqis did establish basic defenses around Basra using the weapons and equipment that they
had available. Yet these defenses depended more on combat engineering than tactical
proficiency. The fact that the Iraqis had to use tear gas and, later, chemical weapons to break
up the Iranian formations suggests that the Iraqis continued to experience problems in
converting their material resources into actual fighting capabilities. As Pollack puts it, "The
Iraqis were employing all the weaponry available to a modern army to fight what was
basically a light infantry force. They generally outnumbered the Iranians, except temporarily
at the point of attack, where the Iranians might muster an advantage in manpower for their
human-wave assaults. The Iraqis could bring to bear vastly greater firepower than the
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Iranians and were considerably more mobile than the Iranians."126 Yet despite all this, the
battle for Basra permanently destroyed an Iraqi armored division and cost Iraq thousands of
casualties. Strangely, though, Saddam considered the massive Iraqi losses a sign of
effectiveness, interpreting it to mean that Iraqi troops were fighting well.127
Third, and most importantly, Iraq still displayed no ability to conduct complex
operations. Its armor failed to maneuver, and in general its ground forces did not integrate
the use of different combat arms, despite the presence Iranian forces that would have been
very vulnerable to these sorts of operations. Iraq eventually was able to prevail simply by the
sheer volume of its firepower, but against a more skilled and better equipped foe, even this
outcome would have been difficult to achieve.128 The only areas in which Iraq continued to
excel were supply, transportation, and engineering.129
Assessing the Battlefield Effectiveness of Iran
The battle of Basra and Iran's subsequent attacks shone a harsh light on Iranian
tactical limitations. It is true that Iranian cohesion continued to be robust, with tens of
thousands of soldiers willing to walk into the teeth of Iraqi defenses.11 This is certainly
surprisingly in light of the political intervention theory. But it is also the case that the Iranian
strategy, by its very nature, required little more in the way of basic tactic proficiency than this
sort of fearlessness. Many of the Basij were not even armed and simply were required to
march across minefields or stand in front of Iraqi tanks.
If this was the tactic, then the Iranians could have been said to be proficient. Still,
even the timing of these very basic infantry assaults proved more than Iranian forces could
handle effectively, especially as compared to some of the successes Iran had experienced in
the earlier battles where the regular forces had been given more command authority.13 As
Ward notes, "Iran's basic strategy was roughly equivalent to trying to use a hammer to
destroy an anvil. The Guard formations allowed the commanders to commit large numbers
of infantry in repeated attacks, but the divisions were slow and plodding and lacked the
training and mobility needed to counter Iraq's strong armored reserves.""2
More importantly, Iranian effectiveness broke down utterly in the realm of complex
operations. Iranian fearlessness-that is, the willingness of its soldiers to execute the "tactic"
of martyrdom-could not compensate for serious deficits in coordination. Iran's command
structure was so fractured that the human wave assaults were poorly integrated with the
mobility and fire that Iran did possess. Those willing to walk into minefields tended to be
from the Pasdaran and the Guard, while those who operated armor and artillery tended to be
from the Artesh. Because these forces were controlled through entirely different command
structures, "the ability to shift fires or change attacks to take advantage of opportunities was
seriously circumscribed."m For all the terror they may have inspired, the human waves
"could not maneuver quickly or effectively, particularly once forces were committed to
battle. Command and control was difficult."P4
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Furthermore, the reliance on human waves wasted what armor and skilled manpower
the Iranians did have. As Cordesman and Wagner note, "There often was no clear role that
Iranian armor could play except to provide fire support for the infantry. Iranian armor could
occasionally flank an Iraqi force but could not maneuver in depth against Iraqi opposition
without infantry support, and the bulk of Iran's infantry lacked the equipment and skill
needed to operate as a mechanized force. Further, Iran's tactics presented major problems in
supply and in exploiting a breakthrough."13
Additionally, the reliance on human waves to breach the Iraqi lines had worked
better on Iranian territory than it did once the Iraqis were defending established positions on
familiar terrain. The battle of Basra epitomized this problem, but it appeared again and again
in 1982, 1983, and 1984. Iran "never brought an end to the feuding and lack of coordination
between the Pasdaran and regular force, and it continued to reward loyalty and belief, rather
than professionalism."36 A CIA assessment at the end of the year agreed that Iran was
basically incapable of offensive operations and would remain so given the was in which
Iranian leaders intervened in the military: "the Iranian Army is basically a defensive
organization.... The Army will never be fully exonerated under the current regime: political
controls have been tightened over the military. Many of the victories on Iranian territory last
year, although impressive, were largely attributable to the feeble fighting nature of the
Iraqis."137 These factors combined to render a subtle but noticeable decline in Iranian
fighting effectiveness compared to the initial battles of the war.
V. The Battles for the Howizeh Marshes, 1984-5
In February 1984, Iran launched four major thrusts into Iraq: one limited attack in
the north and three in the south. Two of these latter three attacks were diversions from the
real effort, known as Operation Kheiber, which sought to drive into Iraq through the
Howizeh Marshes. These marshes, measuring forty miles east to west and thirty miles north
to south, straddled the Iran-Iraq border near the intersection of the Tigris and Euphrates
(see map 20). Up until this point in the war, the Iraqis had generally assumed that these
marshes would always provide a natural barrier to Iranian passage. The swampy terrain had
water up to 3 meters in depth, in addition to thick vegetation that impeded visibility and
movement. In general, the Iraqis had focused more on keeping the marshes flooded than
building defenses to the rear of the marshes or patrolling the area.'3
As a result, Iran saw a target of opportunity: the marshes, if penetrated, had the
potential to provide Iran with nearly direct access to the major road connecting Basra and
Baghdad. Iran would able to sever southern Iraq, the home of Iraq's Shia, from the rest of
the country. Additionally, the southernmost tip of the marshes housed two manmade
structures known as the Manjoon Islands that provided easy access to the dozens of active
Iraqi oil wells in the area.
For these reasons, Iran launched an amphibious assault on the marshes in 1984.
Although there were some differences from the Iranian attacks on 1982-3, in general
Operation Kheiber followed Iran's same offensive formula of human wave attacks backed
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(or intended to be backed) by some heavy weapons. The operation reflected the continuing
limitations of Iran's approach, yielding only very small territorial gains at a huge human cost.
Iraq, too, repeated its basic defensive approach in the battle, relying on extremely heavy
firepower, including chemical weapons, to mow down Iranian infantry, while engaging in
only very limited counterattacks from fixed defensive positions.
Despite this fresh illustration of the stalemate that their tactics produced-a fact that
had been relatively clear since 1982-both sides repeated the entire interaction yet again
when Iran launched Operation Badr against the marshes in 1985. These two battles thus
offer a further opportunity to examine Iran on the tactical offense and Iraq on the defense.
They also generally confirm the continuing deleterious effects of each side's forms of
political intervention, which hindered the battlefield effectiveness of both combatants. The
1985 battle in particular, taking place on virtually the exact same terrain as the 1984 battle,
and illustrating virtually the exact same effectiveness problems evident in 1982-3, suggests
just how deliberately each regime continued to sacrifice military performance for its
preferred forms of political intervention-or at least how blind each regime continued to be
to this trade-off.
The Forces on Each Side
Iran's 1984-5 campaign to control the Howizeh Marshes led to some of the largest-
scale ground combat seen anywhere since World War 11. The fighting in this sector
ultimately involved a half a million men, about 300,000 of them Iranian.139 By 1984, Iran had
marshaled more than two dozen divisions or independent brigades in the area. Out of this
concentration, some 50-150,000 men deployed as a strike force opposite the marshes, with
another 100,000 men acting as reserves. The Iranian forces were almost entirely light infantry
that planned to cross the marshes using pontoon bridges and small boats. Though Iran had
deployed some better armed Artesh units, the Basij and Pasdaran fighters involved lacked
virtually any artillery, anti-tank weapons, or other sources of heavy firepower.1"
Iraqi forces in the area initially consisted of only 40,000 men. One can get some
indication of how unlikely the Iraqis considered an attack in the marshes from the fact that
the seam between the Iraqi 3"" and 4 "' Corps ran directly through this terrain. Troops from
3"" Corps covered the southern sector, including the Manjoon Islands, while 4 "' Corps
covered the north.14 In early 1984, Iraq's defenses were not nearly as well developed as in
other areas of the front, such as Basra. Nevertheless, the Iraqis still retained a significant
overall superiority in weapons in this sector, particularly armor, artillery, and airpower.
Additionally, Iraq's chemical weapons capabilities had grown to include both mustard gas
and Tabun, a nerve agent.14 2
In the 1985 battles, this scenario was largely repeated, although the Iranian force
dedicated to capturing the marshes was smaller, perhaps only 45-65,000 men, a mix of
Pasdaran and regular army. They were also somewhat better armed, with all the soldiers at
least in possession of assault rifles and plentiful ammunition. Additionally, Iranian forces
possessed rocket propelled-grenades, rockets, small vessels mounted with recoilless rifles and
mortars, some chemical protective masks and clothing, and nerve agent antidote. Iraq still
relied on elements of its 3" and 4"' Corps forces to defend the marshes. These forces initially
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amounted to about two divisions of troops, although they swelled to 60,000 as the fighting
in 1985 escalated.143
THE BATTLES FOR THE MARSHES, 1984-5
Iraq Iran
Battle summary
Tactical orientation Defensive, with some Offensive, with some defense
counterattacks against counterattacks
Plan Defense of Basra-Baghdad Three-pronged attack through
highway and Manjoons marshes to cut Basra from
Baghdad; capture Manjoons
Weapons Artillery and armor, attack Infantry ferried by barges,
helicopters, mustard gas and small boats, rubber rafts; as of
Tabun, water barriers rigged 1985, assault rifles, RPGs,
with electrocution, mines rockets, recoilless rifles,
mortars, pontoon bridges
Manpower 40,000 in 1984, drawn from 3 rd 50-150,000 soldiers, plus
and 4 "h Corps; 60,000 in 1985 another 100,000 in reserve in
1984; 45,000-65,000 in 1985,
with at least 20,000 more
occupying islands
Losses144 6,000 KIA and 10-12,000 WIA 18-26,000 KIA and 20-30,000
in 1984; 2,500-5,000 casualties WIA in 1984; 11-17,000
and several thousand POWs in casualties in 1985
1985
Effectiveness summary
Unit cohesion? Yes Yes
Tactical proficiency? No No
Complex operations? No No
Confirms theory? Yes Somewhat
The Battle in 1984
After launching some attacks in the north and south that attempted to draw Iraqi
forces away from the marshes, Iran launched Operation Kheiber on February 24, 1984. Tens
of thousands of Iranian soldiers set forth on a three-pronged amphibious assault, attempting
to cross the marshes and build a bridgehead by boat before the Iraqis' artillery and armor
could be brought to bear against them.15 Unfortunately for the Iranians, their attempts to
divert the Iraqi forces away from the marshes had not succeeded, and the Iraqis were able to
respond almost immediately to the attempted crossing. Although the Iranians initially
overran a few marsh villages and a few troops may even have reached the Basra-Baghdad
road, Iraqi heavy weapons drove back Iran's light infantry force within the first day of
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fighting.4 6 According to one source, "The fighting was grim. Iraqi tanks ran over some
Pasdaran infantry, and Iraq electrocuted others by diverting power lines into the marshes."147
These gruesome scenes did not halt Iran's efforts, however, and it continued to send
waves of Pasdaran into the Iraqi fields of fire. In a virtual repeat of the scenes of 1982-3,
Iranian sent unprotected infantry directly into Iraqi tank fire and fixed and rotary-wing
aircraft attacks in the marshes. By the end of February Iraq was using artillery and aircraft to
deliver chemical munitions as well. Iraq also manipulated flooding in the area to create water
barriers to Iranian movement; many Iranians drowned.
By March 1, the Iranians had run short of both supplies and the manpower needed
to sustain the human waves, and Iraqi forces were able to isolate and attack the exposed
units that remained. Overall, Iran lost somewhere on the order of 12-20,000 men during the
fighting, five to seven times the number of Iraqi casualties.148
Iran's only territorial gains were the Manjoon Islands at the southern edge of the
marshes, which had been virtually undefended. After occupying the islands on February 22,
Iran had quickly dug in, built a pontoon bridge back to the Iranian side for re-supply, and
brought in artillery. More than 20,000 Iranian soldiers swarmed into the tiny outpost. But by
March 6, the Iraqis were ready to contest these gains, fighting bitterly to re-occupy the
territory and eventually deploying mustard gas and perhaps Tabun. Iraq recovered about a
quarter of the southernmost of the two Manjoon Islands but was unable to dislodge Iran
from the rest of it or to re-take the northern island.14
Having lost huge quantities of equipment and suffered something on the order of
18-26,000 total soldiers killed, and 20-30,000 wounded, Iran now declared Operation
Kheiber a victory because of its gains on the islands. During the rest of 1984, Iran converted
its pontoon bridge back to Iran into a large earthen causeway to allow for better re-supply,
while keeping 250,000-330,000 soldiers at the front for future attacks. Meanwhile, Iraq,
having suffered about 6,000 killed in action and perhaps twice that number wounded,
prepared to defend the southern island "like a fortress under siege."n Total combatant
deaths in the war now reached 320,000: 170,000 Iranian, 150,000 Iraqi.-I
The Battle in 1985
Despite its proclamations of triumph, Iranian losses in early 1984 were so severe that
it was unable to mount any major offensive action for the rest of the year. Iraq took
advantage of Iranian paralysis to launch an offensive to retake the Manjoons on February 28,
1985, but it proved inconclusive. Iraqi firepower had proven adequate for defending territory
but was apparently not enough to take it. The Iranians remained where they were.
In March, Iran launched Operation Badr, which was in many ways a slightly more
cautious repeat of Operation Kheiber. Again, the goal was to sever the Iraqi south from the
rest of the country, cutting through the Howizeh marshes to split Basra from Baghdad. Iran
had assembled 75-100,000 troops in the area, with 45-65,000 of these constituting a mixed
strike force of Pasdaran, Basij, and Artesh soldiers.
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Directly against these seven or eight Iranian division equivalents stood, again, two
Iraqi divisions from 4"h Corps. They guarded the marshes and the approaches to the Basra-
Baghdad highway to the west. During 1984-5, Iraq had strengthened its defenses in the area,
building a network of bunkers and firing positions ringed with mines, barbed wire, and other
obstacles. Iraq had also worked to establish water barriers to further restrict Iranian
movement. Despite these fortifications, Iraqi soldiers did not aggressively patrol the areas
beyond their immediate fixed defenses, and in many places they had constructed only a
single line of defense rather than layered positions that could mutually support one another.
Aware of these deficiencies, the Iranian forces charged into the marshes on March
11, 1985. With the benefit of surprise, the Iranians managed to penetrate the Iraq 4 'h Corps
defenses, again with the use of human wave attacks. Over the next several days, the Iranians
drove about 24 km into Iraq, reaching the Tigris on March 14 and stringing several pontoon
bridges across it by March 15. Although a small contingent of Pasdaran and Basij forces then
reached the road between Baghdad and Basra, Iran again had no ability to support their
advance. Iranian armor and artillery were nowhere to be found, leaving what were essentially
light infantry forces completely exposed inside Iraqi territory.
The Iraqis by now had drawn in three other divisions, bringing the total Iraqi
defensive force in the area to a total of about 60,000 soldiers. Even the Republican Guard
division was committed, an unusual step at this point in the war. The Iranian penetration
was easily surrounded from the north, south, and west, and by March 17, Iraq had
recaptured its original positions in the marshes, albeit at a heavy cost. Iraq suffered 2,500-
5,000 casualties, and Iran 8-12,000.
Rather than pull back, Iran on March 19 launched an additional attack with 15-
20,000 men directly on the Iraqi positions in Manjoon at the south edge of the marshes,
guarded by 3"' Corps. Iran may have hoped that the attack on 4 "' Corps would have drawn
these 3 "' Corps forces away, but it did not. The Iranians again drove directly into the Iraqi
defenses, suffering enormous casualties. They repeated this tactic on March 21, finally giving
up two days later without evicting the Iraqis from their portion of the southern island.
Another 3-5,000 Iranians had been killed or wounded, some by Iraqi use of mustard gas and
Tabun.
Although Iran attempted to keep up the pressure during the remainder of 1985, both
sides were now exhausted. Some additional fighting occurred as year the wore on, and Iraq
initiated large-scale missile strikes against Iranian cities, but no further ground combat on the
scale of Operation Badr occurred.15 Nevertheless, both sides seemed to read the battles of
1984-5 as reinforcing rather than undermining their existing methods of warfare.15
Assessing the Battlefield E fctiveness ofIraq
The campaign to defend the marshes and regain the Manjoon Islands reflected
poorly on Iraqi battlefield effectiveness, evincing many of the same problems that had
appeared in 1982-3. First, Iraqi cohesion appears to have been adequate, although by this
point that may have had to do with the consequences facing those who broke ranks. Perhaps
a response to the large number of Iraqi POWs that had been captured during the first four
Cordcesman and Wagner, I essons, pp. 200-203; and Ward, Immiortal, p. 266.
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years of the war, Iraq now had a Punishment Corps, as mentioned in Chapter 4.155 It
operated in the rear areas and existed specifically to coerce those who failed to perform
adequately on the battlefield.156 With this unit at their backs, it is not too surprising that the
defending Iraqis now seemed to operate with some what better cohesion than before.
Second, Iraqi tactical proficiency was still lacking. Repeatedly, the Iranians were able
to surprise the Iraqis because they did not conduct basic patrols around their static defenses.
And although Iraq was able to stop the Iranian advances in most areas-except for the
Manjoons-it required enormous amounts of firepower to do so. The fact that Iraq had to
rely repeatedly on chemical weapons to halt a light infantry force casts some doubt on the
skills of its armor, artillery, and airpower. Iraq's one real tactical success continued to be in
the area of combat engineering, which certainly redounded to its benefit in the marshes,
where the ability to direct water constituted a major advantage. Nevertheless, with this one
exception, it is far from clear that Iraqi battlefield performance reflected an efficient use of
its resources.
Lastly, Iraq continued to display virtually no ability to conduct complex operations.
Iraq had multiple air and ground combat arms at its disposal in the battles for the marshes,
yet it never integrated them into combined arms operations. For instance, there are virtually
no examples of the Iraqis using their ground forces to pin down Iranian units that could
then be attacked by airpower, even though the Iraqis had near-total air superiority during the
battle. When Iraqi aircraft did attack, it was not in coordination with ground forces. The air
force "failed to provide air support for Iraqi forces on the front lines."I
Moreover, one detailed analysis attributes this sort of coordination failure directly to
Saddam's coup concerns, noting, "A number of officers in the Air Force were not from his
network of loyal clans and tribes and were not politically reliable..... Due to these
considerations, Hussein discouraged inter-service cooperation so that the Air Force and the
Army could not coordinate a coup. On the battlefield, this arrangement resulted in the
ground forces failing to work effectively with the Iraqi Air Force. By the time information
from ground commanders on the battlefield filtered through the various political circles to
the Air Force, it would be too late for them to perform in an effective manner. An example
of such failures occurred during the battle in the Marshes in 1984 when the Iranian military
was able to build a massive 17 kilometer pontoon bridge without Iraqi aircraft taking any
actions to disrupt this effort."-h
Additionally, despite the extensive nature of the Iraqi defenses, they remained simple
and rigid, rather than layered and flexible. Iraq never adopted a defense-in-depth, even
though it clearly had the equipment, weapons, and numbers needed to do so. Most notably,
Iraq rarely engaged in offensive action to push the Iranians back across the border.
Cordesman and Wagner have noted that even as the campaign became more and more
intense, "Iraq continued to fight relatively passively.... It failed to give proper emphasis to
increasing its infantry and assault capability."e instead, the iraqis relied on their
technological and fixed positional defenses to simply grind down the Iranians to the point of
By 1984, Iraq held only 7,300 Iranian prisoners of war, whereas Iran held more than 50,000 Iraqis. Hiro,
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exhaustion. In the one situation where this approach did not work, the Manjoon Islands, the
Iraqis had to cede the territory.160
Assessing the Battlefield Effectiveness of Iran
Despite all the problems with Iraqi battlefield effectiveness, it managed to hold on to
most of the marshes because of the continuing problems with Iranian military performance.
These, too, were largely a repeat of the battles of 1982-3. Again, Iranian forces did display
surprisingly good cohesion, despite the imposition of worst practices in political
intervention. But, again, this cohesion was not used in the service of effective tactics, unless
walking into prepared defenses counts as a tactic. Even the human wave tactics, such as they
were, were not executed effectively. For example, Iran launched these attacks in broad
daylight, when they were most vulnerable to Iraqi firepower. The attacks were often not
timed to launch simultaneously, giving the Iraqis ample opportunity to concentrate firepower
against them. Iranian soldiers also "persisted in their habit of congregating indecisively once
they had achieved their objective, providing ideal targets to the well-entrenched Iraqis."161 All
of these errors demonstrate that Iran essentially wasted the one asset it had in spades, which
was a ready supply of martyrs. This resource could have posed a far greater challenge to Iraq
than it actually did, but the surprising Iranian cohesion did not translate into even limited
tactical proficiency, even among the regular forces.
Third, and most important, the Iranian campaigns continued to reflect a total
inability to conduct complex operations, consistent with the predictions of the theory. Again
and again, even where Iranian human waves achieved a breakthrough, as when a brigade
reached the Basra-Baghdad highway in the initial stages of battle in 1984, Iran had no ability
to exploit these penetrations as it had in the initial battles of the war. Iranian armor, artillery,
and airpower never appeared, leaving its infantry to be attacked and destroyed at the Iraqis'
leisure. Hiro observes that Iran "could not score solid achievements for the same reasons as
before: its insufficiently trained revolutionary guards marched against the enemy without
adequate combined arms backing and proper resupply facilities," resulting in a campaign that
was nothing short of "suicidal."16
As Ward notes, even where Iran demonstrated some good combat engineering skills
in its planning of amphibious operations, it still never developed "a means to bring heavy
artillery and antitank guns forward quickly," and its air force "was unable to provide air
cover or offset Iraqi attack helicopters."Ia Cordesman and Wagner concur: "The reason for
Iraq's defensive victories in 1983-1984 was the combination of both Iraqi superiority in
firepower, armor, and air power, and of Iran's failure to properly plan and manage its
infantry attacks.... Iran helped defeat itself by consistently exposing its manpower in direct
human-wave assaults on heavily held Iraqi positions in broad daylight, without major artillery
and air support, and without effective battle management."16 In short, while Iranian
cohesion was impressive, the overall battlefield result was very much what the political
intervention theory would predict, with both revolutionary and regular forces now
performing with little effectiveness.
'6" Iraq eventually regained some of this territory in January 1986. Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, pp. 217-18.
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VI. The Battles for Faw and Mehran, 1986
Although Iran's attempts to take significant territory in Iraq had met with failure
during the previous three years, Iran continued to harbor ambitions of overthrowing the
Ba'th regime. In 1986 these took the form of another major offensive, launched against
several different targets in the southern sector of the front: the Howizeh Marshes, some
islands in the Shatt al Arab waterway, and the Faw peninsula. It remains unclear whether
Iran actually intended to capture all of these areas, or whether Faw was its only real target all
along. Certainly, the Faw peninsula was prize real estate: it provided Iraq's only access to the
Gulf, as well as a foothold into the Shia-majority, oil-rich Iraqi south (see map 21).165
What is known is that although the other components of the Iranian offensive in
February 1986 failed, the Iranians did manage to capture Faw. Many observers point to this
battle as representing a major improvement in the Iranians' fighting capabilities. While the
Iranian gains there were undeniable, closer inspection of the battle, especially within the
context of the overall offensive, reveals more continuity than change in Iranian battlefield
effectiveness. Iran did perform somewhat better at Faw than it had in earlier battles
perhaps because the operation was designed by an officer from the regular forces-but even
so, the Iranians continued to have serious deficits in tactical proficiency and sustaining
offensive complex operations.
Furthermore, a close look at the details of the Faw battle reveals, again, that apparent
Iranian effectiveness was as much a product of Iraqi weakness as of real changes in the
Iranian military. Indeed, some additional fighting in the immediate aftermath of Faw, in an
area known as Mehran across the border in Iran, illustrates just how deficient Iraqi forces
continued to be, because of the imposition of worst practices in political intervention.
The Forces on Each Side
In preparation for its offensive, Iran had kept nearly half of its regular army and two-
thirds of the Guards deployed in the southern sector. In all, it had about 200,000 troops
there at the start of 1986, equivalent to 20-25 divisions.I ' Although the exact numbers are
unclear, a sizable portion of this force was devoted to the attack on Faw-probably a corps
containing several divisions. 16 Iranian troops had been supplied with some new arms, such
as anti-tank missiles, as well as with chemical protective gear.18 Additionally, Iran had
stockpiled large amounts of supplies and bridging equipment in the area and deployed some
units that had been specially trained for amphibious assaults and fighting in the wetlands.16
For its part, the Iraqi army was not lacking for weapons or numbers. It continued to
enjoy a qualitative and quantitative overall advantage in all types of arms ranging form armor
to aircraft. Additionally, the Iraqi ground forces now totaled 700-800,000 men, in addition to
nearly a quarter million reservists.1- On the peninsula, however, Iraq had stationed only its
2 6 ' Division, consisting of Popular Army soldiers, and within the city of Faw itself, it had
'1'' Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, p. 219.
6 Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, p. 218.
16 Woods et al, Saddam W ar, p. 74.
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only 1,000 reservists.171 Clearly, despite Iraq's overall superiority, Iran had the advantage of
an overwhelming local superiority in the opening stages of the battle.
THE BATTLE FOR FAW, FEBRUARY 1986
Iraq Iran
Battle summary
Tactical orientation Defensive Offensive
Plan Defend existing positions on Capture Faw, as part of larger
the front; regain Faw southern offensive
Weapons Armor, including T-72 tanks; Anti-tank missiles; pontoon
chemical weapons; barriers, bridges and boats; SAMs and
wire, mines AAA; later, captured heavy
weaponry and equipment
Manpower On Faw: 2 6th Division, On Faw: probably several
consisting of Popular Army; divisions out of an overall
1,000 reservists in the city southern front force of 200,000
Pasdaran and Artesh
Losses 8-10,000 casualties, including 30 27-30,000 casualties
percent among Republican
Guard units; 20-25 aircraft
Effectiveness summary
Unit cohesion? Mixed Yes
Tactical proficiency? No Yes
Complex operations? No No
Confirms theory? Yes Somewhat
The Battlefor Faw'
As mentioned, the battle for Faw was but one of several Iranian attacks during
February 1986. First, on February 9, Iran had launched several large attacks against the Iraqi
3"" and 4" Corps in the Howizeh Marshes. It is unclear if these were intended to be major
offensives in the style of Operations Kheiber and Badr, or merely distractions from the real
attack in the south. Either way, they were unsuccessful, and for the same reasons that the
1984 and 1985 efforts had failed. Iraqi forces simply mowed down the waves of attacking
Iranians, who seemed to employ the same tactics they had previously.'2
Meanwhile, the Iranians had also launched an amphibious assault on Umm al-Rasas,
a group of islands in the Shatt north of Faw, but the Iraqis managed to turn back this thrust
as well. The Iraqi high command apparently believed that this effort and the push in the
marshes were all feints designed to divert their attention from Basra, where the Iranians had
also initiated a massive artillery barrage.m But the Iraqis were wrong; the real attack in the
south was coming from much farther south.
On February 10 the Iranians launched a major amphibious assault on Faw. In the
midst of a driving rainstorm, Iran began a massive artillery barrage against the Iraqi lines
while also sending forward an infantry division that quickly overran the first line of defenses.
Woods et al, Saddaml's [V'ar, p. 74.
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According to Ward, "The attackers were lightly armed but were trained to use captured Iraqi
tanks and ammunition, which they put to immediate use in mopping up the last few
positions on the Iraqi front lines before advancing against Iraqi strongpoints and rear area
facilities....174
As this spearhead punched forward, another 20,000 Iranian troops flooded in behind
it, attacking, as usual, straight through the Iraqi defensive obstacles, which included trenches,
wire, and mines.175 Most of these defenses were not well prepared and seemed to reflect a
lack of consideration of the peninsula's strategic importance as Iraq's economic lifeline and
gateway to the oil-rich south. Although some of the Iraqi troops in the city of Faw itself held
out until February 14, the Iraqi units outside the city panicked within the first two days of
the Iranian attack. Surprised, disoriented by the terrible weather, and outnumbered, these
Popular Army forces almost immediately abandoned their positions and equipment.176
According to one Iraqi general, "Everything was happening so quickly that even after
the battle started, the leadership in Baghdad and Basra still believed there was another main
attack coming."177 Their misperception may also have stemmed from the unwillingness of
Iraqi commanders at Faw to report their initial losses up the chain, for fear of punishment.17 1
Finally realizing the seriousness of the advance on Faw, however, Iraq sent reinforcements
to shore up the remaining lines on the peninsula. But the Iraqis' initial counterattacks were
"poorly organized."179 Iraqi armor attempted to attack, but its movement was poorly
coordinated with infantry. Iraq also attempted aerial attacks, but the poor weather impeded
their effectiveness. 18 Even the Republican Guard division, eventually sent into the fight,
proved unable to conduct an effective infantry assault against the dug-in Iranians. The Iraqi
troops simply were not ready for close fighting, especially on swampy terrain.18I
Through the massive application of firepower, including chemical weapons, Iraq at
last managed to break the momentum of the Iranian attack on February 14. According to
Ward, "Many of Iran's losses came from Iraq's heavy use of chemical weapons. Despite the
greater availability of masks and protective gear, the Basijis were poorly trained in using their
equipment...." During this intense week, the Iraqis also burned through two hundred of
their tanks' main gun barrels and expended so much ammunition that Baghdad rushed to
secure new stocks from international suppliers."
The Iraqi forces were now able to hold their lines, but repeated attempts to
counterattack failed."' For nearly a week, the Iraqi forces pounded the Iranians, who by now
were fully dug in. Pollack writes, "The Iraqis threw everything they had at the Iranians. They
committed the air force in full, flying as many as 200 CAS or BAI [close air support or
battlefield air interdiction] sorties per day, in addition to enormous quantities of artillery and
heavy doses of chemical agents. However, after three weeks of constant attacks, the Iraqis
had made little progress. Iraqi infantry-even the elite units-continued to perform poorly
and had to rely heavily on the firepower of their tanks and artillery. Iraqi armor had to stick
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to the roads because of the soft terrain, and even where the ground was firmer, they refused
to maneuver against the Iranians.... Iraq was unable to suppress or defeat Iranian antitank
teams either with artillery fire-slow to respond and inaccurate as ever-or with infantry,
who simply did not know how to cooperate with tanks." 184
Even with the use of mustard gas, Iraq's inability to maneuver cost it entire
battalions in the attempt to regain territory.185 Iraqi casualties were so extensive that the
military was said to have to rely on taxis just to get all the bodies out of the area, and the
government engaged in forced blood donation campaigns.186 Iran, too, suffered immense
losses, with an estimated 27-30,000 killed or wounded in just a few weeks of fighting.187
On March 9-10, the Iraqis made a last stand, attempting to conduct amphibious
landings that would outflank the Iranians. But these, too, failed at great cost, and the Iraqis
finally ceased their attempts at regaining territory.188 An uneasy, exhausted stalemate settled
over the peninsula, where 20-25,000 Iranians and some 25-32,000 Iraqis now sat in their
positions only a few hundred meters apart. 189 Iran now occupied about 200 square km of the
peninsula, which it kept supplied through pontoon bridges across the Shatt, where five
divisions stood at the ready.190 Iraqi defensive lines rimmed the edges of the Iranian holdings
and were soon connected to the large Iraqi road network in the south, which rapidly brought
in more weapons and equipment.191
The Aftermath: Strategy Debates and the Battle for Mehran
Overall, the 1986 offensive had damaged Iraq's strategic position. In addition to its
gains on Faw, Iranian forces had moved to within 10 miles of Sulaimaniyah, a major Kurdish
city in the northern sector, and huge concentrations of Iranian troops were still poised to
attack again across Faw.192 Iraq could at best defend these areas but had no ability to hold
Iranian targets of similar strategic value at risk.
Neither side seemed to consider the events of 1986 to have been much of a success.
In Iran a serious strategy debate ensued, although its details remain murky. What is clear is
that Iran's leaders emerged from it drawing precisely the wrong lessons. In August Khomeini
removed from command the architect of the Faw operation, a Shah-era officer named
General Ali Seyyed Shirazi. Shirazi had been one of the voices calling for Iran's legacy forces
to have a greater role in the development of strategy, and his removal even more firmly
secured this power for the revolutionary forces, particularly the Guard, which was
commanded by Shirazi's rival, Mohsen Rezai.'" As in 1982, Iran's leaders reacted to the
hints of battlefield success delivered by the regular forces with an elevation of the
revolutionary forces.
A similar period of debate occurred in Iraq, although with very different results. In
Iraq, the events of 1986 had shaken the political-military establishment to its core. A
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diplomatic report from Baghdad in April 1986 noted, "Unity among the three major forces
of power, the Baath Party, the army and other armed forces, and the president, has been
broken. The army is unwilling to assume responsibility for the failures at al Faw, and there
are many voices now openly mentioning the role of the president and his immediate
entourage in this failure. Military leaders eager to fight demand that they should be given a
free hand...." The report also noted that "the military leaders responsible for events in the
south have been relieved, transferred to other posts, or even executed." 19 A CIA analysis at
the time proved prescient in predicting that "the military probably will press Saddam for
policy and operational changes to improve Saddam's war making ability." 196
Saddam responded to these apparent challenges by doubling down. In May 1986, he
ordered four Iraqi divisions to seize the virtually abandoned area of Mehran across the
border in Iran, which was guarded by only about 5,000 troops. 9 Saddam then offered to
exchange Mehran for Faw, an offer Tehran rejected.198 Saddam's real miscalculation,
however, had been in rejecting his generals' advice to seize the heights surrounding Mehran,
which were vital to defending the territory. Apparently, Saddam refused to let the general on
the scene, Major General Adin Tawfiq, commander of the Army Second Corps, take the
heights because it would have required the use of elite forces needed to defend Baghdad.199
Predictably, the Iranians soon seized the heights and used them to attack the Iraqi
concentration of forces in Mehran. General Tawfiq, trying to defend his disadvantaged
position, requested air support after he came under attack, but because his request had to be
routed through Baghdad due to restrictions on Army-Air Force communication, the
approval came after the Iraqi ground forces had already been forced to retreat from the
town. Tawfiq was recalled to Baghdad and is believed to have been executed.200 Iran rapidly
regained control of Mehran.201
Coming on the heels of Faw, this debacle only deepened the crisis within the Iraqi
leadership.212 Iraqi generals blamed Saddam's intervention practices for both sets of losses.
Apparently their demands for greater independence led directly to the rather dramatic shift
in Saddam's forms of political intervention in 1986-7, as discussed in Chapter 4, setting the
stage for significant improvements in Iraqi battlefield effectiveness in 1988.2"3
Assessing the Battlefield Effectiveness of Iraq
Even the Iraqis clearly recognized their poor effectiveness during the 1986 battles,
particularly at Faw and Mehran. First, unit cohesion was mixed at best. The cohesion of the
units subject to worst practices-the Popular Army units, which had the worst leaders and
194Report, I Hungarian Embassy Baghdad to Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Varkony, "The Negative Impact
of the War on the Iraqi Domestic Situation," April 24, 1986, available at the National Security Archive, the
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least training-collapsed completely during the initial Iranian attack on Faw.2o4 Had they
stood and fought, the initial Iranian bridgehead onto the peninsula likely never would have
formed. Instead, Popular Army equipment and weapons were actually later used to attack
other Iraqi units. Although some of these other units, such as the regular army and
Republican Guard, did demonstrate adequate cohesion, it is important to remember that
they also had the Punishment Corps at their backs.
Second, Iraqi tactical proficiency continued to display numerous limitations. The
amount of firepower the Iraqis required to halt what were essentially light infantry attacks
again suggests that Iraqi heavy weapons were not used with a great deal of competence. 29s
Ward notes that the Iraqis repeatedly "relied on firepower over skill and maneuver."216 This
seemed to be true even as Iraq threw supposedly more and more proficient units into the
battle, replacing the Popular Army units with regular army units, and the regular army units
with Republican Guard units. None of these forces were able to counterattack successfully,
and many were destroyed trying. When it came to close fighting, even Republican Guard
units simply were not able to perform well. Only through an escalation to chemical weapons
were the Iraqis able to stabilize their position.m
Third, and most importantly, Iraqi units continued to display serious problems with
complex operations. Regardless of their particular tactical deficiencies, a broader problem for
the Iraqis was simply that their response to the attack on Faw was slow and late. This was in
large part because commanders lacked the initiative-or permission-to organize defenses
as soon as they detected the Iranian advance. They in fact failed to report up the chain how
serious the initial Iranian attacks had been. Had the Iraqis reacted more quickly, the entire
battle might have turned out differently. A similar story can be told about the defeat at
Mehran, where the lack of independence for the field commander led to rapid Iraqi losses.
Above all, however, coordination remained the Achilles' heel of Iraqi operations.
The Iraqis missed repeated opportunities to conduct combined arms operations that could
have smashed the massed Iranian forces at Faw. To be sure, the terrible weather impeded
Iraqi air operations, neutralizing a major Iraqi advantage. But even with the combat arms
that were in perfectly good working order during the battle-notably armor and infantry-
the Iraqis repeatedly failed to integrate their movement. The same was true at Mehran, where
Iraqi airpower was not impeded by weather. The Iraqi command structure was so fractured
that ground forces were unable to get air support in time to save them from the disastrous
position in which Saddam's leadership had placed them.
All in all, the battles of 1986 continued to reflect very poorly on Iraqi battlefield
effectiveness. For all the Iraqis' advantages in weaponry, their political-military relations
continued to exert a very real constraint on the military power they could generate.
Assessing the Battle/ield Ef/fctiveness of Iran
Iran did capture territory during 1986, so in some sense it was more effective than it
had been previously. Clearly, Iranian forces continued to be very cohesive, beyond what the
political intervention explanation would predict. But many of the same battlefield problems
that Iran had experienced previously with tactical proficiency and complex operations also
recurred in these battles.
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At Faw, Iran was never able to advance past its initial breakthrough, although it is
notable that the breakthrough itself was an operation planned by an officer from the Shah-
era regular forces, General Shirazi. Perhaps not coincidentally, the Iranian crossing of the
Shatt was indeed impressive, reflecting a coordinated effort at multiple points and
considerable feats of combat engineering and logistical preparation.2 "s In preparation for the
campaign, Iran had apparently trained a small contingent of Pasdaran in amphibious tactics,
using the waters of northern Iran as a training ground. Yet it is also important to remember
that this crossing was virtually unopposed. The Iraqis were caught by complete surprise, at
night, in terrible weather; they were locally outnumbered by the Iranians at a ratio of
something like 20:1; and the opposing Iraqi soldiers were drawn from the Popular Army.
As soon as these factors shifted-the Iraqis realizing the scale of the attack, the
weather clearing, better trained reinforcements arriving-even minimal, unskilled Iraqi
resistance managed to stop the Iranian advance. The Iranians also continued to be far more
vulnerable to Iraqi chemical weapons than they had to be, suffering numerous casualties
from gas even though soldiers had greater protective gear. While the Iranians may have put
more effort into the amphibious aspects of training and preparation for the battle, its troops
still had not mastered the very basic use of gas masks, which turned out to be a deadly deficit
in the actual fighting. In fact, the impact of Iraqi chemical weapons would have been far
worse had the wet weather and high winds not dispersed much more of the gas than was
typical.2o9
As in all of the other battles since 1982, Iran was still never able to use other combat
arms to exploit the initial penetration its infantry achieved through Iraqi defensive lines. Hiro
notes, for example, that yet again, "Tehran found itself unable to support its infantry with
enough tanks and firepower."210 It was this inability to perform complex operations that
ultimately limited what the Iranians could achieve on Faw, despite the influence of Shirazi.
While they clearly had prepared better for this attack than for others and benefited from a
series of favorable circumstances, their fundamental strategy of sending forth waves of
martyrs into the teeth of Iraqi firepower had not changed. As a result, Iranian battlefield
effectiveness was still far lower than it could have been given the balance of manpower and
the other circumstantial advantages Iran possessed at Faw.
VII. The Karbala Offensives, December 1986-April 1987
Iran's last attempt to take significant territory in Iraq occurred from December 1986
to April 1987, when Iran launched the Karbala offensives, a series of attacks in both the
northern and southern sectors of the front. Iran's primary objective in this campaign vas to
take Basra, the city it had sought since 1982. Control of Basra offered a foothold to control
all of southern Iraq, whose Shia populace Iran continued to see as natural allies.
Furthermore, capturing Basra would greatly hinder if not end Iraqi access to the Gulf and, at
the same time, position Iran to control much of the region's oil wealth.
As a result, the Karbala offensives, particularly the Kabala V battle for Basra in early
1987, offer a final opportunity to view Iran attempting to conduct complex offensive
operations, with leaders from the revolutionary forces firmly in control of the military. It
" W'oods et al, Saddam's If[r, p. 74; and Ward, I,,mortal, p. 275.
T"" Hiro, Longest ["ar, pp. 167-8.
10 Hiro, Lo tlest Iar, p. 168.
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also offers an opportunity to examine Iraqi attempts at complex defensive operations, as well
as complex counterattacks. Generally speaking, both Iran and Iraq evinced the same
effectiveness problems that they had displayed in their earlier battles on this same terrain,
and it would be hard to call the offensives a victory for either side. Iran certainly did not
prevail in taking Basra, but neither did Iraq in evicting the Iranians from their new positions
on the Iraqi side of the Shatt al-Arab.
That said, some improvements in Iraqi tactical effectiveness were evident in the
Republican Guard units called into the fight. This change, although subtle, suggests that
some of the shifts in Saddam's forms of political intervention during 1986 were already
beginning to alter the battlefield effectiveness of these units. This variation was an important
harbinger of changes that were to become fully evident in the 1988 battles.
The Forces on Each Side
At the time of the Karbala offensives, the two sides were fairly evenly matched in
terms of manpower in the southern sector of the border.211 Iran had massed something on
the order of 150,000-200,000 soldiers for the campaign, and Iraq could call upon a similarly
sized contingent. It is important to acknowledge, however, that parity in numbers usually
puts the attacker, in this case Iran, at a disadvantage, given that offensive action tends to be
more manpower intensive than defensive action. In this sense, the balance of forces actually
favored Iraq.21
Iraqi forces consisted of army units, although they were later backed by Republican
Guard units from Baghdad. Iranian forces were primarily Guard and Basij, although about a
third of the forces came from the Artesh.m As in the earlier battles, these Iranian forces
were mostly light infantry, although they were better armed now with anti-tank weapons
including new TOW (tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided) missiles. Iraqi forces
enjoyed clear superiority in armor, artillery, and fixed and rotary wing airpower.
The Iraqis also made extensive use of defensive obstacles such as mines, barbed
wire, trenches, and water barriers, many of which had required extensive combat engineering
during the previous several years to create. Chief among these was the aforementioned Fish
Lake, a large man-made water barrier between the border and Basra, rigged with sensors,
underwater obstacles, barbed wire, and electrocution zones (see map 21).21 The Iraqis also
had expanded the lake to create two additional channels to the north and south, essentially
forming a giant moat guarding eastern routes of advance on the citv.2I- These water barriers
provided excellent fighting positions for Iraq heavy weapons. Directly surrounding Basra
itself, the Iraqis had also constructed multiple rings of land defenses, converting the city into
a virtual fortress."1
[SEE NEXT PAGE]
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m Zabih, Iwian Ailitary, p. 196.
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TH KRBLAOFFiq-VESDECEMVE 1-9 -" 1 S7
Iraq Iran
Baqtie summary
Tactical orientation Defensive, then offensive Offensive, then defensive
Plan Defend approaches to Basra; Cross the Shatt, launch a two-
push Iranians back from any pronged assault around Fish
territory gained Lake, converge on Basra;
conduct additional attacks
elsewhere to divert Iraqis
Weapons Armor, artillery, air power, Rockets, missiles, anti-tank
chemical weapons, defensive weapons including TOWs,
obstacles including water HAWK anti-aircraft system
barriers
Manpower In the southern sector: 200,000 In the southern sector:
soldiers, including some 150,000-200,000 soldiers,
Republican Guard units mostly Pasdaran and Basij
Losses27 8-15,000 KIA 50,000 KIA
E ffectiveness summary
Unit cohesion? Better in Republican Guards Yes
Tactical proficiency? Better in Republican Guards No
Complex operations? No No
Confirms theory? Yes Somewhat
The Battle
The Iranians launched the first part of their offensive on the night of December 23,
1986, in an attack known as Karbala-4. Using an initial assault force of around 15,000
soldiers, Iran crossed the Shatt al-Arab along a 25-mile front stretching roughly from Basra
to Abadan. Under cover of darkness, specially trained Iranian commandos and frogmen
quickly captured several weakly defended islands in the Shatt. A much larger force of up to
60,000 Pasdaran and Basij then used these islands as stepping stones to surge across to the
Iraqi side.218
Despite this initially successful crossing, Iranian forces made virtually no progress
once they attempted to move up the road toward Basra. This was mainly because their battle
plan had sent them straight into the teeth of perhaps the most heavily defended area of the
entire border. Iraqi minefields and barbed wire guarded huge emplacements of Iraqi heavy
weapons in a massive killing zone. 19 Iran's light infantry simply was no match for these
defenses, especially given that the only Artesh support for the Basij and Guard spearheads
was artillery fire from the western bank of the Shatt. As in earlier battles, the human waves
were also "ill-coordinated" and conducted suicidal frontal attacks during daylight hours.22
Iran suffered 9-12,000 casualties in the assault and quickly retreated back across the
Shatt. The Iraqis, safe behind their defenses, suffered far fewer losses, around 1-2,000. The
entire episode was a disaster for Iran, with Cordesman and Wagner noting, "The Karbala-4
2K Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, p. 261.
2) Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, p. 247; and Ward, 1Imuortal, p. 277.
219 Ward, Immortal, p. 277.
22" Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, p. 247.
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offensive may have been the worst planned and executed major Iranian offensive since Bani-
Sadr's ill-fated offensives early in the war. It had much of the character of the hopeless mass
infantry assaults that Britain, France, and Germany had launched against well-entrenched
defenses in World War I."221
Despite this catastrophe, Basra continued to be the bloody fulcrum on which the
Iranians had decided the entire war balanced. In the early days of January 1987, they renewed
their campaign with an offensive called Karbala-5. Notwithstanding the recklessness of
Karbala-4, Karbala-5 does appear to have benefited at least from some better planning,
including some division-level, combined arms exercises in the Caspian.222 Furthermore, Iran
still had about 200,000 men deployed in the southern sector, although only 120-140,000 of
these, mostly Basij and Pasdaran, participated in the offensive.
Recognizing that the Iraqis expected an attack on Basra to originate from farther
south at Faw-a credible threat, given the events of 1986-the Iranians instead launched a
two-pronged attack north and south of Fish Lake, just to the northeast of Basra. Each prong
consisted of about 60,000 soldiers, with the idea that they would encircle Iraqi forces and
then converge on the city (see map 21).223 Launching their assaults on January 9, the first
spearheads consisted of about 50,000 troops, mostly waves of Basij followed by
Revolutionary Guards.224 According to Cordesman and Wagner, "their initial battle
management was good, and the leaders of the assault included large cadres of experienced
officers, NCOs, and troops."25
Iran made some initial territorial gains along the border, as the first Iraqi
counterattacks proved unsuccessful. Indeed, the Iraqi advantage in armor was of little use in
the marshy terrain, and Iraq proved unable to maneuver in the face of the Iranians' light
anti-armor weapons.26 The pressure of the Iranian waves caused some Iraqi infantry
formations to disintegrate, eventually allowing the Iranians to puncture two of the major
defensive lines around Basra.227
On January 12, however, the Iranian advance slowed dramatically, for two major
reasons. First, Iraq recognized the direction of the main attack and committed its Republican
Guard forces to the fight, providing important local reinforcements.228 Second, the terrain
now began to work in Iraq's favor: the closer the Iranians got to Basra, the more established
the Iraqi defenses became and the drier the land on which Iraqi armor could operate.
Meanwhile, Iranian lines also became longer, stressing access to supplies and ammunition."
During January Iraq also massively escalated the air war, bombing major Iranian cities. Iran
responded with missile attacks on Baghdad and Basra.231
By mid-January, Iranian losses in the offensive had risen to 40,000 men total,
counting those killed and wounded, and Iraqi losses had reached at least 10,000.
Nevertheless, on January 17 Iran committed another 50,000 troops to the battle, and in the
following days it managed to make a few additional territorial gains. During January 19-26,
221 Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, p. 246-7.
2 Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, p. 248.
' Ward, I1mmorta/, p. 278,
-4 Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, p. 250.
,, Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, p. 250.
26 Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, p. 250.
7 Pollack, Arabs at [Far, p. 223; and Cordesman and \agner, Lessons, p. 250.
2 Pollack, Arabs at Iar, p. 223.
9 Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, p. 251.
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the Iranians continued to launch more infantry attacks against Basra, in some places getting
to within 15 km of the city, but their daily advance was now measured in meters.23' Iraqi
artillery and chemical weapons continued to break up the Iranian assaults.
Iraq then attempted a major counterattack, hoping to sever the southern prong of
the Iranian attack by driving south from behind Fish Lake. But according to Pollack, "The
operation went nowhere. Although the counterattacking force began as a combined arms
team, it almost immediately separated into its different components, with the infantry
veering off to the southwest, the armor veering off to the southeast, and the artillery failing
to effectively support either." Now it was the Iraqi infantry's turn to try frontal assaults
against well-established defenses, an approach that did little to dislodge the Iranians but
greatly increased Iraqi casualties.232
In general, Iraq continued to display serious problems in coordinating its fire from
artillery and air power. Additionally, the relatively soft ground continued to absorb much of
the impact of Iraqi shells and conventional fragmentation bombs. Iraq was expending tens
of millions of dollars in ammunition every week and had lost more than a thousand armored
vehicles. Several Iraqi officers leading forces in this battle were relieved of command, some
probably executed. But Iraq continued to pour in reinforcements, and Iran continued to
creep against the Iraqi defensive rings.
By early February Iran had lost probably 17,000 KIA and another 35-45,000 WIA,
while Iraq had suffered 6,000 dead and at least twice that number wounded. Iran also
claimed to have taken 1,750 POWs, including more than 150 officers. According to
Cordesman and Wagner, "Intense fighting continued through the middle of February, and
Iraqi troops did not always perform well. A few of Iraq's secondary positions were virtually
abandoned, along with large stocks of equipment and munitions, although Iraqi forces
generally inflicted very high casualties for what ultimately were minor losses of territorv."
Iran was now within 10 km of Basra but was trapped in the narrow strip of land between the
Shatt and Fish Lake. It never broke out.33
Iran continued to launch new assaults into early March, but these eventually
devolved into a siege of the city. When Iran called off the offensive, Saddam quickly ordered
an attempt to retake the lost territory. Iraqi armor, backed by artillery and air sorties, again
attempted to drive the Iranians back from their positions surrounding Fish Lake. But the
Iraqis failed to maneuver adequately or to coordinate their armored movement with
supporting fires.234 Pollack writes, "Again, the Iraqis were hindered by a major breakdown in
combined arms cooperation and the determination of Iraqi mechanized forces to conduct
simplistic frontal assaults rather than maneuvering for advantage. In addition, while Baghdad
committed heavy air support for the counterattack, the Iraqi Air Force contributed little
because its airstrikes were not provided in a timely fashion, were not delivered in sufficient
strength to have a substantial effect, and Iraqi pilots were incapable of accurately targeting
tactical military targets.7"
The battle had produced victory for neither side, only a stalemate that they both had
to accept. 6 Iraq could defend Basra but not counterattack. iran could invade Iraq but not
Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, pp. 251-2.
2 Pollack, Arabs a! IVar, p. 223.
33 Cordesman and Wagner, I essons, pp. 252-3.
34 Hiro, Liongest War, p. 183.
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take its prize city. In its core elements, Karbala-5 had essentially repeated the duel at Faw the
previous year.
During this period, Iran also launched several other attacks, including Karbala-6 in
the area north of Baghdad in January 1987 and Karbala-7 in the Kurdish areas in March. In
the latter attack, Iran gained control of some territory, which, combined with the ongoing
fighting at Basra, appears to have deeply concerned the Iraqi leadership. On March 15, 1987,
Saddam called a five-hour meeting with his commanders in Baghdad, which apparently led
to the decision discussed in Chapter 4 to expand the Republican Guards, as well as to
escalate the tanker war and expand the use of chemical weapons. 2 37
In April, Iran renewed its attack on Basra in the Karbala-8 offensive, throwing
another 30-35,000 Pasdaran directly into the Iraqi defenses. Again, the scene was "a blood
bath," producing some 8-10,000 Iranian casualties in only three days of fighting. Iraq
suffered some 2,000 casualties and again managed to keep the Iranians from entering the
city. Iran also launched the Karbala-9 offensive during this period in the north, achieving
some limited territorial gains there.238
Overall, however, the period from December 1986 to April 1987 was devastating for
Iran, inflicting so many casualties that it would never again be able to launch a "final
offensive." It may have lost as many as 50,000 men during this period. Iraq did not fare
much better. It probably suffered 8-15,000 men killed in action and as many as 65,000 total
casualties.239 Iranian troops remained on Iraqi soil.
Assessing the Battlefield Effectiveness of Iraq
Iraqi battlefield effectiveness in the Karbala offensives generally continued to be
poor, although some improvements were evident. First, Iraqi cohesion was mixed. It was
partly the disintegration of regular army units early in the campaign that caused Baghdad to
send in the Republican Guard units. These forces then stood and fought, and their cohesion
clearly was better than that of the initial defenders. This is consistent with the predictions of
the theory, given some of the improvements in political intervention practices that had
occurred with respect to these units starting in 1986.
Second, Iraqi forces continued to display serious deficits in tactical proficiency.
Clearly, Iraqi combat engineering was very good, as evidenced in the extensive defensive
fortifications that greeted the Iranians upon their advance toward Basra. Iraq's extensive use
of water barriers and land obstacles, and its improved road networks, all reflected this
strength of the Iraqi ground forces.24"
Nevertheless, a close examination of most of the Iraqis' actual methods of fighting
reveals continuing problems. Again, the Iraqis required enormous quantities of firepower to
mow down what were essentially light infantry forces, suggesting some lack of skill in the
basic use of combat arms such as artillery and air power. Indeed, the campaign reveals the
Iraqis repeatedly firing enormous quantities of artillery, even though it was obvious that the
terrain muted the impact of this weapon. Cordesman and Wagner note, for example, "Iraqi
units often wasted their artillery supenonty on mass barrages in marsh areas where much of
[the] effect of Iraqi shells was lost because of the use of untargeted fire against dug-in forces
21 Cordesman and Wagner, I essons, pp. 257, 259-60.
23 Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, p. 260.
23 Cordesman and Wagner, Iessons, p. 261.
24' Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, p. 356.
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and the absorptive capability of the soft ground."241 As mentioned, Iraqi pilots also seem to
have delivered their ordinance late, inaccurately, and in insufficient quantity. All of these
misjudgments and inefficiencies make it difficult to rate the Iraqis as tactically proficient,
outside the area of combat engineering. Indeed, Pollack argues "there was little or no
discernible enhancement in [Iraqi] tactical competence."242
Some accounts do give the Republican Guard forces slightly higher marks for tactical
proficiency during the Karbala offensives. For example, Woods et al argue, "The major
factor in the Iraqi ability to hold off the Iranian attacks lay in the skill and capabilities of the
expanded and improved Republican Guard formations."243 Cordesman and Wagner, too,
make the general observation that "Iraqi ground forces performed better than in previous
years" during the battles of early 1987.244 In their view, "it was already clear that some
aspects of Iraqi performance were improving. Iraq's new elite forces showed increasing
capability to act as a strategic reserve."245 This reading of the evidence would be consistent
with the predictions in Chapter 4 that as the form of Saddam's political intervention in the
Republican Guard shifted away from worst practices and toward best practices, these units'
battlefield effectiveness should have improved.
Nevertheless, it is very important not to exaggerate the extent of these shifts by early
1987. Iraqi forces, even the Republican Guard units, still were unable to perform complex
operations. The Republican Guards provided greater numbers and firepower, but they
hardly could have been said to be fully effective.246 Cordesman and Wagner are careful to
note, for example, that Iraq "still could not efficiently counterattack Iranian forces with
armor.... Its forces continued to fail to coordinate its ground, air, and helicopter forces
efficiently. It still lacked an effective overall command structure, and it consistently
committed its technology and firepower piecemeal rather than in a coherent form or in
support of some coordinated form of maneuver warfare."24 Over and over, Iraqi armor and
infantry counterattacked separately and in frontal assaults that left them vulnerable to what
little capabilities the Iranians possessed. It was for this reason that although Iraq could
defend Basra, it was unable to permanently evict the Iranians.
Assessing the Battlefield ffectiveness of Iran
Overall Iranian battlefield effectiveness in the Karbala offensives vas relatively poor
among both the regular and revolutionary forces. Cohesion was still surprisingly good, but it
was used in human wave attacks that reflected little tactical proficiency and no ability to
conduct complex operations. While the Iranians did manage to cross the Shatt, it is
important to remember that they did so in the face of virtually no Iraqi defenses. As soon as
Iranian forces arrived in Iraqi territory, their forces continued to drive straight into the teeth
of Iraqi defenses, in broad daylight, with little effort to time the infantry assaults for
maximum effect. This resulted in very minimal territorial gains for Iran at the price of a
catastrophic loss of human life.
Indeed, these tactical shortcomings finally began to have strategic effects for Iran in
1987, as they severely hobbled Iran's supply of manpower heading into the battles of 1988.
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It is true that the Iranians seem to have done slightly better in the Karbala offensives in
terms of their use of amphibious operations, anti-tank weapons, and anti-aircraft missiles.248
But overall, the Iranian forces still reflected their lack of training, leadership by revolutionary
zealots, and highly fractured command structure.
This was most clear when the Iranians attempted to conduct complex operations.
Virtually all attempts to combine combat arms-for example, by relying on artillery from
across the Shatt to support infantry in Karbala-4, or by linking up the two major prongs of
its assault on Basra in Karbala-5-met with failure.249 Iranian battlefield effectiveness among
both regular and revolutionary forces was therefore generally consistent with what the theory
would predict, with the exception of the forces' continued cohesion.
VIII. The Second Battle for Faw, April 1988
In the spring of 1988, the Iraqis returned to the offensive, seeking to take territory
from the Iranians in a manner not seen since the first year of the war (see map 22). Iraq
chose as its initial point of attack the Faw peninsula, which Iran had taken two years earlier.
Faw had both symbolic and strategic significance. Not only had it been the scene of a major
Iraqi defeat, but the Iraqis probably recognized that the continuing Iranian foothold there
hindered the Iraqis from taking other territory they wished to regain in the south, notably the
Manjoons and the areas near Fish Lake outside Basra.
The Iraqi attempt to retake Faw therefore offers a useful opportunity to view an
Iraqi attempt at complex offensive operations-the first such attempt since the shifts in
political intervention practices toward the Republican Guard that began in 1986 and had
accelerated during 1987 and early 1988. If the political intervention explanation is right, the
substantial changes in Iraqi promotion, training, command, and information management
practices during this period should have led to an observable improvement in Iraqi
battlefield effectiveness by April 1988. This contrast should have been especially evident in
comparison with Iranian performance, which should not have shifted because there was no
major change in Iranian leaders' political intervention practices during this same period.
In fact, the battle provides confirmation of these predictions, showing strong Iraqi
cohesion, greatly improved tactical proficiency, and a much better ability to conduct
complex operations than seen in the earlier battles. It is important not to overstate the extent
of these changes, and also to acknowledge that in this particular battle the Iraqis also had
strong numerical and material advantages. However, the Iraqis had had a superiority in
weapons and, in some cases, the local balance of manpower at numerous points already in
the war, without ever demonstrating the ability to perform complex operations. A close
analysis of the fighting at Faw in 1988 makes it clear that the Iraqis were certainly more
skilled now at the tasks required in modern battle. Given the nature of their opponent-a
military fully subject to worst practices in political intervention, and finally cracking under
the enormous human costs of its suicidal tactics-this edge was more than enough to finally
deliver a victory to the Iraqis.
The Forces on Eiach Side
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The balance of forces both locally and nationally heavily favored the Iraqis after the
Iranian disasters of 1986. Iran's total manpower had fallen to only 600,000, while Iraq now
had a million-man army.250 Indeed, Iran had begun to experience serious mobilization
problems. Whatever Iranians' beliefs about the revolution, Arab invaders, or the rewards of
martyrdom, the enormous casualties and strategic futility of the human wave attacks had
become obvious, and far fewer citizens were willing to sign on to military service.251
By the spring of 1988, Iran had reduced its presence in the garrison at Faw from
some 30,000 troops to only 5-8,000. This may partly have been in preparation for a troop
rotation but also reflected the Iranian mobilization problems and the fact that it did not
expect an Iraqi challenge at Faw. The Iranian troops at Faw also were far from Iran's best,
mostly older soldiers and volunteers rather than Artesh forces.252
By contrast, Iraq had marshaled something on the order of 100,000 troops for the
battle at Faw, mostly Republican Guard, as well as 3rd and 7 t' Corps forces. As mentioned in
Chapter 4, the Republican Guard had not only expanded in size during the last two years but
also had been subject to major changes in how its combat leaders were chosen, the rigor and
frequency of training it underwent, the nature of its command structure, and the way it
managed information. Merit and combat competence had become much more important in
selecting Republican Guard leaders; combined arms training had become extensive and
much more realistic at both the small- and large-unit levels; command authority had been
decentralized much more so than before; and information sharing both between Saddam
and his senior officers, and among the different parts of the military, had finally been
allowed.
Iraq also had fed large stockpiles of artillery, chemical weapons, and ammunition into
the area in preparation for the attack, which was to be a combined arms amphibious assault.
For its part, Iran still retained significant stockpiles of armor and artillery in the garrison at
Faw, which, after all, had been the site of a major earlier battle. However, Cordesman and
Wagner note, "The Iranian defensive positions were surprisingly badly developed. They
lacked depth and were not particularly well sheltered or reinforced with tank barriers. The
only major sheltered area was the central Iranian command post in the town of Faw. Many
defensive facilities had been left unfinished, and there seems to have been little training or
preparation for gas warfare."253
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THE SECOND BATTLE FOR FAW, APRIL 1988
Iraq Iran
Battle summary
Tactical orientation Offensive Defensive
Plan Combined arms amphibious Fixed defense from prepared
assault to evict Iranians positions
Weapons Artillery, armor, chemical Infantry, artillery, mines,
weapons, air support barbed wire, water barriers
Manpower 100,000 soldiers, headed by 8-15,000 Pasdaran and Artesh
Republican Guard units
Losses 1,000 Heavy, but number unknown
E ffectivenes summary
Unit cohesion? Yes No
Tactical proficiency? Yes No
Complex operations? Yes No
Confirms theory? Yes Somewhat
The Battle
Saddam carefully planned the attack on Faw in consultation with six senior
officers.24 In the month before the attack, they worked to sow Iranian confusion about the
likely targets of future Iraqi offensives. Iraqi forces moved around the front, deliberately
giving the general impression that most deployments were occurring in the northern sector,
where some fighting had already taken place in March. Iraq also chose to launch the attack
on April 17, the first day of Ramadan, when Iranian forces would not be in their normal
state of alert.255
At five in the morning, the Iraqis launched a massive air and artillery bombardment
against the defenders at Faw, subjecting them to both chemical and conventional
munitions.256 A multi-part ground assault then began. First, according to Pollack, a
Republican Guard naval infantry brigade had "conducted an amphibious assault against the
southern coast of the peninsula, flanking the Iranian lines."25- Then a large contingent of
Republican Guards, at least two division equivalents, attacked the southern end of the
Iranian lines on Faw. Meanwhile, still more Republican Guard forces pushed up from the
foothold on the southern coast, moving into the city itself. At the same time, the regular
army's 7 th Corps hammered the Iranians from the north by driving directly down the bank of
the Shatt. One division from this corps-the 6th, which, as noted in Chapter 4, had received
additional training-eventually broke through the Iranian lines, while another-the 1"
Mechanized Division, which also had received additional training-managed to link up with
the Guard units that had pushed up from the south.251
Iraqi forces faced considerable fixed defenses as they advanced through minefields,
barbed wire, and water barriers. They continued to rely liberally on nonpersistent nerve gas
to overwhelm the Iranian defenders. Cordesman and Wagner also discuss the importance of
234 Woods et al, Saddam's War, p. 15.
255 Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, pp. 370-33.
2 5 Ward, Immortal, p. 292-3.
25i Pollack, Arabs at War, p. 225.
25X Pollack, Arabs at IWar, p. 225; and Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, p. 374.
276
Iraqi artillery in the battle, noting that it was "effective" and "clearly benefited from its
improved training in 1987. Iraqi artillery moved more quickly, was more responsive to
commanders in the forward area, and did a much better job of shifting and concentrating
fires." 259 Additionally, the Iraqi air force flew over 300 sorties in support of the attack,
reflecting an improved ability to work with ground forces.26
The Iranians did receive some fire support from the eastern bank of the Shatt, but
they were too surprised, outnumbered, and outfought to hold out for long. According to
Cordesman and Wagner, "Many Iranian forces put up only a brief defense, and the local
commanders showed little ability to rally their troops. Few units showed any of the
willingness to die that had characterized Iranian forces in previous campaigns. The Iranian
defenders began to pour back across the Shatt, but Iraqi fighters also knocked out two of the
three pontoon bridges across the Shatt al-Arab from Iran to Faw. This still allowed Iranian
troops to retreat but forced them to retreat in disarray and without their equipment."26i The
Iranian leadership also may have been delayed in responding due to a major naval
confrontation with the United States in the Gulf on April 18.262
Although exact figures do not appear in reports of the second battle for Faw, all
sources agree that Iranian losses were "heavy" in terms of both men and equipment. 263 Iraqi
casualties, too, are unclear based on reports of the battle, but one reliable source suggests
that about 1,000 Iraqi soldiers were lost.2" Within 35 hours of the start of the attack, Iraq
had restored its control of the peninsula and captured virtually of the Iranian armor, artillery,
and equipment in the garrison at Faw.215 It was, as an American intelligence cable put it at the
time, "by far the biggest Iraqi military victory since 1981 ."26"
Assessing the Battlefield Effectiveness of Iraq
Iraqi battlefield effectiveness at the second battle of Faw was significantly better than
it had been at any other point in the war, including during the invasion in 1980. First, Iraqi
cohesion was excellent. There were no reports of Iraqi forces breaking and running, despite
being on the offense and despite the heavy casualties suffered when surmounting the
Iranians' fixed defenses. The sheer speed of the Iraqi attack also suggests that soldiers had a
solid willingness to fight. This was a very different picture from Iraqi cohesion on this same
terrain only two years earlier and is consistent with what the political intervention
explanation would expect of Republican Guard units at this point in the war.
Second, Iraqi tactical proficiency was clearly better here than it had been earlier in
the war. Artillery and airpower were used more accurately and in a more timely fashion,
suggesting greater skill. Iraqi forces were able to penetrate Iranian lines quickly, suggesting
that the increased infantry training had paid off. The Iraqis also demonstrated obvious
proficiency in basic amphibious warfare skills, reflected in their amphibious landings and
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rapid destruction of the Iranians' pontoon bridges. Despite the fact that much of the war
had already been fought on marshy terrain, these capabilities were new.
Third, and most importantly, the Iraqis for the first time in the war showed that they
could execute complex operations. The assault on Faw actually integrated different combat
arms so that they each supported and enhanced the combat power of the others. Artillery
and air power actually responded to the needs of the ground forces, for example. Although
the Iraqis had used all these combat arms in previous battles, they had been far less effective
in those instances because they had operated more of less independently of one another.
Furthermore, the battle reflected impressive coordination among large Iraqi ground
units, something the Iraqis had thus far also failed to demonstrate. The Iraqi plan required
synchronized movements among multiple different divisions in order to squeeze the Iranians
out of their positions. The fact that the Iraqis actually managed to position (in some cases,
through amphibious landings) and move these forces according to plan and without any
detection by the Iranians showed significantly greater effectiveness than they had exhibited
before. For example, the Republican Guard units driving up from the south did in fact link
up with the 7 h Corps forces driving down from the north as planned.
Part of the reason that the Iraqis could advance so quickly and execute these sorts of
plans was that command decisions no longer had to be routed through Baghdad.267 In other
words, commanders- who themselves were more competent than had been the case
previously-were actually able to take advantage of the improved training and information
sharing that had occurred among their forces in the last year. Certainly, the Iranians' poor
performance also accelerated the Iraqi victory at Faw. Some accounts, particularly those
written in the period just before the 1991 Gulf War, perhaps have overstated just how much
the Iraqis improved by the war's final years. 268 But the shifts that had occurred in Saddam's
political intervention practices were essential to Iraq's ability to exploit Iran's long-standing
deficiencies.269
Furthermore, even Pollack, who is highly skeptical about the military capabilities of
Arab armies, notes that Faw was the beginning of a period that saw "a higher degree of
effectiveness than the Iraqi military had ever hinted at previously."" Pollack emphasizes that
the Iraqi attacks, at Faw and in the subsequent offensives discussed below, remained heavily
pre-planned, even rigid, and argues that at a tactical level the Iraqis "did not internalize any
of the concepts that lay behind these carefully scripted moves."2 In his view, the Iraqi
improvements in effectiveness were mostly the result of a better general staff planning and
limited primarily to Republican Guard units.
In short, Pollack's claim is not that there was no improvement in Iraqi performance,
only that the Iraqis still did not meet the standard of combined arms maneuver warfare set
by, say, the best American divisions during the Cold War or the Israelis in 1967. No doubt
this is true, but it also does not deny that Iraqi units subjected to different practices in
political intervention after 1986 still performed remarkably better than they had only a short
time earlier using essentially the same weapons and human capital, fighting the same
opponent on the same terrain, and under the influence of the same broad structural factors
such as culture, regime type, and level of economic development. These other variables may
26 Al-Marashi and Salarna, Iraq'si Aned Forces, p. 171.
6 See, for example, Pelletiere and Johnson, Lessons Leanied.
269 Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, p. 353.
" Pollack, Arabs at IFar, p. 229.
Pollack, A rabs at IF ar, p. 231.
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not have been irrelevant to a full explanation of all aspects of Iraqi military performance in
1988, but clearly the shift in political intervention produced important shifts in battlefield
effectiveness. At least, the Iranians probably found these shifts to be important.
Assessing the Battlefield Effectiveness of Iran
Iranian battlefield effectiveness in the second battle of Faw was poor and reflected a
military firmly under the grip of worst practices. First, Iranian forces finally showed serious
cohesion problems. On the one hand, their unwillingness to fight and disorderly retreat were
probably reasonable; the small contingent at Faw was outnumbered and outgunned,
although the small size of the detachment also reflected the larger mobilization problems
Iran was experiencing by this point in the war. That said, Iran had faced local imbalances of
forces and weapons already in the war, and its units still generally stood and fought. Up until
this point, some other factor-nationalism, revolutionary fervor, a quest for Shia
martyrdom, or some combination of these-had motivated Iranian soldiers to remain
cohesive despite the imposition of worst practices in political intervention. The possible
influence of these other factors will be discussed in more detail at the end of the chapter.
For whatever reason, though, by the spring of 1988 these factors could no longer
compensate for the reality that a great many young Iranian men simply did not want to fight
and die in futile infantry attacks.272
Second, in what little fighting they did in this battle, the Iranians continued to
demonstrate serious tactical deficits. Whatever traces of competence the Shah's practices had
left behind were clearly gone. For example, despite being ensconced in Faw for two years,
their fixed positions were, as mentioned, not especially well prepared. They never managed
to use most of the armor and artillery that they apparently did have in the garrison. The
Iranian retreat was so disorderly that it also left behind most equipment and weapons. There
also had been little preparation for defense against chemical weapons, even though the Iraqis
had been using such munitions since 1983.
All of these actions reflect exactly what the political intervention theory would
predict of a military subject to worst practices. Lastly, it almost goes without saying that the
Iranians were unable to conduct complex operations at Faw, as had been the case in most
earlier battles. The Iranian command structured continued to be so fractured due to the
divisions between the Artesh and the revolutionary forces that such operations remained
virtually impossible.2
IX. The Iraqi Final Offensives, May-July 1988
The Iraqi victory at Faw was but the first in a string of five major offensives it
conducted during the spring and early summer of 1988. The other four occurred near Fish
Lake outside Basra; in Mehran in the central sector of the front; at the Manjoon Islands in
the Howizeh Marshes; and in Dehloran, also in the central sector (see map 22). In each of
these battles, the Iraqis sought to retake territory defended by Iranian forces, providing
important additional opportunities to observe attempted Iraqi complex offensive operations
and Iranian complex defensive operations.
Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, p. 353.
-Woods et al, Saddam's IFar, p. 15.
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Notably, the evidence from these battles confirms the pattern established in the
second battle of Faw: the Iraqi armed forces demonstrated significantly improved
effectiveness, while Iranian forces continued to perform poorly. The consistency of the
evidence across these multiple additional offensives suggests that the Iraqi victory at Faw
was no fluke. Instead, it reflected a sustained increase in the degree of military power that
Iraq was able to generate from its national resources-an increase directly attributable to the
shifts in the nature of political intervention in the Iraqi military that had occurred since 1986
and especially during 1987. By contrast, continuing Iranian effectiveness problems reflected
the country's full adherence to worst practices in political intervention toward the military.
The Forces on Each Side
The overall balance of forces during Iraq's final four offensives was essentially the
same as it had been during the second battle for Faw. All of the Iraqi attacks were led by the
Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC), usually acting in conjunction with some
armored, mechanized, and/or infantry elements from the regular army corps located near
the sites of particular battles. Total Iraqi manpower involved in this series of battles was well
over 100,000 men, which gave Iraq a substantial local advantage in all of the battles.
Although the exact number of Iranian forces in each of these confrontations is unknown,
most reports refer only to division-size or smaller formations. Additionally, the Iraqis
enjoyed an overwhelming superiority in armor and artillery-including chemical weapons-
in these battles, as will be discussed below.
Iraq Iran
Battle summary
Tactical orientation Offensive Defensive
Plan Evict Iranian forces from Basra, Initially, defend positions; then,
Manjoon Islands and Howizeh retreat
Marshes, and Mehran; capture
Dehloran
Weapons Armor, fixed and rotary wing Fixed defenses containing
aircraft, artillery with chemical mines, barbed wire, water
and conventional munitions, barriers; minimal armor and
pontoon bridges and artillery
engineering equipment
Manpower 100,000+: multiple Republican Probably no more than 2-3
Guard units, including special divisions at any given point of
naval infantry brigade; Iraqi attack, so no more than
additional armored, 1/3 or '/4of the total Iraqi
mechanized, and infantry forces forces
from III, IV, and VII Corps
Losses Unknown but usually minimal Significant, including POWs
Effectiveness summary
Unit cohesion? Yes No
Tactical proficiency? Yes No
Complex operations? Yes No
Confirms theory? Yes Somewhat
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IRAQI FINAL OFFENSIVES, MAY-JULY 1988
The First Battle
Basra remained a key locus of contention, and after re-taking Faw, the Iraqis sought
to end the Iranian threat to their second-largest city once and for all. Iran still retained
something on the order of five divisions near Basra from the Karbala V offensive in early
1987, creating a large salient south of Fish Lake (see map 21).274 Additionally, according to
Cordesman and Wagner, "The Iranian defenses in the area involved a well-designed mix of
trenches, sand-mound fortifications, barbed wire, tank snares, and minefields." Already in
early 1988, Iraq had begun to drain Fish Lake in order to dry out the terrain surrounding
these Iranian positions and enable easier use of Iraqi armor. The Iranians did their best to re-
flood the area but failed.275
In May 1988, Iraq surged more than 100,000 soldiers to the area around Basra,
building up a local manpower advantage of at least 3:1 or 4:1 over the Iranian defenders.
Iraqi forces included the newly trained and expanded Republican Guard units, including the
same special naval infantry forces that had been used the previous month at Faw. They
enjoyed an enormous advantage in armor, as high as 15:1 or 20:1, according to Pollack.276
Iraq also created attack routes for these forces to use in moving out of the defenses around
the city, which now included even more concentric rings of fixed defenses interlaid with
observation and artillery posts. 277 Nevertheless, Iraq also managed to conduct some
deception operations that convinced Iran the real attack was coming from farther north,
leading the Iranian forces around Basra to be unprepared for what was to come. 278
On the morning of May 25, Iraq launched a massive attack reminiscent of the assault
on Faw a month earlier, bombarding the Iranians with huge quantities of artillery, including
chemical munitions. Before Iranian forces had to time to recover or react, Iraqi armored and
mechanized forces charged into the Iranian flanks, rapidly enveloping them. Iran initially
attempted a counterattack, imposing "significant casualties" on the Iraqis who tried to
penetrate theirlines. But Iraq called in fixed wing aircraft for close air support and also used
them as spotters for its artillery, which provided additional support to the ground forces.79
Within hours, the Iranian forces retreated in disorder, leaving much of their
equipment and weapons behind. These included more than 100 tanks and 150 artillery
pieces, many of them captured by Iraq without signs of combat damage. In fact, observers
who walked the battlefield after the fight found the Iranian positions still filled with soldiers'
personal effects, as well as a great deal of unused ammunition, grenades, bullets, gas masks,
and small rockets. There was little sign of the high Iranian casualties that had characterized
earlier battles, and indeed, at least 350 Iranian soldiers surrendered without resisting.28" Other
reports indicated that Iranian officers and soldiers had commandeered civilian cars and buses
in order to flee the battlefield as quickly as possible.28' In one fell swoop, Iran had
surrendered all of its gains in the area from 1987, achieved at the cost of tens of thousands
of war dead.2 8
- Pollack, Arabs at [Var, pp. 225-7.
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The Second Battle
The next Iraqi attack came in mid-June against the Iranian city of Mehran in the
central sector of the front. Again, Mehran had been the scene of an ugly Iraqi defeat in the
aftermath of the Faw disaster in 1986. And again, Iraqi forces followed the pattern they had
established to reverse their earlier losses, although the battle at Mehran was certainly on a
much smaller scale than the fighting at Faw and Fish Lake.
Iraq massed several divisions (along with some soldiers form the Mujahedeen e-
Khalq, an Iranian dissident group) and initiated an enormous artillery barrage that,
predictably, included extensive use of chemical weapons. Without giving the Iranian
defenders time to react to this assault, Iraqi armor rapidly conducted a double envelopment,
virtually destroying the two Revolutionary Guard division equivalents defending the town.23
Iraq easily overwhelmed the Iranian defenses and advanced almost 20 miles into the country.
There do not appear to have been high casualties on either side, though the Iranians lost the
equipment of their two divisions.84
The Third Battle
Only a week after retaking Mehran, on June 25, Iraq launched a third attack, this
time on the Iranian positions on the Manjoon Islands in the Howizeh Marshes. The assault
followed the same pattern the Iraqis had established in their earlier efforts. Again, Iraq
initiated a massive artillery barrage containing both conventional and chemical weapons.
Then its Republican Guard forces, including the same naval infantry brigade that had fought
at Faw and at Basra, executed an amphibious assault to take the islands, supported by air
power and Iraqi tanks that had been carefully pre-positioned in the marshes to provide
supporting firepower. After Iraqi infantry had streamed onto the island in small boats and
amphibious armored vehicles, combat engineers then rushed in to build pontoon bridges
and earthen causeways so that Iraqi armor could move in to defend the islands against any
Iranian attempt to retake them.2 5
Then the Iraqis, led by two Republican Guard division equivalents, initiated a double
envelopment of the remaining Iranian forces in the area. Specifically, according to Pollack,
"The RGFC's Hammurabi and Madinah Armored Divisions, supported by the
Nebuchadnezzar Infantry Division, swung around to the north and linked up with
mechanized formations from the III Corps that had looped around to the south thirty
kilometers into Iran."286 Enjoying an enormous superiority in weapons by this point-Iraq
had perhaps 2,000 tanks and 600 artillery pieces, compared to 50-60 Iranian tanks and a
handful of artillery pieces-the Iraqis obliterated the Iranian defenders. Iran suffered
thousands of casualties, and many of its soldiers surrendered to the Iraqis after putting up
little more than token resistance.8 According to Pollack, "The Iraqis mauled six to eight
army and Revolutionary Guard divisions in their envelopment, seizing all of their weapons
before pulling back across the border."s'
1'3 Pollack, Arabs at Ivar, p. 227.
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The Fourth Battle
On July 12, Iraq launched the last attack, seeking to capture the Iranian city of
Dehloran. Located in the central sector of the front, Dehloran had no particular importance
except that its capture would clearly demonstrate the full implications of Iraq's new
offensive power: it had the capability not only to retake all its own territory but also to drive
back into Iran in a manner not seen since 1980.
The Republican Guard Forces Command again led the attack, this time in
conjunction with mechanized elements of the army's 4 "h Corps. In the same pattern used in
the other offensives of 1988, Iraq launched an initial artillery bombardment using both
chemical and conventional weapons. Then, as in the other battles, "the Iraqis conducted a
double envelopment, with the Republican Guard forming one prong and the IV Corps
forming the other." In this attack, "the Iraqis met little resistance and drove 40 kilometers
into Iran, encircling and routing a number of enemy formations."89 Within hours, all Iranian
defenses had "quickly collapsed."290
On July 13, Iraq issued a public threat to invade all of southern Iran if Iran did not
abandon its only remaining positions on Iraqi soil, which were in the northern sector.
Meanwhile, rather than attempt to hold the 1,500 square miles of territory they had captured,
Iraqi forces retreated back across the border. Some 2,500 prisoners and large amounts of
captured equipment were in tow. Iran quickly complied with the Iraqi demands for
withdrawal, and Khomeini soon accepted a ceasefire. The war officially ended on August 8,
1988.291
Assessing the Battlefield Effectiveness of Iraq
Iraqi performance in the final four battles of the war demonstrates that the
improvements in battlefield effectiveness evinced at the second battle for Faw were not
anomalous. First, Iraqi cohesion continued to be the dog that didn't bark: there were no
reports of Iraqi units breaking and running, disintegrating, collapsing, or retreating, as had
happened earlier in the war. There were no reports of Iran taking additional Iraqi prisoners,
despite the large number that had been taken in other phases of the conflict. Instead, most
accounts of these battles stress the speed of Iraqi attack, which suggests that soldiers'
willingness to fight was not a problem.292
Second, Iraqi tactical proficiency continued to be quite good compared to earlier in
the war. It is very important not to ignore the significant Iraqi advantages in weapons in
these final offensives, of course, but being outgunned was nothing new for the Iranians: Iraq
had been better armed in terms of quality and quantity throughout the war, but this edge,
even with the use of chemical weapons, had never translated into a war winning advantage
until 1987-8. This seems to have occurred because the Iraqis finally knew how to use the
weapons that they had. Airstrikes and artillery reached their targets; Iraqi tanks were well
positioned to provide fire support to advancing forces; amphibious forces actually gained
control of marshy areas so that combat engineers could build the necessary bridges to
transport heavier weapons and equipment. These activities all reflect improvements in basic
tactical skills that Iraqi forces had repeatedly failed to demonstrate earlier in the war.
- Pollack, Arabs at IWar, p. 228.
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Third, and most important, Iraq continued to demonstrate a much better ability to
conduct complex operations. Cordesman and Wagner, for example, repeatedly characterize
Iraqi operations in this period as "effective combined arms and maneuver warfare."293 An
effusive American military assessment goes so far as to claim that the final Iraqi offensives
represented "the perfection of the Iraqi attempt to develop combined arms practices."294
This sort of praise must be taken with a barrel of salt, given that it was written as the U.S.
military prepared to fight a war with Iraq; surely, no American analyst wanted to make the
mistake underestimating the capabilities of a soon-to-be adversary. Nevertheless, the
American assessment correctly notes that Iraqi forces in 1988 "were the beneficiaries of
tested training techniques, experienced cadres, and especially of training time.... As they
began operational training for the final campaign, their use of mock-ups-upon which entire
divisions trained repeatedly-was highly effective."25
In other words, there had been real changes in how well the Iraqis were able to
integrate different combat arms in operations that required both coordination and
initiative-and, crucially, these changes stemmed from the very different forms of political
intervention the Iraqis had adopted after 1986, particularly with respect to training. Even
Pollack writes that Iraqi forces "conducted fairly deep maneuvers that led to the
encirclement of sizeable Iranian forces. The offensives were preceded by highly effective
deception operations and benefited from excellent intelligence regarding the disposition of
Iranian forces at the start of the battle. What's more, all of the Iraqi operations moved
crisply and efficiently."296 He continues to stress, however, that the Iraqi improvement was
only "relative," "adequate," and "modest," especially given the country's overwhelming
material advantages by 1988.29 Clearly, there is some daylight between his view and the
American military's interpretation that by war's end the Iraqi military had become "a first-
class fighting institution."298 Still, it is clear that Iraqi fighting effectiveness did grow very
substantially in 1988, consistent with the general predictions of the political intervention
explanation.
Assessing the Battlefield Effectiveness of Iran
Iranian battlefield effectiveness in the final four battles was at least as poor as it had
been at the second battle for Faw. First, Iranian cohesion continued to give out. Repeatedly,
Iranian forces put up little resistance and retreated in disorder. While there is no doubt that
Iraq had a large advantage in armaments, it is important to remember that the Iranians also
abandoned huge amounts of perfectly good military equipment and weapons. The Iraqi
government at one point actually put on show all it had captured: thousands of abandoned
assault rifles, over 570 tanks, more than 300 armored personnel carriers, over 320 towed
artillery weapons, 45 self-propelled artillery weapons, over 300 anti-aircraft guns, and
numerous machine guns. According to Cordesman and Wagner, "Virtually all of this
equipment was intact and functional, and much of it looked brand new."2" Clearly, Iranian
21 Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, pp. 76, 382, 388.
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effectiveness deficits stemmed from more than a lack of weapons; its forces lacked the will
to use those weapons.00
Iranian tactical proficiency and complex operations were almost irrelevant in the
final battles. Only in the fighting at Fish Lake did the Iranians even try to counterattack, and
their efforts quickly failed. Iranian forces generated virtually no combat power from their
resources in the final year of the war-a fact that Iran's own leadership seemed to
acknowledge by finally accepting a ceasefire that gave it essentially the same territory it had
held in 1982.
X. Disconfirming Evidence and Possible Alternative Explanations
Although the battlefield evidence discussed above provides substantial support for
the theory, it is also important to look carefully for any disconfirming evidence. The Vietnam
chapters did this by examining additional battles, in part because the battles initially
examined had produced very decisive values of the dependent variable, indicating robust
support for the theory: the battles consistently showed that North Vietnamese units fought
very well and South Vietnamese units poorly, with the systematic exception of the 1"
division. The last section of the chapter therefore tried to seek outliers from this pattern and
to evaluate whether they confirmed the theory or lent support to alternative explanations.
In the Iran-Iraq cases, there are no major additional battles that seem to display
surprising values on the dependent variable. Rather, in the battles already discussed, the
value of the dependent variable was not as always as extreme as the theory would predict.
For example, until the last year of the war, Iranian units were consistently more cohesive
than the theory would predict. This evidence poses a different kind of challenge to the
theory: what allowed for Iranian cohesion, despite the imposition of worst practices in
political intervention?
Below, this section tries to answer that question, examining possible ideological
sources of Iranian fighting effectiveness. The section also examines another case-specific
alternative explanation: that battlefield events were simply the product of the two sides'
material capabilities, including support from outside powers. Overall, the section concludes
that all of these factors played some role in the war, but they are insufficient to explain the
full timing and range of variation seen in the battlefield effectiveness of the two sides. As
such, the political intervention variable remains crucial in explaining the phenomena of
interest.
The Role ofIdeology
The consistent cohesion of Iranian forces constitutes a striking empirical anomaly.
Despite being subject to the results of worst practices in political intervention-incompetent
leaders, inadequate training, a convoluted command structure, and poor information
sharing-soldiers in the Iranian ground forces rarely surrendered, deserted, or retreated
during battles, at least until the last year of the war. More than a million Iranian men were
willing not just to stand and fight but to engage in battlefield tactics that all but guaranteed
their deaths. Iranian soldiers, particularly those in the Basij, were more than brave or
resilient; they were suicidal, completely willing to walk into certain death in the face of Iraqi
firepower.
Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, p. 395.
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Virtually all sources agree that this unusual behavior had ideational sources: an
unusual cocktail of religious and revolutionary motivations.3i0 Of crucial significance here
was the Shia emphasis on martyrdom as a righteous act-a theme emphasized repeatedly to
Iranian soldiers in their training and indoctrination.3o2 Rather than recoil from the
horrendous losses incurred in the human wave attacks, Iranian leaders glorified them in a
manner that seemed religiously sanctioned; sacrificing oneself was not just acceptable, but a
duty that brought rewards. Iran's leaders also were able to link the war with Iraq to the cause
of safeguarding and expanding the revolution, which provided further motivation for Iranian
soldiers to stand and fight.303 All of these ideas combined to form what one observer called
"the new Islamic Shia nationalism." 304
Notably, Iranian troops had not fought with this sort of fervor prior to the
revolution. For example, in the Iranian deployment to Oman during the 1970s, British
observers characterized Iranian performance as relatively lackluster. According to one
source, "The Iranians were not fighting to the extent required." 30 Another way to put this is
that Iranian cohesion during the Iran-Iraq War had to stem from something besides simply
being Iranian or Shia-from something besides general cultural or societal forces. Only after
the revolution had taken hold in Iran was the cohesion of the human wave attacks possible.
The fact that this fervor then died down as the war went on also casts doubt on broad
cultural explanations of Iranian performance.
Furthermore, the human wave attacks-and their consequences for Iran's war
effort-also reinforce the idea that unit cohesion is not synonymous with battlefield
effectiveness. The former is a necessary but insufficient condition of the latter. In other
words, Iran's seemingly limitless supply of martyrs helped it avoid losing the war for a
number of years, but it never translated into a war-winning edge, because these forces were
still so utterly lacking in tactical proficiency and the ability to conduct complex operations.
Moreover, the reason that Iran lacked these latter two capacities still stemmed directly from
the nature of political intervention in the military. That said, the cohesion of Iran's very large
supply of manpower clearly caused the war to last much longer than it otherwise would
have, imposed significant costs on the Iraqis, and therefore represents an important caveat in
the assessment of the explanatory power of the political intervention variable. Clearly, certain
ideologies may have the power to mute the detrimental impact of worst practices on
cohesion, if not on the other aspects of the dependent variable.
The Role of Material Capabilities and Third Party Supoir
One also might point to the balance of material capabilities and third party support
to explain the battlefield effectiveness of the two sides. As has been noted in the analysis
above, Iraq had a substantial superiority in both the quality and quantity of arms throughout
the war. Not only did revolutionary Iran alienate most of the nations that could have sold it
weapons, but many countries, especially in the Gulf, actively feared an Iranian victory and
3" For example, Schahgaldian, Iranian ilitag, pp. vi-vii; and Edgar O'Ballance, The Gf V ashington:
Brassey, 1988), p. 211. Some sources indicate that some Iranian soldiers may not have known that they were
walking into Iraqi kill zones, but it is hard to believe that the majority of the Iranian ground forces were
unaxvare of what awaited them on the battlefield. Certainly this should have been the case after several years of
war. See claims reported in Woods et al, Saddam's [;ar, p. 46.
3" Hiro, Ionhguest Iar, pp. 52, 106.
3" Chubin, "Iran and the War," in Gulf Iar, p. 6.
3"4 Sepehr Zabib, The Iranian Militarj' in Reo/uition and War (New York: Routledge, 1988), p. 17.
3"5 Zabih, Iranian Militay, p. 11.
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sought to support Iraq. After 1982, even the United States shared intelligence with the Iraqis,
although it refrained from direct weapons sales.306 Given these advantages, perhaps the
eventual Iraqi victory in the war is not so surprising, irrespective of any changes in the nature
of political intervention in the military.
Still, it is important not to overstate the impact of these factors. First, Iraq had an
indisputable weaponry advantage for essentially six full years before it demonstrated
significant improvements in battlefield effectiveness (see table below comparing the two
sides' arsenals of main battle tanks, for example). This gap widened as the war went on, but
it hard to understand why a 6:1 advantage (as seen in 1986) would suddenly confer
battlefield benefits that a 5:1 advantage (as seen in 1984) had not already provided.
Comparing Arsenals: Main Battle Tanks"
1980 1984 1986
Iraq 2,750 4,820 6,150
Iran 1,735 1,000 1,000
Second, while it is true that Iraq received extensive foreign military assistance, most
of it was received in the period 1981-83.3" Despite the enormous capital advantage this
assistance should have afforded Iraq, however, there was little to no change in Iraqi
battlefield performance until much later in the war. In fact, during the period when the Iraqi
military began to improve, Iranian defense spending was actually higher than Iraq's (see table
below).
Comparing Capital: Defense Spending"
(in Billions of Dollars)
1980 1984 1986
Iraq 2.67 10.296 12.866
Iran 4.2 17.370 14.091
306 The United States did sell weapons to Iran, however, in the arms-for-hostages deal known as the Iran
Contra scandal. Hiro, Longest War, chapter 5. On the tilt in U.S. policy toward supporting Iraq after 1982, see
Information Memorandum, State Department, Nicholas A. Veliotes and Jonathan T. Howe to Lawrence S.
Eagleburger, "Iran-Iraq War: Analysis of Possible U.S. Shift from Position of Strict Neutrality," October 7,
1983, available at the National Security Archive, the George Washington University, Washington, DC;
Memorandum for the Record, National Security Council, Geoffrey Kemp, "Near-Term Options in the Iran-
Iraq War," March 26, 1984, available at the National Security Archive, the George Washington University,
Washington, DC; Cable, State Department to American Embassy Cairo, "Briefing Material for Ambassador
Wisner: Iran-Iraq," August 28, 1986, available at the National Security Archive, the George Washington
University, Washington, DC; and PROFS Message, White House, Dennis Ross to John M. Poindexter,
"Expanding Intelligence to [sic] Provided to the Iraqis," October 3, 1986, available at the National Security
Archive, the George Washington University, Washington, DC; Memorandum, NSC, Ronald C. St. Martin to
Robert C. McFarlane, "U.S. Targeting Support re Iran-Iraq War," October 16, 1986, available at the National
Security Archive, the George Washington University, Washington, DC.
307 All data taken from Iran and Iraq estimates in "The Middle East and North Africa," The Mi/itary Balance,
vols. 80, 84, 86 (1980, 1984, 1986), pp. 42, 61-2, and 96-7, respectively.
3"8 Iraq received an estimated $25-35 billion in foreign military assistance from 1981-3. "The Middle East and
North Africa," The Militaty Balance, vol. 84 (1984), p. 62.
3"9 The table does not include foreign military assistance to Iraq. All data taken from Iran and Iraq estimates in
"Middle East and North Africa," Militaty Balance, vols. 80, 84, 86, pp. 42, 61-2, and 96-97, respectively.
287
Similarly, Iraq had been receiving U.S. tactical intelligence for years before it seemed
to perform better militarily.31 Until shifts in the nature of Iraqi political intervention allowed
for better use of these resources, they did not make a substantial difference. As late as
February 1986, in fact, internal U.S. government correspondence on the matter suggested
that the Iraqis were "unable or unwilling" to act on the information provided to them.3"
Even many years later, U.S. officials were skeptical about whether Iraq ever really used or
needed the intelligence provided to them.312 Furthermore, the U.S. secretary of state at the
time privately characterized the intelligence sharing as "limited," though useful.313
These are all additional reasons that the role of outside countries should not be
overestimated as a factor in Iraq's eventually improved battlefield effectiveness. Once the
nature of political intervention in the Iraqi military shifted, it was certainly able to take
advantage of these resources, but prior to 1986, Iraqi performance looked very similar to
how it had looked in 1980.
XI. Conclusions and Summary
This chapter sought to test the validity of the predictions generated in Chapter 4
from the theory of political intervention outlined in Chapter 1. First, the evidence from the
battles showed that, in general, there is good reason to be skeptical of existing explanations
of military effectiveness. Iranian and especially Iraqi units demonstrated considerable over-
time and cross-unit variation in their effectiveness-variation that should not have occurred
if theories focused on the effects of wealth, regime type, culture and society, and the general
level of civilian control of the military are correct. More importantly, much of this variation,
in addition to the cross-national variation also seen, was directly attributable to the nature of
political intervention in the two militaries.
First, with respect to the Iranian case, Iranian regular forces that had been subject to
slightly better practices with respect to training during the time of the Shah did demonstrate
tactical proficiency and a minimal ability to conduct some complex operations in the early
years of the war. While the contrast should not be overdrawn, there was a clear differential
between their effectiveness and that of Iranian revolutionary forces, which had been subject
entirely to worst practices throughout their existence. This difference speaks again to the
importance of variation in political intervention, even though it was quite subtle compared
to the more extreme values of the independent variable discussed in Chapter 1.
Unfortunately for Iran, its leaders mistakenly credited the country's early victories to
the revolutionary instead of the regular forces, accelerating the imposition of worst practices
over the regular forces. Exogenous events such as the disastrous 1981 helicopter crash that
killed key military leaders also played a role in completely erasing any legacy of effectiveness
lingering from the time of the Shah. As a result, the regular and revolutionary forces
3" Pollack, Arabs at lWar, p. 211.
3" PROFS Message, White House, Bob Pearson forwarding message from Ken DeGraffenreid to Donald
Fortier and John NI. Poindexter, "Intelligence Exchange with Iraq," February 24, 1986, available at the National
Security Archive, the George Washington University, Washington, DC.
31 "Towards an International I listory of the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988: a Critical Oral History Workshop,"
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, July 19, 2004, p. 20.
31 "U.S. Intelligence for Iraq," Background paper, December 15, 1986, p. 1, available through the Digital
National Security Archive, item number 1G00383.
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increasingly converged toward nearly total ineffectiveness as the war went on, at least in
terms of tactical proficiency and the ability to conduct complex operations.
Meanwhile, Iraqi units displayed virtually no effectiveness in the early years of the
war with Iran. Their battlefield performance reflected minimal cohesion, virtually no tactical
proficiency, and no ability whatsoever to conduct complex operations. Indeed, during the
years 1982-1986, the war's stalemate reflected the mutual ineffectiveness of the two
militaries, both subject to worst practices. After 1986, however, Saddam shifted his practices
toward the Republican Guard, and there was substantial improvement in the battlefield
effectiveness of those units. They proved to be highly cohesive, tactically proficient, and
capable of at least some complex operations. They were notably more effective than they or
regular army or Popular Army units had been earlier in the war, and were also more effective
than their Iranian counterparts.
In general, then, the battlefield evidence from the war provides strong support to the
predictions needed to confirm the theory of political intervention. The timing, nature, and
direction of the observed variation in effectiveness was clearly linked to variations in the
forms of political intervention. Indeed, the behavior of both Iran and Iraq should induce
significant caution about explanations of effectiveness focused solely on weapons (the Iraqi
advantage) or numbers (the Iranian advantage). Neither of these advantages was enough to
generate good battlefield performance, in the absence of the other crucial inputs emphasized
here: promotion structures, rigorous training, command structures, and information sharing.
These variables had to be right in order for the material variables to exert their force.
Ultimately, the Iran-Iraq War was a duel between two states, neither of which used
the resources it possessed efficiently. Despite some promising early triumphs, Iran was never
able to convert its economic, demographic, or supposed cultural advantages into sustained
fighting power. For the first six years of the war, Iraq was similarly unable to convert its
advantages in weaponry and support from outside powers into the strategic outcome it
sought. Only when Saddam altered his political intervention practices was his country able to
utilize the assets it possessed to generate combat capability. Interestingly, however, once
these practices did shift, Iraq was able to overcome the supposed disadvantages that it faced,
namely, a smaller population, a weaker economic base, and Arab culture. These events
suggest the powerful effects of the political intervention variable. lndeed, it is impossible to
explain why the war lasted as long as it did, imposed the costs that it did, and then ended
when it did, absent an account of this factor.
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CONCLUSION
Implications for Theory and Policy
The preceding pages have presented one overarching argument: that understanding
the nature of political intervention in the military is crucial to explaining why states vary so
widely in the fighting power they generate from their national resources. This claim, tested
through detailed and carefully controlled case studies, challenges much of the existing
consensus on both civil-military relations and military effectiveness.
For more than 50 years, scholarship on both of these topics has been dominated by
Samuel Huntington's The Soldier and the State, in which Huntington argued that the complete
separation of the military from politics was the linchpin of both civilian control and military
effectiveness. Insulating the military from politics, he contended, was the only way to foster
a professional military ethos that would ensure both deference to civilian authority and
fighting prowess on the battlefield.
The ideas and evidence presented in this study challenge Huntington's claims about
the very nature of civil-military relations and about how politics affect military performance.
Rather than accepting the distinction between militaries enmeshed with politics-
Huntington's "subjective control"-and those free of politics-Huntington's "objective
control"-this study contends that the complete insulation of the military from politics is
actually quite rare. The study focuses instead on the rather large range of variation in military
effectiveness seen even among regimes whose armies are highly politicized-armies in which
military autonomy is relatively low and political intervention is frequent and intense. The
evidence shows that what matters for battlefield effectiveness in these circumstances are the
differingforms of political intervention in the military, because different forms of civilian or
political involvement, even when highly personalist and even when involving the same areas
of military activity, can have very different consequences for battlefield performance.
The main findings, summarized below, also strongly challenge contemporary
research on the sources of military effectiveness. Some of this research focuses heavily on
material factors, such as wealth and demography. But the evidence here shows that states
display much more variation in their battlefield effectiveness than analysis of these relatively
static inputs would suggest. Indeed, it shows that variations in political intervention in the
military condition when states are actually able to convert their material resources into
effective fighting power, and when they cannot.
The findings also challenge other recent research on effectiveness, which, while
acknowledging the importance of non-material variables, still tends to focus on slow-moving
structural drivers of military performance, such as regime type, culture, or the broad level of
military autonomy or civilian control. This study in no way denies that these variables
influence military performance, but it strongly cautions analysts against drawing any
deterministic relationship between these national traits and battlefield performance. The
evidence indicates that where states get their forms of political intervention "right," they can
perform quite well on the battlefield, despite whatever supposedly detrimental national
characteristics they possess. Conversely, even when states possess many supposedly
favorable traits compared to their opponents, if they get political intervention "wrong,"
these assets essentially go to waste.
The political intervention variable does not mean that other variables are irrelevant
to military performance, but it sheds powerful light on when and how these factors exert
their causal force. It therefore enables a much more refined assessment of battlefield
effectiveness than might otherwise be possible. After reviewing the theory and evidence to
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support these claims, this conclusion explores the study's implications for policy and
scholarship, and outlines areas in need of further research.
Summary of The Theory
In some sense, all forms of intervention are attempts at political control-the
attempt to ensure that military is used for politically acceptable ends. The key question is the
nature of those ends. Virtually all forms of political intervention generate militaries that are
"effective" at doing something, even if that activity has little to do with external
conventional combat. Depending on their perceptions-correct or not-of the nature and
severity of internal and external threats, political leaders can intervene to make militaries
good at state-building, at coup prevention, at suppression of domestic dissidents, at
counterinsurgency, or at a host of other tasks.
But they can also intervene in ways that expressly improve conventional military
performance. These forms of political intervention constitute a series of what I have called
"best practices," which I have contrasted with another approach to political intervention
called "worst practices." These two extremes are ideal types, with several varieties of "mixed
practices" being possible between them.
Taking leaders' threat perceptions as exogenous-and, as 1 have argued, highly
contingent-the study has focused on forms of political intervention in four key areas of
military activity: promotions, training, command arrangements, and information
management. In brief, the study has posited that political leaders who employ best practices
intervene to ensure that military promotions are based on competence and battlefield
performance. They actively encourage rigorous, frequent, and realistic military training at
both the small- and large-unit levels. They ensure that command authority is decentralized to
those in the field rather than concentrated at higher echelons, while also pushing for
integrated and unified command structures that allow rapid decision-making and
coordination. And they strongly encourage vertical and horizontal information sharing, as
well as frequent political-military communication. In combination, these policies ensure the
generation of cohesive military units capable of basic tactics as well as the ability to conduct
more complex modern military operations, such as combined arms maneuver.
By contrast, political leaders under worst practices intervene in the same areas of
military activity, but with very different policies. They ensure that military promotion is
based entirely on political loyalty, and they actively select against battlefield prowess in
making decisions about whom to hire and fire in the officer corps. They restrict training.
They both centralize and fracture command structures, concentrating in their own hands
decision-making authority while also circumscribing the range of whatever authority
commanders are given. Lastly, political leaders who adopt worst practices heavily restrict
both vertical and horizontal communication within the military and engage in little
substantive political-military communication. Together these policies decimate battlefield
effectiveness, leading to militaries that are unable to forge together cohesive units, much less
endow those units with tactical skill or the ability to conduct complex operations.
Between these two extremes lie a range of mixed that can combine different
elements of best and worst practices to a greater or lesser degree. Other things being equal,
however, the closer a state moves toward best practices, the better its military performance
in conventional interstate war will be. Absent these practices, it is virtually impossible for a
state to develop a cohesive, tactically proficient army capable of displaying the coordination
and initiative necessary for modern, complex military operations-even if that state has
significant material advantages such as economic power or a large population. Indeed, the
291
closer a state moves toward worst practices, the more its military performance can be
expected to deteriorate. By contrast, states that adopt best practices are likely to "punch
above their weight," generating maximum fighting power from the resources they possess,
however meager.
Su'mmary of the Evidence
The study tested these arguments through two controlled, paired comparisons of
states at war, relying on extensive use of primary documents, many of them not previously
examined in the study of either civil-military relations or effectiveness: North and South
Vietnam (1961-1975), and Iran and Iraq (1980-1988). The study relied on these particular
cases because they offered the strongest possible controls for alternative explanations and
therefore the cleanest test of the argument. The cases constituted "fair" fights-that is,
instances in which dyads were evenly matched along the major dimensions said to matter for
military effectiveness. These possible independent variables included wealth; population;
regime type; external threat, or the "stakes" involved in losing the war; culture and society;
and civil-military relations as generally conceived in the existing literature, that is, as a
political environment characterized by either high or low military autonomy. Another way to
put this is that the study sought to avoiding examining cases whose value of the dependent
variable, battlefield effectiveness, was over-determined.
The Vietnam and Iran-Iraq cases were useful in this respect, because the two pairs of
states were each closely matched along these dimensions. Most notably, all four states were
non-democratic, and all experienced high levels of political intervention into their militaries
as they fought large-scale ground wars. Still, there was substantial variation in each state's
battlefield effectiveness over the course of these wars, both cross-nationally and, in the
South Vietnamese, Iranian, and Iraqi cases, sub-nationally. According to existing theories of
effectiveness, there should have been very little variation of any type across or within these
four states.
Instead, the evidence from the cases showed that differences in the nature of
political intervention accounted for both the cross-national and sub-national variation in
battlefield effectiveness. In the Vietnam cases, South Vietnamese leaders generally adopted
worst practices in political intervention, which accounts for their military's poor
performance against the North Vietnamese, despite the fact that the two countries had
almost identical levels of economic development, the same size populations, similar colonial
legacies, and very high stakes in the war. If anything, in fact, the stakes in the war were
higher for South Vietnam, and it should have performed especially well given the massive
infusion of American aid it received. But the empirical evidence reveals that the ways in
which South Vietnamese leaders intervened in their military consistently foiled battlefield
effectiveness. Meanwhile, the forms of North Vietnamese intervention, though no less
extensive or "political," had the opposite effect and maximized fighting power.
Interestingly, where South Vietnamese political leaders varied their forms of
intervention-notably, with respect to the 1 Division, which was consistently subjected to
mixed or best practices rather than worst practices-battlefield effectiveness was much
better (see chart below). Indeed, an analysis of the major battles of the war shows that the 1
Division's military performance under best practices proved to be virtually indistinguishable
from that of North Vietnamese units. This convergence suggests just how differently the war
could have turned out, and how much sooner it could have ended, had South Vietnamese
leaders believed that they could or should adopt best practices with respect to their entire
military rather than a single division. It also suggests the limits of traditional explanations of
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the war's outcome, including communist ideology, the benefits and disadvantages of fighting
on one's own territory, and the role of outside powers. Even with these other factors in play,
South Vietnamese forces could fight surprisingly well when political leaders adopted best
practices.
Sub-National Variation Observed in Case Studies
Country Change in Practices Battlefield Impact
South Worst -> Best, but toward 1" 1" Division much more effective than other
Vietnam Division only units from South Vietnamese army and just as
effective as comparable North Vietnamese units
North No change, consistently Best Consistent effectiveness across virtually all
Vietnam military units
Iraq Worst -> Best, but toward Dramatic improvement in effectiveness of
Republican Guard units only Republican Guard units compared to their own
earlier performance, the performance of other
Iraqi units, and the performance of Iranian units
during the same period
Iran Worst, with exception of Regular units initially more effective than
regular army units -> Worst, revolutionary forces, followed by uniformly
toward all units poor effectiveness across virtually all units
In the Iran-Iraq cases, political leaders in both states initially adopted worst practices
with respect to political intervention in the military. The result was that for most of the war
neither side was able to capitalize on the advantages that it possessed-in Iran's case,
superior economic wealth and a three-fold population edge, and in Iraq's case, far stronger
allies and a far greater quantity and quality of weapons. Most of the first six years of the war
were a bloody military stalemate.
That said, in the early years of the war Iran's regular forces do seem to have
benefited from the slightly better practices in political intervention that the Shah had
employed, not all of which Iran's revolutionary leaders had yet been able to dismantle. In
particular, Iranian units drawn from the pre-revolutionary regular army, which had received
American training during the 1970s, displayed noticeably better tactical proficiency in the
initial battles than the revolutionary masses roused by Shia clerics to become martyrs.
Unfortunately for Iran, however, its leaders never successfully integrated pre-
revolutionary and revolutionary armed forces, and in fact mistakenly credited the
revolutionary forces rather than the legacy regular units with their country's early battlefield
successes. As a result, Iran's leaders only deepened their imposition of worst practices as the
war went on, decimating whatever legacy lingered from the Shah's era. They instead relied
on soldiers who were ideologically motivated to be cohesive but who lacked any ability to
convert that cohesion into tactical proficiency or complex operations.
With two belligerents both under the full grip of worst practices, the war devolved
into deadlock from roughly 1982-1986. Finally, however, in 1986-several long years after
the disastrous effects of worst practices had been evident, even to him-Saddam Hussein
endeavored to shift the nature of his political intervention into the Iraqi armed forces.
Specifically, he adopted something very close to best practices with respect to his Republican
Guard units, even as he kept worst practices with respect to other units. The result of this
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shift was a relatively rapid improvement in the battlefield effectiveness of the Republican
Guard.
Indeed, once subject to different forms of political intervention, these Iraqi units'
effectiveness improved so significantly that they were able to beat their larger, wealthier,
more populous neighbor in a succession of quick battles that ended the war in 1988. These
victories occurred despite the fact that the Iraqi military experienced no great increase in its
autonomy, and the fact that it obviously retained its Arab culture, a trait sometimes maligned
in the effectiveness literature as hindering military performance.
Put simply, both Iran and Iraq performed poorly when their militaries were
uniformly subject to worst practices: in the Iranian case, after about 1982, and in the Iraqi
case, before about 1986. By contrast, in the period before these practices were fully imposed
on the regular military in Iran and in the period after these practices were lifted on the
Republican Guard units in Iraq, military performance by those forces was noticeably better
compared both to the opponent's military and to other units drawn from the same state. The
contrast was subtle in the Iranian case, dramatic in the Iraqi case, but these distinctions-
similar to those seen in the Vietnam comparisons-suggest again the power of the political
intervention variable in explaining battlefield effectiveness. Indeed, the cases showed this
variable to matter across a very diverse set of national institutions, ranging from one-party
communist rule (North Vietnam) to military dictatorship (South Vietnam), and from
revolutionary theocracy (Iran) to Ba'thist personalism (Iraq).
To sum up, the cases generally provided strong confirmation of the theory presented
in Chapter 1, especially its predictions about the drivers of tactical proficiency and complex
operations. The theory was weakest in explaining cohesion, which the cases revealed to have
multiple drivers (although in quite a few instances, forms of political intervention were
among them). In particular, the North Vietnamese and Iranian cases both showed the
overwhelming importance of ideational factors such as nationalism and ideology in
generating military cohesion-something not accounted for in the political intervention
theory.
By the same token, however, the stark overall contrast in military performance
between North Vietnam and Iran actually reinforces the general conception of military
effectiveness outlined in Chapter 1: namely, that cohesion alone is not enough. Cohesion is a
necessary but not sufficient condition of battlefield effectiveness. Even highly cohesive
armies such as Iran's will not generate much fighting power from their resources in the
absence of tactical proficiency and an ability to conduct complex operations-both of which
the cases did show to be highly dependent upon the adoption of best practices in political
intervention.
Implicationsfor the S'tudy of International Relations
The cases examined in this study suggest that non-democratic states do exhibit
significant Tariation in forms of political intervention and battlefield effectiveness, not only
cross-nationally, but also sub-nationally. This latter variation in particular suggests the
importance of looking beyond structural factors to explain and predict military performance.
Indeed, the findings illuminate an important, more agile mechanism-forms of political
intervention in the armed forces-that may actually be doing much of the casual work often
attributed to regime type. The empirical evidence shows that when autocratic regimes adopt
best practices in political intervention, they can perform with surprisingly high levels of
effectiveness, certainly comparable to that often attributed to democratic regimes.
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Although such instances may indeed be outliers, they constitute a particularly
important set of cases for international relations theory. Perhaps no topic has garnered
greater attention in recent international relations theory than the study of democracies-but
understanding instances of autocratic military effectiveness sheds light on what it is about
democracies that may enable them to generally perform better. For a variety of reasons,
democracies may be more likely to adopt best practices in political intervention, but where
they fail to do so, or where autocracies choose to embrace best practices, the performances
of the two regime types may be nearly indistinguishable.
Although existing studies would not deny that autocracies sometimes perform well in
war, this study provides the first systematic explanation for when, why, and how this should
occur. Indeed, if the democratic peace theory is correct, then virtually all future conflicts will
involve at least one non-democratic regime. It is therefore vital to understand how these
states are likely to perform. The study here suggests that a close examination of political
intervention in these states' armed forces is crucial to accurately explaining and predicting
the costs, length, and outcome of such wars.
Additionally, the similarity in Iraqi, Iranian, and South Vietnamese military
performance under worst practices, as well as the improvements in Iraqi and South
Vietnamese performance under best practices, should cast strong doubt on the role of any
particular type of culture in determining battlefield effectiveness. While national culture
remains an important factor in conditioning state behavior, the research here shows that it is
also important to look at variation in the specific modes of politicization that can operate
even within a given cultural setting.
Lastly, this study helps differentiate between the concepts of autocracy and civil-
military pathology, which are so conflated that one serves interchangeably as a proxy for the
other in some studies. By intentionally excluding democracies from the empirical analysis,
the research strategy employed here shows that regime type and civil-military relations are
related but distinct variables that can move independently of each other. So while the cases
here do not dispute the finding that democracies may have better overall battlefield
effectiveness, they should make us very skeptical about the causal logic normally used to
support this claim. At a minimum, the North Vietnamese and Iraqi cases suggest that the
lack of a liberal political culture does not present any inherent bar to military performance.
Ultimately, states that adopt best practices may not always win their wars, just as
states adopting worst practices may not always lose their wars. As mentioned, many factors
account for war outcomes. But the actual fighting effectiveness of the belligerents surely
matters as well, and understanding the nature of political intervention in the militaries of the
two sides goes a long way toward explaining not only war outcomes, but also why wars end
when they do, with what costs, and with what settlements.
States that adopt best practices can be expected to fight harder, resist longer, and
impose significantly higher costs on their adversaries than might otherwise be expected
based on an assessment of their material resources. Conversely, states that adopt worst
practices can be expected to collapse more quickly than traditional net assessments based on
order of battle data might predict. As a result, understanding the varying forms of political
intervention in the military and how these interventions shape effectiveness is crucial to both
the academic study of war duration, cost, and termination, and also to the practical
policymaking task of assessing fighting power-a topic to which the conclusion now turns.
Imp/li cations /or Foreign Policy
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Underpinning this study is the assumption that there exists a crucial distinction
between victory and effectiveness. While the academic study of warfare has often focused
simply on war outcomes, the manner in which outcomes are achieved is of vital concern to
policymakers. Simply knowing whether a war is likely to be won or not is important, but
more often those wielding the levers of the state seek to understand the potential costs of
victory. For example, the question preceding U.S. conventional military operations is rarely,
"Will this operation ultimately result in victory for the United States?" Given America's
overwhelming material power and the additional benefits it usually enjoys from working with
militarily strong allies, its ability to impose its will on weaker states by force is usually not in
question, at least if the objective is conventional military triumph. The real question is,
"What costs can potential opponents impose on the United States during the fight, even if
the United States still gets the eventual outcome it seeks?"
The findings here shed light on this question, illuminating a vital set of factors to be
analyzed in assessing potential adversaries. When facing opponents that adopt best practices,
the United States can expect military conflict to last longer, cost more, and impose great
casualties on the United States. America can also expect that by offering greater resistance,
such states may also gain a better final position in any settlement once the war is over, even
if such states still lose the war. For example, although the 1999 war for Kosovo is often
portrayed as a resounding defeat for Milosevic, the Serbian military's ability and willingness
to hold out for more than nine weeks-rather than the mere days NATO expected
arguably secured for Serbia several significant concessions compared to the deal it would
have achieved from the Rambouillet accords.' This outcome shows that when weak states
fight well, there are very real consequences for U.S. military operations and foreign policy.
Again, victory and effectiveness are distinct.
By contrast, when the United States faces adversaries that adopt worst practices, it
can expect rapid military collapse on the part of the adversary. Indeed, this is a vulnerability
that the United States may be able to exploit-but which also may set the stage for a major
security vacuum in the aftermath of a conventional military victory. Many would argue it was
this exact scenario that played out in 2003 in Iraq, for example.2 Had the United States
understood how brittle the Iraqi military actually was, it might have prepared for the post-
conflict environment differently, or it might have decided that military operations actually
were unnecessary to achieve its goals. At both extremes, a clear understanding of the nature
of political intervention in an adversary's military is essential to solid calculations about
whether to go to war, how to fight, and how to prepare for the aftermath.
This logic can also be seen if one extrapolates directly from the empirical cases
examined in this study. After all, two of the states examined-North Vietnam and Iraq-
actually fought wars against the United States. The contrast in the performance of these two
On expectations about the war and Serbia's likely performance, see Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon,
17innin [ly: NATO's W'ar to Save Kosovo (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p. 55; Elaine
Sciolino and Ethan Bronner, "How a President, Distracted by Scandal, Entered Balkan War," New York Times,
April 18, 1999, p. 1. On Serbian effectiveness, see Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Kosovo and the Continuing SEAD
Challenge," (Santa Monica, CA: RAND report RP-1018, 2002); Darrel Whitcomb, "The Night They Saved
Vega 31," Air Force Aaga inle, vol. 89, no. 2 (December 2006), pp. 70-74; and Andrew Stigler, "A Clear Victory
for Air Power: NATO's Empty Threat to Invade Kosovo," InternationalSecurity, vol. 27, no. 3 (winter 2002-03),
pp. 129-30. On Serbia's gains in the post-war settlement compared to Rambouillet, see Barn R. Posen, "The
War for Kosovo: Serbia's Political-Military Strategy," JIternationa/Seciuity, vol. 24, no. 4 (spring 2000), p. 79.
2 Kevin NI. Woods et al, Iraqi Perspectives Project: A Vien of Oper-ationi Iraqi Freedomf/-om Saddam's Senior li eaderis/j>
(Virginia: U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2006)
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relatively weak, authoritarian regimes against a materially superior, democratic adversary is
quite striking, yet it is highly consistent with what we would expect based on the theory.3 For
example, the best practices employed by the North Vietnamese enabled them to impose very
significant costs in terms of time, resources, and casualties on the United States. North
Vietnamese fighting effectiveness also clearly influenced the outcome of the conflict,
producing one of the few draws in recent American military history. By contrast, when the
Iraqis fought the United States in 1991 (and 2003), Saddam had reverted to worst practices,
which helps explain why the coalition managed to achieve conventional military victory so
rapidly and at such low costs in both cases, despite the large size of the Iraqi army and (in
1991) the excellent quality of many of its weapons.
The theory also bears on the question of effectiveness in the militaries of U.S.
coalition partners and allies. More and more, American military strategy calls for "building
partner capacity," that is, for bolstering the fighting effectiveness of other armies, particularly
the armies of non-democratic or nascent democratic states. 4 For example, the U.S. exit
strategies for both Iraq and Afghanistan rely heavily on the building of indigenous army and
police forces that can operate independently of the United States. Broader U.S. strategies in
both East Asia and the Middle East also depend on building or sustaining the military
effectiveness of allies such as South Korea, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Egypt. This is
also the U.S. approach to counterterrorism operations in places such as Yemen. The factors
identified in this study present an important set of indicators that U.S. policymakers should
therefore seek to examine and to influence in these countries.
It is worth noting, for example, that the other two countries examined in this
study-South Vietnam and Iran-both received enormous infusions of U.S. weapons and
military assistance just prior to or during the wars examined here. Saddam Hussein's regime
also received some indirect support and the provision of tactical intelligence. But the nature
of political intervention in the militaries of all three states greatly eroded the potential
battlefield value of these U.S. contributions. (Only in the Iraqi case, after the shift in
Saddam's political intervention late in the war, was the recipient of U.S. assistance actually
able to generate fighting power.) Indeed, the sheer scale of U.S. assistance to South Vietnam
and Iran under the Shah only underscores how important it is to look beyond purely material
factors in estimating the likely return on U.S. security assistance. If any regimes should have
been able to fight effectively purely through the provision of U.S. aid, surely South Vietnam
in the 1960s and Iran in the 1980s should have qualified. Yet their performances were poor,
largely because of political-military relations in the two societies.
These experiences suggest again the need to include the political intervention
variable in assessments of U.S. adversaries and allies. Furthermore, while the threat
perceptions that drive the adoption of leaders' intervention practices may be opaque, there
are good reasons to believe the actual forms of intervention themselves-states' policies
regarding promotion, training, command, and information management-can be visible to
policvmakers who wish to track them. Indeed, many of the U.S. documents cited in this
study suggest that U.S. intelligence agencies do in fact monitor political intervention in these
areas, although it is open to question whether the implications of these observations have
actually altered U.S. policy decisions.
A very useful comparison of the twvo countries' air defense efforts against the United States is Stephen Biddle
and Robert Zirkle, "Technology, Civil-Military Relations, and Warfare in the Developing World,"fJournal /
Vtrateic StuIdies, Vol. 19, No. 2 (1996), pp. 171-212.
4 Robert Gates, "Helping Others Defend Themselves," Vore/guAl/airc, vol. 89, no. 3 (May/June 2010), pp. 2-6.
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Areas for Further Research
While this study has tried to answer one set of questions, it has raised others.
Perhaps the most important of these is whether there is a systematic driver of leaders' threat
perceptions and therefore of the forms of political intervention they will choose to adopt.
The evidence presented here makes a strong case that these decisions are highly contingent,
and it was for this reason that the case studies focused most directly on the intervention
practices and their consequences. Still, this is an area that merits further research. Were it
possible to identify such a variable, it would constitute a powerful driver of military
effectiveness.
Related to this question, further research should more tightly establish the
connection between regime type and forms of political intervention. The general contention
here has been that democracies are much less likely to adopt worst practices, but that non-
democratic regimes display significant variation in their practices. Still, the research design of
this study prioritized understanding the consequences of political intervention rather than
the causes and did not established whether there is a systematic connection to regime type.
In other words, the fact that there was variation in political intervention among the non-
democratic states examined here does not tell us how frequent this variation is in the broader
universe of autocracies. Nor does it tell us whether the suspicion that democracies almost
never adopt worst practices is correct. It would be worthwhile to examine instances in which
variations in the forms of political intervention may have occurred in democratic states, such
as early post-Independence India or Republican France.
Additionally, it would be useful to code a larger universe of cases according their
political control mechanisms, to establish these connections with more certainty. This
exercise would not only open the path toward some quantitative tests of the argument, but it
would also allow us to the systematic drivers of differing forms of intervention, if they exist.
For example, it might be the case that highly legitimate regimes never adopt worst practices.
We would expect democracy and legitimacy to be highly positively correlated (though not
perfectly so), meaning that coding the adoption of forms of intervention according to regime
type could be informative and could also identify useful outliers-those exceptions that
might prove the rule. By the same token, we would expect autocracies to vary significantly in
their legitimacv, with some being quite legitimate and others much less so.
Legitimacy is a notoriously difficult variable to define and measure, but exploring the
distribution of political intervention across a broader universe of both democratic and non-
democratic cases, both quantitatively and qualitatively, might enable more confident
statements about its impact on effectiveness than those made possible by this study.
Additionally, any findings would help us further understand whether the mechanism driving
the apparent democratic effectiveness advantage actually stems from liberal political culture





FIGURE 1: HYPOTHESES ABOUT VARIATION IN BATTLEFIELD EFFECTIVENESS
HYPOTHESES




Economic * States with equal levels of wealth and economic development should * Little variation absent major No variation predicted.
Wealth produce armies with similar batdefield effectiveness. economic changes.
* States with greater wealth and economic development should produce * As countries become wealthier,
armies with greater battlefield effectiveness. they should perform better.
Demography - States with similar demography should produce armies with similar * Little variation absent major No variation predicted.
battlefield effectiveness. population changes.
0 States with larger populations should produce armies with greater
battlefield effectiveness.
External e States facing similar external threat environments should produce armies * Battlefield effectiveness should * No variation predicted,
Threat with similar battlefield effectiveness. vary with shifts in the external although units closer to the
e States facing the highest levels of external threat should produce armies threat environment. threat might be expected to
with the greatest battlefield effectiveness. perform better.
Regime Type e States with the same regime type should generate armies with equivalent * No variation absent change in No variation predicted.
battlefield effectiveness. regime type.
u More autocratic states should generall perform worse on the battlefield.
Culture, * States with similar cultural and societal traits should generate armies with *Little variation absent major No variation predicted.
Society equivalent battlefield effectiveness, changes in society and culture.
- States that possess a purportedly detrimental national characteristic (Arab
culture, internal divisions, lack of communal values) should demonstrate
lower battlefield effectiveness.
e States with similar levels of military autonomy or civilian control of the
military should perform similarly on the battlefield.
e Little variation absent shift in
the level of military autonomy
* No variation predicted.
* States whose leaders adopt similar forms of political int
military should generate similar levels of battlefield effe
e States that adopt best practices in political intervention
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MAP 4: ANOTHER VIEW OF THE BATTLE OF AP BAC, 1963. Map reproduced from:







MAP 5: THE BATTLE OF BINH GIA, 1964. Map reproduced from U.S. Army map
contained in Earle G. Wheeler, "Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Subject: Binh Gia
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MAP 10: THE CONTRACTION OF ARVN DEFENSIVE LINES IN MR-1, 1972. Map
reproduced from: Lt. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong, The Easter Offensive of 1972 (Washington,
DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980), p. 42.
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MAP 11: THE BATTLES AROUND KONTUM, 1972. Map reproduced from: Lt. Gen.
Ngo Quang Truong, The Easter Offensive of 1972 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of
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w-- -+ Iranian attacks
------ + Iraqi counterattacks
IJraqi frontlines, July 1982
- Tnternational bordcr
319
MAP 20: IRANIAN OFFENSIVES, 1983-1987. Map reproduced from: Steven R. Ward,
Immortak a Military History of Iran and Its Armed Forces (Washington, DC: Georgetown
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MAP 21: IRANIAN OFFENSIVES, 1986-7. Map reproduced from: Kenneth Pollack, Arabs
at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), p. 222.
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